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ABSTRACT
Rhetorical Theory and Criticism primarily features modes of close reading that
reconstructs the meaning of a text by constructing meaning through contingent textual moments
within a theoretical perspective, typically ideological criticism. The dominant mode of
ideological critique projects ideology as an anterior and universal cause; this projection strips
individual and group agency from within various systems by totalizing them under one system. I
strive to answer how we can preserve descriptive acuity while opening and exploiting contingent
gaps to make scholarship more efficacious for social justice. Chapter one explores the
inevitability of infinite regress in response to problems of vagueness endemic to the
philosophical enterprise. Chapter two explores Bergson’s Retrospective Illusion: strict modes of
ontological necessity in a transcendental reasoning pattern produce tautological ontologies in
which an effect becomes projected backwards as universal but, ultimately, illusory cause.
Chapter three maps out Bergson’s solution to the “Retrospective Illusion” and names it the
“Prospective Illusion.” In short, chains of sufficient reasoning are projected out towards
tendencies in becoming such that universals are always in construction and never fully actual.
Ontologies founded upon spatial necessity are replaced by a process ontology closely attuned to
scientific process that folds space and time topologically into tendential becoming. Chapter four
applies both illusions to rhetorical theory in its ideological and new materialist modes to argue
for the usefulness of both models in breaking rhetorical theory out of its tacit methodological
reliance upon reconstructive close reading and by re-evaluating some of rhetorical theory’s
ontological assumptions. The project concludes with prospective directions in methodology.
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PREFACE
It is my understanding that a preface is meant to give context to considerations too
personal for formal writing and the contextual exigences that impute the creation of the work.
The best prefaces are second prefaces written after a publication to situate a work in terms of its
historical significance in context. I doubt strongly that this work will ever merit such a preface.
However, this work strains the definition of a dissertation, and it comes from a strange and
stubborn source. This preface branches out in two directions: First, I will discuss the primary
exigences, the discipline named rhetoric, teaching the discipline named rhetoric, and teaching the
discipline named rhetoric after 2016 in the American context. Second, I will discuss the material
exigencies that help account for why this dissertation takes on such a range of disparate
philosophical source materials, even at the risk of textual messiness.
The first exigence might could be considered personal problem or boon depending on
who considers it. I have never been the person who can do a thing without having good reasons
to do it, a thorough understanding of why I have chosen how I am doing going to do it, and what
it means to do the thing. This personal problem was compounded by the almost random set of
occurrences that led me into academia and rhetoric. My undergraduate life saw the following
progression of majors: engineering aimed at biomedical engineering, public policy, psychology,
and, finally, English with an unfinished art minor after ten semesters of ceramics. Of course, I
applied to studio art graduate programs instead of English ones and, ironically given the
philosophical bent of this dissertation that had already manifested in my undergraduate English
work, I was turned down because my ceramics portfolio was “insufficiently conceptual.” I
applied to the communications department at Georgia State because my father said I should have
a backup plan and they admitted me for some obscure reason dealing with my writing sample.
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An outsider wary of a new inside, I spent all my masters and much of my PhD trying to figure
out precisely what it means to study rhetoric and do rhetoric as someone who has struggled to
ever do a single thing with unity of purpose and specificity ever.
My coursework in rhetorical theory did not aid this confusion nor did it discipline me
adequately. As noted, this lack of discipline may be more my fault than my teachers’, but I think
there is another cause here that runs deeper in the discipline. Seminar after seminar we would
read through debates about what it meant to do rhetorical theory and or criticism. On the one
hand, I flourished in the utter ambiguity of what it means to do rhetoric and got to do a great
many things more restrictive understandings of rhetoric would not consider rhetoric. On the other
hand, the multitude of theoretical turns and constant disciplinary introspection frustrated and
frustrates me deeply. The turns seem to me to be a way to maintain the production necessary for
promotion under the duress of academia's political economy and an age in which everything
must be quantified under the regime of so-called neoliberalism. Rhetorical theory tends to find
some new branch of continental philosophy or a new branch emerges – an example is, the
nascent return to realism across several new classifications, including thing theory and new
materialism – and they reevaluate old rhetorical concepts through these new philosophical
structures.
Then rhetorical critics craft heuristic tools from these theory pieces. Famous texts that
have already been thoroughly worked get worked more. This is not necessarily bad, as producing
new readings from within a new historical context and theoretical understanding generates new
meanings, but it also can produce cookie cutter type criticism. Theory X says we will find Y in
object type Z and my specific text fits the pattern. Alternatively, new theory opens a new field of
objects for study. The new objects are criticized through the new theory and are then criticized
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through old theory such that a bloom of new work appears. When it works best, applying the
rhetorical theoretical concepts to objects not immediately presenting as rhetorical can produce
novel meanings about the world around us. Otherwise, the readings can be a reach. The best
work in both tendencies finds the messy excess of actual expression and uses it to push back
against generalized ways of reading so that they must be revised, but I do not often find work
that reaches this aspiration. Meanwhile, as these endless “turns” obscures two potentials that,
were they to manifest, could conceivably be labeled a turn towards methodology or
interdisciplinarity.
The humanities and social sciences, broadly conceived, appear inefficient and inexact to
me. I remember sitting in on one of GSU’s new hire’s “meet the students” sessions. The
candidate does health communication research from a quantitatively oriented content analysis
and big data perspective to study how health communication works online. There was an
awkward moment when the group heard I was from the rhetoric side of the department. I was
asked, quite candidly and from a place of curiosity, something to the effect of: “I remember
rhetoricians at my old university. I never quite figured out what you all do.” Another rhetorician
in the room sat there, unresponsive I expect, because it is normal to be unsure and anxious when
asked to explain what we do. So, I responded: “You know the normal curve? You use quant
methods to crunch the big part in the middle. We use qual methods, namely close reading, to
figure out what the wild outliers off to the side can tell us about the whole.” Despite the limits
on that analogy, I found it a bit surreal when both a health communication professor and the
rhetorician student looked at each other, looked at me, and said “Oh, yeah, that makes sense.”
It seems to me the communication discipline’s inherent interdisciplinary potentials are
not being fully utilized, in the particular sense that we lack a sufficient body of work that reveals
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how different methodologies are tangibly effective in deploying a range of readings,
collaboratively undertaken, to comprehensively map out a system or set of phenomena. Put
differently, we all read groups like the Frankfurt, Birmingham, or Chicago groups approvingly
but rarely forge our own beyond strings of coauthors working within a single theoreticalmethodological framework. I hope this work brings us close to this potential and helps me find
ways to be a part of larger working groups.
Considering rhetoric’s efficacy as a part of a broader commitment to, or project aimed at
enhancing, social justice reveals a second exigency of this project: a moment of epiphany I
experienced while trying and perhaps failing in teaching an undergraduate section of rhetorical
theory and criticism, in a unit focused on stirring ideological critique. I view ideological critique
as the dominant theoretical orientation behind most rhetorical theory and criticism produced in
the last twenty years, particularly analyses that invoke the dreaded and omnipotent idea of neoliberalism. This is an important issue to take up with students, especially those with shorter
lifespans, because there is a reason reactionary forces so fully despise higher education. As we
talked, my students more or less understood the false consciousness idea; they got some notions
of how discourse can embody power and social norms; they saw how repressive state
apparatuses enforce these ideological norms. In a seminar reflecting Georgia State University’s
demographic diversity, I wasn’t teaching them anything they have not personally experienced in
a variety of ways. What they did not see strikes me as more important: they did not see the utility
of ideological critique.
This gap led to a classroom moment that I believe will haunt me until I die. We had
finished working through the canonical series of rhetorical theory texts on ideological critique,
ending on excerpts from McKerrow’s “Critical Rhetoric.” One of my particularly bright students
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raised their hand and asked something like: “if the system is going to win anyway, what's the
point?” I was taken aback. I had read any number of rhetorical theory texts justifying the case for
making ethical judgments in the process of rhetorical criticism; I had read competing accounts
attending to how we should theorize ideology and its relationship to rhetoric; I had readmany
case studies in which the ideological structure of one or another discourse was laid bare to reveal
power oppressing the oppressed. I had not read many success stories outside of some of the more
ethnographically inflected work; I just read analyses of social problems primarily read by other
academics analyzing the problem.
The story, perhaps, merely indicates that I was not teaching the right stuff or teaching
well. Maybe my own investigation of ideological critique was inadequate. Or, at some level, the
story and the student’s poignant question indicates that not all is right with how some portions of
academia attempt to do social change. The moment led me to start thinking multimethodologically in ways that would empower myself and my students, so they don’t end up
stuck in an infinite regress of negative critique. I have never believed the line between biography
and historical context and philosophy or theory to be as robust as we all like to believe in the
wake of the linguistic turn’s murder of the author. Certainly, biographical and historical
reductionism should be avoided, but we typically do not sunder the texts we analyze from their
contexts. Why should we do so with more abstract work?
The 2016 election, the paucity of effective leftist organizing, the rhizomatic Black Lives
Matter movements, my encounter with academic Leftists at Emory, and the Covid pandemic all
live in this dissertation. Much of my anger in response to these exigences has faded as survival in
the face of disability have drained my capacities, but my will and resolve to do something about
these problems has not. In a sense, this work is a prolegomenon to my career. The obsessive
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concern I display in what follows with infinite regress, problems of vagueness, and process
ontology are not detached theoretical concerns but arise from reckoning with identity in America
and the diffractive cross patterns of inclusion and exclusion across multiple registers. It seems to
me that there are two broad tasks for a more progressive politics: to find ways to work through
the fissures between oppressed groups to increase solidarity and to pressure the fault lines in the
ever-shifting borders of hegemony. This work does not get there explicitly, but these
considerations should be considered an introduction to work to come.
Finally, the influence of my health on this project should not be ignored. The summer
before I started doctoral studies a femur cam shaft deformity tore through the labrum in my hip.
Bodies, what well organized and flawless things, right? This led to misdiagnosis and painful
physical therapy, PT becomes painful when it is not actually working on what needs to be
worked on, until new health insurance provided me access to Emory Hospital orthopedists who
promptly arranged a surgery to get my hip back into functionality. The problem worsened as I
navigated down that path: other joints began hurting bilaterally. Finally, in 2020, at the end of
the fourth year of my Ph.D. program, I was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. The first line
treatments for fibromyalgia involve SSRI SNRI combo medications and these landed me in the
emergency room, sometimes out of my mind. Neurotypical brains don’t react in this way and
these events led to a bipolar type II diagnosis. Suddenly, my more insane moments, terrible life
choices, and tendency towards delirium made sense. It is only three months ago, as I sit here
writing this in October 2021, that medications began to mitigate both the fibromyalgia symptoms
and the bipolar excesses. I am thankful for that.
What does this self-disclosure mean for the project below? Primarily, and I do not say
this facetiously, if it seems as though the dissertation was written by several different people, that

xvii
is because it was. I have a pain dimension with a quantitative gradient and a mental state
Borromean Knot with the three states, bipolar has always been a misnomer, that oscillate
between tendencies towards depression, irritability, and hypomania. I imagine anyone who
knows me well enough may be able to tell which alignment of Micah wrote which of the
following sections, even through editing or through noting when I use “we” to refer to my selves
and when I use I. I hope this disclosure dispels potential confusion about the winding and
somewhat wild texture of the text below.

1

INTRODUCTION
My comportment towards rhetorical theory, philosophical metaphysics, and the recent
intersection of the two can be reduced in allegorical fashion to a children’s show named
Adventure Time. Episode twenty-six of season five is called “Wizard’s Only, Fools” and follows
a scientifically inclined character named Princess Bubblegum on a journey to a city populated by
bizarre, even by the standards of adult television, wizards. As a scientist, Princess Bubblegum
sees magic as best understood naturalistically, and she resents one of her subjects refusing
medication for the common cold, insisting he needs a cold potion in line with his religious
beliefs. The following exchange happens between Princess Bubblegum and a potion seller in the
wizard city:
Wizard: This baby right here, right here, this… is what you WANT… brothers!
Princess Bubblegum: How’s it work?
Wizard: It works by magic… It’s a spell.
Princess Bubblegum with increasing frustration: What? I’m curious… So, what’s in it?
Wizard mirroring her frustration: It’s my secret brew, dog!
Princess Bubblegum: So you want to sell me a product with no information?
Wizard menacingly: It’s a cold spell.
Princess Bubblegum intensely menacing: MADE FROM WHAT.
Wizard: MAAAAGIC
Princess Bubblegum: WHATS THE MAGIC MADE OUT OF, DING DONG. 1
In a reductive sense, this theoretical thrust of this entire project can be summed up by the
analogous line: “WHATS THE METAPHYSICS MADE OUT OF, DING DONG.”
1

Adventure Time, “Wizards Only, Fools,” 5:26-5:54
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The new proliferation of metaphysical and ontological modes of realist philosophy,
despite tending to different conclusions, are established by logical warrants and argumentative
structures that supposedly account for the ontical capacities, as opposed to ontic materializations,
of all beings – or becomings. While such positions can seem straightforwardly compelling, I am
not so convinced. I believe much in realist philosophy is constructed out of various modes of
logic beyond the necessity of expressing thought through speech or writing. These accounts end
up implicitly relying on the notion that the universe is an ordered place beyond the provisional
and contingent order that interests us humans. If such a reading is correct, it should trouble
disciplinary accounts that typically see themselves dedicated to, or even founded on, an
ontological commitment to contingency.
Two strands of the return to ontology, I argue, can help specify a naturalist response to
the return to ontology (and without recourse to a vulgar materialism in which the parts
automatically account for the properties of a whole): a re-working of the materialist
interpretation of Deleuze performed by Manuel DeLanda and the philosophy-physics of Karen
Barad. DeLanda defends a sociological materialism against two problematic tendencies: “microreductionism…reduction to a mere aggregate of many rational decision makers…” and “macroreductionism, as when one rejects the rational actors…in favor of society as a whole, a society
that fully determines the nature of its members.” 2 These two constructs function as strawpersons; that is, no theorist of society fully fits either tendency when one dives into the weeds of
their work. DeLanda does not always provide discrete examples of either mode. Still, the broad
orientations he names are useful in identifying tendencies that never obtain in a pure sense but
can still be used to describe bodies of work. For example, early to mid-Habermas exhibits some

2

Manuel DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 9-10. Italics removed.
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tendencies towards micro-reductionism given his early tendency to center deliberative processes
around rational actors. Or Niklas Luhmann and his accounts of systems theory, which tend to
explain social phenomena at mid and lower scales as epiphenomena of giant social systems that
are rarely if ever affected by individual agents. This reductionism in both theorists is undone, at
least in some measure, by their later work, especially in Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms
and as Luhman’s moves into dynamic systems theory obtains.
The distinction between macro and micro-reductionism can assist rhetorical theorists
thinking about analogous problems, such as the relationship between individual subjectivity, its
individuation at the micro level, and its structural determination through ideology at the macrolevel. Foregrounded in such frameworks are the problematic accounts often offered of causality,
emergence, and scale. Any well-constructed rhetorical theory must acknowledge that parts have
effects on wholes and can belong to many different wholes at the same time. And meanwhile,
larger scale social organizations do exert some amount of top-down causal force evinced, in part,
by their ability to persist despite environmental and internal pressure. The work of Henri
Bergson, Gilles Deleuze’s various manifestations both alone and in combination with Felix
Guattari, and Manual DeLanda’s work can thus help rhetorical theory achieve a fuller
understanding of agency while preserving a plausible ontological contingency that functions as a
necessary condition of rhetoric, at least to an extent.
In what follows, I examine the benefits for rhetorical theory of engaging this literature,
while also trying to sustain what I argue is a well justified sense of caution. Any New Materialist
rhetorical theory, that is, must be wary of the New Materialism they claim: Deleuze and
DeLanda both, at times, posit the existence of entities like “the plane of consistency” or
Bergsonian Duration as temporal Absolute that introduce purely metaphysical entities in their
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laudable attempts to escape the problems they position as inherent to representation in
philosophy.
A naturalist account, offered in combination with Karen Barad’s philosophy-physics
fulfills a vital conceptual role in this project for both the close reading of recent New Materialist
research, with necessary attention to the role of logic and Absolutes, and a commitment to
rethinking criticism considering the elements of New Materialism that we take on. On the
theoretical side, naturalism “entails rejecting the distinction between empirical and a priori
truths, where the a priori truths are those that are known independently of experience and
immune to revision in the light of it.” 3 Naturalism requires experimental verification but does not
disallow a speculative bent to the theories that guide future experimentation. Models are
warranted, even those that make metaphysical arguments, but treating these structures as real
without empirical verification is not. The question remains one of how we justify the inferences
our minds make through patterns logical and mathematical.
One might think such a conclusion obvious, and philosophy has been performing this
maneuver (to offer knowledge claims but then also to interrogate them against the available
natural evidence) for a long time even while claiming access to universal truths. Philosophy and
science were not exactly separable in the classic period: Aristotle does biology as much as he
does ethics. Even as disciplinary specialization picks up, a relationship between philosophy and
science persists. Big breaks in science can be correlated to big breaks in philosophy. Kant reacts
to Newtonian physics and calculus by positing time and space as eternal containers; Bergson
reacts to Darwin and Einstein with a kind of panpsychism that treats different beings as temporal
durations that evolve as part of an open system; Deleuze, in many ways, reacts to Paul Dirac’s
Michael D. Resnik, “Quine and the Web of Belief” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and
Logic, 416.
3

5
Quantum Field Theory by positing an immanent dialetheic virtuality in which the entire universe
shares a monistic fabric of self-differencing difference. And so on. Positing theoretical constructs
that exceed falsifiability can assist human understanding but granting ontological priority to the
model’s logical validity through argument and not empirical, i.e., not replicable nor falsifiable,
experiments problematically commits to what I will later name the “Retrospective Illusion” (RI),
a move influenced by following Jankèlèvich’s reading of Bergson.
To connect the philosophical accounts I’m naming with the everyday theorizing work of
rhetorical studies, I want to claim that a conceptual re-orientation towards naturalism requires a
re-evaluation of the relationships between rhetorical theory in constitutive rhetoric and new
materialism with regards to the modelling excesses of the philosophical systems they rely upon
and an expansion of methodologies and interdisciplinary work to provide greater empirical
acuity through diverse measuring apparatuses. Putting it differently: working with reified
concepts as retrospective totalities like “rhetoricity,” ideology, subjectivity, energy, and the
virtual as Absolutes guiding rhetorical criticism through retrospective close reading in which
textual elements are inferred as symptoms of deeper causes by matching up theory-context-text
is a practice must be challenged.
The details of both the RI and the Prospective Illusion (PI) will receive detailed attention
in chapters two and three respectively. In short, a RI happens when a thinker deploys a universal
conception or categorical term, like ideology, and projects it back as the anterior cause of its
specific historical individuations, their ramifications, and further self-differencing. This process
relies upon transcendental reasoning in the mode of necessity: it is necessary for universal X to
exist to explain the logical conditions required for things Y, X, and what have you. In such a
configuration, universal X tends to function as an Absolute and runs into the problems associated
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with Absolutes, namely Sorites and Liar’s Paradoxes, a problem given greater attention in
chapter one. The universal X also runs into the problems mapped out in Deleuze: the category
does not adequately explain the phenomena in question but must have its own emergence
explained by tracing its genesis through both things itself and not itself. Categories can help us
compare and establish quantitative gradients between items in their set, but they do not
necessarily grant us any agency living within the empirical world and run the risk of obscuring
useful difference under similar characteristics.
To establish the problem more clearly, consider two different reasons these Absolutes are
problematic for the analysis of social phenomena and where we can find these kinds of
categorical Absolutes beyond discrete individuation in rhetorical theory. Latour’s work on
society as totalized reification can be extended relatively simply to various rhetorical totalities:
“…it’s crucial not to conflate all the agencies overtaking the action into some kind of agency —
‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘structure’, ‘fields’, ‘individuals’, or whatever name they are given — that
would itself be the social…we should begin… not from…” these kinds of reified totalities as
anterior causes “but rather the underdetermination of action.” 4 Or, in simpler terms: when we
start with a theoretical construct like ideology and then analyze some set of social “texts” broadly
conceived, an analytic cookie cutter situation can result. The critic finds precisely what they
thought would be found because the critical gesture failed to begin with the speech itself as free
from assumptions as possible. Instead, the critic reads the speech as the apparent manifestation of
a hidden cause: “…social forces play the complicated role of being simultaneously what has to
be postulated to explain everything and what, for many reasons, has to remain invisible.” 5
Ideological critique provides a clean example of this problem because it, and the constitutive
4
5

Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory, 45. Italics Removed.
Ibid, 102.
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rhetoric derived from various theorizations of ideology, revert into an infinite regress where each
determination of ideology through analysis always already belies just another deeper
ideologically mystified structure.
One ends up with ideology read “all the way down” in a retrospective mode when it may
be better to follow something like Latour’s solution: “We simply have to make sure that their
diversity is not prematurely closed by one hegemonic version of one kind of matter of fact
claiming to be what is present in experience…” 6 For Latour, this proper inoculant is Actor
Network Theory and the enumeration of specific agencies that map out networks that account for
social asymmetry through controversy and underdetermination, among other things. I construct
an alternative solution, by reading Deleuze and DeLanda to both clarify and complicate recent
New Materialist rhetorical theories. This reading results in a prospective orientation towards both
the emergent genesis of a discrete individuated rhetoric and the development of cartographic
tools able to better map events and topological invariants characteristic of rhetorical becoming.
In a sense, all we do here is return to the synchronic vs. diachronic question and attempt to put it
on a different philosophical footing to argue that methodological pluralism and an attention to
the problematic over the categorical can provide rhetorical studies with greater tools to make
scholarship an active, as opposed to reactive, social force.
DeLanda makes an analogous critique of various Marxist totalities that derive from
classical Marxist commitments to versions of historical determinism: “Much of the academic left
today has become prey to the double danger of politically targeting reified generalities (Power,
Resistance, Capitalism, Labour) while at the same time abandoning realism. A new left may yet
emerge…if it focuses its efforts at the right social scale…if it leaves behind the dream of a

6
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Revolution…” 7 To DeLanda’s list one might add other Marxist reifications favored in rhetorical
theory, such as ideology and subjectivity. DeLanda’s solution with regards to “Capitalism”
employs Fernand Braudel’s distinction between “market economy” and “capitalism”; in such a
distinction no economic system as Absolute obtains because economic-governmental-ideological
and other interpretive motifs function as discrete individuations and assemblages better analyzed
and intervened against at the scale of organization. 8
Alongside Latour, DeLanda suggests that critics start at the middle level, aiming first to
account for the discrete and historically contingent individuation of empirical social
organizations, without recourse to some deeper level of social being that necessarily accounts for
the population of all social organizations. Any other intervention against an invisible historical
Absolute like ideology appears hopeless because it is hopeless; you cannot hope to out theorize a
concept that you have made into a spectral god. Interventions made against individuated
organizations populated by human beings invariably reveal uncertainties in how organizations
interact across scale and within the ecosystem populated by other organizations: hegemony, or
the association of dominant assemblages in many social organizations, itself becomes less an
anterior force or re-produced product and more a system of production or process that can be
attacked at both junctures of over and under determination.
We will evaluate the conceptual apparatus through which this shift operates at a deeper
argumentative and ontological level in chapters three and four, but the connection to rhetorical
theory can be previewed here: constitutive rhetoric’s subjectivity and ideology and new
materialist rhetoric’s rhetoricity, energy, and version of Deleuzian virtuality all commit
rhetorical critics to reified totalities that hamstring social efficacy because they reduce the
7
8
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genesis of qualitative diversity to that of a gradient of quantitative and metric differences. This
problem will be investigated deeply with constitutive rhetoric and the kind of new materialist
rhetoric expressed most clearly by Diane Davis and Thomas Rickert in chapter four. I do not deal
with energy nor virtuality at length in this project, but the critique holds for them as well through
analogic extension.
When rhetorical theorists reduce rhetoric to a reified generality like rhetoricity, energy,
and so on, the qualitative genesis of discrete individuations of rhetorical systems becomes
obscured by the act of generalization. Rhetorics are transmuted into quantitively different
manifestations of some fundamental thing that constitutes rhetoric or provides its necessary
condition of possibility: all rhetoric can be said to be energy but we do not, from this literature,
get great information about how different specific energies vary qualitatively, nor what the stakes
for critical judgement might be given such an insight. Rhetoric becomes an oddly comparative
venture: differences in quality are subsumed under identity under category. Disciplinary
practitioners engage in a strange kind of rhetorical imperialism, where different individuated
disciplinary fields in academia are secretly rhetorical simply because they involve contingency or
relationality. Whether their secret rhetorical status, once revealed, affords us analytic and
creative tools will be taken up extensively in chapter four.
No quote more clearly reveals this tendency in New Materialist rhetorical theory than the
following from Scot Barnett and Casey Boyle: “…we take ontology to be fundamentally
rhetorical…We thus take ontology to be the pervasive relationality of all things — the means by
which things come into relation and have effects on other things that resonate strongly with
existing and emerging understandings of rhetoric.” 9 Because rhetoric deals with relationality and
Scot Barnett and Casey Boyle, “Introduction: Rhetorical Ontology, or, How to Do Things with Things” in Rhetoric
Through Everyday Things, 8-9. Italics in Original.
9
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contingency, and many strands of the return to ontology focus on relationality and the contingent
emergence beyond deterministic physics, it must thus follow that ontology is “fundamentally
rhetorical.” What reified universal term occupies this status as “fundamentally rhetorical” varies
in the literature. Diane Davis works through Derrida to produce “rhetoricity” or “an irreducible
and…irreducibly rhetorical ‘text’ that structures the living on…of ‘life itself,’” 10 a rendition
meaning that “Rhetoric is not first of all an essence or property ‘in the speaker’… but an
underivable obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality.” 11 “Rhetoricity,”
then functions like other reified totalities (e.g., “ideology)” by serving as an always anterior and
spectral condition that somehow opens the ontological and totalizing potential for rhetoric, by
constructing relationality, and by extension rhetoric, not as conceptual category but as
fundamental to the universe.
Many rhetorical studies texts 12 follow the same pattern with substitutions – “energy” or
“force” that derive from or at least resemble George Kennedy’s speculations: “Rhetoric in the
most general sense may perhaps be identified with the energy inherent in communication…one
might even seek to identify some quantitative unit of rhetorical energy…by which rhetorical
energy could be measured.” 13 This rhetoric-as-energy “is prior to speech” as a necessary
cosmological condition, 14 which is then conceptually and speculatively expanded into a rhetoric
of “subatomic particles,” 15 that provides “some universal rules of the rhetorical code.” 16

Diane Davis, “Rhetoricity at the End of the World,” 432.
Davis, “Creaturely Rhetorics,” 89.
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See the following: Catherine Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the
Overdetermination of Affective Energy,” 7-8; Amanda Nell Edgar, “The Rhetoric of Auscultation: Corporeal
Sounds, Mediated Bodies, and Abortion Rights,” 351; Debra Hawhee, “Rhetoric’s Sensorium,” 13; Byron Hawk,
“Sound: Resonance as Rhetorical,” 322; Chris Ingraham, “Energy: Rhetoric’s Vitality,” 260; Ehren Helmut
Pflugfelder, “Rhetoric’s New Materialism: From Micro-Rhetoric to Microbrew,” 446.
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It is to Kennedy’s credit that he stops short of the problems of the Absolute that beset
universal categorical constructs: “Research on the forms of rhetoric in nature can be a first step
toward a theory of general rhetoric and a comprehensive history of its development…what is
seen among animals is only analogous to features of human rhetoric, not its direct sources.” 17
Despite this, Kennedy’s formulation is a cautionary tale. An account of rhetoric as a
manifestation of fundamental and universally cosmic energy clearly carries the baggage of the
always anterior rhetoric as rhetoricity introduced above. Rhetoric is reduced to energy, and this
becomes a universalized declaration; this universal energy picks up a cosmological quantitative
gradient, and analysis of discrete and individuated rhetorics becomes difficult to do because they
will only ever be epiphenomenal of some deeper reality that has already been named. And yet
Kennedy appears to snap back against this construal at the end of the essay and proposes a
significance argument that, for us, directly implicates a kind of Deleuzian “Transcendental
Empiricism.” Rhetoric as energy, in Kennedy’s final rendition, is revealed as an illusory though
productive starting point for analyzing the specific emergence of qualitatively different historical
individuals and the differences in kind arising across different rhetorical intensities. Animal and
human rhetorics share a common condition of potential emergence, but overdetermine their
quality underneath a category can obscure the very distinctions that make their emergence
meaningful.
Both rhetoric-as-energy and New Materialist rhetorical theory (e.g., following the work
of Diane Davis) have been criticized for their lack of attention to qualitative differences and the
reduction of rhetoric to ever more reified and cosmically fundamental categories that always
commit the critic to a strategy of withdrawal from the object of analysis. Liska criticizes

17
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Kennedy: “…I believe that his characterization of rhetoric as ‘an energy existing in life,’…is far
too broad to be conceptually useful…” 18 because not “all definitions are created equal: critical
assessment of their utility and/or heuristic value is essential in the development of theory.” 19
Carolyn Miller offers a similar critique, although her understanding of the potentials of Actor
Network Theory are off: “Rhetoric, like sociology, is interested in associations…A rhetorician,
however, wants to know something about the nature and quality of these associations…” 20 She
finds Latour insufficient to these ends, despite (and this is where I believe her reading goes
astray) Reassembling the Social having plenty to say about ambiguity, underdetermination, and
asymmetry in networks that can be adapted to providing qualitative descriptions of discrete
individuals with relatively little supplementation. Regardless of quibbling about Latour, both
Liska and Miller point directly at the problem with reifying categorical and conceptual universals
or abstractions: they do not provide us with sufficient theoretical resources to account for the
genesis of a given assemblage, its qualitative tendencies in a local sense, nor the various
transformations it may undergo while maintaining recognizably spatial and temporal coherence.
Kennedy right that studying animal rhetorics could provide useful insights to the genesis of
human rhetoric in a nondeterminative sense and may be worth studying alongside biologists. In
this mode, neither rhetoric nor biology can sufficiently pose the problem of communication in
their own disciplinary terms. Cooperation and interdisciplinary work become necessary.
However, reducing all phenomena to manifestations of an essential cosmological scale rhetoric
does not help us to analyze their qualitative differences and, in this incapacity, cannot fully effect
socially efficacious change on the issues pressing human agents, racism and so on, nor
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necessarily the climate change that affects many processes human and otherwise on this planet.
Essentializing rhetoric to push against anthropocentrism may function as a necessary preface to
future work (after all, part of the impetus of this work is to problematize it), but I do not believe
it sufficient on its own.
What we need, then, is a New Materialist conception of rhetorical theory that takes
reified generalities, categories, and concepts to task through a thoroughgoing naturalism that can
both remove metaphysical content from New Materialist theories and suggest novel
methodologies beyond reconstructive close reading as approaches more suited to understanding
both emergent genesis and qualitative differentiation in a process ontological framework
applicable to both human and nonhuman systems. Gilles Deleuze’s work and its uptake by
Manual DeLanda are integral here because they provide highly rigorous philosophical
conceptualizations of the relationship between science, philosophy, and mathematics, and their
research is taken seriously as providing the conceptual foundation for many contemporary New
Materialists. Yet, as a precise argumentative critique will reveal, their variety of “transcendental
empiricism” harbors the very same tendencies towards reified universals that they claim to
escape, especially in any formulation of the virtual register that functions within a logic of the set
of all sets. This metaphysical tendency towards the Absolute must be dealt with through
naturalistic inquiry before other lessons from these philosophers can be leveraged in untangling
the various anterior and universal structures that find their ways into rhetorical theory. Chapters
three and four are largely dedicated to this task.
Advocating a rhetorical naturalism appears counter-intuitive to both the sophistic and
constitutive bents that permeate rhetorical theory with a thoroughgoing subjective relativism.
Broadly conceived, rhetorical theorists typically position themselves as hostile towards some
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construction of scientism. The legitimacy and diverse specificity of these constructions exceeds
the scope I can handle, but two renounced orientations continue broadly to shape rhetorical
studies, both of which incline to anxiety about the possibility of objective knowledge. First,
many scholars critique Enlightenment Rationalism in which the cosmos has a determinant order
that can be uncovered through scientific methodologies through the erasure of subjective
influence by objective methodologies. These critiques generally invoke Descartes’ Meditations,
the Port Royal school of logic that sundered all things logical from the rhetorical canon from
Aristotle, or something similar in which disagreement indicates an epistemological lack in the
face of a deistic cosmos. Contingency and probable knowledge, those sacred elements of
classical rhetorical theory, become fleeting illusions better left to their eventual resolution by
what passed for the scientific method back then.
Second, scholars critique Positivism in which mathematical or scientific models do not
describe reality but give up reality’s essential characteristics and eliminate subjective bias
through rigorous experimental or mathematical apparatuses and a distinct lack of theoretical
speculation on the meaning of the models. Positivism, perhaps more than Rationalism, strikes
directly at the heart of the critical enterprise: objective data should be quantifiable, and the
quantitative models should provide predictive acuity. Control through prediction becomes the
primary goal of human thought and more traditionally rhetorical practices like meaning making
or exploring relativistic perspectives are marginalized.
The rhetorical theorist’s response to these perceived threats throws Thomas S. Kuhn’s
Structure of Scientific Revolutions or some postmodern text about perspectivism and the
inescapability of language at “objective” knowledge in favor of a more perspectival mode of
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rhetorical criticism 21 or a more constructivist take on science itself. 22 In a highly reductive mode:
scientists are humans and scientific process involves groups; humans and human groups have to
use language to communicate in experimental process and to deliver the results of experiments;
therefore, science itself cannot escape the epistemological relativity inherent in the linguistic
enterprise. Sometimes these critiques work through scientific controversy to hammer down on
this point; sometimes the critiques marshal the results of bad science that is revealed to have
reproduced bias baked into study design. Subjectivity, meaning, and perspective end up opposed,
in this staging, to objectivity, data, and methodology in order to save the pertinence of
humanistic inquiry. But I am not always sure of whether the epistemological limitations in
quantum mechanics nor bad science should truly warrant the justification of humanistic
enterprise in a relativistic way that relies heavily upon reconstructive close reading to accomplish
its work. After all, rhetorical theory and criticism comported towards social change does want to
predict and exert influence on different social organizations. Otherwise, why would we do it?
Some scholars committed to the ideological turn appear aware of these problems.
Brummett provides a more measured approach by arguing for both “experimentalism” and more
“holistic” modes of inquiry: “More important than the experimental focus which produces data is
the organizing and guiding perspective which interprets that data.” 23 Rhetorical theorists should
provide “holistic” takes that attempt to integrate data produced by “isolation” in experimental
apparatuses 24 and, presumably, vice versa. Rhetorical methodologies attempt to see how
experimental analyses generalize into larger contexts; experimental methodologies attempt to test
these generalizations, so forth and so on in an infinite machine. The problem with this construal
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comes down to what we mean by “experimental methodologies.” Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar
presents an astute take by analyzing several well-regarded nodes in the progression of how
rhetorical theorists conceptualize critical practice to conclude: “From Wichelns to McGee, the
object gradually recedes and finally disintegrates into fragments. But even as it recedes and
disintegrates, object continues to hold the method captive.” 25 In this sense, the opposition
between ideological critique epitomized by Michael Calvin McGee and the close textual analysis
advocated by Michael Leff dissolve because, for both, methodological questions are reduced to
the matter of how best to ascertain the object of rhetorical criticism, to determine which theory
should be used to criticize these objects, and to do so while tacitly relying on reconstructive close
reading as the ur-methodology of rhetorical criticism. 26 Regardless of our theoretical outlook or
how we construe the significance of the critical act, rhetorical critics largely, with some
progressive and activist-ethnography scholars serving as exceptions to the rule, hold ourselves in
bondage to a method of reconstructive close reading in which textual elements evince deeper
structures that only leave traces in whatever rhetorical object we analyze.
Little wonder then, as Appendix I and chapter four demonstrate, that the significance
sections of publications in rhetorical criticism betray that the authors rarely feel as though they
have done the work they set out to do when all they have found is that the overbearing neoliberal or other ideology they knew was at work in the text even before it was engaged, ends up
giving up the textual effects predicted all along! This mode of critique is not wholly without
value – for example, it might make Republicans and some Democrats nervous by documenting
the myriad patterns of oppression – but it derives from our field’s not-so-secret reliance on
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hidden entities and, I argue, must be aided by a naturalistic comportment towards both
methodology and theory.
Experimental apparatuses discursive and material are capable of measuring reality and
breaking away from a primary focus on reconstructive close reading if critics are open to a more
expansive set of social scientific and artistic methodologies that facilitate an escape from always
anterior causality. Hidden causes must either be measured and acted upon or discarded; we must
be extremely careful with rhetorical theory by attending to how our conceptualizations of the
underlying philosophy (and these philosophies themselves) break from naturalistic norms by
positing hidden entities that rely upon logical existence criteria instead of empirical ones. A
revised New Materialist philosophy, rewritten to embrace a naturalistic set of truth criteria, can
help justify methodological pluralism in this way, but only if the genesis of New Materialism in
the work of Gilles Deleuze can be freed from its lurking insistence upon a strange mode of
Platonic Idealism.
To put the argument in a critical register: the point of socially efficacious rhetorical
criticism is control through prediction and effect through intervention, and an expanded sense of
methodological pluralism will help us undertake this work more powerfully. Reconstructive
close reading need not be removed from the methodological repertoire of rhetorical studies, but
contextualized as one among many methods and one suited to explaining the divergent features
of the singular instead of the recurring of the ordinairy. Let us take metaphysical fictive
categories, like ideology, as useful modelling functions that stall out the infinite regress of
retrospective analysis seriously for a moment. Different rhetorical criticisms of specific texts
map out how this spectral and anterior cause manifests; new texts and events in culture build
upon or complicate the model, but we know what to expect and the typical pattern of criticism is
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reasserted through the diachronic and discipline reproducing assumptions of the field itself. We
may wrap this thing up in terms of meaning making or the constitution of subjectivity, but the
implication that a similar rhetoric given similar contingencies through a similar context function
strongly. The whole point of finding exemplary objects that break with the pattern justifies the
existence of the predictive bent of the field! Why not own it? Let us move away from slow and
relatively microscopic methodologies into more robust ways of mapping the singular and
ordinary sets of speech and rhetorical objects.
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CHAPTER I: INFINITE REGRESS AND ARGUMENTATIVE WARRANTS
It may be helpful to clarify at the start that I do not find rhetorical theory different from
philosophy, nor philosophy a singularly existing edifice transcendent to processes mundane and
human. Philosophy cannot be understood apart from the lived experience that generates it any
more than it can be from the language that conditions it in its articulation. Philosophy’s myriad
methodologies and individual philosopher’s idiosyncrasies or individual methodologies cannot
be read apart from the context of their lives, bodies, times, their friendships or rivalries,
academic or personal, and the background condition of other, ever-growing libraries filled by
dead philosophers. This matters because argumentative warrants, following Toulmin as the link
between evidence and claim, in philosophy have a tropological bent. It does not matter which
“kind,” methodology, or overall structure of philosophic enterprise one engages: from Deleuze’s
“Transcendental Empiricism,” to Marx’s “Dialectical Materialism,” to Derrida’s
“Deconstruction,” to Aristotle’s love of categorization, formal logical patterns constructed
through series of inference repeat that end up simply reproducing conceptual vagueness as
totalizing categories emerge at the logical limits of definition.
This chapter examines two argumentative structures constructed by Graham Priest: “The
Inclosure Paradox” and “The Domain Principle.” In short, the act of measurement or definition
makes some things precise but, in doing so, create higher order vagueness. Philosophers tend to
deal with this higher order vagueness by creating chains of logic through their preferred
philosophic warrant/s that converge towards some form of totality, which can also be understood
as a domain or range of applicability. The process then begins anew as younger philosophers
take up the work of their predecessors’ constructions.
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Providing some examples of philosophical warrants will help make the necessity of this
endeavor more concrete. The Law of Noncontradiction has been codified since at least Aristotle
and is still cited today by philosophers given to a certain tendency to demarcate spatiality or
mechanism. 27 The Law of Noncontradiction simply states: At any given time, a thing must either
be A or not. 28 At an immediate intuitive level, it is difficult to imagine how we could define or
clarify a thing without such a warrant! Philosophic warrants represent the logical articulation of
inference but the lines between them and argumentative structures blur. Warrants like the Law of
Noncontradiction seemingly commit a philosopher to an ontology and, when re-constructed
retrospectively, the argument can be re-articulated as exhibiting an argumentative structure.
These terms should be taken as heuristic, permeable, and open.
Argumentative structures exhibit greater complexity because they can be represented as
deploying different philosophical warrants in strategic places. Jankélévitch’s “Retrospective
Illusion” takes Bergson’s critique of what he finds to be a bad pattern of transcendental inference
common in Western philosophy and sublimates it into more concise formulation. In short,
sometimes we project something about ourselves or the way we work into our analyses of Being
when we should not. It is not my aim to build a typology or taxonomy of philosophical warrants
nor to undertake genetic work to determine which one/s are more fundamental or temporally
anterior on logic’s family tree than others. I am not sure such an argument could ever reach
resolution. However, a sense of complexity emerges all the same: the representation of
inferential processes appears to be than finding patterns in their deployment that can construct
Mechanism indicates a model of causality that becomes best articulated in work after Sir Isaac Newton’s massive
advances in physics and mathematics. Mechanism views the universe as a sort of churning machine assemblage in
which things have causes that are discernable with precise enough observational and experimental capacity. To use a
metaphor: the executive ball clicker. You pull the ball to one side of the swing, release it, and can clearly see how
the motion and collision of the end ball is transmitted through the other balls to cause the other end ball to fly up in
the air, and so on, until enough energy has been lost for the body to return to rest.
28
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structures of greater complexity. The primary goal of this chapter is to show that Priest’s
Inclosure Paradox and Domain Principle describe through formalization a process of infinite
regress and conceptual totalization that underlies other philosophical warrants that they have
been created to remedy but, in the end, only replicate. To this end we proceed in the following
steps:
1. Why Should We Speculate and Formalize?: Where the introduction covers the topic’s
pertinence to rhetoric, this section describes the background tendencies in philosophy and
offers an example from rhetorical theory that tend towards conceptual totalization and
provides an ethical rational for why this process has merit.
2. Hegelian Infinities, Domain, and Inclosure: I cover the problems of the Absolute from above
through everyday thought experiments and Hegelian infinities to provide an intuitive and
lightly mathematical demonstration of given system’s tendency to project an Absolute
domain, and to reveal that domain’s own paradoxical qualities.
3. Rhetoric, The Rhetorical, Rhetoricity: Regress and Domain in Rhetorical Theory: Where the
previous section approaches Absolutes and vagueness from above, this section takes on a
material analogy from below to illustrate the inevitability of these problems when we try to
draw precise definitional or empirical borders. Typical solutions to this problem from the
history of philosophy are quickly evaluated and an analogy to Rhetoricity / the Rhetorical /
Rhetoric (R/R/R) 29 will be drawn.

Rhetoricity comes from, as noted in the introduction, Davis’ work and refers to ontology’s fundamentally
rhetorical characteristics. I do not share the assumption concerning rhetoricity’s anterior priority in becoming, but I
do believe the term usefully signals any discussion about the ontological characteristics of rhetoric, however one
construes that term. The Rhetorical refers to what powers, capacities, things, processes, however you label
ontological existences persuasive valences. What counts as rhetorical has a link to small r rhetorics that emerge from
the world and big R Rhetoric that signifies a theorist’s set of all sets conceptualization of Rhetoric. These terms are,
as everything in this dissertation, heuristic and permeable. What someone considers rhetorical doubtlessly relates to
29
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Why Should We Speculate and Formalize?
We need to elaborate on the role of formalization and speculation in theory. Rhetorical
scholarship will benefit from more explicitly defending our ontological claims, rather than
leaving them implied, unspoken, or uninterrogated. Scholars experience philosophical systems
outside of time and experience, folding projects from widely separated centuries onto one
another. Education in philosophers sometimes gives the impression that philosophers entire
careers have been spent fiddling with a rubrics cube until all the sides click together in a
satisfactory way, the concepts aligned like the colors. We get to see the completed cube by
reading the books and associated secondary texts led to read philosophical work as seamless and
emergent neat and complete from thought, but not everyone gets to see the speculative process
that required an ungodly cycle of iteration to result in relative coherence, nor how these
completed works are themselves iterations in a longer lineage.
Theorists do the same thing but within the particular domain of some loosely bounded
object – society, rhetoric, literature, film, art – and sometimes even attempt to systematize
understanding in some cohort below or between areas, like notions of story or agency. So, we
either are doing, are a component of, or make use of this very system-building process in our
respective disciplinary histories. Even in everyday conversation, we undertake this speculative
process and typically with less systematic rigor. We get into gardening and find out just how
many problems of plant, climate, soil composition, and so on arise when one gardens; we decide
to paint miniatures and learn just how many problems of style, tool, material, and so on arise
when one models and paints. Once wholly competent in a thing, everyday or academic, one
quickly learns how varying possibilities arise out of multiple practices, where each path evokes
the rhetorics they study, implies a notion of the ontology necessary for such things to emerge, and may be bounded
in the first place by what the theorist thinks Rhetoric is.
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different consequences. Just as some materials used in miniatures are dangerous or some
gardening practices have ecological consequences, philosophical positions have consequences
for any theory or for the person embracing them. These consequences follow to students who
then take them into the world. In a certain sense this is an obvious inevitability: taking a position
on a problem always creates a consequence! If it did not, there would be little reason to do it. But
danger lurks in insufficiently speculative and rigorous philosophy-theory: little problems and
positions that produce bad consequences can stay hidden, such that an apparently impressive
theory harbors dangerous modes of purity or hierarchy that you did not realize were in there.
You become the gardener who suddenly finds dead bees around their garden, at the very moment
when we and other animals very much need bees to be alive.
Let us start with the idea of logical necessity. In a sense, the development of any given
position in one area or topic of philosophy entails and constrains the available positions in
adjunct areas of philosophy. For example: If you have taken the position that persuasion inheres
strictly in mana or as an essence-power projected by words themselves, you imply and require an
ontology that potentiates essences or a materialist view that stipulates an animus of energy
coursing through all things, or so on. Options remain, but you have implied there is a hidden
power in things and demonstrating how this entailment works should burden you. In short, this
process of ever-expanding schematization derives from the paradoxes and ambiguities that
inevitably arise in making ideas clearer and more carefully differentiated by reliance upon some
particular method. The fact that language is the medium of theory only compounds the ambiguity
given the vagueness inherent to expression.
There is a further problem: the gaps between what is made systematically explicit versus
what is left to implicature often reproduces the distance in real life between what gets said and
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the quiet parts you are not supposed to say aloud. For example: your mana-essence theory might
have some nasty consequences when you, or someone writing in your wake, try to explain how
different beings appear to be differently suited to channel mana, or that some beings do or could
possess more mana than others. Does this imply that some essences are superior to others? Have
you created a hierarchy of Being based upon the pure power of mana that, by implication, could
justify oppression? Or are you willing to defend the alternative, that there is no quantitative
gradient of power, only qualitative difference? Is that even really better?
Making things explicit through speculative philosophical process and/or having a go at
conceptual formalization fulfills an ethical purpose in this sense: the exclusions we make silently
in pursuit of one philosophical ground over another have material consequences because of their
political implications. These quiet parts tend to speak loudly when we push a system to account
for Absolutes or the philosophical warrants it employs to prevent the fall into infinite regress.
Pushing out or at least noting our ontological, epistemological, ethical, and methodological
positions is not only logically inevitable, then, but ethically necessary.
Should the mana or gardening examples leave one unconvinced, consider this from the
theory-discipline of rhetorical studies. 30 Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins elaborated a version
of rhetorical epistemology across 1982-3. In 1982 they write: “First, we assume that matters of
epistemology are both conceptually and logically prior to matters of ontology… What we offer
is a concept of knowledge which makes no ontological statement regarding the nature of the
objects of reality.” 31 “No ontological statement” shifts remarkably quickly into the production of
a full ontological inquiry in 1983. They turn to ontological matters whose “formulation is a

My sense is that this example is unusual, though knowing so would await a more exhaustive content analysis of
the literature in top journals of Rhetoric and Communication.
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prerequisite to understanding rhetoric’s inherent epistemological function.” 32 Presumably, the
period bookended by these two publications must have featured some epiphany or “oh no”
moment that can account for a dramatic about face from the “logically prior” epistemology to the
“prerequisite” ontology.
Cherwitz and Hikins then formulate ontological orientations that, perhaps unsurprisingly,
anticipate some of the typical arguments of New Materialist rhetoricians: a universal
relationality, a sort of gestalt psychology of consciousness, and a remarkably flat ontology. 33
This example highlights a moment in which two authors beneficially realize their epistemology
entails a certain kind of ontology then proceed ethically to do the work to flesh out what those
problems and positions look like. To my knowledge, Cherwitz and Hikins do not take their
partnership into spelling out what a perspectival rhetoric entails in connected philosophical
fields, or what it requires ethically, and nor does methodology get their attention, but all this can
be made right as the ramifications of their projects unfold through future work in the discipline.
Life interferes with philosophical world building, of course, though footnotes can give direction
to the footsteps tracked in the works cited page to let someone else beget that iteration in the
longer speculative bent of the discipline.
Cherwitz and Hikin’s work to repair their initial attempt at a pure epistemology is a rarity
in rhetorical theory 34 and this rarity has ethical and analytic consequences: philosophy should be
speculative because it provides greater analytic rigor by making the implicit explicit, and this
same process of clarification makes philosophical inquiry more ethical. Whitehead’s definition
Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism,” 251. Italics in Original.
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of speculative in his Process and Reality resonates: “Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to
frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of
our own experience can be interpreted.” 35 What “necessary” entails is a fraught subject itself, but
Whitehead’s rationale for the speculative bent argues for its analytic necessity: “The importance
of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable of
criticism and improvement.” 36
Karen Barad makes the ethical stakes explicit with regards to her justification for
engaging in ontological inquiry: “How reality is understood matters. There are risks entailed in
putting forward an ontology: making metaphysical assumptions explicit exposes the exclusions
on which any given conception of realty is based.” 37 Thus Barad calls for “something like an
ethico-onto-epistem-ology — an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being
— since each intra-action matters, since the possibilities for what the world may become call
out…” 38 I agree with Barad’s sentiment entirely, even if my own speculative bent does not
always bend enough in its prevailing focus on ontology and methodology when engaging
rhetorical theory and criticism (a partial remedy, I hope, will be found in my footnotes).
There are at least two ways to show that the pattern hinted at above holds for thought
endeavors at a more general level. The first would be to map out the moments and accompanying
rationalizations for expansion in a genealogical-descriptive mode that shows tendencies in the
empirical development of thought across the work of individual thinkers, academic disciplines,
and so on, in orders of scaling cardinality. A comprehensive work of that scale may not be
possible in an individual’s lifetime, but a second path, which proceeds inductively to formalize a
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structure and inferential devices, can work as a more achievable substitution. However, risk
proliferates on this approach: the exact risk inherent in retrospective ventures that this exact
project will spend much time discussing. This mode risks flattening the texture, contradictory
moments, and ambiguities that tether philosophy to life itself and do not treat some
generalization of a work as monolithic.
Despite that risk, in what follows, I take this second route using Graham Priest’s Beyond
the Limits of Thought as a vital text by explaining Hegelian infinities, doing an empirical
metaphor with ants, and applying this problematic to rhetoric broadly conceived. In the next
chapter, I will let some ambiguity and confusion creep through as I do a different kind of Priest
that looks at regress, totalization, and the inevitable messy materialist strains. With that work in
place, the later chapters map out the implications for rhetorical theory and explore the
methodological considerations that necessarily follow.
Hegelian Infinities, Domain, and Inclosure:
Priest develops what he names “The Inclosure Paradox,” reading through several nodes
in Western Philosophy and Mathematics’ that conceptualize the Absolute to argue that, at the
limit of thought, “such limits are dialetheic; that is, that they are the subject, or locus, of true
contradictions.” 39 Whether or not we ultimately accept dialetheism as the proper posture
regarding the limits of thought, I am interested in extracting two linked philosophical warrants
from this text, the “Domain Principle” and the “Inclosure Paradox,” since these schemas
illustrate how thought expands and gives logical necessity to this process. In short, the lived
process of doing thought creates vagueness in two strata. In highly reduced form: making a
concept precise produces higher order vagueness, and, dealing with this vagueness frequently
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requires creating a chain of definitions that represent series of inferences that otherwise
compound this vagueness; finally, a categorical projection or an Absolute suture the vagueness
of the system itself. Along the way, insufficiently exact concepts emerge because each system is
only a logical model of reality and, as we will see, reality itself features a heavy dose of
indeterminism when thought from a materialist – empiricist mode. In a sense, Priest provides
compelling evidence that the engine of thought is paradox because of inevitable problems of
infinite regress and liar’s paradoxes that are typical to conceptual spatialization or in the
deployment of language to articulate theory.
The “Domain Principle” and “Inclosure Paradox” are mutually imbricated in the sense
that both describe through formalization two sides of the same speculative process of thought.
The Inclosure Paradox describes it from below in the sense of the potential infinite: some
“infinity generator,” 40 to use Priest’s terms, gets applied some arbitrarily large number of times
to produce an infinity. In argumentative terms, definitions run into ambiguous border cases or are
put in dialogue with other definitions and produce more definitions, ad nausea. The “Domain
Principle” describes a perspectival projection from the point of view of the regress or system in
question, in which the limit statement of a series both is and is not a member of itself.
Definitional chains imply ranges of application (in this they are not unlike mathematical sets),
but as they approach the limit case, at least according to Priest, objects, terms, ideas, and
concepts, emerge as dialetheic in the sense of both being and not being members of themselves.
Sometimes these concepts end up starting their own series, operating in the same way as
definitions of an infinite set can be made to do in mathematics. In a sense, these two resulting
moments of motion are not separable and are conceptually fuzzy, when considered against the
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actual processes they purport to describe. Domains are conceptual objects of speculation while
steps are followed; the positing of a domain immediately implies new steps. The “Domain
Principle” and “Inclosure Paradox” thus describe the same process from two different
perspectives, above and below respectively.
The everyday metaphor that best articulates the different and yet inextricably linked
nature of these two formalizations can be illustrated through the experiences of two different
kinds of shoppers. Let us return to the miniature painting and wargaming metaphor. I am a
shopper from below and the Inclosure Paradox definitely applies to me. When I decide to make a
new unit in a wargame, I just go to the hobby store and get what I think I need in a process of
messy iteration, return home and get to work, realize as I paint that I’m missing what I need to
paint this or that feature, project a total domain for the materials required for this or that
miniature set, and shamefully order what has been omitted. This kind of shopping analogizes the
process from below: I set out with a color concept, find vague moments and new problems as I
paint, and then attempt to demarcate the total number of things required from below.
My friend Andy differs from me greatly, perhaps because he is an engineer and data
scientist. Andy precisely knows everything he needs to produce in advance; he has stipulated a
domain well before he gets in the store. Andy’s problem starts once he has gotten in the store. In
the wargame we play, there are different options you can take for the unit composition of your
army. Andy knows the domain of what he has come for and then ends up leaving with a new
regress after he buys options to add on top of the start of his unit. His completed domain
becomes the first term in a new series of scaling up his one set of models into a small army, so
that his initial set acquires more variety than anticipated in terms of model options for the little
war game we use these things for. Perhaps you have already considered your own and, likely,
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your partner’s grocery shopping tendencies in terms of this metaphor. Not unlike shopping,
philosophy and theory can be said to work in a remarkably similar way, albeit one that takes far
more time, produces far more complexity, and tends create a messy muddle of both the
“inclosure paradox” and the “domain principle.”
If where we start does not logically matter, then we might as well start with the Domain
Principle because it lets us get into Hegelian infinities a bit faster than starting from below, and
doing so will prove organizationally useful as we apply all this to rhetorical theorizing. Priest
formalizes the Domain Principle as follows: “For every potential infinity there is a corresponding
actual infinity. Following Hallett ((1984), p 7) let us call this the Domain Principle. I take it to be
a formulation of the Kantian insight that totalisation is conceptually unavoidable…” 41 Put
differently, for any potentially infinite convergent series there is some limit statement that
defines its infinitude. The implication should also already be clear: any defined infinity can be
given a new infinity generator and iterated into an infinity of higher cardinality. What Priest
means by this statement and its implication requires an example from the immediate
mathematical-philosophical context and I think Priest’s treatment of Hegel is the most accessible
and necessary among many. Actual and potential infinities, 42 despite having analogues
throughout philosophy, as Priest compellingly argues, acquire explicit definition by Hegel who
“distinguishes between two notions of infinity: the false or spurious infinite and the true genuine
infinite. Each of these manifests itself in a qualitative and a quantitative guise.” 43 The finite and
false infinite qualitatively conceived require one another for definition: “Something is finite if it
Ibid, 124. Italics in original.
The following problem should be noted: Priest glosses the quantitative/ qualitative infinity distinction and
something tells me that I am opening myself up to all manner of Deleuzian “but you take Hegel on the quant / qual
distinction uncritically” by having not read The Science of Logic and matched Hegel’s quant qual, to Bergson’s, and
finally to Deleuze’s to see what falls out. I recognize this weakness to the argument, but I think a full treatment of
the qualitative and the quantitative need wait.
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is determinate (in his terminology), that is, limited or bounded by something else. Something is
infinite (in the false concept) if it is not finite.” 44 Qualitatively, we can think of finite as a
collection of things without far ranging variability; we can think of the spurious or false infinite
as a collection of things in progress with what Priest calls an “infinity generator.” For Hegel,
qualitatively true infinities have this infinite range defined whereas qualitatively false infinities
are simply undefined infinite regresses. As we will see in the next chapter, dealing with infinite
regress by projecting a domain, as Hegel has done here, is a recurring part of philosophical
speculation.
As per usual, making the qualitative infinite intuitive through an everyday analogy is the
correct precursor to making it formally rigorous when we move to discussing the Hegelian
infinities in their quantitative guise. In the collection “plushies on Micah’s bed,” there are the
Kurzgesagt Duck, a Sylveon from Pokémon, and Chomusuke from KonoSuba. To convert this
qualitative collection into a quantitative collection we assign number to plushie and have the
determinate finite collection [1,2,3,4]. This collection does not change because there is no
variable quantity, like a plushie X where X can be any value of plushie, nor a function to apply
to the X, such as the number of plushie increases by one for each time Micah completes a
semester or simply f(x) = x +1. Making a series out of the function brings in considerations of the
spurious infinite as we attempt to enumerate how many plushies Micah could someday acquire,
or to determine the range of potential plushies. To do this, we simply start running the function
to produce a series of the values: one plushie per semester or [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10…].
This analogy features a useful moment of disanalogy that helps us start to clarify the
difference between empirical and logical necessity. Empirically, we know that Micah will die
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and there will, eventually and disappointingly, be a finite and determinate collection of plushies
he has managed to acquire, but logically and mathematically the story differs. The spurious
infinite attempts to produce the largest value from within the process of infinity and we are
presented with a problem: for each highest value we reach there is always a higher value to infer
and so infinity is always deferred by finitude. Priest articulates the problem more technically: “In
fact, the flip-flop here is simply an infinity generator: another thought of the finite, if x is a
thought of the infinite; another thought of the infinite, if x is a thought of the finite. And this
false infinite is simply its corresponding potential infinity.” 45 For Hegel, quantitative infinity by
implication from the inside is “never more than finite” 46 and we must look elsewhere for a
definition of the true quantitative infinite.
If the spurious infinite can be conceptualized as approaching the infinite from below, then
the Absolute infinite can be conceptualized as defining a given infinity’s limit from above. 47 It
helps to start with the quantitative side of this process, before weighing the qualitative
implications. Priest discusses the Absolute infinite in its “Quantitative guise:” “For example
(Logic, pp. 246ff.), Hegel considers the infinite sum 1+a+a2+a3. . . (-1<a<1). This is a false
(potential) infinity which, by adding successive terms, gets as close to some number as we wish,
but never reaches it. The true (completed) infinity is just this limit, (1-a)-1.” 48 Translating this
argument to the everyday may stretch the plushie metaphor’s seam to its breaking point, but we
can grasp it intuitively in by doing some math and citing a professional proof that Priest does not
provide because he assumes his audience is technically competent. I am not fully technically
competent in these maths and assume many of my readers are not either, so best to take it slow.
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Let us imagine an example with a value for a in the specified range of between -1 and 1: ¼.
Then, let us see how a scientific calculator reacts to the limit statement Priest gives us. Using a
scientific calculator, we get the following values:

Figure 1. Produced by Author.

The first four lines iterate the series manually; the final line plugs the value into the limit
statement Priest provides; we can already infer that any fraction raised to successively higher
powers approaches its own limit insomuch as each successive value added approaches zero.
Intuitively, from the first four lines, we can sense that no matter how many values we add to the
series it will never exceed some value because the values we add decrease asymptotically,
tending towards zero. The limit statement Priest provides derives from geometric proofs about
the relationship of the series to itself: these proofs have been provided in the footnotes. 49

There are two things worth noting here. 1. The math behind divergent and convergent series can be found at
Stuart’s Early Transcendentals 6th edition at 688-689 and the formal proof of Priest’s identity in “Infinite Series and
Geometric Distributions” by Bill Husen. 2. The rules noted are for convergent series that do indeed converge on
some value or diverge to some defined of infinity. As I understand it, there are proofs for doing something like this
with fully divergent series that Deleuze makes use of in his philosophy. I have not quite gotten that figured out yet,
but it deals with Taylor and Power Series and I hope to get into that, with its notion of strange attractors, when we
deal with Deleuze on Leibnizian infinities more closely in chapter three.
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Priest cleverly states the qualitative impact of the true infinite in Hegelian terms: “The
triple <finite, false infinite, true infinite> is not an official Hegelean triad. However, the false
infinite is the negation of the finite, and so these two categories are related to each other as the
first two members of a triad. The true infinite is the third: the negation of the negation (Logic, p.
239).” 50 The form of Hegelian dialectic bears uncanny similarities to Priests’ Inclosure Paradox
and Domain Principle, but within the register of using dialectical negation as a philosophical
warrant to deal with ambiguous borderline cases, whereas the Inclosure Paradox supports more
Philosophical Warrants than simply dialectical negation. When we push this motion past any
particular given series into the notion of the finite and infinite as such, a truly bizarre thing
happens: “The true infinite is the coming together of the two moments in the shape of an
absolute totality, which yet can be broken out of; a limit which, none the less, can be
transcended; a bounded unbounded.” 51 The Absolute Infinite appears to be dialetheic: it is
bounded by domain because it can be defined and formalized, but, by doing so, we create the
first term for a new potentially infinite series. Priest spends the remainder of the book tracking
this dialetheic moment in systematic absolution through various moments in mathematics in
which some new math attempts to deal with the contradictory nature of the Absolute from the
previous maths, only to end up replicating the problem again. 52
This seemingly unbounded process within mathematics considered from an empirical
perspective suggests that developments in mathematics and physics follow a Chicken or Egg
logic. For any sufficiently rigorous mathematical model, predictive acuity obtains within the
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bounds of measuring precision. When measuring precision and empirical experimentation
produce new and untidy findings against the model, some new mode of mathematical modelling
obtains that produces new predictive values that cannot yet be empirically validated because of a
lack in the technology required for empirical precision. On and on this process goes; the key, for
philosophers and theorists, is to recognize this game for what it is and be careful in justifying
which side they fall on: that of the materialist chicken or the mathematical egg. For theory, we
will see in chapter two that there are consequences for conceptualizing rhetorical ontology and
communication that follow from these perspectives. The danger arises when we forget the larger
processes of regress and domain projection of which our messy little interventions are part.
These problems with conceptualization of the Absolute may still seem obscure given the
original aim of supporting and explaining the DP’s connection with philosophical work and,
eventually, rhetorical theory. These connections can be made explicit by returning to the DP’s
formulation with regards to Hegelian infinities: “For every potential infinity there is a
corresponding actual infinity.” 53 The trick comes with translating this statement into a register
that makes sense with Priest’s assertion that this statement corresponds to Kant’s insights about
conceptual totalization in philosophy. Priest notes that mathematicians “including Hessenberg,
Zermelo and Frankel,” noticed the connection between Kant and problems of the Absolute that
involve “the dialectic between defining from below and conceiving as a unity from above…” 54
Priest lands on a quote from Martin’s 1955 Kant’s Metaphysics and Theory of Science to spell
out the connection:
“This conflict between concluding and beginning anew, between forming a totality and
using this totality as a new element, is the actual ground of the [set-theoretic] antimony. It
53
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is this conflict that gives the connection with the Kantian antimonies. Kant saw quite
clearly that the antimonies rest on this antithesis between making a conclusion and going
beyond the conclusion.” 55
The problems that arise in mathematics with defining a set, series, or any other mathematical
thing given to iteration and, thus, regress greatly resemble the problems that emerge with
philosophical conceptualization and definition. When we conceive of something like the Kantian
categories, our minds make an analogic move in which we immediately begin, through a process
of analogy-disanalogy, to attempt to see just how well our definition holds from some
perspective and, in doing so, project its range or domain. Priest articulates it this way: “As Kant
saw so well, given a notion like that of set or ordinal [or definition], reason forces us to conceive
of the totality of all things satisfying it. Totalising is part of our conceptual machinery – like it or
not.” 56 The question remains to be answered whether or not this projection of an Absolute in the
pursuit of conceptual totalization regards primarily our “conceptual machinery” or Being in
itself, a topic that will be dealt with at length when we start looking at the roots of New
Materialist philosophy and their panpsychist tendencies in Chapters Three and Four.
At any rate, the DP’s applicability to logical processes appears clear: as one does the
work of defining and arguing in philosophy, the process of creating a potential infinity, one
pushes the potential range of conceptual variability to its logical extent by speculating on a range
of applicability for our concepts or, to use Priest-Hegel, by creating a limit that is an absolute.
This process can happen from “above” when one defines the range of variability only to find that
the range itself triggers the start of a new series or from “below” by working each iteration of a
series until an upper bound is projected as the absolute range. These absolutes are shifty: each
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limit we generate for a series can be taken as the first term in a new series that is of higher
cardinality to the terms bounded by the limit. Priest takes this dynamic to forcefully argue for
dialetheism of the Absolute: 57 the limits of systems are true contradictions as they both are and
are not members of themselves and dialetheism is the only way formal logic can truthfully deal
with infinite regress. We will push back on this dialetheic conclusion when we look at the
domain of Deleuze’s transcendental arguments with Barad’s diffraction and more probabilistic or
“Bayesian” reasoning in mind. For now, we need to look at the process of defining from below
through the Inclosure Paradox.
In a sense, we have already examined the Inclosure Paradox as we looked at the process
of the Domain Principle from below, but a more thorough elucidation that brings in an explicitly
empirical-biological metaphor might help to define the mutual messiness of these two processes.
The IP encompasses three conditions that refer to membership in a set: existence, transcendence,
and closure. 58 We define a set widely here; that is, it might be a mathematical set such as the set
of all ordinal numbers, 59 or a seemingly softer set like Kant’s division of the world into
phenomena, all things we experience, and noumena, the necessary objective but unknowable
things in themselves that cause our experiences in combination with the categories and the
fundamental intuition of space and time. 60 Priest provides a nice chart and formal logic chain on
156 of Beyond the Limits of Thought, for those with the formal logic technical know-how, but I
would prefer to provide us with a simpler parallel overview that breaks all this into smaller
situations of everyday reasoning, relying on a material or empirical hypothetical before turning
to these processes’ relevance in rhetorical theory.
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The hypothetical must be material to start to shift this formal logic dynamic into an
empirical register and thus, for us as proper and good materialists, into an ontological valence. 61
The broader import here will be felt more clearly as we move into Deleuze and rhetorical theory
writ large, but, in short, what I hope to argue is this: the philosophical warrants, especially the
Law of Noncontradiction, that condition essentialism in the tradition of Being do the same in
Deleuze and Bergson at the level of Becoming and this problem produces some confusing
conclusions with regards to hierarchy and purity in Deleuze’s thought, with further implications
for its lumpy uptake into rhetorical theory.
Imagine we have a kitchen and that this kitchen has a trail of ants in it moving from a
baseboard to a dead spider that they favor us by slowly removing. The existence step is easy
enough. We walk into the kitchen and lo and behold: the ants exist. 62 The problem now is to
determine the domain of the ants to know what kind of ant problem we are working with here.
The ants fulfill the transcendence step beyond kitchen boundary the instant we follow their telltale trail to find that they have been travelling through a minute crack in the baseboard molding.
Our definition of the ant’s domain must change to include the walls and we call in a specialist.
The specialist tells us that he can eliminate the ants through poisons from our house for a time. A

While it will not become explicitly clear why we, as rhetoricians, should do things from a materialist-empirical
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the empirical. Chapter three deals with this relationship at greater length.
62
A skeptic might say, hold on, but what if we are all brains in a vat! Then the ants do not exist! This objection does
nothing to the motion of the Inclosure Paradox: it only redirects it at two levels. We might persist in inquiring where
the boundaries of the code or magic or what have you that produces the illusion of the ants ends and, if the code is
adequate to the reality we experience, simply replicate the rest of the problem knowing that we are attempting to
discern the boundaries of a simulation. We might also say, fine, the ants are simulated and that means that the
definite border of the ants exhibits problems of vagueness within the simulation itself which would then have
problems of vagueness with the next world up, and so on. Border cases emerge, infinite regress ensues, an absolute
is posited, and the problems with the Absolute ensue.
61

39
bit draconian, but the Closure step obtains at last. We ask, “Why only for a time?” The specialist
responds: “Fire ants in this region have what is called a super colony. I can get rid of these and
lay poison around your house so they stay away for a year, but I cannot keep them from coming
back forever!” 63 We now have a problem with closure: it seems there must be some Absolute
boundary for the ants, but just where that boundary is and how we measure it become difficult to
specify.
All of this treats the solution to the boundary of the ants in terms of an infinite progress,
but another scale and directionality of vagueness arise when we start trying to enumerate the
ants, starting precisely with a count of one. Our naïve phenomenological visuality assures us: lo
and behold, I only see a (first to me) and ant, but just as we can go big by scaling up to the level
of the hive, we can go small and start considering ant organs, gut bacteria, parasites, or even
molecules or DNA. The relationship between steps of infinite progress towards the big and
infinite regress towards the small from our perspectival starting place in terms of scale begins to
tend towards the same potential absolute when we add the variable time to these considerations.
We might consider a degree in entomology to attempt to provide an adequate boundary for the
ants, but something tells me we may, at that point, run into ambiguous border cases within which
tribe of fire ants with their specific DNA coding this super colony has and its relationship to the
hive, mega colony, and individual across scalar levels, and so on, ad infinitum. Lord forbid we
try to make this much smaller relationship precisely defined because then we are trapped
considering what DNA is and biochemical interactions!
Each term in the following graphic expresses one potential conceptual or empirical
pathing for different elements or aggregates that an ant could belong to in descending and
For a good discussion on Ant Mega colonies, see Kurzesagt – In a Nutshell, “The Billion And Mega Colony and
the Biggest War on Earth” on YouTube.
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ascending scale respectively. These links are hardly exhaustive and at points in both infinite
regress and progress directions I insert time to make the complexity of such an endeavor
apparent. Each of these things has its own muddy boundaries and could become the first term in
a new cosmological series of association or causation. The key here is that, were we to attempt to
measure these things, that each empirical thing eventually dovetails in a strange way by positing
the universe as Absolute. The universe is a different kind of absolute than Being or Becoming
unified under some concept because it resists definitional closure, so far in human history, and
should be considered as presenting a potential infinity that cannot, without serious empirical
evidence in a mode of finality, be made to mathematically produce an Absolute domain. This
may change, both math and physics people work on this problem regularly, but the Standard
Model has holes and has yet to answer questions like: “Why do types of particles come in
families of three? or “Is there a reason this particle tends towards this mass?”
Let us track this dynamic out visually with all the caveats that visualization entail: 64

Figure 2. Produced by Author.

For us, visualization represents logic in accordance with the Law of Noncontradiction because of the way
visuality works through illustration in its fabrication of seemingly clear lines that signify concepts. When we use a
visual it must be recognized that we are merely drawing out the logical connections to make a point and that the
underlying empirical phenomenon resists total disambiguation.
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The mystery of where “the ant/s” boundary is suggests in all its ambiguity the driving
force of the Inclosure and Domain Paradoxes: vagueness. Formalizing different kinds of
vagueness into paradoxes is a long tradition in Western Philosophy. Priest lumps several
paradoxes into the Inclosure Paradox: the Sorites’ Paradox (SP) and associated paradoxes like
the Ship of Theseus alongside the paradoxes of self-reference epitomized by the Liar’s
Paradox. 65 Whether or not the LP and species of the SP are really all that similar need not
concern us here, although there is significant debate on the issue. 66 We are concerned with how
philosophers and theorists produce vagueness in acts of definition and how local absolutes or
totalizing Absolutes attempt to unify this vagueness under a concept that may or may not be
projected as metaphysically real instead of empirically testable. These problems necessarily arise
when we attempt to make boundaries precise through empirical measurement or conceptual
determination. In this sense, many human endeavors function as modelling machines that inserts
a perspectival line in provisional acts of definition or measurement. I find this process explicitly
analogic, if the copious amounts of analogy in this very text have not already made that
abundantly clear: 67 each determination begets higher order vagueness necessitating new
determinations into infinite regress. Just as we line up enough points of analogy and disanalogy
until we are satisfied with the sense of our proposition. We will eventually see that this
vagueness in thought is present in Becoming itself as ontological indeterminacy and ensures the
emergence of relative novelty, but that is a question for chapter two’s closer look at the different
kinds of philosophical warrants that deal with different manifestations of the Inclosure Paradox
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in chapter two. For now, we need one more formalization before we turn to how the process of
Inclosure is relevant to rhetorical theory.
The Philosophical Warrant I want us to accept in addition to those I’ve described from
Priest I suggest calling the Perspectival Projection (PP). In short, an illusory and fantastic line or
point like those we find in geometry produces a perspectival boundary through which we unify
vagueness under the aegis of some concept. Here is a visual representation of this process:

Figure 3. Produced by Author.

Of course, we may equally argue in an ontological vein that X is the passive member and Y
makes X precise in a sense through passive synthesis, as both Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty do so.
This line of argument has merit, but we are interested, for now, in more active attempts at the
making precise of a thing conceptual-material through definition or measurement. X can be an
observer attempting to make precise an object or phenomena through measurement apparatuses;
X can also be a thinker attempting to make successive thought-determinations to make precise
the definition of a thing or to create a concept. The little grey dots are things associated with the
Y. The concentric circles indicate the tendency towards regress: how large of a definitional net or
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experimental apparatus does one settle on before engaging in the perspectival projection to cut
off further regress? Each of these attributes sits on or across a line to indicate problems of
vagueness; each dot can serve as its own thing and suggests that to account for all dots a
completed circle as Absolute would be required. The way most thinkers, through various
philosophical warrants and logical arguments, keep this regress from obtaining is by unifying the
ontology of objects under some or another concept at the level of absolute and various absolutes
under the aegis of an Absolute. The local absolutes function like categories, they cycle back into
our observer to start a new series or serve as the apparatus through which things are made
precise. We will look at this process intently in chapter two through a chosen repertoire of
philosophers, examining the Philosophical Warrants they use to justify the unification of a Y
under some concept.
Rhetoric, The Rhetorical, Rhetoricity: Regress and Domain in Rhetorical Theory
Members of “theory-disciplines,” who primarily embrace while critiquing these
philosophies through recourse to a field of objects defined through some homological material,
structure, or content, participate in the use of Philosophical Warrants and Perspectival
Projections for the ethical reasons outlined above. At a bare minimum, these commitments are
unwittingly used when philosophy is imported into theory; they also arise even in the work of
generalizing from case studies aimed at producing or edifying theory against an imported
philosophy. At the most general level, the problems of vagueness in rhetoric acquires a clear
formulation in Ed Schiappa’s work: “By ‘Big Rhetoric’ I refer only to the theoretical position
that everything, or virtually everything, can be described as ‘rhetorical.’” 68 This formulation
appears innocuous enough, except that many scholars have taken this idea and began to push it
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towards a logical limit in ways Schiappa did not anticipate. Let us start at the level of content
with a hardly exhaustive enumeration of things at the least rhetorical and at the most categorized
as rhetoric now: animal behavior, sound in itself, 69 the infinitesimal in mathematics, 70 energy at
varying levels of confidence and ontologizing, 71 the rhetorical as virtuality-potentiality, 72 food, 73
and microbiology’s chemical interactions. 74 The pattern matches that of the much feared
consequence of logical explosion feared by Aristotelian essentialists everywhere: If we have no
identity, we are all things! The definition of rhetoric has explicitly and implicitly become so
broad that it can encompass anything!
The caricature I have just named rehearses an alarmist argument Schiappa aims to defeat,
it’s true. But his position warrants closer examination because it deploys a common move in
rhetorical studies. Schiappa carefully sidesteps a sort of rhetorical imperialism through a
perspectival argument in his work: “Any phenomenon can be described using any disciplinary
vocabulary.” 75 A sociology of presidential rhetoric; a rhetoric of economic systems. What
determines whether or not we should leverage our “rhetorical perspective” depends, for
Schiappa, on whether or not the leveraging produces “quality work.” 76 This argument produces a
different truth criterion than the one we have labored under so far. Perhaps what makes a
definition or measurement “good” relies not upon its precise fit to reality, but upon its pragmatic
utility.
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Certainly, there is a strain of truth in this argument (I return to it in the fourth chapter’s
commentary on the utility of rhetorical theory and limitations in close reading analytic
methodology). However, with regards to New Materialist rhetoricians work, the argument has
already been dealt with by Carolyn Miller on two fronts.
The first is semi-ideological: “And this is part of its appeal to the new materialist
rhetoricians: ANT [Actor Network Theory] distributes agency into a heterogenous network,
relieving the human actor of the burdens of modernism.” 77 While this claim is not entirely fair to
Latour, as he deals with questions about asymmetricity and oppression in Reassembling the
Social, 78 it can be applied, in my view, to new materialist rhetoricians who tend to focus on
energy or ambient music while bracketing the myriad forms of oppression still quite alive and
well in 2020. The second deals with the quality of work produced: “Rhetoric, like sociology, is
interested in associations — in identifications, communities, adherences, agreements. A
rhetorician, however, wants to know something about the nature and quality of those
associations, in addition to their number…” 79 While there is something satisfactory in the erasure
of qualitative differences in Being for the sake of some environmentalist ethos, doing so
contradicts the philosophy of some of New Materialism’s precursors, including Bergson and
Deleuze. Monism at the level of Being and/or Becoming does not erase the production of
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genuine difference in quality in either philosopher’s work. Or, to put it differently, the
acceptance of a flat ontology does not preclude the elaboration “difference that makes a
difference,” to use Barad’s language, in the analysis of existing nor the synthesis of new Being
itself. Work that finds something resembling human rhetorical agency in an ant trail carries a
useful ethical message and may tell us something about ants, but it does not necessarily produce
good work aiming at intervention in human modes of oppression.
Miller’s problems with new materialist rhetoric alongside Schiappa are useful, but the
route that I take in responding to Schiappa’s pragmatic defense deals, predictably, by applying
infinite regress to the argument and noting one of his own caveats. Infinite regress should be
already obvious in Schiappa’s argument: what we judge to be “good work” has something to do
with our overall philosophical-theoretical-metaphysical orientations, yes? Surely these, in some
way, depend on how we spend our time and how we undertake criticism and thus link to
particular methodologies? Shifting from truth value to pragmatic utility as the measure of
scholarly quality thus introduces infinite regress when one attempts to determine why we find
one thing or another pragmatically useful. And when Schiappa turns to “critique the critiques,”
he offers a telling caveat about his argument: “Note that the definitional dispute is not a
metaphysical one.” 80 Yet, as we will see, the dispute about definition has become explicitly
metaphysical and so we must be doubly careful with pragmatism as a truth condition. This is
because vagueness in the ontologically and metaphysically oriented definitions of rhetoric, the
rhetorical, and rhetoricity complicate the production of “good work” advocated by Schiappa
because they replicate the problems of the Absolute introduced earlier in this chapter. In short,
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definitional disputes have always carried ontological assumptions and the times have changed
such that some theorists explicitly engage ontological questions.
Scott Barnett and Casey Boyle outline two varyingly intense approaches to ontology and
rhetoric in their Introduction to Rhetoric, Through Everyday Things that reflect two relevant
disciplinary tendencies. The milder formulation: “Rhetorical ontology builds on the
philosophical definition of ontology as the study of being or ‘what is’ to develop an inclusive
rhetorical theory and practice. Rhetorical ontology highlights how various material elements –
human and nonhuman alike – interact suasively and agentially in rhetorical situations and
ecologies.” 81 Here we see a recapitulation of Schiappa’s argument that many phenomena can be
named “rhetorical” and sustain analysis through a “rhetorical perspective.” Barnett and Boyle’s
second formulation escalates in intensity: “…we take ontology to be fundamentally rhetorical.
That is, ontology is an ongoing negotiation of being through relations among what we might, on
some occasions, call human and/or nonhuman. We take ontology to be the pervasive
relationality of all things…” 82 “Pervasive relationality” is thus conflated rhetoricity, in a move
that follows from the perspective produced and defended by Diane Davis.
Davis writes: “Rhetoric [later rhetoricity] is not first of all an essence or property ‘in the
speaker’ (a natural function of biology) but an underivable obligation to respond that issues from
an irreducible relationality.” 83 Davis’ use of the term rhetoricity follows from Derrida: “The
rhetoricity of this text is a fundamental addressivity and responsivity, the (genetic and psychic)
mattering of which grants ‘all History,’ Derrida writes, ‘from what metaphysics has defined as
‘non-living’ up to ‘consciousness,’ passing through all levels of animal organization…’” 84 In
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short, “rhetoricity” presents a relational ontology as conceived form the perspective of rhetoric.
“Rhetoricity” has proved influential in several NM rhetorical theory texts, such as Thomas
Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric 85 or entries in Rhetoric Society Quarterly’s “Forum: Bruno Latour on
Rhetoric.”
The problem with all this is that it involves rhetorical theory in an insipient grasping
towards an Absolute, without fully navigating the challenges presented by that maneuver Here
the same structure noted in Priest’s Inclosure Paradox is evoked. We start with something
seemingly bounded, rhetoric. As disciplinary history evolves, more border cases are brought
under the “Big Tent” based on the idea that many phenomena can be understood as suasory, thus
the term rhetorical is revised to start the process where categorical transcendence  closure.
Finally, we reach a metaphysical Absolute, rhetoricity, that reads Rhetoric into the essence of
Being as such, such that everything is to some degree rhetorical, because relationality itself is
rhetorical. We have reduced quality into retrospective quantity under a category. Thus,
Schiappa’s syllogism at 261 should now read: “Rhetoric deals with things that are rhetorical 
things that are rhetorical are relational  the fundamental quality of relationality is rhetoricity 
therefore: in the strong formation, all things are rhetoric or in the weak formation, all things can
be studied from a rhetorical perspective.” The weak version of the rhetoricity claim does not
necessarily corrupt the critical enterprise: after all, nothing is necessarily wrong with the use of a
rhetorical perspective apart from the risk of occasionally veering into the uncanny, where the
application of rhetorical critical principles finally seems to generate underwhelming insight. A
rhetorical critique of microbiology, in hypothetical, only produces evidence that Being is
relational and tells us nothing about the quality of microbial exchange that microbiologists have
Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being, 15. See the similarity with how he
defines rhetoric at 34.
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not already nor can extend these insights into systems in which humans more typically
participate. On the other hand, and this is troubling because of the easy embrace often made of
the stronger position, rhetorical theory has triggered Problems of the Absolute but without
having done the necessary work to build a sufficiently rigorous vocabulary to deal with the
consequences.
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CHAPTER II: THE RETROSPECTIVE ILLUSION
Although I introduce a new perspective in this chapter as a way to clarify my concerns
about the directions of the rhetorical theoretical enterprise, it bears noting that we will continue
to engage the infinite regress issue; this is so because the philosophers dealt with here also take it
up, also perhaps because the problem may be endemic to Becoming in Itself to the extent that
Becoming is understood spatially as a lattice of imbricating perspectives, of insides and outsides
and inside outsides and outside insides, in an infinite conceptual regress. By engaging rhetorical
theory through the perspective of infinite regress, other things are omitted, but that is one of the
necessary risks of critique.
In this chapter, I introduce Aristotle, Leibniz, Bergson, Deleuze, and Barad into
discussion of the two paradoxes earlier introduced, the Inclosure Paradox from below and the
Domain Principle from above. I hope do this work reflexively, aware that I am essentially doing
the very thing I am analyzing: I will be making elements of argumentation comply with a schema
on infinite regress that occurs from a given perspective. It would be strange to argue that the
perspectival projection of an absolute results in an incomplete model of the thing it breaks into
bits and not be candid about the reality of that process in the work of this very chapter.
Expression through writing, in a sense, spatializes thought when it translates ideas into
coordinates of words on the page.
All this means I will not, in what follows, trace the path taken by Deleuze, Lacan, or
Judith Butler when they attempt to wrench from writing’s strange spatiality a spectral meaning
by doing violence to language. Authors who pursue this expressive strategy do important work
by bringing to light how violence to thought can be accomplished through violence to language,
but the tack I prefer to follow is one of flattening and compressing complex membranes together
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such that they are useful as more than abstractions. To use Deleuzian terminology, this chapter is
one of counteractualization, where the actual expressions of a text are read as producing
unexpected problems that are read back into the virtual or potential being of philosophy and
theory as such. However, my expression is not without stylistic conceit. Perhaps someday there
will be a truly philosophical medium that can convey life and being as life and being through
some miraculous technological conceit. For now, there is only writing and talking, and I would
like to write more closely to how I talk, as I think we have grasped in this project already. The
overriding point of this chapter is to tell a story about a messy materialism that has the power to
subvert hierarchy and purity as the grounding feature of Western thought, a necessary precursor
before one can turn to how rhetorical theory can be made messier and, thus, more socially
efficacious.
This story has several movements within each chapter division by philosopher. First, I
trace how each philosopher moves along the inclosure paradox from below: where do they stop
and draw the line and what kind of concept unifies or totalizes the thing as a projection that
accounts for the messy remainders that occur when thought is made to model reality? Each
philosopher I’ll engage offers their own philosophical structure reliant upon philosophical
warrants for producing the line or the inclosure, and defends how concepts from this imposition
feel or are formed. We will thus touch on which ontological consequences obtain and, when
appropriate, assess the status of communication in their systems.
Second, I am interested in the kinds of domains they project at the level of the absolute
when regress sets in, and then, how they re-integrate this absolute understanding as an onticology
of ontology. What a terrible turn of phrase! However, it describes a common metaphysical
gesture these days. Philosophers have largely given up on the ontology of ontology because the
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Being of Being appears to elude precise conceptualization. We might say it suffers too acutely
from problems of the Absolute, and so they settle for the onticology of ontology or the typical
being of Being by describing the characteristics, powers, and capacities that all Being/s have in
common. In this sense, philosophy has become an exercise in virtual conceptualization more
interested in potentiality than actuality. Consideration of the first two motions in tandem, returns
us to the ant-graph and the meeting of twin absolutes at the interval where infinite progress and
regress run aground.
Third, when the philosopher and my reading of them allows, 86 I hope to be careful to
identify moments of indeterminism and/or materialist doubt, occasions when the philosopher
adopts a stranger stance towards materiality, in which something resists all potential of
conceptualization and we must act on it to make it act. In short, the process of doing philosophy
in this life results in moments of ambiguity and doubt that are highly worth tracking out.
Finally, I examine the gap between formal-final conceptualization and fuzzy efficientmaterial indeterminism through a metaphor of the Chicken and the Egg to suggest that, while
both can be valuable approaches, the kind of hierarchy and purity that the conceptualization side
favors also carries dangerous essentialist ethical implications for critical practice. To put it
differently, the acceptance of a materialist remainder of fuzzy indeterminacy has preferable
ethical consequences compared with the perspectival projection of a totalization. Qualitative
differences in kind become subsumed by quantitative differences of degree and our analyses can
only suggest how much or how little a thing complies with the category.
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Aristotle the Essentialist
Aristotle constructs his essentialism on the back of two PW’s named the Law of
Noncontradiction (LNC) and the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM). ParaphrasingLaurence
Horn’s formalization of both laws: LNC – It cannot be the case that something both is and is not
itself; and LEM -- Given some thing, it must be itself or not itself at a given instant. 87 The LNC
deals with spatiality and borders; the LEM deals with states of property expression and
introduces the issue temporality. At a given moment, an ant moves or it does not. Aristotle uses
the ontological formation of the LNC, named the Principle of Noncontradiction, as an
indubitable first principle beyond demonstration because “if the PNC could be demonstrated,
then everything would be subject to demonstration, which would lead to an infinite regress.” 88 It
did not take us much time to find regress, did it? Aristotle’s reasons for wanting to avoid infinite
regress become circular with his justification for the LNC and LEM as originally offered: were
we not able to say a non-contradictory thing, truth and signification would not be possible. 89
Because we do experience the ability to signify and find truth, the world must be configured
consistent with the configuration of the LNC and LEM.
Aristotle’s argument in this bears uncanny similarities to the transcendental arguments, 90
although these will not be formalized until Kant. Aristotle takes the experiential assumption that
we experience truthfulness in signification as a sufficient argumentative warrant to argue that
there is some necessary state of affairs that must exist in order for this experience of truthfulness
to obtain. 91
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For this version of Aristotle, questions of the ant’s definitional and empirical boundaries
must comply with the LEM and LNC: either the ant is here or not here in this moment and the
ant either is or is not an ant. We can pile the LNC and LEM on top of each other to get: the ant
either will be an ant, with ant capacities and ant expression of them, tomorrow or it will not.
After all, the ant might be squished or fall for a deadly poison trap and a change of this
magnitude would change the ant enough to break any kind of regress along the Ship of Theseus
Paradox. Some percentage of ant or mixed state cannot obtain in the Aristotelian universe: an
alive ant and an ant corpse are categorically different and some precise boundary between the
two exists.
To prevent mixed states and the dangers of regress, Aristotle must project a domain to
tidy up a swarm of ant-accidents. This perspectival projection in Aristotle is named Essentialism.
Gottlieb sums it up nicely: “Aristotelian essentialism is the view that there exist what modern
philosophers would treat as natural kinds…” like ants whose “essential natures [are]
definable.” 92 These “essential natures” are “definable” because the world itself complies with the
PNC. It appears that there is some amount of collapse between empirical measurement and
logical definition in the Aristotle’s thought. These “natural kinds” or essences contrast with what
Aristotle calls accidents or things that an essence can do that do not substantially change the
essence. So, our little ant and every step on the ant regress has an essence such that their essential
being persists through accidental changes. The ant may or may not express any number of
powers at a given moment, but its essence remains the same until some change occurs that
changes its essence. We can see that the division between essential and accidental holds for a
time, until Aristotle has to start explaining how changes in essence or the emergence of new
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essences are possible at all. If essences can change, how does an essence not become an accident
to an essence of higher cardinality?
Aristotle offers a way out of this problem by dividing the potential and the actual that
follows from the LEM: “An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it cannot be
actually F and actually not F at the same time.” 93 The problem with this route comes down to
temporality, precision, and measurement. Time must flatten out into an instant and instants must
be distinct from one another such that at one instant the ant is dead and at the next instant the ant
is alive. However, perfect instants may prove to be more of a human fantasy than an empirical
reality. As we try to make precise the instant at which the ant dies, we will inevitably produce
more ambiguity through the precision of our measurement in itself: the question of whether time
is a continuous or discontinuous thing emerges and we are off on another regress. Aristotle
forestalls this regress out by insisting that, beyond any potential measurement, there is still an
actual state of affairs that is determined by the ant’s essence. This response resonates with the
epistemic response to problems of vagueness and empirical measurement: it is not that the
precise boundary created by the essence that follows the PNC does not exist or is a perspectival
projection; it is the case that our previous measurement or definition of it was simply wrong! 94
Absolute precision exists despite our fumbling human attempts to measure it. Error against an
absolutely spatialized being explains away any kind of ontologically based indeterminacy or
fuzziness.
The general structure of the perspectival projection particularized to Aristotle the Essentialist
becomes:
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Figure 4. Produced by author.

This modality of Aristotle is the Aristotle Deleuze so abuses in chapter three of Difference and
Repetition and largely reflects the uptake of Aristotelianism in Western philosophy. The IP
produces vagueness and infinite regress and we try to make precise our empirical measurements
and definitional boundaries. This process leads the philosopher to posit a concept that unifies
messy being, a move needed to prevent infinite regress and this concept is then reified on the
side of domain or the Absolute and retro-actively applied to all beings. For Aristotle, this
tendency plays out as the projection of a hierarchical logic of the pure and essential essence that
accounts for the apparent stability of the thing, despite its accidents.
Essentialist thought poses problems for both ethics and theories of communication. The
ethical problems in this ontology should be clear to anyone who has read any critical theory in
the past hundred plus years: when we create a distribution of the pure and essential against the
messy and inessential and map this distinction against social objects or subject, patterns of
exclusion and oppressive hierarchy inevitably emerge. The problems with communication more
subtly deal with the role of contingency-in-becoming. That is, only accidents are contingent,
communication deals with contingency, and communication is an epiphenomenon that does not
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deal with real changes to substance most of the time. Essentialist thought figures communication
more as a burden to be overcome in the interactions between substances more than anything that
could be causally efficacious or important in its own right. Anyone who believes that words have
consequences and that social hierarchies should be eschewed in favor of novel ways of existing
together must be skeptical, at the least, of any philosophical system that distributes the singular
and ordinary along a logic of the essential and the accidental.
Aristotle the Indeterminist
Aristotle is much more complex than the above indicates because “to make precise” can
also be read “determine.” The instant spatial boundary considerations shift into a temporal
register, causality immediately seeps in. Aristotle’s essentialism implies a theory of causality that
he addresses through his famous fourfold of material, hypothetical, final, and efficient causes.
This fourfold causality follows us into our analyses of other thinkers because it points out one
crucial feature-bug of the thinkers who follow: they exhibit the tendency to marginalize or erase
material causality in favor of formal and final causality, where this marginalization has an oddly
gendered texture that follows from Aristotle himself. Aristotelian causality rests on a familiar
transcendental argument that Andrea Falcon phrases as: “Where there is regularity there is also a
call for an explanation, and coincidence is no explanation at all.” 95 Put differently, there must be
some cause of the apparent order in the sense of regularity in the world.
However, when we push Aristotelian causality to its logical extent, a murky form of noncausality emerges that relies upon a strange kind of indeterminism: “the accidental cause” or
chance causation. This section reconstructs that progression in Aristotle’s thought before turning
to its implications for and eradication by Leibniz in the next section.
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Aristotle develops his fourfold “causal pluralism” according to his doxastic methodology
to make a “theory” of past “uses” of causality. 96 Where “most of his predecessors recognized
only the material and efficient [causality],” 97 Aristotle adds a “teleological explanation” 98 to
these more plainly empirical modes by imposing the more idealistic and oddly purposive,
insomuch as they resemble human will, formal and final modes of causality to the other two. We
end up with a fourfold that can be described as follows with the Ant-Diagram in mind: (1) “The
material cause: ‘that out of which,’” for example: the atoms, molecules, DNA, organs, and so on
the ant is made of; (2) “The formal cause: ‘the form’, ‘the account of what-it-is-to-be,’” for
example: the repeating shape and relationships between the ant’s material components; (3) “The
efficient cause: ‘the primary source of the change or rest,’” for example: factors in the ant’s
environment that it reacts to like wind or rain and the chemical-social relationships it has with its
hive; (4) “The final cause: ‘the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done,’” for example: the
process of evolution, the survival of the colony, for Aristotle, the sublunar striving of the ant to
become the perfect ant and attain the perfection of the unmoved mover. 99 Aristotle follows his
general tendency in causality by producing more categories in an effort to stall infinite regress by
unifying border cases under new categorical banners. As we will see, doing so simply displaces
the regress by creating what is referred to as higher order vagueness.
Aristotle’s “causal pluralism” only displaces regress in at least two ways. The first is that
it performs a conceptual sleigh-of-hand regarding the relationship between entities of different
scales. The Ant-Examples above keep things relatively tight to the singular ant in scale, but we
run into a difficult problem if we push scale harder. DNA doubtlessly affects the ant and,
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arguably, all organic life. Yet, DNA also has its own relationship with the environment in the
form of the epigenome that can modulate and even over-code DNA based upon environmental
factors. DNA is a scale jumping entity such that physical contiguity becomes challenged by a
kind of causal continuity between entities of different scales. Different components jump scales
in surprising ways that make precisely defining the ant start to push away from whatever the
essential boundary is towards a system of relationships and, ultimately, to the Absolute.
Aristotelian causality in its essentialist guise depends upon an active synthesis in which the
perceiver can accurately determine causal chains by categorizing them through conscious action;
it misses the different passive syntheses that condition the determining subject before analytic
action has taken place.
The second displacement is that Aristotelian causality has a fractal or kaleidoscopic
motion to it because we can submit each part of the ant’s fourfold analysis to its own fourfold
analysis, and thus also into regress. DNA acts as a causal system but DNA’s material causality
revolves around the specific proteins found in DNA. The fourfold analyses can then be applied to
a specific molecule, then particle, ad infinitum. We could do the same thing scaling up from ant
to hive and so on. We are back at the twin absolutes of chapter one because Aristotle’s fourfold
causality is an “infinity generator” that produces infinite regress. The outcome is ironic since
they emerge precisely out of philosophical warrants Aristotle had imposed to forestall infinite
regress in the first place. But because each thing must be itself and only itself, the relationship
between part and whole compels the Aristotelian thinker to produce higher order vagueness that
complies with the LNC and LEM.
Aristotle has two strange and seemingly contradictory, given the status of the PNC and
LEM, solutions to this infinite regress that come out once we start to trace how he deals with his
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own theory of causality when border cases, such as monsters or the Absolute, arise. On the one
hand, Aristotle does a typically Aristotelian thing by dividing the fourfold along two related
categories: the split between Absolute and Hypothetical necessity and their link to feminine and
masculine genders in hylomorphism. On the other hand, this link and its oddly gendered
implications become difficult to maintain when Aristotle starts to blend categories to deal with
borderline or paradoxical cases, such as the status of chance events within efficient causal chains
and the large number of accidents that crop up in the empirical side of his work.
The diathetic un-category that holds Aristotle’s apparent contradiction together is what
we might call a fifth category of causality named chance, but that cannot be a category since it
flaunts the requirements of identity within Aristotelian causality, without which no thing can be a
substance and, therefore, a category. The important relationships to track out in what follows
bear directly on our coming discussions of Leibniz, Bergson, and Deleuze. All three philosophers
mirror and diverge from Aristotle in ways that are valuable because they indicate the thinker’s
odd recalcitrance to material causality and the oddly gendered features of their philosophies, and
help us understand their positions on communication and rhetoric. “Deleuzians,” in particular,
should be interested in the following because it suggests, despite the rage against Aristotle-theessentialist that Deleuze undertakes in Chapter three of Difference and Repetition, that Deleuze
does not finally break with the Aristotelian cosmology nearly as much as he claims. This lack of
breakage emerges most clearly when he maintains the LNC in his reading of extensity vs.
intensity and the virtual vs. the actual. This tendency also becomes an acute problem in Badiou’s
reading of Deleuze in which the virtual scales up into a totalizing force or set of all sets over all
Being.
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The Aristotelian fourfold is further complicated by an anterior division Aristotle makes
between the necessary and contingent that informs the division of the necessary into absolute and
Hypothetical necessities. John Dudley explains: “Aristotle defines the necessary as that which
cannot not be.” 100 But Aristotle’s notions of hypothetical and absolute necessities somewhat
boggle the mind because, without his broader cosmology in view, the way it maps onto the
fourfold appears counterintuitive. In general, Efficient and Material causes follow Absolute
necessity and follow from the Absolute unqualified ground of the unmoved mover insomuch as
they comply with the final cause of becoming, striving for perfection, and the usual properties of
their substances. In distinction, final and formal causes are hypothetical and follow from the
contingent will of either the unmoved mover’s absolute positioning of substance or the sort of
causal break, or free will, presented by human endeavors. We will see how these distinctions
becomes muddy and how, in that ambiguity, they reveal a key fact about Aristotelian causality:
when pushed to its limits it exhibits surprisingly gendered qualities and a surprising uncertainty
about indeterminism.
With respect to Absolute Necessity, Dudley continues: “Absolute necessity is the
necessity belonging to eternal things… Thus the necessity in mathematics is absolute necessity,
e.g. since a straight line is what it is, it is necessary that the angles of a triangle should be equal
to two right angles.” 101 Things that follow from Absolute necessity must always happen.
Aristotle will hardly be the last of our philosophers to ground a strict mode of necessity in the
ideals of and illusion of mathematical purity. This move works well with the LNC and LEM
because most maths exemplify the ideal purity in which many thinkers want to found their
theories of reality. Material and efficient causality, when operating within the bounds of what
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nature intends, are considered to have Absolute necessity. 102 This attribution logically follows
from Aristotle’s cosmology, splitting the universe into lunar and sublunar realms, but requires a
further division into qualified and unqualified absolute necessity. The chain of qualified absolute
necessity is grounded in the Unmoved Mover who starts the universe’s motion; this entity has
unqualified absolute necessity because no external cause was applied to it to affect its movement
by efficient causality. 103 The unmoved mover’s absolute and unqualified necessity grounds the
qualified necessity of three interrelated processes: (1) “the heavenly bodies and… their
movement…” 104 (2) becoming itself “because becoming is eternal…” 105 (3) the absolute
necessity of the final cause of striving for perfection: “The eternal cycle of generation and decay
is an imitation of – resulting from a striving for – the eternal active rest of the Unmoved
Mover.” 106 It is in this backhanded way that material and efficient causality possess absolute
necessity: they only do so when they comply with the expected course of an unqualified
necessity in the form of a final absolute cause in the striving for the perfection of the Unmoved
Mover.
To understand what happens when material causality and efficient causality do not
comply with this universal finality, we must first understand hypothetical necessity with regards
to formal and final causality and its connection to the unmoved mover. Dudley explains:
“Hypothetical or conditional necessity is the necessity of the means once the end (final or formal
cause) is given.” 107 Hypothetical necessity introduces a moment of contingency within entities
that can will or have purpose in the sense of being self-moving: these things are not absolutely
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necessary in the same way as a rock falling or the sun orbiting the earth. Hypothetical necessity
tracks what is required once a choice has been made: a rock may drop from absolute necessity if
it rolls off a hill, but the absolute necessity of gravity may join human will in hypothetical
necessity if someone chooses to pick up and drop a rock. Formal and Final causality, shape and
purpose, are the two kinds of cause that fall under hypothetical causality because a thing’s shape
and its purpose derive from contingent choices in some entity that has a self-moving will
capacity within it.
When we push the hypothetical and absolute modes of causality up against Aristotle’s
cosmology, strange things happen with the unmoved mover: “The final causality of the unmoved
mover also operates on all living beings, including plants, in the sublunar area, but without
producing absolutely necessary results.” 108 Were the chain of causality perfect in the sense of
mathematical unqualified absolute necessity, unusual occurrences could not happen, but we
know they do happen because of monsters and mutations. 109 Aristotle allows that, while these
things cannot be studied scientifically because they do not always or usually occur, there is a
sense in which the universe is replete with usual amounts of unusual occurrences. 110 It appears as
though the final causality set by the unmoved mover actually requires an anterior mode of
indeterminacy or chaos, that Aristotle will locate precisely in material causality, to prevent the
universe from becoming hard determinist and governed by unqualified absolute necessity. We
have a strange situation in which an uncaused cause must cause something its cause cannot fully
overdetermine.
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The connection of this to the Liar’s Paradox comes immediately to mind. The Liar’s
Paradox describes a family of paradoxes, such as the sentence “this statement is false,” and can
be submitted to the same kind of inclosure paradox analysis undertaken earlier. In short, the
statement resolves in a dialetheia in which it is both true and false, indicating that such paradoxes
have a constitutive dimension in which undecidability becomes logically productive because of,
instead of, in spite of, the statement’s ambiguity. This kind of ambiguity operates at the juncture
between hypothetical and absolute causality in Aristotle: the unmoved mover as the sole cause
without external cause of the universe appears to have caused indeterminacy under the guise of
an absolute material causality that it cannot directly cause. Put differently, Aristotelian causality
does not logically cohere without material causality understood as an active, as opposed to
merely passive, form of causality; a strange indeterminism and a fifth form of causality is thus
introduced under the guise of the “accidental cause.”
Monsters are accidental substances 111 and because they are substances, both in the cases
of spontaneous generation of an entire organism or the monstrous in what we modern readers
would call mutation, they “seek the full perfection of their form and therefore belong to
nature…” 112 Regardless of whether we are dealing with spontaneous generation, mutation, or
mythic creatures, the monstrous occurs when a substance arises via essential definition, but that
also in some way defies the formal or final causality typical to its kind.113 Dudley explains:
“Thus what occurs contrary to the usual in nature is monstrous. It is possible, in the case of the
female, for nature not to achieve its end in a way that is usual. In this case Aristotle speaks of a
natural deformity.” 114 A child with a mutation is monstrous; a deer jumping out of sea foam is

Ibid, 166.
Ibid, 184.
113
Ibid, 167.
114
Ibid, 192.
111
112

65
monstrous; my own fibromyalgia and bipolar type II are monstrous because they emerged from
me and subvert the formal and final causality of the usual human psyche striving for perfection.
Aristotle’s explanation of how such chance substances arise 115 uses misogynist
hylomorphism to preserve the logical and purposive texture of his cosmology: monsters arise
when the masculine causality found within the formal or final causality that influences the
development of kinds cannot master the “passive not recalcitrant” feminine causality found
within material causality. 116 Finally, I am fully become a monster! This configuration reflects
earlier formulations found in, for example, Plato’s Timaeus: “Reason (the Demiurge) has to
prevail over Necessity (the resistance to order in matter).” 117 We are confronted with a strange
solution to the apparent Liar’s Paradox of the Unmoved Mover: a force must actively subvert the
absolute causality found in material causal forces such that the unmoved mover’s final causality
does not absolutely determine reality. This theory is thoroughly misogynist and ableist, but when
we start to read monsters against accidents and then scale back up to Aristotle’s entire
cosmology, we can subvert and remedy this problem by fully embracing the sort of chance
causality and indeterminism implied elsewhere in Aristotelian accounts.
Accidents tend to be qualities that elude local efficient causal chains: “Thus those aspects
of the material cause (the matter) or of the operation of the efficient cause on the matter, where
they do not contribute to the accomplishment of the form or final cause, are accidental to it.” 118
Aristotle often uses the example of the essential purpose of the eye against its accidental color to
demonstrate this point. 119 The purpose or final cause of the eye is seeing, not having a color,
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such that any purpose through exaptation, such as cultural meanings attached to eye color, are
secondary to the metaphysically primary final cause in eyes seeing. This relies upon the essential
// accidental distinction outlined in the Aristotle the Essentialist section, but one can now sense
that the distinction Aristotle uses to distribute the singular and ordinary relies on a cosmology in
which the universe follows from a final telos of categorical rationality. Usual accidents, like
having a blue eye, join monsters “in the category of accidents of that which has a purpose, i.e.
accidents arising from the development of natural substances.” 120
And yet, there are also unusual accidents, though the role of these in mapping out the
contours of Aristotle’s theory of causality at an ontological level are strained. Do only usual
unusual eye colors count? Are heterochromatic eyes a form of a monstrous accident? Dudley
admits that “for Aristotle the question of determinism and of contingency depends on
epistemological considerations.” 121 The question of a usual accident, someone having a blue eye,
against an unusual accident, the coincidence of meeting someone you owe money to at market
when you went to go grocery shopping, 122 clearly places the distinction in an epistemological
register. The usual against the unusual accident depends upon human perception and categorical
rationality and, thus, ties back into Aristotle’s doxastic methodology that seeks to explain the
universe from the opinions of the common and the wise. We might even go so far as to read the
final telos of the unmoved mover as a projection of this form of rationality into the heart of
Being as such.
When we attempt to translate this distinction from an epistemological in a fully
ontological register, things get weird. On the one hand, we could fall back on Aristotle’s full

Ibid, 127.
Ibid, 317.
122
Ibid, 165.
120
121

67
LNC and LEM essentialism to argue that an accident that appears unusual must actually have a
firm causal chain that we simply cannot perceive because of epistemological limitations, but is
fully real and waiting for us to discover at the ontological level. Unusual accidents are just
categories of substance we have not yet figured out in the great determinist chain of essential
being. On the other hand, when we bring monsters back into the equation and speculate upon
how the new emerges in Aristotle, we can see that Aristotle’s categories of substance depend on
a prior materialist indeterminacy, such that rationality always depends on a background
condition of irrationality found in blunt material existence. Accidents cannot have a purpose
because they are not substances; monsters are substances and, thus, have a purpose after the fact
of their emergence, but violate the conceptual unity of their kind through their imperfection. In a
sense, then, monsters are novel modulations of substance whose novelty depends on their strange
mixture of accidental qualities, where they only appear monstrous against the background
distribution Aristotle sets up in his essentialist mode between the essential and the accidental.
The monstrous is the emergence of the new beyond the purpose of becoming, of striving to reach
the conceptual perfection embodied by the Unmoved Mover. A strange causal loop emerges in
which final and formal causality appear less as anterior and solid modes of causality and more as
future tendencies that will never be perfectly embodied by sublunar striving entities in a division
of the universe into the rational and irrational.
Dudley does not go this far but provides the necessary materials to do so when he
discusses “accidental causality” and the relationship between the lunar world of telos and
rational category against the sublunar world of striving and imperfection. The relationship
between category-based perfection and the world we experience follows: “The final causality of
the Prime Mover does not necessitate the events that occur in the sublunar world, but merely the
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general orientation of the sublunary world (repetition of kinds of events).” 123 This repetition has
no logical meaning without a different kind of repetition beneath it that produces drives the
unusual occurrences without which the order would have no logical meaning.
It is in this sense I find it curious that Deleuze so marginalizes Aristotelian thought when
it appears that the sort of repetition of the different that Deleuze theorizes was already a
necessary constituent of a logical rendering of Aristotelian cosmology. This unusual occurrence
emerges in two places. The first we have talked about at length, when there is no logical
conclusion between the hypothetical cause and the material cause, and a monstrous substance
emerges. The second is a kind of causality that cannot be causality under the regime of the LNC
alongside essentialist identity because it is causality as unexpected difference that inheres in
efficient causality:
…Aristotle, in identifying the cause of a chance event, turns immediately to the per se or
substantial (efficient) cause. He does not classify an accident contrary to expectation
under one of the four causes, but views it as a separate kind of cause an ‘accidental cause’
which comes to inhere in the [efficient cause] when the chance event occurs (i.e. is
perceived to be a chance event.) 124
Slippages in the transmission or communication of the final telos of Being, into the passive but
not recalcitrant material register, can derive from an imperfection in the transmission through
efficient causality: the spark of a monstrous substance, a thing that does not comply with
category until part of nature, can be said to derive from accidental causality at an ontological
level. The Aristotelian fourfold depends upon a presumed yet hidden non-causality named “the
accidental cause,” found when the hypothesis of final or formal causality does not match up with
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the results to explain how new categories of substance come into Being. We might even push the
argument as far as to say that a necessary irrationality, indeterminism, or chaos underlies the
conceptual, categorical, and ordered Aristotelian universe without which emergence and
substantial change would be inconceivable. The chains of LNC and LEM reasoning that push
outwards towards the twin absolutes found in the ant diagram resolve with the production of
something more than a dialetheism: they resolve with an immanent indeterminism.
This attention to Aristotle is not digression since it stages several vital problems that
recur later in the thesis. The first deals with philosophical methodology itself. Anyone who has
read chapter three of Difference and Repetition by Deleuze would doubtlessly view Aristotle as
an ancient fuddy-duddy, so bonded to the concept of identity that he could think nothing else.
Aristotle’s fourfold causality teeters on doubts precipitated by a strain of indeterminism
connected to material causality and chance in his work: theories of order and identity invariably
produce chaos and non-identity when pushed to their logical extent. Against the dialetheic
response in which a thing both is and is not itself, a diffractive sense that previews Karen Barad
emerges in which a thing both is itself and is others, a view that in a positive way doesn’t rely on
a dialectic grounded in a reified conceptual absence. In this sense, Aristotle previews both the
retrospective and prospective illusions alongside the solution to them that this project advocates.
With regards to the retrospective illusion, Aristotle projects an anterior and causally
dominant reified human logic as the totalization of the universe with his unmoved mover who
sets the general telos of all Being. The world becomes dominated by a sense of active
determination that functions parallel to consciousness’ subjective determination of the object.
With regards to the prospective illusion, Aristotle does something truly bizarre with his theory of
the sublunar world of striving and becoming. The apparent order and telos of the universe can
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never obtain because their absolution is forever deferred to the future. Perfection only attains in
the formal and final causes forever deferred as potentially emergent in the future, but not
determinative from the past. In both cases of projective illusion, the sort of hierarchy and purity
found in human conceptualization becomes the determining orientation of being and becoming.
As we will see, this double projection also well maps onto the two dominate trends of rhetorical
theory and criticism. Ideological critique retrospectively projects an ideology that is its own
cause and effect; new materialist rhetorical theory backloads potentiality to project a never
attained actuality in the future. Both must be disputed in terms of the LEM because they exclude
the messy, materialist, and indeterminate middle which we live in and experience in favor of
conceptual purity as totalized projection.
Second, we see that Aristotle, despite his acknowledgement of an anterior materialismindeterminism required to explain the appearance of rationality in Being, does his absolute best
to marginalize it in favor of identity/substance, ideality in the formal and final causes, and, in so
doing, attaches a strangely misogynist and ableist hierarchy to this causality. When it comes to
material causality, this pattern repeats time and time again. Philosophy, even accounts of
difference as in Deleuze, does its best to project a human sense of rationality into Being and
Becoming through different philosophical warrants, particularly the Law of Noncontradiction,
that presumes while erasing an anterior chaos within Being. Categorial and Western thought has
hierarchical consequences baked into its very notion of the distribution of the singular and
ordinary or the essential and the accidental. What is judged essential follows from a construal of
logic in which determination follows from logical categories more so than messy empirical
investigation or even creation.
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Finally, the foregoing analysis of Aristotle confirms something strange is underway in the
relationship between material and accidental causality and the ontological foundations of
communication itself. When the communication or causality found in the efficient cause is
incapable -of failing or of partial determination, the universe oddly flattens out into a hard
determinist world where conviction as coercion predominates, and persuasion drops out of the
picture. Put differently, without the genuine ontological capacity for things to have been
otherwise we end up in a universe in which communication is mere epiphenomenon to the
movement of substances in their essential sense. Communication studies in a universe
determined by an absolutely necessary totality without some materialist remainder would be
better figured as a mode of information science than a rhetoric which requires genuine
contingency to make sense.
Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Leibniz articulates the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relationship to the Law of
Noncontradiction in “The Monadology”:
31. Our reasonings are based on two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of
which we judge that which involves a contradiction to be false, and that which is opposed
or contradictory to the false to be true (sec 44, 169).
32. And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true
or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus
and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us (sec
44, 196). 125
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Leibniz goes on to delimit two different modalities of truth that correspond to each of these laws
and the key with extending his philosophical warrants to the ant metaphor deals with this split by
clarifying the different registers of truth claim: “The truths of reasoning [those derived from the
Law of Noncontradiction] are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact [those
derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason] are contingent, and their opposite is
possible.” 126 The “truths of reasoning” take on a decidedly mathematical bent when one
considers the possible and the impossible, whereas the “truths of fact” reproduce the same
problem illustrated by our ant chart, where contingent facts presuppose a long chain of other
contingent facts.
A question arises: what happens to these truth categories when they are pushed to their
logical limit, run aground in infinite regress, thus delimiting the relationship of one to another.
Leibniz’s cosmological solution to this relationship pushes Aristotelian essentialism to its logical
limit by establishing eternal structures that suture both sides of the absolute to the messy middle;
Leibniz essentially maintains the Law of Excluded Middle by universalizing the Law of
Noncontradiction through his speculative cosmology, bounded on one side by an all-powerful,
knowing, and good God and on the other by the Monad. The messy middle becomes the
excluded and inessential by a spatializing trick in which God has chosen one configuration of
universe against all other potential configurations at the level of universal essence.
In fleshing this out, let us start with the two kinds of truths. Simon Duffy explains them
in this fashion: “While 2 + 2 = 4 occurs in all time and in all places, and is therefore a necessary
truth, the proposition that ‘Adam sinned’ is specifically dated, i.e., Adam will sin in a particular
place at a particular time. It is therefore a truth of existence, and, as will be demonstrated, a
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contingent truth.” 127 The Necessary Truths are simple enough at face value: they are the
conclusions of logic and mathematics that cannot be otherwise. We could, of course, start to push
on Leibniz and wonder whether or not, for example, all branches of mathematics can be
theoretically unified, as Albert Lautman would later attempt, but for the moment we can set that
aside and let simple arithmetic do the trick. But contingent truths are trickier: “There is an
infinity of past and present shapes and motions that enter into the efficient cause of my present
writing, and there is an infinity of small inclinations and dispositions of my soul, present and
past, that enter into its final cause.” 128 On the one hand, contingent truths are shaped by
contingent events of position and qualities that might have happened otherwise. On the other
hand, a relationship does seem to exist between the final causality Leibniz positions on the side
of the absolutely necessary, for him the “best of all possible worlds” situation, and contingent
everyday events. It appears we must revert to the ant chart with its problems of infinite regress
and progress. Leibniz, not unlike Aristotle, resorts to positing an entire metaphysics with an
associated cosmology to solve this problem while maintaining the law of noncontradiction at a
universal level.
Leibniz follows a familiar pattern to resolve this ambiguity by casting a concept beyond
all empirical explication as the first cause of the chain of sufficiency from both absolutes.
Following Aristotle’s essentialism, he denies the potentiality of material causality through
indeterminacy by grounding a never-ending chain of efficient causality in an absolute finality: “It
must be the case that the sufficient or ultimate reason is outside the sequence or series of this
multiplicity of contingencies, however infinite it may be… This is what we call God (Theod.
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Sec. 7).” 129 This division of causality into Sufficient and Necessary, a warrant that often recurs in
the philosophical tradition, extends the division of soul and body into Being itself: “79. Souls act
according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according
to the laws of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each other.” 130 It
appears that the contingency the Principle of Sufficient Reason speculates is merely
epistemological: it is only contingency for us as imperfect observers of reality, but has no
ontological existence because it has already been grounded in God’s final causality.
Leibniz grounds this division at both ends of the Absolute: the actual infinity that only
God enacts and comprehends at one end, chosen from the set of all potential absolute infinities or
worlds, coupled with the infinitesimal monad or simple substance that expresses all other Being
as a part of its continuous fabric, and from a minute perspective. 131 The monad’s substance and
infinitesimal perspective on Being are set by God such that both ends of the Absolute follow
from the god-totality. Deleuze usefully provides a matheme for this relationship: “The individual
notion, the monad, is exactly the inverse of God to the degree that reciprocals are numbers that
exchange their numerator and their denominator: 2, of 2/1 has as a reciprocal ½. And God,
whose formula is ∞/1, has as its reciprocal the monad, 1/∞.” 132 Put differently, God as

Absolute Infinity and immanent will selects from potentially infinite series of worlds one world
within which each monad is that world from one perspective, from one series that converges with
universal finality. To attempt to put this in an everyday register, Leibniz nails, well before its
time, the famous feeling many people get on acid in which their consciousness is the biggest
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thing they will ever experience, but also just a tiny portion of the world by being a perspective on
the whole.
Predictably, trouble sets in at the precise juncture in the pattern where it set in for
Descartes’ reasoning: presuming we have these two orders of things, an absolute series selected
and imbued with the final causality of god and an infinitely small perspective on it tethered to a
body… how do monads and their bodies interact? The answer is metaphysical: “The monad is
prior to the multiplicity that constitutes the body, and the monad exists phenomenally only
through the body it constitutes.” 133 Here, Leibniz resorts to a strange immanence in which the
Monad still has causal anteriority despite only being identifiable through its phenomenal
existence. For us, the Monad is a logically necessary idealist projection required by Leibniz’s
construal of cosmology beyond the physical body to guarantee its substance beyond the
phenomenal change of attributes. Monads guarantee phenomenal things their identity, but in a
different way than Aristotelian essentialism because monads are predicated upon their
infinitesimal difference in perspective from one another alongside their ultimate convergence
into God’s finality. Leibniz reverses the materialist order of causality such that the phenomenal
is projection, whereas the ideal is the real: “What to each monad is its everyday spatio-temporal
reality is to Leibniz a phenomenal projection, which is only rendered intelligible when it is
understood to reflect the mathematical order that determines the structure of Leibniz’s
metaphysics.” 134 Leibniz bases his understanding of reality in the necessity of the final causality
of God in producing the best of all possible worlds such that the harmony of a given world is
determined at the level of final causality such that the phenomenal friction between and
extension of monads are contingent illusions that have no effect on the universe’s telos. Leibniz
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goes much further than Aristotle here: there is no free will as a category nor indeterminacy to
support the emergence of novelty in any meaningful way within a given universe because God
has already made all of the Monads.
Let’s try to make Leibniz fit in our nice Ant-Variable Charts and talk about the tendency
shared by him and Aristotle against material causality and the moral implications that result:

Figure 5. Produced by author.

Where Aristotle the essentialist comfortably projects an ideal being at any level of scale, Leibniz
follows infinite progress and regress at the level of the universe to support the existence of a God
who chooses among variations on the universe to place us in the best possible universe. Genuine
ontological contingency in the middle is projected outward and spatialized into all possible
universes, but with agency resting on the side of the Absolute because the contingency of the
middle is an epistemological illusion. Properly speaking, the little line between Yy and Xx
represents the modality of the formal cause in Leibniz or “The Law of Continuity” stipulating
that monads, regardless of their body’s spatial-phenomenal orientation, exist in a continuous
membrane such that their infinitesimal perspectives on the universe gel within God’s final
causality for this best possible universe.
Strictly speaking, Monads commune but do not communicate. Monads are infinitesimal
perspectives on all other monads and all at once; they are the universe in miniature from a point
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of view such that they each have a perspective on each other but do not interact with each other
in a phenomenal sense. Phenomenal appearances act out the scripts of their monads in contingent
ways that do not affect their substance; their substance is set in harmony with all other
substances by God. Aristotle stops at assigning the everyday observable world, sublunar being
for him, a general orientation in terms of striving for the categorical perfection stipulated by the
unmoved mover. This motion allows for indeterminacy and genuine chance events to produce
the emergence of novelty and supports communication between things, in the rupture of efficient
causality, as capable of bringing the new into being. Leibniz has none of this: infinitesimal
differences among monads have already been predetermined by God such that the universe is in
perfect harmony and converges necessarily towards God’s telos no matter the phenomenological
illusions that might suggest otherwise. The new and the emergent are but perspective errors that
confuse a phenomenological and contingent iteration with the mathematical substance that
always already contained it.
The Leibnizian system has strange consequences for communication:
However, among monads there is no direct communication. Instead, each dominant
monad or individual subject is harmonized in such a way that what it expresses forms a
common compossible world that is continuous and converges with what is expressed by
the other monads. So it is necessary that the monads are in harmony with one another, in
fact the world is nothing other than the preestablished harmony among monads. 135
Communication between monads does not exist because of the pre-existing and determining final
causality of the universe as set by God: communication shifts to a sort of universal communion
through this pre-established and divine harmony. The relationship between the middle that we
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live in and the Absolute becomes clear. The invisible Absolute that is logically necessary for
Leibniz sets the essential rules of communion such that any act of communication is merely the
expression of friction between two monad’s phenomenal extensions but has neither agency nor
causal priority in interaction. The traditional rhetorical notion of persuasion in which a moment
of genuine contingency between some number of agents becomes determined through the
consequences of speech and the genuine free will of the agents involved becomes an ontological
impossibility. Speech, individual agency, and persuasion become illusory epiphenomenon to the
monads simply expressing their final causality and anterior conviction determined by their
emergence from God.
Rhetorical theories focused on the manifestation of a speech thing from an anterior pool
of infinite potentials a an anterior structure, not unlike Deleuze’s Virtual, can err on the side of
Leibniz by sacrificing the contingency and indeterminism of persuasion for an information
science of probabilities that indicates a communion of the preestablished such that change only
derives from a mode of coercion-conviction and is only ever apparent change between potential
differences in a metaphysical set of all sets. Things and things rhetorical in this model change
their states based upon efficient causality almost entirely because of the constitution of their
internal states: we become a communication studies in which audience is the determining factor
in our analysis of all other parts, text, rhetor, and context. Such a conception of communicative
process may be reasonable, but it would certainly force us to make decisions about what
methodologies are best suited to an information science of communication beyond one of more
traditional modes of persuasion that presume at least the possibility of genuine ontological
contingency. This is an issue we will revisit more fully in chapters three and four.
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For now, let us read Leibniz against Aristotelian causality to see precisely how this
formulation differs and what its ethical consequences are: Leibniz sacrifices any agency or
indeterminacy in material causality to form a fully determined and masculine universal finality in
which only substances possess causality and all causality is an active force. Far from Aristotle,
who must presume some countervailing force to explain the new and the usually unusual,
Leibniz eliminates material causality to reduce the Aristotelian fourfold to a set of three: “Three
species of cause: efficient causes (in accordance with laws of mind and active forces), final
causes (in accordance with the law of appetites and ultimately God’s aim of universal and
maximum harmony), and formal causes (in accordance with the Law of Continuity).” 136 This
shift follows Aristotle’s attempt to deny accidents any causal mode to let only substance have
causality, but does so by removing chance as an ontological force and by positing a fully final
and absolutely necessary determined universe by way of divine fiat. Chance events through
human perception in Aristotle are merely epistemological mistakes; monsters do not arise
because material causality does not exist. Were it to exist, Leibniz’s cosmology would fall apart
because there would be some force that is capable of subverting the all-powerful, all knowing,
and all good God such that we might not live in the best of all possible worlds and God,
therefore, could not be all good. One wonders whether it was logical necessity that pushes
Leibniz to his Absolute God in the first place.
It becomes difficult, with Leibniz as with any philosopher, to tell what ontological
premises derive from logical necessity and which from moral conviction. An oddly masculine,
along the traditional misogynist logic of the active and the passive, ensues: “Leibniz defines
‘efficient cause’ as ‘active cause… The purely passive cannot do anything unless it is acted

136

Marc Bobro, “Leibniz on Causation,” 13.

80
upon. At times, Leibniz seems to think that only the truly active exists…’” 137 Leibniz appears to
have absorbed elements of Aristotle’s misogynist theory, wrapped it in the language of the active
against the passive, and pushed it to its logical extent by eliminating all impotence in causal
transmission or agency on the side of a material which is acted upon. There are no partial chains
of causality in which a kind of ontological disagreement or friction produce the new as
monstrous; there are only failsafe efficient causes that transmit God’s final causality in the form
of continuity into the universe. Of course, Leibniz was not a hylozoist; he was a Christian who
believed the life of all things becomes the life imbued by God. Philosophy that does not
recognize creation’s divine providence in Leibniz mode defies the will of this God. Leibniz
positions materialist philosophies as having moral consequences in a letter to “the Princess of
Wales”: “that next to corruption of manners, the principles of the materialists do very much
contribute to keep up impiety.” 138 Materialists’ “impiety” derives from insufficiently extending
the metaphysical precepts found in the Law of Noncontradiction and the Principle of Sufficient
Reason into philosophy in a deductive sense such that they would resolve into a Christian
understanding of the all-powerful, all knowing, and all good God. 139 The traces of the feminine
as material causality from Aristotle are present: were a material causality to exist, the entire
universe could exert a feminine causality not unlike Eve’s in the garden that subverts the final
causality of the masculine God. Such a cause cannot exist because passive bodies as traditionally
conceived do not exist, in the strong reading, or exert, in the lighter reading, causal force in the
Leibnizian universe.
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An incredible and strange set of ethical precepts follows from the erasure of material
causality: “88. This harmony leads things to grace through the very paths of nature. For example,
this globe must be destroyed and restored by natural means at such times as the governing of
minds requires it, for the punishment of some and the reward of others (sec. 18 & seq., 110, 244
,245, 340).” 140 Yet, this universal requirement for punishment arises from the predestination of
monads or souls qualities from the very final causality of God himself: good and evil become
strained in a fully harmonized universe. Punishment becomes not an ethical question to argued,
but an ontological requirement set by the arrangement of the universe. We do not necessarily
need recourse to arguments about the Active and the Passive to see that Leibniz’s totalization of
Being under his divine Absolute has extremely questionable consequences.
Leibniz deals with the paradoxes that inherently result from thought’s infinite series by
totalizing the series under the will of an Absolute God, such that the world is a continuous
membrane of monads, infinitesimal local perspectives on all other perspectives, the substance
that determines phenomenal being’s false appearance of contingency. While Leibniz shifts the
ground slightly from Aristotelian notions of identity by shifting the defining feature of Monads
to infinitesimal difference, his erasure of ontologically agentive materiality, indeterminacy, and
passivity pose serious questions for theories of rhetoric that consciously or unconsciously follow
from scholars indebted to Leibniz, such as Deleuze. Two readings of Deleuze suffer from the
problems we have found with Leibniz: that of Badiou and DeLanda. As we will see later in
looking at DeLanda’s Deleuze, Deleuze’s notion of singularities is greatly indebted to Leibniz’s
Monads, although Deleuze manages to find space for divergent series such that the Best Possible
World need not obtain. In Badiou’s Deleuze, the problem takes form in the totalization of the
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virtual into an anterior existing and causally efficacious Absolute infinity. In both cases,
Deleuze’s concepts fold to analysis within the Inclosure Paradox and produce results
unsatisfactory to a philosophy of communication or theory of rhetoric aiming to ground itself in
persuasion and, therefore, the possibility of genuine ontological contingency.
Jankélévitch’s Bergson and the Retrospective Illusion
Jankèlèvich’s noted book on Bergson nicely encapsulates two interrelated intellectuallinguistic predispositions towards the kind of infinite regress we have occupied ourselves with so
far that nonetheless fail properly to address the question because of their spatialization of
temporality: “the illusion of retrospectivity” and “the idols of distance.” 141 These are novel
philosophical structures that point to a deficiency in a particular modality of transcendental
reasoning through which one starts with a concept and makes active and subjective
determinations on an object set (as other to the subject) in order to create a chain of necessary
conditions that explain the conceptualization. I do not believe Bergson claims that all
transcendental reasoning is by necessity flawed, for after all, he makes use of his finding of
duration in human memory as a shared feature of all Being in Creative Evolution.
Bergson’s own transcendental reasoning operates more in terms of attempting to find the
passive syntheses that operate prior to active determination. For Bergson, the intuition of what he
calls “Duration” or the inextricability of the past from the present is the key passive synthesis
that must be recognized so that transcendental reasoning possesses a sufficient ground for active
synthesis. In a sense, Bergson renders his ontological assumptions explicit such that the intuition
of duration functions as the dominant philosophical warrant for why each step of transcdendental
reasoning functions. Of course, as we will see when we look at Bergson’s method more closely,
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older philosophical warrants, particularly the Law of Noncontradiction, remain operative in his
methodology. When philosophers and theorists are not fully conscious of these ontological
assumptions at the level of argument itself or in the connection between warrants and ontology
problems can ensue.
This problem operates with what I will call projective reasoning, both in the retrospective
and prospective senses found in Bergson and Deleuze. Identifying retrospective argument’s
structure and assumptions provides a valuable critical tool for metanalyses within a field because
doing so allows the field to break circular reasoning between the forces that account for behavior
associated with the field and the field’s conceptual reifications of the tendencies of this behavior.
Bergson recommends an intuitive methodology that approaches each problem as new so that all
assumptions must themselves be explained to remedy this problem, but whether his own solution
and work truly escapes this illusion or merely displaces it will be a question for the next section.
For now, let us get into detail about what these twin illusions are, how they work, and provide
examples of the process with regards to infinite regress in everyday life and within academic
disciplines, particularly rhetoric.
Jankèlèvich sums up the first of the two illusions: “The retrospective illusion consists in
leaving what is in the making, in placing oneself after the fact, and in performing, a posteriori, a
little justificatory reconstruction thanks to which belated abstractions become primitive only
because they are simple and poor.” 142 The retrospective illusion describes a fundamental
philosophical orientation predicated upon mechanistic philosophies, 143 but its full implications
do not emerge without the second mistaken habit, which is to leverage how these “belated
abstractions” are actually reified images of thought more so than movements in becoming.
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This idea is important, and also is the essential flaw of the retrospective illusion: it
substitutes a fully spatialized modality of causality in which partial causality fades in favor of
primary efficient causes that are determinative in the last instance. In this sense, mechanistic
causality resembles an executive ball clicker in which the pendulum clearly isolates mechanical
causality from a messier reality and the material causality it is inextricable from. The key is the
realization that the ball clicker is itself an apparatus that is highly selective. The “idols of
distance” describe “the false perspective of intellectualism [that] derives largely from the fact
that the mind perpetually splits, it projects an image of its own activity away from itself in order
to contemplate it objectively.” 144 The faulty mode of transcendental reasoning splits off some
human concept assumed to be natural, makes an object of it, and then engages in a series of
transcendental steps in the guise of active subjective determinations to find that the reified
abstraction is its own cause.
The idea of the ball clicker is an apt physical metaphor: the entire apparatus is designed
to isolate a mechanistic motion that it, as a physical model, well draws out. For every action
there is an equal and opposite reaction. The ball clicker isolates both action and reaction through
its very construction, though action and reaction past simple systems cannot be viewed so
simply. In parallel fashion, “The Idol of Distance” draws out the thing to be explained by
separating it from its environment such that the causal lineage appears simple. “The
Retrospective Illusion” then attempts to explain for the reified concept’s emergence in terms of
dominant active cause and can succeed only by ignoring the causal efficacy and multimodality of
the concept’s referent in its empirical environment.
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Among the most important examples of this process in Bergson, as his critique of
nothingness and spatialized time are the basis for his theory of Duration, deals with attempting to
consider time for itself beyond the limits of a mechanized universe. Bergson accomplishes this
by theorizing time as organism or organistic in a positive sense that denies the constitutive
necessity of nothing, which he dismisses as a human fantasy within quantity that we
retrospectively project behind any active synthesis of transcendental reasoning. This process has
two aspects with regards to nothing in spatial boundaries and this nothing’s influence on the
conceptualization of time. Nothing is nothing more than a reification of the absence of number,
an absence that cannot be empirically verified or produced anywhere in the universe. 145 When
we can find no empirical referent for a reified conceptualization or the referent for the
conceptualization is a messy aggregate, we can be relatively sure we are off on a “Retrospective
Illusion.” These illusions frequently arise when the logical maneuver of part-for-whole is
deployed. Looking at how Bergson’s critique works gives a particular body to the schema of the
twin illusions in their formalized state and sets out important ontological arguments that persist
across the entire project. These illusions combine to create a quantized spatialization of time that
manifests in the analytic and retrospective division of an object to account for its being by
unmanifested possibilities of it’s becoming out of nothingness. 146
Any number of scientific metaphors put forward in the guise of mechanistic theories can
help us understand this confusion of the infinitesimal point, the zero, or infinity with Being itself,
but we will, for now, focus on time as spatialized instant in Newtonian Mechanism. We can view
an instant of time as an infinitely small slice of a loaf of bread or as a single page of the book;
time itself and change become illusions because time is just a spatialized dimension in which we
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are trapped. Could we see the entire loaf of bread or the whole book, time and change as we
know it would not exist. This ontology makes causality relatively easy; when we analyze past
occurrences to explain them in the future, we explain each page of the book by reconstructing the
pages that came before it to the best of our ability, often never realizing that this very
methodology relies on our already existing assumptions of mechanized time and the Law of
Noncontradiction as applied to these temporal slices. Hard determinism is the necessary
outcomes of this worldview: when we push each instant of time into another and regress is
introduced, we will inevitably push for a fully spatialized and eternal temporal dimension in
which change is illusory.
In a sense, we have already observed this process happen arise in Leibniz’s totalization of
the universe under God’s command, with some complications. Leibniz projects all modalities of
difference in cosmological makeup out into an infinite series of minutely different universes,
thus adding a layer of cardinality to the fully spatialized universe of Newtonian Mechanism.
However, the spatialization trick is the same: The universe is fully determined by the
mathematical causality of God, and the appearance of change in the phenomenal register is an
illusion. The entire configuration of the universe already exists; through scientific reconstructive
analysis we discover what has already been here and will be here in a flattened temporality in
which change and time are phenomenological illusions buried under idealist totalizations.
The imaginary fabrication of an absolute presence in the mathematical point model of the
present is the very construct that demands a negative, not as positive and negative number’s state
of contradiction, but the negation of Being itself, nothingness, to buttress the idea of a complete
one, an already completed infinite in which the universe and each moment within its spatialized
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temporality are coordinated. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, working through while pushing against
Bergson, puts a fine point on this problem, worth quoting at length:
We are not thinking of [nothing] as negative if we treat it as an ‘object of thought’ or try
to say what it is: that is to make of it a more subtle or more rarefied species of being, it is
to reintegrate it into being… more precisely, as calling for being in order to not be
nothing, and, as such, called forth by being as the sole supplement to being that would be
conceivable, a lack of being, but at the same time a lack that constitutes itself into a lack,
hence a fissure that deepens in the exact measure it is filled. 147
What Merleau-Ponty describes here addresses the infinite regress arising in philosophies that
invoke a causal nothing as they attempt to track out the logical links that we earlier described
with the name The Inclosure Paradox. At each logical link, nothing behaves as a necessary
logical projection, the next anterior step to a step filled by any positive being. Philosophies of
nothing becomes self-actualizing prophecies in which something must always arise from nothing
because nothing lurks beyond something at each step of reasoning. The Law of Noncontradiction
facilitates this process through implication: for being to have identity it must be strictly separable
from nothing and this separability grants nothingness an ontological status despite it being a
reified abstraction. We are presented an illusion that shores up shaky boundaries of Being
because beyond any given being there is its own illusory non-being that somehow guarantees the
initial Being’s determinate existence in the first place.
And yet, such maneuverers subvert our ability to conceptualize change and time.
Merleau-Ponty makes the connection to temporality explicit: “Thus to fill up the fissure is in
reality to deepen it, since the present one throws into it does not negate the negations that have

147

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 53. Italics in Original.

88
been or will be in their own time, and displaces them only by exposing itself to the same
imminent fate.” 148 What Merleau-Ponty gives us here recalls Graham Priest’s “Inclosure
Paradox” in which a limit becomes logically dialetheic; the point at which a thing both is and is
not itself. 149 In effect, we have two inclosure paradoxes that Merleau-Ponty outlines, both owing
their form to Bergson. On the one hand, nothing emerges as a truly imaginary signifier because
to measure it anywhere would automatically convert it into somethingness. Nothingness must
always be projected one step beyond the somethingness in an ontotheological sleight of hand. On
the other hand, the entire temporality of negative ontologies relies on Western notions of an
absolute and real present as real and the basis of our consciousness. The present is a strange
philosophical trap; our verb tenses support it as do our philosophies, but the absolute fullness of
the present is the very philosophical assumption that logically entails an absolute void. 150
Bergson places this apparent ontological dialetheia in a phenomenological register in his
analysis of the messy aggregate formed by perception and recollection: “What for me is this
present moment?... But there can be no question here of a mathematical instant. No doubt there is
an ideal present – a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future. But
the real, concrete, live present – that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception –
that present necessarily occupies a duration.” 151 For Bergson, the logical solution is to posit, at
first, a dialetheia resultant upon analytically condensing the thing in question into an impossible
point: the point at which past and present meet. Hence, for Bergson, the present is both itself and
is the past in the guise of duration. As with nothing in a spatialized sense, making precise the
present instant results in an infinite regress in which the present must be itself and not itself at the
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same time: “Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible
limit which divides the past from the future. When we think the present as going to be, it exists
not yet, and when we think it as existing, it is already past.” 152 The absolute present is a
mathematical point that is nothingness’ fantasy twin; the absolute present indicates a fullness
beyond all relation and nothingness an emptiness beyond all relation. Such concepts only acquire
logical necessity by adherence to a strong version of the Law of Noncontradiction at the level of
spatialized Being.
Let us provide a chart of the retrospective illusion to extend our arguments beyond
Bergson’s breaking of the nothing // something dialectic or messy aggregate into a more general
argument:

Figure 6. Produced by author.

In formalizing the retrospective illusion, and adding considerations from Priest’s
Inclosure Paradox, and considering each illusion as a set tending towards a potentially infinite
cardinality, a sense that the retrospective illusion can provide an interesting model of analytic
thought itself begins to emerge. When we project the reified abstraction, we have already done
an active synthesis that determines an object by taking part from whole or whole from part in a
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conceptual space. Working through some thought experiment examples will help us make the
consequences of the retrospective illusion more clear in the everyday case so that its
consequences can be analyzed with regards to social theory, including rhetorical theory.
The ant chart presented earlier itself contains a retrospective conceit: the movement of
synecdoche along a transcendental pattern that relies on mereological and active inference in the
guise of subjective determination drives the motion of thought as it attempts to determine the
spatial and then temporal boundaries of an ant towards the Absolute through both infinite regress
and progress. This process involves both the continuous thought-content we land on at each
lettered step, but it also involves some philosophical warrant by which each step holds logical
validity. The curious thing about the Law of Noncontradiction is that it necessitates each further
step in order to unify each new messy aggregate underneath some new dominant cause that is
logically distinct from the previous step. These steps are hidden to us when we fall into thought:
only by breaking thought up into the image of thought by thinking about thought do we explicate
these inferential steps in a new series of thought that we can diagram against its results as
objective determinations. In this sense, thought thinking thought cannot tie a knot that resolves in
only a string; thought about thought does not express thought as such, but only the image of
thought. I argue that there is no immanence of the model to the real, only perspectival partiality.
Certainly, the visual representation above, while diagraming the relevant features, falls
far short. It portrays the retrospective illusion as analytic determination in a single series; while
conscious thought can be theorized as such, we also know that the self-system does not stop with
single series and does not always work in a conscious register. For this reason, among many,
Bergson and in a fuller sense Deleuze, turn to elaborating the passive syntheses that underlie
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active subjective determination. However, whether their thought adheres more closely to the real
or simply multiplies perspectives has yet to be interrogated.
One important feature of the retrospective illusion for understanding the analytic and
reconstructive mode of thought deals with the very ideal projection that Bergson claims leads
people astray: without some mode of retrospective illusion through which the infinite series of
thought resolves momentarily in a perspectival projection that closes the loop, thought could
provisionally determine nothing. The retrospective illusion functions as a limit statement to a
thought series that forces a convergence upon some value that the series will never actually
reach. We saw this cycle in chapter one through the logic of the inclosure paradox and Priest’s
exhaustive study of the process in thought about the Absolute. The Absolute, like nothingness in
Bergson’s analyses of time, is a retrospective illusion in a similar way. Projecting zero projects a
quantitative abstraction of the absence of number, a thing that we know does not empirically
exist. Projecting an Absolute projects a fantasy of totality and its accompanying notion of purity
through which the parts of the totality and related things can be arrayed on a quantitative gradient
from most pure to least pure with regards to a given category or projection. A human abstraction
explains a human abstraction; the problem arises when this abstraction, totality or zero, is
assumed to have some ontological primacy over how the empirical world works.
However, without this kind of projection the infinite motion of thought could not be
snipped off and represented in the spatializing mode of speech or writing with their typical
temporal rhythms and literal spatialization in the case of the written word. Were these illusions,
these perspectival projections, not potential within a system of thought, there would be no way to
cap localized sections of thought under some totalizing concept for the purpose of expression and
transmission. The problem arises when we believe that the convergence of the thought series
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indicates its correctness through logical criteria that are only partial perspectives on world.
Illusory though they may be in the endless cycle of inclosure that we find in thought unexpressed
and becoming as such, they are useful for representation and conceptualization. Without the
ability to totalize a segment of thought and, in doing so, generate the first term for a new series
of thought, we would live in an impoverished and solipsistic world. The illusion is a delirious
movement in which we substitute the mental model for the real, but that does not mean it has no
value nor any predictive thrust. The forms and patterns of inference by which we determine our
models of thought must be particular to us, but as particular to us (as beings in the world) they
must share the order of being as a partial cause.
We return to the earlier example, having not yet decided on the precise boundary of an
ant! We do not know where the line between ant and not-ant splits being apart. The parallel to
which I have aimed is to make the point that, in a similar manner, our rules of inference or
philosophical warrants, such as the Law of Noncontradiction, are also illusions built on the
fantastic purity and infinite determinability of our conceptual spaces. Objects have a naïve
phenomenological appearance of being separate entities in space when observed with our visual
apparatuses, our eyes, and we experience our own persistence and difference through subjective
time… too easily returning us to a commonsensical but naïvely concluded Law of
Noncontradiction! But we also now know, thanks to the newer sciences and more complex
measuring apparatuses, that there exists many cases, such as the double slit experiment with
photons, in which this strict visual separation does not hold.
But is there not some truth to the law of noncontradiction? My laptop is not the cat next
to me, though the environment may imbricate them in the shared sea of relations and forces that
affect both. The philosophical warrants through which we move from active sensory
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determination to active determination of the causal forces between objects in thought can be read
as negotiations between being in the world and being in thought. They are provisional,
incomplete, modelling apparatuses, and deeply perspectival. They are, in a sense, illusory, but
they are immensely productive illusions all the same. There is a sense in which a realist mode of
philosophy can only find truth through the recognition of the incomplete and partial relationship
to reality given by its cognitive machinery and formalized methodologies. Realism and
perspectivism; perspectivism and realism. Illusions and the totalizing perspectival projections the
modes of thought we have looked at in terms of infinite regress so far are not by necessity
wrong; they are models of being from a given perspective that must be edified by the always
incomplete multiplication of perspectives and through careful attention to the ethical
consequences their expression of Being produces.
One way to bring these ideas back to a more everyday level, at least for academics, and
without recourse to the ant chart, is by evaluating a parallel argument about the status of analysis
in sociology that operates along the form of Bergson’s retrospective illusion: Latour’s critique of
sociology by way of his critique of the social. Latour expresses his argument: “…when social
scientists add the adjective ‘social’ to some phenomenon, they designate a stabilized state of
affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be mobilized to account for some other phenomenon…
Problems arise, however, when ‘social’ begins to mean a type of material…” 153 With far less
analytic rigor and no recourse to mathematics in the form of set theory, cardinality or infinite
series, Latour has more or less pinned down the preceding pages’ argument with regards to
sociology: A series of parts are analyzed through some methodology with underlying ontological
assumptions to attempt to ascertain something about the social.
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The problem begins when the reified construct (e.g., “the social,” or whatever bit of the
social the theorist is stipulating) takes its place as the first term of a new series in which it
appears to have occurred naturally, rather than understood as an assembly of the forces, social
and non, that produce it. The reified chunk, here, the social, acquires the status of a retrospective
illusion the instant social things start to be inserted into the causal chain of thought’s
determination as the root cause of more social things. The retrospective illusion in sociology thus
sustains a closed causal chain in which the social becomes both cause and effect, emergent as the
projection of a reified concept into a transcendental schema of active subjective conceptual
determination.
Latour makes this process more particular with regards to agency: “For the social
sciences to regain their initial energy, it’s crucial not to conflate all the agencies overtaking the
action into some kind of agency — ‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘structure’, ‘fields’, ‘individuals’, or
whatever name they are given — that would itself be social.” 154 Such a move has the effect of
projecting a necessary, but invisible and spectral, cause behind the apparent and empirically
verifiable social assemblages that operate without regards to analytic distinctions. This move
leads to a strangely ontotheological position, where “social forces play the complicated role of
being simultaneously what has to be postulated to explain everything and what, for many
reasons, has to remain invisible.” The very phenomena sociologists set out to explain becomes
“the social in which it is ‘really’ built.” 155 In summation, the analytic mode of reconstructive
reasoning sets out to explain some totality by reconstructing it out of parts that become
marginalized in their own articulations and causal variability by being nothing more than
symptoms of what the scholar set out to explain in the first place.
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While we will take a deeper look at the formulation of this problem in rhetoric with
regards to materiality, potentiality, and ideological critique in the next chapter, it is worth
pausing to make the analogy explicit to rhetoric departments. Rhetoricians have analyzed texts in
a reconstructive mode through various theoretical apparatuses for the entire duration of our field.
Strictly speaking, many of these analyses resolve in a retrospective illusion in which something
that should be theorized as an effect, such as ideology, norms, audience, agency, potential, and
so on, have been retroactively posited as a cause of the arrangements that produce them, instead
of the other way around. In theory, this tying of the knot could function under some regime of a
philosophy of immanence, as we will see in Deleuze, but in its current state it does not. At its
logical limit, such reasoning leads to the path in which rhetoricity has been projected backwards
into being to give all things relational a rhetorical tint, instead of all things rhetorical an
irreducible relational bent.
The recognition of the retrospective illusion in rhetorical studies, operating as one of
many devices that freeze the infinite movement of thought, is not a decisive blow against the
prospects for rhetorical theorizing. Rhetoricity can still be understood as a category useful for the
examination of patterned relationality read from a rhetorical perspective. Actionable truths
emerge from this process of reconstructive analysis: where the whole becomes a strange
Absolute god, the parts gain greater clarity when read through the perspective of some totalizing
whole. The key is to keep always alive the recognition such a reading practice can result in
conceptual overdetermination, where a totality ends up projected in a way that separates critical
practice from the possibility of fomenting change and initiating action. This becomes particularly
problematic when the bent towards the analytic-reconstructive mode in our field precludes the
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development of novel methodologies better fit to contemporary philosophies of Becoming and to
produce social change.
Taking Stock: From Retrospective to Prospective Illusions
I have discussed at length a mode of subjective-active determination in which conscious
thought makes meaning by separating things into components analytically, such that each step in
the asserted causal chain is determined via the principle of identity found in the Law of
Noncontradiction, leading invariably to the assertion of a primary cause positioned as the
Absolute. I have aimed so far to have formalized this process through Priest’s notion of the
“Inclosure Paradox” as an approach to conceptual infinite regress that leads to conceptual
totalization when projected through some arbitrary perspectival point through the “Domain
Principle.” Jankèlèvich’s reading of Bergson’s Retrospective Illusion elaborates the
argumentative or propositional structure of this process through which some conceptual
reification within thought becomes retrospectively posited as its own primary cause as the “Idol
of Distance” and the kind of false problem that positions nothing as the anterior guarantor of
absolute something-ness. The quality, characteristic, or general orientation of the Absolute
becomes reintegrated into Being as the true, even if scientifically or empirically impossible to
measure, and first cause within reality.
I have critiqued this process by reading it through Aristotelian substance, and outlined
this process via Leibniz, who grounds the phenomenal appearance of contingency in a necessary
and absolute final telos of the all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God. And, finally, I have
attempted a logical formalization of this process through a reading of Jankèlèvich’s Bergson.
The retrospective illusion is important to this project in several ways but is of particular
relevance today because Bergson’s critique of it suggests a clear alternative that I have named

97
the prospective illusion, a position that emerges most clearly in Deleuze’s book Bergsonism.
Deleuze and Bergson tout the superiority of their own orientation/s towards philosophical
methodology, but it remains to be measured to what degree Deleuze and Bergson’s philosophical
methodological alternative truly diminishes the, for a naturalist problematic, perspectival point
that the retrospective illusion brings in when it moves from regress to totality. Bergson builds his
methodology in a strange way and Deleuze follows this methodology, at least in his
reconstruction of Bergson’s method in Bergsonism, with some important divergences in terms of
thinking space and iterating the structure common to all being/s through myriad adjunct content
fields. The goal of both Deleuze and Bergson revolves around thinking being in terms of
becoming, to produce an adequate process ontology.
The rhetorical structure of these philosophical projects is invariably dialectical. On the
one hand, Bergson builds his philosophical method by critiquing broad dualistic tendencies in the
thought of his lifeworld through the work of past philosophers. Matter and Memory, for
example, is full of these moments: realists vs. idealist, mechanists vs. dynamists, conceptualists
vs. nominalists, and so on. 156 In this sense, Bergson’s philosophy and Deleuze’s (with particular
attention to chapter three of Difference and Repetition) are inherently critical, although defenders
of philosophy as evental occurrence could argue that these critiques are a problem of expression
and not of philosophy. When we move into methodology more fully considered in its own right,
I will suggest that Maurice Merleau-Ponty furnishes plenty of arguments against this
interpretation.
On the other hand, both Deleuze and Bergson claim a kind of naïve intuition in which
philosophical methodology and duration as temporal ontology merge such that a chiasmus
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results: duration emerges from intuition and intuition emerges from duration. In this regard, the
retrospective illusion and prospective illusions converge. They are both the motion of tying a
knot between ontology on one side and philosophical methodology on the other. Or: models of
being tend to ontologize models of thought or methodologies by analyzing thought’s relationship
to being. Methodology is ontology in action; Ontology is methodology in theory.
The key difference between retrospective and prospective illusions is that the latter will
mobilize systematic isomorphy as the level of the distribution in differences at the level of
process-structure-event instead of being-object-eternity. Understood in this manner, both
prospective and retrospective illusions are forms of transcendental reasoning: each starts with
experiences and attempt to explain through argumentative and logical warrants with ontological
underpinnings how these experiences can arise. The retrospective illusion projects knowledge
backward as a mechanistic and necessary cause; the prospective illusion attempts to specify the
ontical characteristics of being sufficient for the experience to obtain. As both methods select
when and how to rely upon the LEM and LNC, one wonders just how much difference in
consequence exists between active and passive transcendental reasoning.
The consequences of these different orientations in thought are deep, but they can be
tracked out at a highly general register. Deleuze articulates this duality when discussing
determination in the virtual register: “In going from A to B and then B to A, we do not arrive
back at the point of departure as in a bare repetition; rather, the repetition between A and B and
B and A is the progressive tour or description of the whole of a problematic field.” 157 We can
also consider the same to be true of moving from B to A and then A back into B. Leaving the
ontological baggage aside for the moment, repetition does not occur in philosophical method in

157

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 210.

99
the same sense of a scientific experiment in which open systems are manipulated to be
comparatively closed and change is measured by breaking intensive qualities up into quantitative
chunks.
Deleuze articulates this idea most clearly in his analysis of Nietzsche’s eternal return:
“The mechanist idea affirms the eternal return but only by assuming that differences in quantity
balance or cancel each other out between the initial and final states of a reversible system.” 158
Thought does not operate like a conceptually purified thermodynamic experiment where a
quantitative zero state is made to reach some level of excitation before being released back to its
zero state or viewed as an unchanged whole based upon the law of conservation of energy. Of
course, we now know that because of entropy at both the thermodynamic and quantum levels,
neither does material being. The point is the same for Deleuze either way: thought is never bare
repetition and the order of thought produces different results each time it is iterated. The same
never returns as the same; the same is always the different.
To use a more everyday example to attempt to put these thoughts in a different way with
a different intonation: think of the game at state fairs to “test your strength.” You wield the
mallet and whack the pressure plate such that a disc flies towards a bell before falling back to
this apparent zero state. For Deleuze, the point is that any number of subsequent strikes on the
pressure plate are not the same because, whether we perceive them when we break up change
into broad quantitative chunks, elements of the game have changed. The fair device wears down
and no two strikes from any one person are exactly the same. To take Deleuze’s A and B and
modify them into the language we are developing here: analysis and synthesis work the same
way. The structure of the journey from thing to thing, accomplished by a regularized process,
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even as we construct new things, changes each future iteration such that each part of the process
matters. To use Barad’s language: each difference makes a difference. Part to whole followed by
whole to part is not equivalent to whole to part followed by part to whole, and so on: thought is
incapable of bare repetition, and each path produces different inflections. We can iterate this
through any number of scales of thought and levels of formalization. For now, it is enough to
know that A to B can signify the retrospective illusion and B to A the prospective.
Let us re-sum the work done so far with this A to B language in mind. Philosophical
warrants, while themselves emerging in the history of thought, are treated as indicative of
Being’s structure and used as active-subjective determinations of messy aggregates to produce
causal chains from some conceptual projection that explains everyday life or empirical reality.
These modes stop at some value along an infinite series of thought replete with active and
subjective conceptual determinations to then project some concept from some perspective to
forestall infinite regress. These modes of perspectival projection embody Bergson’s
Retrospective Illusion that formalizes this process as follows: what we find at determination B is
actually just a reified chunk of thought A such that A  B in conceptual analytic space and
shares equivalency with B  A as an ontological feature of the world.
This mode of reconstructive analysis is clearly flawed at the level of causality thanks to
its partiality and in its singular velocity in its modelling function: we have taken something that
emerges from world within thought, and injected it back into being to stop infinite regress,
without using different methodologies to see what the thought thing shares with being and what
is truly novel to it because we seek a primary cause in the chain of efficient causes. The
philosophers so far, with Aristotle’s strange relationship to indeterminism partially withstanding,
work in mechanistic modes. We have yet to see a philosopher who starts with the ontical
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capacities of Being and Becoming from the start to account for the passive synthesis of
subjectivity as such, outside of quickly noting Bergson on duration. We have not observed the
process reversed through which we move from B  A and back again.
I do not argue for a radical epistemological break: we think in world and therefore
thought is partially caused by world. There is no strict separation between world and thought;
there is only the same creative and productive separation that characterizes and textures the
ontical quality of ontology as such, as we will see more clearly when we take up Karen Barad’s
work. One can maintain a flat ontology while recognizing asymmetry in complexity and agency
at the level of the ontical: the best way to do that is to add the thinkers of B  A to more
consciousness focused and active modes of determination. Retrospective Illusions produce truths
about the parts through their substitution of the reified whole and are useful in the analytic
critique of objects constructed by critics engaged in the reconstructive mode. But they hardly
exhaust the conceptual schemas and methodologies available, even within an analytic vein.
Meanwhile, the section on the prospective illusion turns to a different orientation within
the analytic world that attempts to branch the two modalities of synthesis and analysis by moving
from B  A and then A  B by turning cause and effect on their heads through a different
temporality than the one presumed by analytic processes within the retrospective illusion. The
fundamental stipulation for this move relies on Bergson’s Duration as figured in Creative
Evolution: “The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall
comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the
absolutely new.” 159 At first, we are less interested in an Absolute first cause and more interested
in the ways in which manifestations of being ramify outwards as part of a monistic whole that
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divides itself through self-differentiation. The fundamental move here presages that of systems
theory’s systematic isomorphy such that shared forms in many cases indicate some fundamental
structure that repeats across individual beings. Spinozist monism is clearly implicated: the
prospective illusion will reason from many adjunct fields back into singular forms that account
for the shared capacities of all beings. To do this thing, duration must be extended to all of Being
such that we do not actively synthesize the shared elements of duration but are passively
synthesized by them. We intuit the whole duration by intuiting our own duration. Everything
starts at the beginning and the beginning still insists in the subjective experience of the now
knowing that the Absolute now is a fantasy and we are always already in a now-then.
CHAPTER III: THE PROSPECTIVE ILLUSION
I focus on Deleuze’s Bergsonism more fully than on a close reading of Bergson himself
or of Jankèlèvich’s Bergson in this chapter because Deleuze’s Bergson, with its careful attention
to his arguments and conceptual structures that most closely presage Deleuze’s own philosophy.
The pathway that runs from Bergson through Deleuze has also been the most influential in
rhetorical studies. Bergsonism provides an uncannily clear take into the constituent pieces of
Deleuze’s own ontology without the tortuous writing and almost absurd obscurity of Deleuze’s
main texts. There are also differences between Deleuze and Bergson that end up refracted or
sidestepped in Bergsonism: Deleuze will favor a virtuality that encompasses spatiality (where
Bergson prioritizes time over space) and will take examples from biology and mathematics in
support of metaphysics far further than Bergson had conceptual resources in his time to
accomplish. In the end, both philosophers are exceptionally useful to re-thinking how
argumentative structure can align with ontology through argumentative warrants, even though

103
neither significantly breaks with the prior philosophical tradition in terms of essence and the
denial of material reality for a higher ideal plane.
Deleuze and Bergson both occupy prominent roles in setting the philosophical
groundwork for the vague movement named New Materialism and other realist philosophical
camps that today are regularly imported into the theory disciplines. We see terms and structures
like the virtual, sometimes thought as potentiality, sometimes as energy, sometimes explicitly
called the virtual, in contemporary rhetorical theory, but the expanding use of this terminology
makes pinning down a clear meaning difficult. Do rhetoricians use the terms primarily to
ontologize contingency and therefore rhetoric as what is essential within being? Is the virtual to
be understood as a reservoir of potentiality in a localized scheme or does it carry the full
monistic-topological weight assigned it by most Deleuzian iterations? Do our disciplinary
readings confuse possibility with potentiality? Are these conceptualizations of the virtual
adequate to Bergson’s own theorizing? To answer these questions requires as firm a grasp of the
virtual in Bergson from Deleuze’s articulation of it as can be specified.
I name Bergson’s intuitive methodology the prospective illusion because my aim is to
reverse the already negatively charged retrospective illusion into a positive project of clarifying
in a simpler way the relationship between theory and praxis. Where the retrospective illusion
moves backwards through the LNC towards first cause, the prospective illusion might
alternatively be understood as selecting some aggregate and moving it forward to conceptual
clarity at the level of tendency or becoming where the LNC can still hold despite our empirical
experiences of things falling into paradox when we try to strictly delineate their boundaries. In
this sense, I view Bergson’s early work as containing an interesting potential strain in which the
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virtual and the actual are two poles, neither fully realized, that help us to model everyday reality
without being ontologized as determinates of it.
Pure actuality offers an impossible future tendency that nonetheless helps us understand
material actuality, while pure virtuality presents an impossible fantasy of pure difference through
memory that would have no content nor material without actuality. Considered as such, the
prospective illusion would be an illusion, yes, but a useful one in that it motivates clearer
thinking about becoming and changes our perspective by changing our orientation towards
ontology. Unfortunately, Bergson will eventually hedge his bets and position this conceptual
purity as anterior cause in an Absolute virtual figured as universal duration and self-differencing
difference in a distinctly temporal register; this path reflected his late encounter with Einstein’s
relativity theory, which he worked through in Duration and Simultaneity. A lovely ontology of
local and cascading inside-outside durations with varying temporal and spatial rhythms blend
together with an Ideal-Absolute that a certain mode of logic requires, but has no capacity to be
empirically verified. The problems of conceptual purity-totalization and hierarchy that haunt
Western philosophy still possess both Bergson and Deleuze.
The prospective illusion features perspectival projections as much as the retrospective
illusion does, but their comportment and temporality differ. The retrospective illusion projects a
domain in reaction to infinite regress backwards towards first cause in the register of being; the
prospective illusion projects a domain in reaction to the infinite progress, a regress towards a
future perfect form that never obtains, at the level of the logical tendency purified by reason at
the level of becoming. Ramifications of some messy aggregate tend towards a qualitative limit
statement towards its purified tendency by iterating out a series of terms through a logic of
sufficiency. Regress as progress terminates through the projection of a domain, as in the
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retrospective illusion, but a domain that accepts its fantastic status as synthetic concept in a
messy reality conceived as an open system. When sufficiency has been reached in Bergsonism
depends, as in the retrospective illusion, on when infinite regress has been followed enough for
plausibility even if the foundations of the entire system have never been justified or are
unreachable. Dualism by dualism Deleuze’s Bergson builds his oeuvre, but how do we know
when, say, perception has been sufficiently well established to justify a jump to pure perception?
If the world is a monistic system, as Bergson follows Spinoza in believing, then how
could any one series be sufficiently constructed without ramifying all Being? What justifies the
cutoff and the projection? As with the retrospective illusion, some combination of lived, bodily,
historical, contextual, or other potential factors determine a starting point and a cutoff for the
infinite regress of thought. While pursuit of this strategy appears to result in the same conceptual
dead end, Deleuze will posit a fourth moment of Bergson’s method, where an explicit conceptual
totalization of the virtual as virtual of virtuals will be retrospectively inserted, resulting in the
assertion that this conceptual totalization escapes the problems with universality in the
retrospective mode.
I am not wholly convinced this argumentative move escapes the problems of the prior
philosophical tradition. It may merely shifts registers, from a focus on being as object-essence to
formal essence as multiplicity. Meanwhile, this move towards conceptual totality relies on a
strange argumentative structure that has commonly been accused of panpsychism, since it starts
with mental experience and generalizes the structures it finds there to all Being. But there is a
conceptual rejoinder to this problem: a way out for those working through the logic of
prospective illusion is to make a double claim about monism and immanence that produces
panpsychism: (1) Being is monistic with a dialetheic but positive split, conceived of as
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contradiction without negation, between quantitative and qualitative multiplicities. (2) Conscious
thought emerges as one ramified series of self-differencing difference within the Being that is
one-multiple and has the same self-differentiating capacity as Being because of its complexity or
“zones of indetermination.” (3) The distribution of differences peculiar to thought must, at a
formal and final level of causality, be isomorphic to other multiplicity-structures in Being
because Being is one-multiple. (4) Therefore, we have access to Being’s one-multiple through
thinking about and experimenting upon the emergence of our own selves through the passive
synthesis that produce us.
Several issues arise once the prospective illusion is formalized. One question hinges on
whether the monistic plane of cosmic scale, virtuality’s projection of an Absolute domain for all
being, truly follows the logic of the prospective illusion: is reliance on a one-whole account that
is split into qualitative and quantitative aspects able to account for all of Being’s ramifications or
does the projection of a necessary domain always obligate us back into the entailments of a
retrospective illusion? Put differently, do the twin higher cardinality warrants of immanence +
monism really escape the problems of previous constructions of some Absolute division in
Being? Where might the criteria for the truth of this cosmic virtuality reside, in empirical or
logical truth criteria? After all, we cannot measure the virtual because the condition cannot
resemble the conditioned.
For a posthumanist, panpsychist claims are problematic because they bind the human up
in all of being or, perhaps, all of being up in some kind of anthropomorphized sense of the
human. If genuine differences in kind inhabit a monistic becoming, we must attend carefully to
the differences between ramified chains and not too readily attribute any characteristic
whatsoever to a monistic virtual that lacks scientific necessity. For a naturalist, with regards to
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mathematics and a phenomenological or genealogical take on logic, the argument that we can
discern pure tendencies at the level of becoming and that these are the virtual-evental-ideal
determinants of actual-material-concrete reality will always be deeply concerning. The risk is
that the prospective illusion may not so much reverse Plato in any meaningful way, as it might
merely shift the ground of the LNC and the Absolute from being to becoming.
Meanwhile, for any anti-essentialist ethicist, an insistence on purity in the register of the
event such that the pure-event and accident dichotomy obtains should be deeply disturbing. We
have mapped what notions of purity, read into the heart of being and causality, produce in
Aristotle and Leibniz: does transferring the purity from being to becoming really alleviate these
problems? Finally, to what extent does materialist indeterminacy eat at the base of Bergsonism?
If the prospective illusion eventually rebounds into a retrospective illusion, will it end up having
the same hidden reliance on a mode of materiality it explicitly eschews in favor of ideal
Absolutism?
I argue that the prospective illusion is a useful illusion up until the move from sufficient
chains of ramifications backlashes into the positing of a necessary Absolute in the form of the
one-many with its dialetheic guises of qualitative and quantitative multiplicities. Bergsonism,
ironically, makes a Hegelian move, but instead of Absolute Spirit emerging through the
eventually sublimation of all things, it has already happened as the cone of universal memory in
the past-present aggregate. Potentiality as the virtual becomes a self-actualizing force through
intensity. In Aristotelian terms, self-differencing difference becomes the final cause of Being and
the virtual its structural formal cause. Materiality as the actual becomes an almost dead force
poised at the limit before spatiality. In Aristotelian terms, efficient causality between the surface
regions of things merely carries out their actualization, and material causality is merely the
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stumbling block of potentiality’s endless creativity, particularly the creativity of mind and life. It
is the problem that must be solved by the ideal’s actualization in a way that uncannily
reintroduces the limits of Aristotle’s larger cosmology. The solution to the problem is to reclaim
the version of Bergson in Matter and Memory that does not require a necessary Absolute to
usefully model Becoming.
To sketch this case, I’ll initially map out the higher order structure of Bergson’s
prospective illusion given Deleuze’s reconstruction in Bergsonism. Next, we will examine the
ontological-methodological problems emerging when the ontological entailments of the
methodology are elaborated. And finally, we will attempt to provide a solution in which the
prospective illusions stays prospective without positing a necessary cosmological scale virtuality.
Bergsonism: Problematizing the Problems
Deleuze’s account of Bergson’s philosophical method is not strictly separable from the
ontology that it produces through its application: “…Intuition, as he understands it
methodologically, already presupposes duration.” 160 Here, and as discussed earlier in chapter
two, duration indicates a conceptualization of time that exceeds the mathematical or point model
of the present by making the present “only the most contracted degree of the past,” 161 and the
past a kind of “coexistence without succession” at various levels of relaxation or tension in terms
of differently stratified virtual dimensions. 162 Intuition does not attempt to determine duration
from without by actively analyzing its various parts, but attempts to understand itself as a
qualitatively differentiated strand or series of duration from within, by attempting to account for
the sufficient conditions of its own passively synthesized condition. In a sense, this approach
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requires mechanistic temporality to break from the start. For the past-present to enjoy an
immanent causality such that the present is only the most compressed area between the past and
the future, the past and the present, at the least, cannot be fully separable by the LNC.
Deleuze’s Bergson finds a merely phenomenological approach inadequate: while we start
with a kind of naïve experience, we must “[push] beyond experience a direction drawn from
experience itself. It is only in this way that we can extract a whole aspect of the conditions of
experience.” 163 Bergsonism’s method starts with the messy composites of experience as a
sufficient condition, but, instead of finding a necessary universal condition anterior to the things
we cognize about to ground their possibility, as in the retrospective illusion, we elaborate the
ramifications in terms of the “natural articulations” or the tendencies in becoming in a
comportment towards the future, towards what will be called actualization. 164 The logical chains
start with virtual potentiality and are pushed out into their ramifications through a movement
resembling the principle of sufficient reason, until the series resolves once more in a virtual-ideal
point in which the articulations are unified through universal duration.
The move to sufficiency comported towards a final formal cause attempts to elide the
problems of vagueness that beset retrospective models by substituting time for space, becoming
for being, and tendency for identity. However, the prospective illusion remains, in a sense, a
form of transcendental reasoning because we are still reasoning from conditioned to condition
that, while inextricable at the level of being, is strictly differentiable at the level of becoming.
Deleuze articulates the relationship between Bergson’s “method of division” with transcendental
reasoning in this way: “…there is some resemblance between intuition as method of division and
transcendental analysis: If the composite represents the fact, it must be divided into tendencies or
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into pure presences that only exist in principle…We go beyond experience, toward the
conditions of experience.” 165 The key point to remember is that we can take liberty in how we
read the virtual/actual relationship: these registers of being can be considered as tendencies never
fully obtaining in material reality. In a fully actualized future, the logical conditions of becoming
would become fully reified static actualized elements of being. In a fully virtualized past, that is,
the play of differences would slip off each other ad infinitum and never take root in materiality.
We would be left with a sterile world of ideas on one side and a static universe incapable of
emergence or the new on the other. Only when the virtual is pushed into a kind of temporal
Absolute, with full causal determinacy on its side through the retrospective illusion, does the
potential infinity implied by early Bergson shift through a sneaky retrospective illusion into a
domain that produces an Absolute or actual infinity for all of being for all of time. These
differences are difficult to pin down and will emerge with greater clarity iteration after iteration:
for now it is enough to recognize that to theorize being in terms of becoming focalizes the
proliferation of differences in kind based upon real potentials and not abstract possibilities.
This construal of the relationship of thought to being presents immediate problems that
must be dealt with before elaborating the moments of the method. For example, how is it that we
have access to these “real conditions of experience” and how do they relate to the things they
condition? Both Deleuze’s Bergson and one iteration of Deleuze answer this question through a
clever feint that ties the knot around the principle of sufficient reason. We are part of the
ramified series of being and, in a sense, are the culmination of being itself with our miniature
durations and our embodied tendencies to act as difference making engines. 166 We are privileged
as catalysts of universal becoming, operating on a much smaller time scale in terms of creation
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and invention, as compared to the cosmos. If we are a qualitatively differentiated portion of a
monistic whole that is itself a qualitative difference producing engine, then we can make
differences and think about how they work when we read them back into being. We can engage
in the strange form of transcendental reasoning peculiar to Bergson where, through the intuitive
method, we are opened “up to the inhuman and the superhuman (durations which are inferior or
superior to our own)…” 167
The move here is to utterly violate the LEM at the level of being: cascading durations
indicate both a monistic construal of the virtual as simultaneously “a primordial totality” 168 and
yet one simultaneously indicating “a new metaphysics which now only takes into account
immanent and constantly varying durations.” 169 Put differently, the virtual violates the LEM by
being two different things at the same time: “…at each instant pure duration divides in two
directions, one of which is the past, the other the present; or else the elan vital at every instant
separates into two movements, one of relaxation (détente) that descends into matter, the other of
tension that ascends into duration.” 170 When we drill being down into the fantastic instant only to
find that no such instant obtains in time as such, Deleuze’s Bergson divides the tendency in
becoming between virtual and actual such that as potentiality condenses, more viscous modes of
becoming obtain, and as actualization comes into relation with more actualization, new potentials
evaporate back into the virtual register.
Here the clever conceit around access is conveyed with phenomenal force: Deleuze’s
Bergsons methodology truly merges with the ontology it settles on by the end of the book: when
we attempt to “go beyond the turn of experience” we encounter “so many difficulties in trying to
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reach this focal point that the acts of intuition, which are apparently contradictory, have to be
multiplied. Bergson, thus, sometimes speaks of a movement that is exactly appropriate to the
experience, sometimes a broadening out, sometimes a tightening and narrowing.” 171
Methodology and ontology merge such that panpsychism obtains. Just as the virtual contracts
into the actual and the actual relaxes into the virtual, the intuitive method parallels the
ontological action with its methodological discipline. To find these logical conditions, thought
must focalize, or we might say it must produce a perspectival projection, around some messy
aggregate drilled down into a point of contradiction at the level of being such that purity in
tendency can obtain. Contradiction, and thus logical identity, cannot exist at the level of being
because science has pretty well squashed any pretentions to that with relativity and quantum
mechanics, but we can preserve it if we create an ideal-real stratum of being named the virtual.
Whether or not this move really works and what the motivations may be for maintaining
purity and an ideal stratum at all will be taken up at great length later. For now, it is enough to
know that Deleuze’s Bersgon ontologizes methodology and methodologizes ontology. And yet,
the immanence of monistic becoming is a difficult concept to grasp. I prefer to think about it
with a topological metaphor of shrink wrap: somehow this virtual “primordial totality” seeps into
every pore of becoming such that the condition-that-conditions-all-conditioned is not an abstract
universal possessing more generality than local objects. Rather, it is immanent to them. We can
only identify the clear shrink wrap through its play with light in a conceptual realm of ideas.
Deleuze: “…these conditions are neither general nor abstract. They are no broader than the
conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience.” 172 The immanence argument coincides
with the monism argument in their mutual attempt to ground the metaphysical elements of the
171
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ontology-method beyond logical contradiction: we are presented with a monism-that-is-one with
two qualitative aspects. On the one hand, this seemingly contradictory position is secured by the
prospective illusion being more concerned with tendencies in becoming such that the
perspectival projection it engages in is comported towards future actualization. We do not need
to read some aspect backwards against its own non-existence such that we sneak concepts like
nothing into becoming and find more in nonbeing than in being. On the other hand, this feint
may not accomplish the work it attempts: there is a sense in which these “conditions of real
experience” are tailor made to the object: “…it is a concept modeled on the thing itself, which
suits that thing, and which, in this sense, is no broader than what it must account for.” 173
Immanence strains at the notion of the virtual as “primordial totality” because we must question
how open and closed systems can participate in the same whole given their different temporal
rhythms or viscosities. How can a sense of the virtual-as-Absolute not relapse into the problems
besetting retrospective universals; how is it not larger than the local-conditioned-in-itself? This
question is intractable when adhering closely to Bergson’s writings: “Bergson’s texts seem to
vary considerably on this point.” 174 At times, the virtual appears local, while at others as a
universal Absolute, metric and determinant though a multiplicity, won through a differently
comported logic at others.
We will explore the detailed ontological arguments as to which construal of the virtual –
localized plural time or universal Absolute time – ends up making the most sense and along what
criteria sense should be made, but, for now, we should note an argumentative device lurking
beneath the high-flying metaphysics. We can be more certain about the condition by tracking out
systematic isomorphy or analogous distributions of difference across adjunct fields in human
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experience beyond the phenomenological. Put differently, that we find analogous distributions of
differences in systems like the progress of evolution or the history of mathematics to the
construction of the virtual-actual in thought indicates that they emerge from the same monistic
system. In fact, this analogy through systematic isomorphy is suggested quite early in
Bergsonism: “…the very notion of the problem has its roots beyond history, in life itself or in the
élan vital: Life is essentially determined in the act of avoiding obstacles, stating and solving a
problem.” 175 Stated even more directly, Deleuze explicitly justifies the recursive circularity in
terms of systems theory when he discusses Bergson’s analysis of finalism and mechanism:
“…there is a proof of finality to the extent that we discover similar actualizations, identical
structures or apparatuses on divergent lines (for example, the eye in the Mollusk and in the
Vertebrate).” 176 These virtual problematics that we intuit within the horizon of duration are not
universal conditions that arise out of nothing: they are, at the least, localized to different
ramifications of becoming itself and, at the most, indicate an absolute or totality that can be
logically and empirically justified for Deleuze’s Bergson. Just as philosophers intuit a generative
problematic and examine its consequences or solutions by matching it to its conditions, the
progress of organic life can itself be considered as engaging in an analogous process via
systematic isomorphy. Philosophical methodology and ontology once more blend even as they
proliferate horizontally: intuition as “method of division” functions in an isomorphic fashion to
life’s ramified proliferation into ever more forms in reaction to environmental factors. Where
transcendental reasoning within the retrospective illusion posits anterior conditions for possible
existence universalized from a singular case, the prospective illusion in Bergson starts with “real
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experience” and applies itself as a “method of division” to find “natural articulations” that ramify
forwards towards actualization..
The preceding attempts to get some of the thornier ontological and epistemological
questions out of the way without wading even more deeply into the associated philosophical
literatures will become necessary of Bergson’s intuitive method. What I want to suggest here is
that we move instead into a discussion over the general movements a human might attempt, and
only then, to return to further examination of the methodology’s ontology and a resulting
argumentative formalization. As Deleuze follows this path, an action focus generates the
following methodological determinations: “Bergson distinguishes between essentially three
distinct sorts of acts that in turn determine the rules of the method: The first concerns the stating
and creating of problems; the second, the discovery of genuine differences in kind; the third, the
apprehension of real time.” 177 The first step is distinctly critical: “the stating and creating of
problems” deals as much with the critique of “false problems” found in the philosophic doxa of
one’s time as it does with “the creative upsurge of true ones” or a kind of naïve encounter with
the sufficient conditions of Being in experience purified by intuition. 178
The special status of problems already evokes the ontological assumptions of the
Prospective Illusion as it manifests in both Bergson and Deleuze’s broader oeuvre. I suggested
earlier the analogy to biology, in which “the construction of the organism is both the stating of a
problem and a solution,” 179 but we have not yet noticed how starting with sufficiency alters the
relationship of problem and solution. For Deleuze: “… stating the problem is not simply
uncovering it is inventing… Already in mathematics, and still more in metaphysics, the effort of
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invention consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be
stated.” 180 The analogy to mathematics will, at times, function as far more than an analogy
because, in the analysis of the relationship between Riemann and Bergson, mathematics will
perfectly, formally, and virtually account for the tendencies in becoming in a way that, given
how many maths work, preserves the LNC at the level of becoming.
Mathematics is the paradigm case of ontology for one of many Deleuzes and he exhibits
this tendency already in Bergsonism. Deleuze’s rendition of mathematical Platonism should give
rhetoricians interested in this philosophical lineage pause, because the degree to which it escapes
problems of essentialism by substituting event for essence are highly suspect. For now, it is
enough to note that this relationship between intuitive methodology and mathematics produces
the following conclusion: “…it is the solution that counts, but the problem always has the
solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated…and of the means and terms at our
disposal for stating it.” 181 This construal of the relationship between problem and solution is one
iteration of the prospective illusion in its distilled form. Solutions or the actualization of a virtual
problematic, at this point in Deleuze’s work, do not do what he will later call counteractualization or evoke a defensible account of virtual being as such. A deterministic relationship
exists between the construal of problem and its solution, as in mathematics: once the problem has
been matched against its conditions or the organism against its environment the solution
necessarily follows. Inventiveness, creation, and privilege are on the side of ramifying
potentiality through self-differencing, not on materiality that emerges as nearly bare repetition.
The prospective illusion displaces the chain of logical necessity from an anterior position,
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leading back to the possible conditions of all being to a starting place whose solutions radiate out
along a logically determined path towards the future.
The two kinds of “false problems” temper the next step of the method: to “rediscover the
true differences in kind or articulations of the real.” 182 The two false problems fundamental to
the orientation of the retrospective illusion prevent us from finding these genuine qualitative
differences in the second step. The two kinds of false problem are “‘nonexistent problems,’
defined as problems whose very terms contain a confusion of the ‘more’ and the ‘less’; and
‘badly stated’ questions, so defined because their terms represent badly analyzed composites.” 183
The first kind of “badly stated problem” corresponds closely to the analysis of being and
nonbeing in the section on the retrospective illusion in Jankèlèvich outlined previously. Deleuze
states it concisely: “We mistake the more for the less, we behave as though nonbeing existed
before being, disorder before order and the possible before existence.” 184 This “kind of badly
stated problem” takes a human thing, like the signifier nothing that simply symbolizes the
absence of something, and projects it back as an anterior cause despite the fact nothing has been
demonstrated to lack empirical being.
Of course, at this point, it should be clear that zero’s use in mathematics is perfectly fine
insomuch as the structure of mathematics can be said to inhere at the level of the virtual.
Deleuze’s formulation pushes back against Priest’s dialetheism: the projection of the thing-notthe-thing at the level of the Absolute is only necessitated by a kind of problematic transcendental
illusion in which all things must have a necessary condition instead of serve as a sufficient
starting point for an analysis of the ramifications of real becoming.
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The second “kind of badly stated problem” is more particular to Deleuze’s reading of
Bergson: “This time it is a case of badly analyzed composites that arbitrarily group things that
differ in kind… If the terms do not correspond to ‘natural articulations’ then the problem is false
for it does not affect ‘the very nature of things.’” 185 For Deleuze, this kind of false problem is the
ground of the first kind of false problem because when we do not think difference in terms of
quality, we think it in terms of quantitative intensity. 186 Things end up defined in terms of their
superiority or inferiority along some unrelated quantitative gradient that invariably privileges one
side over the other such that real differences in quality are erased. Being end up tractable only
when conceived against some universal metric, where the most intense beings on this metric are
more real than others and their emergence as the most real must derive from the possibility of
their own nonexistence. Of course, the insistence upon an Absolute virtual theorized as a set of
the potential of all potentials would appear to exhibit this exact problem without the immanence
+ monism conceit. However, the fundamental form tracks in a critical vein against the
retrospective illusion: treating becomings in terms of their “natural articulations” as positive
markers of difference instead of making a metric under some human category presents a useful
alternative in a philosophical methodology that wants a closer relationship to empirical science.
The formulation Deleuze pushes against of this problem of problems relies upon a faulty
use of negation as argumentative warrant such that we could define, for example, perception as
the negation of memory or memory as the negation of perception. A quantitative gradient is
stipulated based on the privileged superior term in a dichotomy and then its opposite is viewed as
the negation of the quality in question instead of as its own kind. This is the basic shape of
Deleuze’s critique of Hegelian dialectic, one he largely draws from Bergson, phrased in a
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hilarious punchy fashion: “negation is not added to what it denies, but only indicates a weakness
in the person who denies.” 187 What the intuitive identification of “natural articulations”
facilitates in terms of critique of older philosophical methodologies “is thus a double one insofar
as it condemns, in both forms of the negative, the same ignorance of differences in kind, which
are sometimes treated as ‘deteriorations,’ sometimes as oppositions.” 188 The opposition noted in
general terms between perception and memory functions as contradiction through negation:
memory is only ever an inferior perception and perception only ever an inferior memory when
one term is taken as the quantitative metric for both. The dialectic provides us with contradiction
through negation whether it strictly matches a thing upon a zero-negative or a quantized quality
gradient. The retrospective illusion forces this problematic even further: the quantized quality is
simply not read into what qualities, objects, values, and so on that it appears to relate to at an
intuitive level, but pushed, through the domain principle’s tendency towards conceptual totality
or the Absolute, as the quality that founds an universal metric. All being/s are then arrayed on a
universal gradient according to their proximity to the pure category in a great hierarchical chain
of Being.
For Deleuze’s Bergson: “There are differences in being and yet nothing negative.” 189 The
proper construal of problem to conditions attempts to facilitate a kind of contradiction that results
in the division of potentialities, not possibilities. Bergson’s famous dualisms attempt to ground
the “experience [that] offers us nothing but composites” by “[dividing it] into tendencies or into
pure presences that only exist in principle (en droit).” 190 Purity cannot obtain at the messy level
of empirical being, but can be discerned through intuition at the level of becoming: “Only that
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which differs in kind can be said to be pure, but only tendencies differ in kind.” 191 This move
marks the fundamental feature and significant difference between Bergson’s work and most of
that which came before: we shift the ontological orientation of philosophical methodology from
being to becoming, from object to process, and different results can obtain. For Bergson in our
terms, this means that the LNC and the LEM are intractable at the level of empirical being such
that becoming accessed through intuition becomes the register in which clear and distinct ideas
can be construed as logical conditions of an empirically nonlogical being.
While this method shares “some resemblance…as method of division [with]
transcendental analysis…”, Deleuze argues that the methodology exceeds mere modelling: “We
go beyond experience toward the conditions of experience (but these are not, in the Kantian
manner, the conditions of all possible experience: they are the conditions of real experience).” 192
This is a strikingly strong claim and one that appears to contradict the image of Deleuze as an
anarchic philosopher of flux, change, and the demolition of Absolutes. I do not understand how
one who believes that “…the Absolute has two ‘halves,’ to which science and metaphysics
correspond…” and that “…[science] demands a metaphysics…” could be so certain they have
found the real metaphysical basis for reality itself. 193 Deleuze will also argue as rigorously that
his construal of the Virtual-Actual split, that deals with the problem in Bergson in which he
marginalizes the virtual capacity of spatiality, provides the real conditions of not only experience
but empirical reality itself beyond a mere modelling function. But to any skeptic, and to any
rhetorician, these proclamations will always seem suspect.
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Deleuze seems to realize the presumptuousness of the project, and even notes in
Bergsonism: “To continue Bergson’s project today, means for example to constitute a
metaphysical image of thought corresponding to the new lines, openings, traces, leaps,
dynamisms discovered by a molecular biology of the brain…” 194 We may even construct a
parallel sentence to Deleuze’s work: “To continue Deleuze’s project today means reworking it
with attention given to bioelectric feedback studies, epigenetics, category theory’s ascendancy
over set theory, fractal topology, nonlinear dynamics in systems theory, and so on.” A
concession lurks here: until science hits a deductively certain unified theory of everything,
metaphysics will be just that, plural and on the same infinite progress as science with the same
standards of falsification.
Several argumentative warrants underlie the jump to tendency in the method. Deleuze
writes: “Bergson, thus, sometimes speaks of a movement that is exactly appropriate to the
experience, sometimes a broadening out, sometimes a tightening and narrowing. For, in the first
place, the determination of each ‘line’ involves a sort of contradiction in which diverse facts are
grouped according to their natural affinities…” 195 Here we have, once again, the merger of
methodology and ontology such that the human doing intuition is a microcosm of universal
duration itself, but for now let the metaphysical-cosmological problematics take a back seat.
What is the argumentative process upon which the intuitive division of “messy aggregates”
depends? The movement to find qualitative differences in “natural articulations” depends on
mobilizing higher order vagueness, by pressing towards a perspectival point, a kind of fantasy of
perfect precision that allows logic a fantastic background, oriented towards the future until
sufficiently differentiated characteristics obtain before turning them outwards as limit statements
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that are the logical conditions of becoming. The prospective illusion reverses the retrospective
illusion. Put differently, the retrospective illusion presses down on vagueness through a
perspectival point that resolves with difference in identity through the LNC or LEM and
accounts for this difference through transcendental reasoning to determine an anterior primary
cause; the prospective illusion presses down on vagueness to account for difference but finds the
singular differences thought as tendencies that ramify outwards towards a future formal finality
that never obtains. Deleuze describes the process with regards to the perception and memory
dualism: “…we push each line beyond the turn, to the point where it goes beyond our own
experience: an extraordinary broadening out that forces us to think a pure perception identical to
the whole of matter, a pure memory identical to the totality of the past.” 196 For these force
vectors in thought to take form, the messy aggregate must be pushed out in divergent fashion to a
state of contradiction in becoming: “…the determination of each ‘line’ involves a sort of
contradiction…” 197 In Deleuzian terms: this is the point at which a quantitative gradient can no
longer explain differences in kind.
We can consider this process of pushing out into “a sort of contradiction” as strictly
analogous to the borderline case problem in “The Inclosure Paradox” with regards to higher
order vagueness. As one starts to enumerate differences, these differences in turn produce more
differences as their borderlines become more precise through some mode of determination,
conceptual or experimental. What Deleuze’s Bergson does, then, to forestall infinite regress at
the level of being is to shift the determination of “the natural articulations” into becoming
through a series of perspectival projections such that the LNC and the LEM hold. The pure
concept that is the localized enunciation of the Absolute virtual is the condition of the messy
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actual aggregate that it conditions: the virtual-ideal is strictly separable from the actual-material
through the Law of Noncontradiction and the dualistic and local tendencies of any given messy
aggregate are strictly separable through the Law of the Excluded middle when thought through
becoming.
Yet, the second step in the methodology has a second half. The broadening out towards a
conceptual limit statement articulated as “tendencies in their purity” may provide the “sufficient
reason of the thing” but the divergent dualistic series must “converge again to give us this time
the virtual image or the distinct reason of the common point.” 198 This second part of the second
step is confusing because it refers more closely to Deleuze’s own imposition of the fourth
moment of his Bergson’s methodology, the moment when Bergson’s prospective tendency snaps
back into a retrospective illusion that posits duration as temporal Absolute. The reason for this
move, at this point in the text, is as follows: “Dualism is therefore only a moment, which must
lead to the re-formation of a monism.” 199 I find it unclear whether there is argumentative
necessity on the side of the sufficient chains of reason brooking out into a potential infinity or if
the necessity rebounds back into the ontological: monism plus immanence is what guarantees our
access so therefore we have to knit divergent series back into, at the least, a local virtual or, at the
most, a universal virtual. Deleuze’s argument, at this point, is tentative; He will spend the end of
Bergsonism fleshing it out and we will return to it more closely when we analyze that part of the
text.
Immediately after the passage quoted above Deleuze goes with a math metaphor in
regards to making the series converge upon a virtual point: “just as integration follows
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differentiation.” 200 The remarks on the divergent series’ relationship to math helps here:
“…infinitesimal calculus: When we have benefitted in experience from a little light which shows
us a line of articulation, all that remains is to extend it beyond experience – just as
mathematicians reconstitute, with infinitely small elements that they perceive of the real curve,
‘the curve itself stretching out into the darkness behind them.’” 201 Or at least, the remarks appear
to help. Deleuze notes in the footnote for this passage that “Bergson often seems to criticize the
infinitesimal analysis…” but follows this remark with “But more profoundly, Bergson requires
that metaphysics…carry out a revolution which is analogous to that of calculus in science… in
order to ‘carry out qualitative differentiations and integrations’: CM, 216-217.” 202 On the one
hand, Bergson appears to be against mathematical Platonism because the relationship between
the calculus and his method is merely “analogous.” Deleuze will, of course, attempt to rescue
this construal of the relationship between Bergson and Math by arranging Bergson’s insights
alongside those of Riemann. 203 On the other hand, the contours of this analogy’s diffractive
pattern of like and unlike are still unclear to me because there are multiple modes of integration
and the “the curve stretching out into the darkness,” while an appealing metaphor, does not tell
us whether we deal with definite or indefinite integration or an even higher mode of math.
Functions come in family groups: do we re-constitute a specific curve with its differentiations
and when do we know when to stop integrating? The metaphor leads us back into the question
about localized versus Absolute virtuality and the perspectival projection: until we have
differentiated down into linear functions or constants, any given curve could be our starting place
or a differentiation or an integration.
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Deleuze may be referring to the process of the Taylor power series expansion: “In
general, the power series converges with a function by generating a continuous branch of a curve
in the neighborhood of a singular point. To the extent that all of the regular points are continuous
across all of the different branches generated by the power series of the singular points, the entire
complex curve or the whole analytic function is generated.” 204 I must be candid: I never made it
to calculus 2 so my capacity to actually do power series analysis and transformations between
them tests the limit of what could be considered even remotely competent. Let us attempt to keep
it simple out of necessity and hope that this simplicity does not present a reductor ad absurdum
in its relative ignorance. A curve represents the real logical conditions of being that the method
pushes towards as it anneals some messy aggregate towards purity by drilling down towards a
point through successive differentiations or making a concept precise on a chain that tends
towards infinity. When Bergson does this thing in Matter and Memory, we can see a series
develop starting with the perception / recollection aggregate, such that perception forms a series
involving qualitative differentiations into parts of perception, such as body, habit, the cerebral
interval, affect, and so on. The disanalogy between Bergon’s method and Taylor series emerges
at how an analysis terminates. Taylor series use mathematics to create an infinite series whose
limit statement is the equation of the original curve; Bergson’s method does not have the
deductive certainty of mathematics. As different qualities in the series are determined, a
conceptual cut off must still be made to prevent regress. To use Priest’s language, a domain must
be posited because there are not mathematical rules for bounding qualitative series through
strong deductive reasoning. Ratios between numbers and ratios or rational connections between
qualities do not function in exactly the same way unless you are willing to argue that your
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metaphysical Absolute actually is reality. We will see Bergson and Deleuze make exactly this
argument to assure the metaphysical weight of their analysis beyond speculation through logic in
the open system of the world.
An astute reader should notice that this qualitative series does not extend to infinity nor
the totality of potential terms and, thus, the analogy between an infinite quantitative series and a
finite qualitative series strains Deleuze’s metaphor. Does such a method really constitute a
“superior empiricism” 205 or does it recapitulate Platonic problems only in another register? One
might think that we could still cast this step of the prospective illusion as providing an
approximation of some inaccessible real curve or, at the least, a useful model that has no
reference to essence as event or pure tendency, but that is not how Deleuze thinks about it: this
procedure gives us “the real conditions of experience.”
The final portion of the second part of the second step further complicates the issue,
begging the question of interpretive differences; that is, in how we might interpret the material
Deleuze martials in support of the integration via power series as either simply metaphorical or
something more. Deleuze martials three examples from Bergson’s oeuvre: aphasia in Matter and
Memory, memory’s intersection with mysticism in Morality and Religion, and a trinary line that
converges in The Creative Mind. 206 The content of these examples can be read to comply
generally with the chiasmatic form given to matter and memory above: because pure perception
would be dead matter and pure memory a dream, we have perception – memory and memory –
perception. The problem arises with what precisely Deleuze means by “a superior probabilism”:
“It should be noted that this method of intersection forms a genuine probabilism: Each line
defines a probability… in the intersection of the real to which they proceed, they now define a
205
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superior probabilism, one capable of solving problems and of bringing the condition back to the
conditioned so that no distance remains between them.” 207
And yet the texts Deleuze martials that mention “lines of fact” and probabilism do not
necessarily support this reading. Deleuze pins the pertinent passages of “Life and
Consciousness” to pages six, seven, and thirty-five in the English translation and, it must be
confessed, perhaps in speaking French Deleuze here sees something I don’t. 208 Bergson here sets
out to differentiate his methodology from that of the systematic metaphysician: “But it seems to
me that in different regions of experience there are different groups of facts, each of which,
without giving us the desired knowledge, points out to us the direction in which we may find
it.” 209 True to the first two steps of the method, according to Deleuze, we start with experience
and push it through purity in tendency towards “one and the same point, and it is that point that
we are seeking.” 210
The discrepancy between Deleuze’s account emerges with his degree of certainty
regarding this point. For Bergson, “Each [line of fact], taken apart, will lead us only to a
conclusion which is simply probable; but taking them all together, they will, by their
convergence, bring before us such an accumulation of probabilities that we shall feel on the road
to certitude.” 211 Interestingly, the match up of these directions functions analogically here:
“Reasoning by analogy never gives us more than a probability; yet there are numerous cases in
which that probability is so high that it amounts to a practical certainty.” 212
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A rhetorician cannot help but see a similarity with the Aristotelian mode of truth as
probable knowledge: the certainty is not absolute in the guise of knowledge but “practical” in the
sense of probability. We are certainly distant from demonstratable knowledge figured as
mathematics at two different places. Bergson argues that this method functions “hypothetically”
and that “for my part…no principle from which the solution of the great problems can be
mathematically deduced” 213 and “But let us not insist that the evidence shall be complete, precise
and mathematical: if we do, we shall get nothing.” 214 I fail to see how “we shall feel on the road
to certitude,” 215 “practical certainty,” 216 or either section on the method’s relationship to math
equate to “a superior probabilism” that eliminates the distance between condition and
conditioned in line with Power series expansions as more than metaphor.
The passage Deleuze could be noting on page thirty-five does not help his case but
further confuses the issue, because here Bergson discusses the potential of life after death.
Because mind already overflows the bounds of matter, “…that preservation and even
intensification of personality are not only possible but even probable after the disintegration of
the body…” 217 But Bergson immediately walks back this suggestion: “I admit this is no more
than a hypothesis. We were just now in the region of the probable, this is the region of the simply
possible.” 218 Why Deleuze finds support for “superior probabilism” in a passage speculating
about the potential of life after death is elusive, but the naturalistic and speculative notes found in
the English translation are not. The role of hypothesis in both pages emerges clearly:
“philosophy…progresses like a positive science.” 219 In this text, Bergson appears to intimate that
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the kind of qualitative probabilism he advocates resides at a theoretical and falsifiable level in
line with naturalistic values, not one that proclaims the convergence of its “lines of facts” as
demonstrating the merger of condition and conditioned along a logic of immanence.
These different “lines of fact” from Bergson suggest two different ways of reading his
philosophical methodology and a certain skepticism towards Deleuze’s articulation of it. Bergson
appears to leave open a line of inquiry that could develop into modes of probabilistic, at the
most, and paraconsistent, at the least, modes of philosophical warrants that facilitate a messier
materialist ontology and even one that might be friendly to the rhetorical tradition, given the
methods analogic inflection at pages nine and ten of “Life and Consciousness.” Perhaps there is a
sense in which tendencies purified through successive determinations conceived as
differentiations may be capable of expression in terms of analogic relations between the
tendencies, assertions of their real but ideal tendential limits. The “virtual point” any number of
“lines of fact” converge back into becomes a provisional model as potentially infinite with no
absolute domain, in a sense, and as messy as the empirical aggregate we began with. Deleuze’s
own position, at least as read out of Difference and Repetition and The Fold, that philosophy
conceived of as mathematics does not approximate the logical conditions of being but delivers
their reality such that a sub- or super-stratum of inaccessible idea-events remain that can only be
mapped through their effects.
The third rule in the methodology will take this Deleuze’s perspective fully, albeit
without his vindication of space within virtuality, and, perhaps unsurprisingly for a Platonist,
inject the methodology and ontology with notions of purity and hierarchy. This third rule appears
simple but its consequences are complex and its logical necessity questionable: “State problems
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and solve them in terms of time rather than of space.” 220 For Deleuze’s Bergson, “the principle
division [is] between duration and space…” and this division places all qualitative-intensive,
both internal and external, change on the side of duration and all quantitative-extensive change
on the side of space. 221 A kind of virtual-point as Absolute is thus stipulated in the hierarchical
contradiction between time and space.
Visualizing the prospective illusion is significantly more complicated than mapping the
retrospective illusion, but consider the ontological problems with this argumentative structure:

Figure 7. Produced by author.

It is useful as well to supplement this form with Deleuze’s summary of Matter and Memory:
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Figure 8. Produced by author.

The Prospective Illusion’s Problems
Deleuze’s claims that he presents a kind of “reversal of Platonism” through his historical
reconstructions and primary body of work give me pause, and parallel Hannah Arendt’s
reservations about Nietzsche’s similar claims:
The quest for meaning, which relentlessly dissolves and examines anew all accepted
doctrines and rules, can at any moment turn against itself, produce a reversal of the old
values, and declare these contraries to be “new values.” To a certain extent, this is what
Nietzsche did when he reversed Platonism, forgetting that a reversed Plato is still Plato,
or what Marx did when he turned Hegel upside down, producing a strictly Hegelian
system of history in the process… All critical examinations must go through a stage of at
least hypothetically negating accepted opinions and “values” by searching out their
implications and tacit assumptions… 222
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Arendt perfectly expresses my own anxieties about philosophers who claim that they have
exceeded the dominant forces that shaped their development as philosophers. Such grandiose
claims tend to obscure genetic strands left unenumerated, such as the odd recurrence of formal
and final causality in much of Western thought or the tacit reliance upon the LNC and LEM in
continental philosophy. And Arendt also leads me to question what could truly constitute a
“reversal of Platonism.” Can a Western philosopher trained in Western philosophy truly escape
the shadow cast by one of the most strident divorce lawyers for the marriage between truth and
experience? Arendt is correct: choosing the other side of the Platonic division maintains Platonic
form, purity, and hierarchy.
I do not think I can construct an alternative to Platonism here. I will try by supplementing
Deleuze and DeLanda’s slightly different notions of transcendental empiricism with a
naturalistic orientation that attempts to fully strip metaphysics from these systems. They
maintain essence, purity, and hierarchy through the Law of Noncontradiction. But this occurs at
the level of multiplicity or one-whole, instead of singular substance, such that the selfdifferencing difference is the Absolute with its two guises of the virtual-intensive-qualitative and
the actual-extensive-quantitative, and where the virtual as Absolute is the final determinant of the
actual in the final case. Have we truly overturned Plato if the ideal-virtual member of the pairing
maintains causal efficacy and essence over the material-actual?
The prospective illusion snaps back into retrospective the instant we cast a closed
domain, a “primordial totality,” or an Absolute over its potentially infinite ramifications
analyzable in experience through provisional sufficient reasoning. The notion of an upper bound
on being that counts as substance and requires a metaphysics ultimately resulting in logical
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necessity instead of empirical sufficiency must be dealt with to demonstrate the problems of
totality at the highest level and, by implication, the theory world as well.
Make no mistake: Deleuze should be vaunted as the thinker who poses the problematics
and notion of the problematic necessary to philosophy’s development to critique in the first
place. However, his project strains the limits of being any kind of materialist or empiricist
conceived from a naturalistic perspective because of how his own “reversal of Platonism” can be
read to maintain the Virtual as an Absolute. This passage in Logic of Sense strikes me as
particularly apt to contour the shape of this problem: “Events are ideal…The distinction is
between event and accident. Events are ideational singularities which communicate in one and
the same Event. They therefore have an eternal truth…Events are the only idealities. To reverse
Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets
of singularities.” 223 These events have determinant causal efficacy parallel to that of the
construal of problem and conditions from which solutions necessarily derive: “…the singularities
preside over the genesis of the solutions of the equation.” 224 In other texts, Deleuze iterates this
construal of becoming in different ways: the ideal-event’s singularities becomes iterated through
the virtual in Difference and Repetition, the Body without Organs in Anti-Oedipus, the cosmic
plane of consistency in Thousand Plateaus, and of course the at times porous and at times fabric
like pleats in being in The Fold. These iterations inflect the concept differently as they ramify it
out into different modalities, but I see the same tendency towards purity and hierarchy insists
through its elaborations.
This structure is most clearly on display in Bergsonism. Deleuze’s “reversal of
Platonism” upends the hierarchy, with Platonism privileging the eternal object in the eternal to
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privileging flux, figured as the event generated when singularities generate the conditions for
problematics whose generative potentiality fades as they tend towards the actual and causally
inert matter. One truly wonders just how far away we are from Plato when these events have
“eternal truth” and just how far Deleuze breaks with Aristotle. We still have hierarchy between
“events and accidents” that skews causal efficacy towards the incorporeal event that parallels
thought’s determinations, just like Aristotle’s formal and final causality as the thought-world
determinants of material causality. The singular generates the ordinary, the event its accidents.
Could it be that the same classical warrants, the LNC and LEM, feature prominently in
maintaining and martialing conceptual purity in reality, by making the truth condition of a thing
depend upon logic and not measurement? The moments where Deleuze invokes Plato in
Bergsonism and the rationale combined with its consequences for the third step of the method
must be put under a microscope given that “to reverse Plato” does not mean what many, except
perhaps Alain Badiou and Manuel DeLanda, believe it means.
Meanwhile, the fourth step of the method shows that we are not really reversing
Platonism at all, only shifting its ontological register from being to becoming. The following
outlines the consequences and considerations of Deleuze’s fourth step, which he reads into
Bergson.
Naivety vs. Critical Philosophy
To what extent can a naïve intuition be said to break with the philosophic doxa of the
day, given that a philosopher typically learns before they think to be naïve in the first place? A
disconnect arises between ontology and methodology in Bergsonism when we add the expression
of philosophy to our considerations. Bergson critiques dualisms made of aggregations of past
thought, such as idealism vs realism, as frequently as he pushes forward through naïve intuition
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the sufficient ramifications of dualisms like matter and memory to provide for a genesis of
quality.
Bergson argues: “In order to have the new understood, it must be expressed in terms of
the old; and the problems already stated, the solutions provided, the philosophy and science of
the times in which he lived…But it would be a strange mistake to take for a constitutive element
of doctrine what was only the means of expressing it.” 225 Bergson here portrays the frequently
critical bent of his philosophy as one of necessity in which expression and the spatializing
tendencies of writing cramp philosophy’s truth. One page later, Bergson compares philosophy to
an organism or evolutionary process and then says: “A philosopher worthy of the name has never
said more than a single thing: and even then it is something he has tried to say, rather than
actually said.” 226 These positions recapitulate the Platonic critique of language’s relationship to
philosophic truth across several texts: thought loses some of its truth value or its quality as
intensity through expression in the imperfect medium of language in the act of speech or writing.
This structure has isomorphy with Deleuze’s Bergson’s take on matter: speech is the
comparatively dead extensive actualization of intensive thought.
This problem has more than simply a rhetorical valence: the question here cuts to that
between the relative speed of intensities between matter and life-force. Bergson makes an
analogy between thought’s relationship to words and life’s relationship to inert materials: “Just
in this way does matter distinguish, separate, resolve into individualities, and finally into
personalities, tendencies before confused in the original impulse of life.” 227 Bergson maintains
the matter // idea dichotomy here in an extremely Aristotelian vein: matter’s resistance to thought
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is generative as the foil of thought’s manifestation in the virtual as final telos enforced through
the twin formal structures of qualitative and quantitative multiplicity. And we fully encounter the
Aristotelianism he continues the analogy’s entailments by intersecting matter and art, a favorite
example of Aristotle himself: “By the resistance matter offers…[it] is at one and the same time,
obstacle, instrument and stimulus.” 228
Yet, a discrepancy arises between different parts of “Life and Consciousness” with itself
and with “Philosophical Intuition.” From a different part of “Life and Consciousness:” “Thought
is a continuity, and in all continuity there is confusion. For a thought to become distinct, there
must be dispersion in words.” 229 This “dispersion in words” does not inhibit expression, it
intensifies it: “The effort is toilsome, but also it is precious, more precious even than the work
which it produces, because, thanks to it, one has drawn out from the self more than it had
already, we are raised above ourselves.” 230 Here, the difficulties of expression do not inhibit or
sully the genesis of philosophical truth; the spatializing process of expression can be generative
beyond the self of the philosopher and, I argue, the concept itself. The transduction of one
intensity to another multiplies the zones of indetermination that, far from diminishing meaning,
function as a methodology or, perhaps, artistic pursuit that generates more and more complex
meanings. This cycle continues when a philosopher engages critically with their predecessors:
the written text counteractualizes back into a person’s thoughts. It seems to me more plausible
that actualization and virtualization, virtualization and actualization, condition and conditioned,
are a perspectival chicken and egg type game. The relationship between expression and thought
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prefigure more complex iterations as we scale up into philosophical analysis through necessary
logic and sufficient intuition.
Deleuze’s Bergson and Platonic Resonances.
Cataloguing the references to Plato in Deleuze’s Bergsonism provides an understanding
of the hierarchy of time over space at play in Deleuze’s Bergson and presages the parallel
priority of the virtual over the actual in Deleuze and DeLanda’s materialist rendering of him.
This analysis serves to explicate that the foundational works of Deleuzian New Materialism are
less grounded in empiricism than we might think because they maintain the Platonic split
between appearance and reality even as they reverse his hierarchy that prioritizes eternal static
forms over fluid accidents in the world of becoming. These references emerge piecemeal from
the text, so I have catalogued and explicate each in turn.
1. “Intuition as method is a method of division, Platonic in Inspiration.” 231 Methodologically,
this line references the division of messy aggregates into qualitative tendencies that branch
out towards a conceptual limit or pure state. I believe that this line foreshadows Deleuze’s
addition of the fourth step of the method in Bergsonism, in which the sufficiently
differentiated qualitative tendencies are integrated into a virtual whole signified by Duration
and serve as a necessary Absolute for generating a new series.
2. “When Plato formulated his method of division, he too intended to divide a composite into
two halves, or along several lines. But the whole problem lay in knowing how to choose the
right half…” 232 As is well known, Plato privileges the pure ideal plane of forms that humans
access through dialectical philosophy through a process named reminiscence. We knew
perfect things like equilateral triangles, pure equality, or the pure form or idea of a rock
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before we were born and, though philosophical dialectic in the Platonic mode, we access this
knowledge as they are revealed through logical proofs. What Bergsonism offers is not a
refutation of the ideal, but a re-working of which side of this formal divide we privilege by
assigning the value of essence: “For by dividing the composite according to two tendencies,
with only one showing the way in which a thing varies qualitatively in time, Bergson
effectively gives himself the means of choosing the ‘right side’ in each case; that of the
essence.” 233 Temporal duration and qualitative elaboration are the essential side over
spatiality and quantitative difference: Hierarchy based upon essential purity delimited
through thought reverses the content of Plato’s hierarchy while maintaining its form.
3. “Once again there is a Platonic tone in Bergson. Plato was the first to deride those who said
‘the One is multiple and the multiple one – Being is nonbeing,’ etc. In each case he asked
how, how many, when and where…Those metaphors of Plato about carving and the good
cook…correspond to Bergson’s invocation of the good tailor…” 234 We have here two things.
The insistence that philosophical division in the Bergsonian mode does not produce abstract
universals because it well fits its objects of analysis through “contradiction without negation”
and the immanence + monism equals the return of the condition to the conditioned, even as it
maintains their ontological separation at the level of the LNC.
4. “The point of contact between Bergson and Plato is in fact the search for a procedure capable
of determining in each case the ‘measure,’ the ‘what’ or the ‘how many.” 235 While Plato
believed a different mode of dialectic could get there, Bergson does not: “The dialectic
passes by a true method of division, it can do nothing other than carve out the real according
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to articulations that are wholly formal or verbal.” 236 On the one hand, the method made
explicit in Bergsonism certainly exceeds what was even available to Plato and Aristotle in
that the “lines of fact” through which it extends messy aggregates frequently begins with the
scientific knowledge of Bergson’s day. Bergson does present us with a kind of empiricism
that concerns itself with measuring. On the other hand, if the totality of all lines of fact leads
Bergson to posit the virtual as a “primordial totality” have we really done anything other than
locate the pure world of forms in a different but equally ideal or metaphysical and essentialist
register? Immediately subsequent to the long comparison with Plato’s metaphors, Deleuze
writes: “Duration is opposed to becoming precisely because it is a multiplicity…” 237 Essence
may become a complex structure, but the kind of process ontology frequently attributed to
Deleuze’s Bergson resolves in a set of all sets situation. Deleuze’s Bergson presents a mode
of ideal-potentiality that, once all the lines of fact converge, results in temporal duration as an
essential and invisible condition, outside of its actualizations conditioneds that occur in
matter and neuter its generative force by reducing quality to quantity. Put differently, the
“Platonic inspiration” leads to the positing of an anterior Absolute. We cannot measure the
virtual through experience; we can only verify it with logical necessity. The dominance of
final and formal causality has been maintained through the exact same argumentative
warrants, the LNC and LEM because the condition must be separable from the conditioned in
terms of space and time, out of which it was constructed in the first place.
5. This problem intensifies as Deleuze moves into noting the resonances between Plato in
Bergson in the directly ontological chapters: “…Not only does the past coexist with the
present that has been, but, as it preserves itself in itself (while the present passes), it is the
236
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whole, integral past; it is all our past, which coexists with each present.” 238 This quote
elaborates Duration as virtual or a temporal multiplicity as pure virtuality outside of the
infinitesimal presents of successive becoming; the mode of duration outside and superior to
becoming. Deleuze explicitly compares this to a difficult and, to a naturalist, absurd Platonic
concept: “The only equivalent thesis is Plato’s notion of Reminiscence. The reminiscence
also affirms a pure being of the past, a being in itself of the past, an ontological Memory that
is capable of serving as the foundation for the unfolding of time. Yet again, a Platonic
inspiration…” 239 Recall that the Platonic theory of reminiscence argues that knowledge is the
process of remembering the pure forms to which our immortal souls had access to before
being actualized in imperfect material bodies. At this point, we must ask the question as to
whether Bergsonism is accomplishing a reversal of Plato or is vindicating him. How did we
move from a notion of present as temporal compression to a virtual that is outside of
becoming in a realm of pure potentiality? How can there not be more in the concept of a total
field of the past figured as potentiality in the guise of qualitative self-differencing than in the
local durations and virtuals sketched out within local analyses of empirical things? This shift
presents a bizarre moment in which the potentially infinite ramifications of the prospective
illusion whiplash back into the positing of an Absolute domain through a kind of
retrospective illusion, albeit without negation. Potentiality against potentiality is better than
something against nothing in the register of the possible, but only by a margin if it strives to
totalize becoming into a primordial totality as ideal multiplicity.
6. Finally, “…The coexistence of all the degrees, of all the levels is virtual, only virtual. The
point of unification is itself virtual. This point is not without similarity to the One-Whole of
238
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the Platonists. All the levels of expansion and contraction coexist in a single Time and form a
totality; but this Whole, this One, are pure virtuality.” 240 The One-Whole at times appears to
follow from the LNC and LEM and at other times appears to depend on a different kind of
argumentative warrant. The One-Whole relation expressed here maintains the LNC and LEM
with a reversal of Aristotle’s solution to the Ship of Theseus Paradox: “This Whole has parts,
this One has a number – but only potentially…” 241 and, with regards to the singularities that
guide intensive differentiation, “…these points are themselves virtual…they form the
potential parts of a Whole that is itself virtual.” 242 The priority has been reversed from
antiquity. Aristotle starts with a substance and comports it towards the future: it is one actual
substance now and exhibits a determinate set of qualities in the present. This identity and
current qualities are a thing’s actuality, but it may potentially become another thing or exhibit
other qualities in the future. For Deleuze’s Bergson, the monistic fabric of the virtual is one
thing, the Absolute as two-faced multiplicity, that may potentially divide itself into an
infinite number of actualities. The past-present messy aggregate is purified through the LNC
at the level of multiplicity: there is one Absolute temporal multiplicity that is responsible for
the emergence of quality and another spatial multiplicity that, as it neutralizes differences in
intensive quality, produces the actual in its quantitative gradients across extensity. In this
way, Deleuze’s Bergson maintains the LNC at the register of Being as Multiplicity instead of
Being as Substance: there is nothing contradictory here because we are dealing with a
multiplicity or set like structure in the register of potentiality and not a discrete object at the
level of actuality. The temporal multiplicity is a one that is potentially many: it insists across
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a monistic fabric of past  present such that each actualization is one potential creation of an
Absolute past that never dies. Once more, monism serves as the argumentative warrant to
ward off the LEM: because we have made time a past  present there is no point like present
to force quality into a state of contradiction. We have a truth glut in which all quality resides
in a monistic temporal fabric; the point-dialetheia of the present has been logically exploded
into an Absolute that does not tolerate contradiction through negation, but instead
internalizes contradiction within quality as self-differentiating process. In these senses,
Deleuze’s Bergson maintains the form of the actual // potential split from Aristotle but does
so by reversing its hierarchy from actuality to potentiality through the doubled argumentative
warrant of monism + immanence.
To follow the argumentative flow of Bergsonism by tracking the Platonic references is to see a
strange conceit or a flourishing sleight of hand within one of the foundational texts in new
materialism. Deleuze’s Bergson is not concerned with materiality at all but maintaining older
ontological forms, despite reversing their hierarchy, by moving the register of metaphysical
analysis from singular substances to multiplicity. The hierarchy in which the ideal determines the
material from antiquity, the ideal that the cosmos has an order like that of the human mind and
intentionality, has been posited, only at a different level. The Idea becomes a self-actualizing set
of virtual singularities; actualities become acts of creation born of infinite potentiality, but ones
destined to only become the matter that will serve as future stumbling block for more
elaborations of the monistic virtual fabric of which they are the most congealed part.
Bergson and Einstein
The argumentative-ontological shift in Bergsonism with regards to Einstein suggests the
move from prospective to retrospective modes of working based upon strange argumentative
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assumptions related to the insistence on the primacy of temporality over spatiality and the
lingering demand that matter be comparatively neutral and dead actuality trapped in a kind of
eternal present of repetition. Deleuze maps out the series in which Bergson handles temporality:
“There is only one time (monism), although there is an infinity of actual fluxes (generalized
pluralism) that necessarily participate in the same virtual whole (limited pluralism).” 243 The
weight of the word “necessarily” here cannot be overstated. Earlier in the layout of the method,
the focus was on building chains of sufficient reason such that we can consider a thing at the
level of becoming in terms of tendency. Different “lines of fact” drawn from an at least empirical
if not naturalistic outlook are used to analyze some messy aggregate and push its parts out
towards a conceptual limit to produce a better understanding of it and its internal parts in a
“contradiction without negation.” The method is provisional, speculative, and always
incomplete; the logical conditions that we extract present one articulation of becoming given the
“lines of articulation” available in the historical period through scientific experimentation and
theorization. If scientific inquiry continually advances, and we do not solve the mysteries of the
universe, the relationship between empiricism and metaphysics remains a fully open system. The
infinity is potential and the projection of a domain provisional. Working through this shift in
Bergsonism is vital to set up the distinction between philosophical-theoretical models that set up
an anterior cause, such as the virtual or ideology, that function as metaphysical causes for
empirical reality and naturalistic orientations that position concepts as useful fictions that help
human minds understand reality but have no metaphysical priority over measurement.
The movement to positing a necessary “virtual whole” presents the moment Bergsonism
changes vectors from B A into A  B and embraces the problems of the Absolute and
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transcendental reasoning by casting the virtual as a multiplicity at the level of being outside of
temporality and then starting a new mode of division based upon this Absolute. This problem
arises clearly with the last shift and Deleuze’s understanding of the consequences of it; it
necessitates a “fourth moment” that deals largely with how this virtual conceived of as temporal
multiplicity at the level of potential being can actualize at all without being reduced to a
quantitative gradient. 244 The argumentative path here arises as Deleuze attempts to remove the
contradictions from the progression of Bergson’s work by more rigidly adhering to the notion of
potentiality as qualitative multiplicity being the determinant of actual being.
Deleuze tracks the idea of duration with regards to mereology or the part-whole problem
through several of Bergson’s texts. Matter and Memory and “Introduction to Metaphysics”
feature a “radical plurality of durations” in which “each rhythm is itself a duration” such that we
are “caught between more dispersed durations and more taught, more intense durations…” 245 No
totality or whole exists; we have only cascading durations varying in terms of their temporal
rhythm, comparative closed or openness in terms of system boundaries, i.e., interaction with one
another, and the analysis of qualitative tendencies ramifies towards a potential infinity not bound
by any notion of the Absolute. On the one hand, Creative Evolution treats organic life as
occurring in a kind of duration or memory both in the differentiation of the individual and the
history of evolution. 246 On the other, this text imposes a wedge between organic life and dead
arrangements of matter: “The only ones that [have duration] are the beings similar to us…living
beings that naturally form relative closed systems, and finally, the Whole of the universe.” 247
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Deleuze describes this step as the move from “general pluralism” to “limited pluralism.” 248 In
the limited pluralism model, matter has no distinct duration outside of being a part of the totality
and has an oddly anthropocentric bent as it has “a certain relative way of participating in our
duration and of giving it emphasis.” 249 The Aristotelian primacy of final and formal causality
over material causality has been re-asserted.
Finally, Duration and Simultaneity projects a domain through conceptual totalization:
“…there is only a single time, a single duration, in which everything would participate…” 250
This new formulation leads to the “triplicity of fluxes” that follows Bergson’s later work in
attempting to include and account for each formulation of duration: “There is only one time
(monism), although there is an infinity of actual fluxes (generalized pluralism) that necessarily
participate in the same virtual whole (limited pluralism).” 251 This triplet appears to follow the
structure of the prospective illusion insomuch as we could conceive of monistic time as a messy
aggregate, the actual fluxes as lines of fact, and the virtual whole as their eventual reconstitution
“beyond the turn in experience.”
However, I may have forced the dough into a cookie cutter. First, the way time works in
Bergson depends greatly on its dualistic pairing with adjunct terms: space, quality and quantity,
matter against potentiality, the past and the present in terms of relaxation and contraction, and
the virtual and the actual. The degree to which the Time//Space pairing truly acts as the
foundational pairing appears suspect to me when it consistently depends on adjunct dualisms that
are far more general than the more phenomenological and empirical ones such as
perception//memory. Second, Deleuze has changed the order in which these insights occur
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between their two explications. In the first part of this section, we are provided with the
chronological explication of General Pluralism  Limited Pluralism  Monism of Time that
emerges from reading Bergson’s works in sequence. Why now is this presented as the sequence
Monism  General Pluralism  Limited Pluralism? In part, because that is how Bergson lays
out his analysis of his own work in Duration and Simultaneity, but also because Deleuze will add
a fourth step to the method. This moment is the moment in a shift from moving from B  A
(prospective) into A  B (retrospective) modes of argumentation. Deleuze’s analysis of method
will call for a “fourth step” that clarifies this shift formally: “But now we are speaking of a
completely different type of division: Our starting point is a unity, a simplicity, a virtual totality.
This unity is actualized according to the divergent lines differing in kind; it ‘explains, it develops
what it had kept enclosed in a virtual manner.” 252 I fail to see how this “completely different type
of division” does not engage in the positing of the exact kind of metaphysical Absolute that these
works supposedly strive to escape.
The logical necessity for the fourth step of the method derives from Bergson’s
“confrontation with the theory of Relativity.” 253 In Deleuze’s recapitulation of Bergson’s
understanding, relativity produces “a multiplicity of times, a plurality of times, with different
speeds of flow, all real, each one peculiar to a system of reference.” 254 This formulation would
appear to share a concord with the kind of “general pluralism” espoused by Bergson in the
Matter and Memory formulation of duration. Yet accepting this construal of relativity without
the hard determinist consequences it produces in Einstein’s later career, especially in his
encounter with quantum mechanics, violates Bergson’s own strict belief in the separability of
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time and space. Deleuze puts it succinctly: “By confusing the two types – actual spatial
multiplicity and virtual temporal multiplicity – Einstein has merely invented a new way of
spatializing time.” 255 One rationale for the confrontation and potential misunderstanding between
the two deals with the tendency that emerges in Bergson’s work outside of Matter and Memory:
to insist upon temporality being on the side of essence. The necessity of a “right side” requires
that Bergson either change his mind about the ascendency of time over space or read his own
metaphysical division into Einstein’s work.
For Deleuze, the role of Riemann multiplicities takes center stage, in part, because it
allows him to rehabilitate Bergson on the plane of mathematics beyond Bergson’s own
phenomenological examples. Deleuze’s problem with Bergson’s construal essentially deals with
choosing the wrong dualism to be essential: “Bergson’s agenda of decomposing the composite
mixture of space and time that he sees as operating in Einstein’s response to Riemann means that
he is intent on dividing the composite into duration, on the one hand, which is pure, and space,
on the other hand, which is an impurity that denatures it.” 256 In privileging the temporal over the
spatial, “Bergson fails to appreciate the implication of Riemann’s work for reassessing the
concept of space.” 257
By way of shifting the emphasis through considerations of quantity/extensity and
quality/intensity, Deleuze will replace the time//space dualism with the virtual//actual dualism as
the primary condition of all conditioned with the privilege on the side of the virtual: “…Deleuze
deploys the full potential of a concept of the virtual modeled on Riemann space, where Riemann
space is composed of sheets, each of which is a Riemann surface.” 258 I find this explanation
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unsatisfactory because I can find no reason why Riemann Spaces and Surfaces, as opposed to say
Group Theory, Category Theory, or Set Theory, should have primacy over other modes of maths
in expressing, in the weak case, or Being, in the strong case, a fully real and totalized virtual. It is
one thing to engage in a soft form of mathematical Platonism where the structures of a
development in mathematics can be said to serve as a metaphor or maybe more for some ideal
condition of being. After all, physics and math are closely bound in a mutual process of creation
at this point in the history of science. It is another thing entirely to show why, if math guides the
virtual actualization of being or serves as a limit on the static being of the actual, that this or that
branch of math transcends model and directly expresses a hidden substrate of Being. Put
differently, the task of a mathematical Platonist dovetails into that of a hard determinist: the
contingent quality of which maths and math’s own progressive bent towards new creation and
physical prediction must be explained without vague mystical reference to a unified theory of
everything mathematical and physical. I have yet to see an adequate answer for why Hilbert
spaces so well express quantum phenomena, except quantum gravity, and why Einstein’s
Riemann based maths work so well for macro scale phenomena. Naturalistic skepticism does not
face this problem: any such unified theory can arise and falsify the predominant framework in
line with the position of naturalism itself because the system remains speculative, it does not
need to project a domain in a metaphysical sense. Theories in science are falsifiable: metaphysics
derived from the “lines of fact” available at some historical period should be falsifiable as well,
instead of hinging their truth values upon logical necessity when we cannot be sure that the
cosmos really is all that logical.
The two primary examples Deleuze reports from Bergson rely upon strange modes of
contradiction to do their work against the spatialization of all time by leveraging logical warrants
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against Einstein’s empirical predictions and rigor. First, we have a strange section about a human
observer in a network with a flying bird and a river. 259 Bergson makes a move eerily similar to
Leibniz’s monads: “The flowing of the water, the flight of the bird, the murmur of my life form
three fluxes; but only because my duration is one of them, and also the element that contains the
two others…two fluxes could never be said to be coexistent or simultaneous if they were not
contained in a third one.” 260 The conscious duration in this network: “divides in two and is
reflected in another that contains it at the same time as it contains the flight of the bird.” 261 This
leads to duration having a triple power: “to disclose other durations, to encompass the others, and
to encompass itself ad infinitum…it is not simply succession but a very special coexistence, a
simultaneity of fluxes.” 262
From the perspective of a spatialized reading of being along the logic of the LNC, this
construal of duration appears contradictory: how can the perception of other things figured as
durations divide my duration such that it is one thing and yet also multiple things? Presumably,
by causing each duration to divide into a novel duration through relation. But why does this local
regress require an Absolute to function? And why resolve local contradiction by subsuming it to
an Absolute Duration in which contradiction exists without negation? Bergson subsumes the
local contradiction into a monism: because there is one duration that is a one, but a one that is a
specific kind of multiplicity, where many things are manifested at once without being entangled
in relations of contradiction. In a sense, the division of durations encountering durations within a
continuous manifold of virtual-being greatly resembles Leibniz’s theory of monads. Each
contains a perspective of the entire universe from its own perspective: at the level of the LNC

Deleuze, Bergsonism, 80.
Ibid.
261
Ibid.
262
Ibid, 80-81.
259
260

150
they are one, but at the level of the LEM they are virtually many. The notion of a virtual
multiplicity as potentiality through universal memory as duration attempts to do the same thing
as Leibniz to wiggle out of contradiction, but the curious part for me is why such a strange
Absolute gets to be immune to contradiction through monism as warrant when Einstein’s
Relativity Theory does not.
The second example dealing with relativity in the apprehension of the other between
Peter and Paul presents greater difficulty. Deleuze, for his part, admits its difficulty: “…the
Bergsonian demonstration of the contradictory character of the plurality of times seems
obscure.” 263 For Deleuze, this obscurity results from Bergson’s refusal to allow intensive quality
in spatiality such that a rigorous construal of the virtual could obtain, a problem he will fix in his
own work. For us, it is because Bergson selectively applies notions of contradiction and ignores
the gap between empirical verification and thought experiment.
General Relativity, in philosophic terms, destroys the notion of space and time as
Absolute categorical reference points for both human consciousness and, presumably, objects not
under human observation. Special relativity, in philosophic terms, features an outright
contradiction at the level of the LNC and LEM: the speed of light is invariant regardless of if you
travel at 2 meters a second walking about or 100 meters a second flying because you have
somehow acquired super-powers. Similarly, the two clocks experiment empirically confirms that
relativity’s predictions hold: time dilation happens when you fly two linked clocks around the
Earth at macro-relevant speeds. Were you to move close to the speed of light the rhythm of your
duration would change compared to a statistical distribution of typical human aging.
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Relativity demonstrates that the typical logic associated with time and space may, to use
Bergson’s terms, present a poorly posed question. It is not, as Bergson insists, that time/space in
Einstein is a messy aggregate, but that Bergson’s division of being into temporal and spatial
multiplicity presents a poorly posed question based upon the doxa that time and space are
qualitatively different things. Experimental verification demonstrates that the apparent
contradiction in Einstein to Bergson derives from logical-metaphysical criteria and not empirical
ones.
Let us return to “Peter and Paul” to grasp the precise mismatch in when contradiction
counts and does not in Deleuze’s Bergson account. Deleuze describes Bergson’s thought
experiment as follows: “When we admit the existence of several times…” we cannot simply
have time A and time B, “we are forced to introduce a strange factor: the image that A has of B,
while nevertheless knowing that B cannot live in this way. This factor is completely ‘symbolic’:
in other words, it opposes and excludes the lived experience and through it (and only it) is the socalled second time realized.” 264 I find this example strange because, assuming even a modest
sense of realism, given that reality relativities when we do the clock experiment, we can assume,
given a similar environment and cosmological history, that reality will relativity whether there is
a human observer or not. I believe this “symbolic factor” describes a kind of perspectival
projection itself that has an ontological grounding more than a representational one. Entities
ground themselves in relatively actualized relationships through permeable boundaries; entities
exhibit a kind of perspective when acute environmental stimuli agitate a response. In the
passivity of reception, a passive synthesis lurks in which the systems themselves determine what
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quantitative threshold of a given stimulus necessitates a response and which qualities can even be
responded to.
Bergson construes relativity as: “…based on the following hypothesis: There are no
longer qualitative fluxes, but systems, ‘in a state of reciprocal and uniform replacement’ where
the observers are interchangeable, since there is no longer a privileged system.” 265 We must be
careful to note the slippage between how Bergson reads “observers” and how a naturalist would
read “observers.” Observers measure reality with experimental apparatuses; they are oriented in
the flux of becoming in a relative sense by how they attempt to close a system for measurement.
Observers do not merely provide a perspective on reality conceived as a mathematical point or a
symbolic edifice. Furthermore, insomuch as experimental apparatuses are part of the phenomena
they elaborate upon through demonstration, we must assume that the things we measure would
exhibit these properties with or without human intervention in similar cases. The universe can be
conceptualized as an experimental apparatus that observes itself. Deleuze sums up Bergson’s
remarks on a thought experiment in which Peter and Paul attempt to measure each other’s times:
“In short, the other time is something that can neither be lived by Peter nor by Paul, nor by Paul
as Peter imagines him. It is a pure symbol excluding the lived and indicating simply that such a
system, and not the other, is taken as a reference point.” 266 The footnote in which Deleuze
attempts to make this insertion of a symbolic thing as perspectival point clearer makes it worse:
“The image that I make to myself of others, or that Peter makes to himself of Paul, is then an
image that cannot be lived or thought as livable without contradiction (by Peter, by Paul, or by
Peter as he imagines Paul.) In Bergsonian terms, this is not an image, it is a ‘symbol.’” 267 So
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there we have it: because the thought experiment version of relativity relies upon perspective
and, for Bergson, perspective indicates a symbol, contradiction has been brought into reality by
treating reality as a language.
The problem with this argument is where Bergson domesticates logical contradiction in
his own system, by positing Duration as a Temporal Absolute that features contradiction without
negation. This edifice depends upon Deleuze’s Bergson selective deployment of what counts as a
symbol and what, therefore, must comply with classical logic, particularly the LNC and LEM.
After all, we have already grasped that monism serves as a supplementary warrant for
Bergsonism’s system that complicates the quality of contradiction with regards to multiplicities
by attempting to remove perspective from rigorous ontology. On the one hand, we have this
frame of reference as symbol in the Relativity thought experiment. We can conceive of this
frame of reference as a perspectival point whose sole purpose is to signify that two systems are
being taken as reciprocal for the purpose of drawing out some characteristic of simultaneity with
regards to Relativity. Bergson argues that this symbol cannot be lived because it is contradictory;
yet, anyone who does their own Hafele-Keating experiment by flying atomic clocks around the
globe will find that this seemingly contradictory reality can indeed be lived. 268 The people on the
planes with the clocks are not in some ideal thought experiment world: they are living it on a
plane.
Simultaneity in Relativity, that is to say, is not a merely epistemological problem in
which some contradiction can be erased that deals with human perception, such as in the case of
thunder and lightning, the contradiction presented by simultaneity in relativity is ontological.269
In short, the thought experiment involves a symbolic perspective or signifier because it is a
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model of reality built with language and that underlying reality, from the perspective of classical
bivalence and the LNC, is contradictory. To be clear: Bergson cannot have “zones of
indetermination” and a logically consistent universe within a mathematical-bivalent
understanding of science. On the other hand, we know from the Inclosure Paradox and the
Domain Principle that absolutes are given to paradox: Bergson’s duration figured as primordial
totality does not escape this problem from the perspective of the very argumentative warrants he
deploys against Einstein by being posited as a Riemann space or a specific kind of continuous or
temporal multiplicity. The projection of the singular and identical time appears as symbolic
insomuch as it totalizes all local and qualitatively differentiated times as the frame of reference
in the Relativity thought experiment. In short, from the perspective of classical logic with
bivalence: both Relativity and Bergsonism are contradictory and Deleuze’s Bergsons selective
application of the LNC and LEM with regards to the symbolic content of a thought experiment
flagrantly shifts the goalposts.
To reframe the preceding argument with explicit reference to classical logical warrants:
1. Relativity has impressive empirical results 270 with time dilation and spatial contraction with
regards to motion. It also has impressive results with regards to the relativity of
“simultaneous” events being dependent upon motion at non-quantum scales.
2. These empirical results are expressed in mathematical terms with Riemann spaces. One could
take this relationship, alongside a strong stance in favor of the logicism of mathematics, to
indicate that Relativity does not exhibit contradiction.
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3. Mathematical logicism aside, both Relativity and Bergson’s notion of immanence as a
cosmological scale virtuality are contradictory at the level of at least the LEM and potentially
the LNC.
a. For Relativity, contradiction obtaining depends on whether one follows Einstein and
some subsequent physicists, Stephen Hawking for example, in positing an eternalist
notion of cosmological time such that these local and relative displacements can be noncontradictory in a fully spatialized universe. I perceive this answer as the shadow twin of
Bergson’s: the Absolute multiplicity being spatial instead of temporal. Of course, this
option has been complicated by quantum mechanics noncompliance with Relativity and
competing ideas at the macro scale that eschew the big bang and or the potentiality of a
unified theory of everything. Relativity can maintain the LNC and LEM by projecting an
Absolute domain at the limit of everything, despite Relativity theorized at a local level
destroying the notion of simultaneity such that all being is a flux of becoming that can
only be spatialized through a kind of perspectivism. 271
b. For Bergson, the universal and singular time is a necessary condition of simultaneity as
we experience it beyond the kind of contradiction presented by what he claims is a
“symbol” in the thought experiment. The Bergsonian temporal multiplicity clearly
violates the LEM without the monistic potential-actual conceit: it is itself and its
qualitative differentiations at the same time. Bergson subsumes these into the
potential//actual distinction just as Aristotle does. The question is to whether it violates
the LNC. On the one hand, it is clear that the framing of a multiplicity that is one with the
kind of multiplicity that it is attempts to escape stages an essence-based contradiction. On
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the other hand, Bergson and Deleuze’s need to strictly separate the condition from the
conditioned all the way to positing an Absolute beyond all local manifestation suggests
that they are attempting to not run afoul of the LNC. How can any set of all set type
mathematical structure not run into the set theoretic antimonies? Positing time as a
Riemann space positions it as an actual infinity: actual infinities fall prey to even
increasingly large mathematical structures in terms of cardinality. As with Relativity at
the limits of all cosmology, Bergson attempts to escape local contradiction by projecting
a domain to be expressed mathematically even though the mathematic totalization itself
does not escape problems of contradiction. Put differently, internalizing contradiction
within an Absolute still maintains a generative dialetheia.
c. Why does Bergson find Relativity’s violation of the LEM contradictory but his own
violation of the LNC and LEM legitimate? In part, because Bergson will follow
Aristotle’s solution to the LEM in which essential “outstanding points” that are
qualitatively different exist only as “potential parts of a Whole that is itself virtual.” 272
While shifting the register and the complexity, Bergson maintains some dualisms to
evade the problems of contradiction that we have already argued as problematic: the
essence//accident and potential//actual distinctions.
d. It is in this sense, that the virtual and the actual can be articulated as perspectival
projections that encompass an infinite processual regress in being under conceptual
totalization.
4. The thought experiment’s use of the signifier for perspective to help model the empirical
reality’s use of contradiction from Bergson’s perspective matters extremely little if empirical
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verification has occurred. In both thought experiment and empirical experiment, the scientist
creates a model of reality that is comparatively closed compared to the open system of the
universe to draw out capacities of the universe that can be assumed through abduction, given
similar conditions, to operate with or without the human measuring apparatus and its
technological extensions. Thought emerges from reality in a partial sense; reality will not
always comply with the strictures of thought.
5. Among the central findings of Relativity is that space and time cannot be considered
absolutes, yet, Bergson, despite his reading in Matter and Memory of local areas of cascading
durations, imposes an Absolute Time such that Time and Space are not a messy aggregate.
Yet, they only appear a messy aggregate if we have already assumed them to be different
things, just as the past and present, in Bergson’s own work, only appear to be a messy
aggregate because we assume past and present are different things. The very thrust of
Relativity and then even more so in Quantum Mechanics is that the time//space distinction is
not a messy aggregate, but a poorly posed question because it relies upon the philosophical
doxa that time and space are different because we experience them to be different in a naïve
phenomenological register. In this sense, Bergson has violated his own methodology in
unequally applying the poorly posed question stipulation. A new line of fact emerges with
Relativity that, instead of its ramifications being tracked in terms of sufficiency and
tendency, has led to the retrospective positing of an Absolute.
6. Bergson describes the frame of reference in relativity as a symbol that does not present a
genuinely phenomenological image. As a symbolic artifice, it is subject to contradiction and
therefore cannot be true of the real. Yet, what happens if we recast the terms of the thought
experiment with higher fidelity to the experimental process? Would perspective and symbol
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not turn into orientation and measurement? Could it be said that in the absence of a human
constructed system that things themselves function as experimental apparatuses in states of
tension with one another?
7. Perspectival projections and the positing of Absolutes derives from ontological commitments
that reality shape itself like thought, particularly the kind of logical thought bound up in
classical logic and bivalence. The problem with metaphysics’ uptake of science, in the
continental and analytic traditions, derives from continental philosophy’s continued and
hidden reliance upon the LNC and LEM in patterns of inclusion and exclusion to prop up
their Absolutes. The foregoing part of this chapter maps out what that looks like with
Bergson; the next chapters map it out with Deleuze, DeLanda, and rhetorical theory. The
problem in parts ofanalytic tradition, that we have already observed with Aristotle and
Leibniz, emerges when classical bivalence is preserved, although several other enticing
options exist that have ontological applicability through advances in relativity and quantum
mechanics. We have not escaped the problems of the Absolute noted in the first chapter:
instead of embracing modes of logic that tolerate a contradictory cosmos we displace
contradiction from the local into the Absolute, thinking we have evaded it, but, in reality, we
have only displaced it into a new register.
8. Logic is a human modelling apparatus and not an inexorable universal truth and we must be
careful with the ontological assumptions that underly our most fundamental argumentative
warrants in their philosophical application. If reality itself is contradictory from the
perspective of the LNC and LEM and potentially contradictory beyond logic through features
like quantum indeterminacy then we must regard philosophical systems as relatively closed
systems that model reality in terms of meaning through various argumentative warrants that
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carry ontological commitments that are always incomplete and challenge the regime of
classical bivalence through the LNC and LEM on which they are founded. Probabilistic
reasoning and truth values more in line with empirical findings, a doing of things instead of a
thought experiment of things, provide appealing alternatives.
Matter and Spatiality
Let us take stock before moving into Deleuze’s Bergsons construal of causality and its
recapitulation of the marginalization of materialist causality, and therefore the ontological
indeterminacy necessary to facilitate contingency. The first three steps of the method form the
basis of the prospective illusion in which series of qualitative tendencies ramify outwards
towards future forms that never obtain in reality but help us to model phenomena. The fourth
step of the method, that arises from Bergson’s encounter with Einstein, snaps Deleuze’s Bergson
into a retrospective mode in which Duration as temporal Absolute becomes a “real but ideal”
multiplicity that is necessary for the self-differencing difference of becoming. This line of
reasoning problematically brings back in the problems of the Absolute from Aristotle and
Leibniz in which a metaphysical entity exerts causal efficacy on reality beyond measurement and
material intervention. We can only know this metaphysical thing through logical means, namely
a selective deployment of the LNC and LEM. Explicating this tendency in Bergonsim, and
eventually Deleuze and DeLanda, can help us find similar patterns in rhetorical theory with
regards to ideology and rhetoricity that need to be similarly challenged through a naturalistic
ontology that foregrounds intervention and measurement over logically produced anterior
Absolutes.
The gap between the first three moments of the method and the final one recapitulates the
animus against material causes first mapped out in Aristotle. With regards to the difference
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between BA and AB: “In the first type, it is a reflexive dualism, which results from the
decomposition of an impure composite: It constitutes the first moment of the method. In the
second type it is a genetic dualism, the result of the differentiation of a Simple or a Pure: It forms
the final moment of the method that ultimately rediscovers the starting point on this new
plane.” 273 The prospective illusion builds out different dualisms towards their virtual but only
potential totality; the retrospective illusion then, contra Deleuze and Bergson, reads the highest
cardinality dualism, for Bergson Time//Space and Deleuze Virtual//Actual, back into Being as
the pure-ideal point of departure. Were these structures offered as mere methodological
modelling functions, we would be done here and ready to deploy these nice argumentative
structures or illusions in rhetorical theory. But they are not: they ostensibly explain to us the real
condition/s of Being itself. Their underlying ontology raises problems because of the Absolute
and the difference in hierarchy and purity between the ideal-virtual and the actual-material. At
times, matter seems a mere obstacle for virtuality to overcome in parallel fashion to Aristotle’s
final causality’s relationship to material causality. At times in these accounts, matter appears to
take on a life of its own. Ultimately, we will see, in the final section of this chapter, that
Deleuze’s Bergsons methodology-ontology shares with the modes of the retrospective illusion a
tacit reliance upon indeterminacy in a materialist vein to prop up its construal of Being’s ideality.
We have made much of the time side of the Time//Space dualism, but how does the status
of spatiality and matter shift in response to the Einstein crisis? In response to supposed reduction
of time to space, Bergson pushes the tendency of the quantitative multiplicity that is the other
side of duration out: “At the limit of expansion…we have matter. While undoubtedly, matter is
not yet space, it is already extensity.” 274 We reach space when we push matter’s tendencies
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towards bare repetition to find that “Space, in effect, is not matter or extension, but the ‘schema’
of matter, that is, the representation of the limit where the movement of expansion would come
to an end as the external envelope of all possible extensions.” 275 One wonders why Duration or
the virtual as totality is not similarly a “representation of [a] limit.” Matter, at this point, retains a
measure of agency in terms of the capacity to create or self-differentiate because it does not
become fully sterile by becoming a “schema” unto itself.
Deleuze articulates this relationship as a chiasmus: “What is expanded if not the
contracted – and what is contracted if not the extended, the expanded? This is why there is
always extensity in our duration, and always duration in matter.” 276 Similarly, duration itself
never reaches a pure virtuality outside of the pure-ideal conditions of reality: “duration is never
contracted enough to be independent of the internal matter where it operates…” 277 Everything is
a mess of time and space in experience; duration could not exist as pure virtuality and matter
could not exist as pure actuality; we can discern their logical conditions by pushing them out into
a state of contradiction at their limits.
Deleuze’s account strains the more processual model of overlapping durations once the
virtual as totality is introduced alongside the fourth moment of the method. We are given a sense
in which “…Duration is differentiated according to the obstacles it meets in matter, according to
the materiality through which it passes, according to the kind of extension that it contracts.” 278
We are still residing in an Aristotelian frame, but at least the recalcitrance of materiality is
generative in the sense of friction and not taken as the constitutive element of disability or
monstrosity. Actualizations push back upon duration and condense or counter-actualize back into
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duration figured at potentiality; potentialities only exist as they ramify out into ever new
configurations and complex structures in actuality. We have an infinite regress here with no
totality: the actualization of one thing is the potential of the future actualization of the next in an
infinite regress or potential infinity such that the problems of the Absolute do not enter the
system. We are also given a sense in which “Duration is differentiated within itself through an
internal explosive force” 279 or “the virtual…must create its own lines of actualization in positive
acts…” 280 or “the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being
differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself.” 281 Somehow the virtual has causal primacy
and this causal primacy becomes an ontotheological totality when the fourth moment of the
method projects an immanence as universal condition beyond all discrete conditioned actualities.
Causality functions like a knot that somehow generates its own string. Instead of leaving it that
things differentiate over cosmological timescales in ways that produce the congregation of
memory in matter that then begets more differences, we are presented with something awfully
close to an unmoved mover: a virtual that is “a simple or pure” that somehow actualizes itself
internally. Matter once again becomes subsumed under an ideal construction that is logically
necessary but beyond empirical measurement and idealism, albeit in a reversal of Plato’s
hierarchy between static form and potential becoming, is maintained.
Duration as Absolute; Virtual as Totality
I fail to see how moving from the possible to the potential and from identity to
divergence, while remaining on an ideal plane that is posited as necessary to account for the
actual measurable world, does anything more than shift the goalposts in a more rigorously
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mathematical direction that, at first, avoids the problems of the Absolute endemic to categorical
projection. Put differently, the re-work of metaphysics previewed by Bergsonism focalizes
difference and potentiality over identity and possibility but it still finally insists on a form of
essence in the event and insists that reality complies with logical entailment by finding refuge in
mathematics. This shift problematically displaces contradiction without truly transmuting it into
productive paradox. Philosophy appears like cleaning a messy floor with a messy mop: we just
shove the contradiction ever more into the corners of the room with classical argumentative
warrants and hierarchical dualistic pairs instead of changing the water.
Here is the metaphysical argument offered in Bergsonism to provide a temporary
conclusion before moving into Deleuze and DeLanda:
1. The Virtual: “…the virtual as virtual has a reality; this reality, extended to the whole
universe, consists in all the coexisting degrees of expansion and contraction.” 282 Here we
have the ontological linkage of the virtual that is graphed out at page 60 of Bergsonism in a
psychological register by the cone diagram in which successive differentiations, as illustrated
by the A, A’ 283 notation between the levels, portrayed as circular sections of the cone as it
tapers towards its point, coalescing towards the present, represent the contraction of universal
memory towards the present. Yet, the diagram at page 60 refers to how memories can
coalesce into things like perceptions that influence our phenomenologically lived present.
One of the fundamental justifications for the virtual relies tacitly upon panpsychism: “The
idea of a virtual coexistence of all the levels of the past…is thus extended to the whole of the
universe…. Everything happens as if the universe were a tremendous Memory.” 284 The
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justifications for this move are subtle and rely upon many different adjunct areas,
argumentative warrants, and truth criteria that we will explore and critique below. In short,
we know there is a virtuality that we have special access to because similar distributions of
differences pop up in the world that we are a microcosm of. Therefore, the way memory
works in mind and the way virtuality works in Being has similarities.
2. The Virtual as Real: “We must take this terminology seriously: The possible has no reality
(although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such
possesses a reality… ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.” 285 Here we
have a justification and qualification of the virtual through critique: when Bergson or
Deleuze refer to the possible they are referring to metaphysical models driven by mechanism
that function through the retrospective illusion. For a thing to exist, it must be possible that it
exists as part of a necessary universal that it resembles in a logic of identity. When we think
the possible against an actualization, we project a vast reservoir of universal resemblance that
is cognitively anterior to the thing, even though we produce this possibility based upon the
thing. We perceive apparent differences between water, ice, and steam and between these
things and more apparently ephemeral forces like electricity and heat make categories like
matter and energy. Time passes, science extends our perceptual apparatuses through
technological invention and we discover that matter and energy are not all that differentiable:
matter are apparently more stable arrangements of energy and energy more fluid
arrangements of matter insomuch as all arrangements exhibit wave-particle duality. There
only appears to be a category named matter because we have bundled similarities and
magnified the apparent differences between things based upon the similarities and then
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projected a category constructed of the similarities backwards to account for the condition of
their possibility against their own nonexistence.
Deleuze’s Bergson attempts to shift the ground from possibility to potentiality and
identity to difference or, perhaps better phrased, divergence, to account for the structures that
sufficiently facilitate the production of a category reduced to a line of fact in the first place.
This route interests itself less in fitting things into categories based on identity and more in
accounting for the division of potentials, for example, of matter as qualitatively distinct from
energy, into solid, gas, liquid, and plasma 286 and attempting to account for the logical
structure underlying matter’s cosmological and local self-differentiation. In short, matter
changes phases from variations in thresholds of an intensive quality named temperature and
these thresholds can be mapped out through mathematical methods. 287 Yet, matter does not
resemble temperature either in its manifestations after the emergence of matter with regards
to changes in temperature nor in matter’s emergent genesis from the singularity in the Big
Bang cosmology. 288 Despite this non-resemblance, we can say that temperature is immanent
to matter: you cannot separate a thing from the layers of intensive force across different
intensive kinds and scales that permeate it.
For Deleuze and Deleuze’s Bergson, this discrepancy indicates that the logic of the
possible in which the conditioned resembles the condition in terms of identity is incorrect,
such that the conditioned do not resemble the condition in terms of divergence or difference.
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temperature, as one “parameter” among many like pressure and so on, can beget intensive changes at a local scale.
On the other hand, in the cosmological view, does temperature itself function as a universal present for all
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assuming that the big bang is correct? What else is required for matter to have phases?
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There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between comparatively intensive and
comparatively extensive qualities; the question for an ontology of Bergsonism comes with
the status of the virtual as immanent and monistic. Why do we need to project, or perhaps,
introject this extra-empirical membrane into the ontology? Why does the matter // energy
messy aggregate appear messy from one perspective, but useful as a starting place for
different states of matter from another?
3. Immanence and Ideality: The logic of immanence strains under the physical inseparability of
intensive qualities, extensive quantities, and what Deleuze argues are their necessary
virtuality that tends to play out as a Platonist extension of the mathematical models we use to
describe these physical phenomena. When we bring in the virtual as Absolute, the logic of
the condition // conditioned maintains the LNC in terms of causality, the virtual singularities
are points in series cancelling of self-difference, such that actualities result, and the LEM in
terms of the potential // actual split through an underlying dichotomy between intensive and
extensive qualities. In a sense, the status of the LNC changes: two things are not different
because their identities are necessarily different but because their structural distributions of
differences are sufficiently different. This move into multiplicity and structure theorized as
the distribution of differences presents a useful tool, but it still shovels contradiction off into
a different register with new Absolutes and introduces a hierarchy between virtuality and
potentiality against extensity and actuality. Intensity becomes a difficultly differentiable
bridge between cause and effect. This begs the question: if many mechanist metaphysics rely
on badly posed questions and messy aggregates and philosophy is a progressive tendency in
thought to reformulate these, could not Deleuze and Deleuze’s Bergson harbor similarly
poorly posed questions also work against their goals?
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The argumentative structure of the prospective illusion can be recursively applied to
the metaphysical content of the prospective illusion such that some new philosophical
resource emerges at the level of argumentative warrants. We have already observed that
Bergson’s insistence that the Time // Space dualism possesses the highest cardinality
challenged: can we, in turn, challenge Deleuze’s solution that wraps the Time // Space
dualism into the Virtual // Actual dualism in terms of “spatiotemporal dynamisms?” I argue
that the extensive // intensive dualism that underlies this distinction in Deleuze and those who
work from him functions as the poorly posed aggregate that requires a lurking contradiction
between the intensive and actual conditioned and the virtual condition deriving from logical
and not empirical criteria. Deleuze may work through contradiction and not negation, but any
split that requires contradiction with a metaphysical fantasy, as we will see that extensity and
metric properties are, sneaks in the very problematic argumentative warrants in the LNC and
LEM and the retrospective illusions that it seeks to supercede.
4. The Multiplicity as One that is Potentially Many: I believe that most ardent Deleuzians
would accuse me of reducto ad absurdum for my apparent reduction of virtuality to
potentiality and perhaps they would be right to do so, since after all there are singularities
and intensities that function as elements in the self-differentiating virtuality. We will get to
Deleuze’s tripartite schema in good time. For now, we are concerned with the connection
between these multiplicities and Aristotle’s solution to the Ship of Theseus Paradox and the
re-distribution of the substance // accident dichotomy. Remember, “This point is not without
similarity to the One-Whole of the Platonists…This Whole has parts, this One has a number
– but only potentially…” 289 or, with regard to the singularities in the virtual, “…they coexist
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in a Unity…they form the potential parts of a Whole that is itself virtual.” 290 The violation of
the LEM in Bergsonism and Deleuze happens at the level of the Absolute as a qualitativeintensive and quantitative-extensive multiplicity at the same time. The LNC is oddly
maintained through the splitting of the virtual condition and the actual conditioned such that
essence as potentiality maintains hierarchy over comparatively sterile actualizations. On the
one hand, the contradiction becomes internalized in terms of qualitative difference without
negation, and this does present a satisfying content based dialetheia in which, at the level of
the Absolute, a thing is and is not itself. Why do we need an Absolute at all? Does the virtual
as totality of cosmological history’s potentiality not present a conceptual totality that must
fall prey to the problems of actual infinities graphed out in the first chapter? Perhaps,
depending on how we take the warrants of immanence and monism. So long as the borders
between the virtual and actual are policed through the LNC along the logic of the condition
and conditioned requiring a strict separation at the level of the Absolute as in the fourth step
of the method, yes. Were we to diffract the boundaries of virtual and actual in a local cascade
with no Absolute in a potential infinity, no. The question comes down to how the
actualization can be a genuinely divergent creation, given the analogies between mathematics
and life and how the virtual attempts to blend singular accidents while remaining an essential
universal condition.
5. Potentials somehow Actualize because Singularities and Lines: in the opening paragraph to
this section, I touched on how the virtual actualizes itself through some strange explosiveness
with absolutely no material referent nor apparent efficient or material cause through a kind of
pure differentiation. How does this work in Bergsonism? It comes down to the different
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levels of expansion and contraction in duration with new friends, singularities here, inside of
them: “On each of these levels there are some ‘outstanding points,’ which are like
remarkable points peculiar to it…” and “Nevertheless, each of these lines corresponds to one
of these degrees that all coexist in the virtual; it actualizes its level, while separating it from
the others; it embodies its prominent points…” 291 We are given no idea what these points are
at the level of metaphysics and it seems suspect to me that Deleuze’s Bergson grants these
points ontological status while staunchly refusing to when it comes to an instant model of
time and the sort of perspectival point or “frame of reference” from the Relativity thought
experiment.
6. The fourth moment of the method strains the conceptual resources available in Bergson and,
to grasp clearly the metaphysical and methodological stakes of Deleuze’s intervention
through Bergson, we must turn to Deleuze himself.
We now have the prospective and retrospective illusions mapped out, although how they
are fully linked in Deleuze still must be worked through. The retrospective illusion relies upon a
mechanistic and substance-based ontology in which universal categories are reified through the
idol of distance and cast back as the anterior cause of observable phenomena through necessary
chains of transcendental reasoning. The truth criteria are logical, the conclusions metaphysical.
The prospective illusion takes some aggregate of experience and ramifies qualitative tendencies
within it out towards conceptual purity by mapping out chains of sufficient reasoning comported
towards a virtual whole. In Bergson’s encounter with Einstein, we see his messy and
indeterminate stance towards becoming, in which the boundary formation’s paradoxical quality
ramifies ever outwards in ever self-differentiating material causality, only to snap back into a
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retrospective mode in which it is the virtual as Absolute that has always already been selfdifferentiating.
Bergson goes from BA only to subsume BA under AB and, in doing so,
reproduces several of the problems found in thinkers like Aristotle and Plato. A kind of idealismessentialism reigns once again, only one made more complex. The key to producing an
argumentative structure capable of critiquing the retrospective tendencies in rhetorical theory
while mapping out prospective options through novel methodologies lies in how Deleuze’s
ontology will attempt to break out of the problems in causality found in Bergsonism by, in part,
placing the regress between AB and BA on equal causal footing through a notion named
counter actualization and eliminating both the LNC and LEM in a naïve sense in favor of
paradox or indeterminacy as productive forces. This rest of this chapter maps out, in short form,
different structures in Deleuze’s work that are conducive to this goal and supplements them with
a thoroughgoing naturalism that pulls back on their more idealistic tendencies.
The Double Illusion, Deleuze, and Naturalism
Deleuze’s solitary works and his collaborations with Guattari should be used as an
experience of generative problematics because systematically rendering their work, as my
reading through DeLanda will demonstrate, presents immense difficulty because there are at
least two ontological models at play. Deleuze has his own version of the BA and then AB
that casts the virtual as the determinative register, but a different line of argument can be
extracted that mirrors Bergson’s more messy overlapping durations one by taking assemblage
theory to indicate a cascade of overlapping intensities. There are structure-themes in Deleuze’s
work that recur regardless of which year the book in question emerged and which model has
been focalized. For example, the tripartite schema of virtual/intensive/actual finds itself iterated
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through different terms in works as early as his book on Hume 292 and within the collaborative
works with Guattari. 293 In DeLanda’s book on Assemblage Theory, he puts a fine point on the
difficulty of working through Deleuze: “[Assemblage] is given half a dozen different definitions
by its creators…Each definition connects the concept to a separate aspect of their
philosophy…when taken in isolation the different definitions do not seem to yield a coherent
notion.” 294 DeLanda attempts to systematize these different modes with a particular emphasis on
materiality, but the project may not succeed because the two different models may not be truly
compatible, and the effort to establish a latent idealism within the Virtual as a set of all sets type
metaphysical entity may not be functional within a processual and materialist ontology.
I will forever find it strange that “Deleuzians,” such as DeLanda here, take great pains to
argue that terms such “as ‘multiplicities’ or ‘Ideas’” do not really “suggest something
Platonic.” 295 We have already grasped the great pains Deleuze takes to link Bergson to Plato in
Bergsonism. If there are multiple Deleuzes, the one that favors the fourth step of the method in
Bergsonism, especially the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition, has the problems associated
with Platonic essences because he simply displaces them and their idealist resonances into a
different register, namely the Virtual as a kind of metaphysical wellspring of self-differentiating
potentiality.
Alain Badiou argues as much: “Deluzianism is fundamentally Platonism with a different
accentuation.” 296 While some Deluzians have found fault with Badiou’s reading of Deleuze, I
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believe that Badiou’s comments on the strangeness of Deleuzian orthodoxy merit full
consideration:
…contrary to the commonly accepted image (Deleuze as liberating the anarchic multiple
of desires and errant drifts), contrary even to the apparent indications of his work that
play on the opposition multiple/multiplicities…it is the occurrence of the One—renamed
by Deleuze the One-All—that forms the supreme destination of thought and to which
thought is accordingly consecrated. 297
Badiou is correct – a kind of latent Platonic Idealism does subsist in some of Deleuze’s texts –
but this does not make other scholars of Deleuze who focalize the elements of his work that
produce a process ontology wrong. There are many Deleuzes, and the key is to select your
problematic and follow its line of argument to the end. Badiou’s reading appears correct when
we focalize virtuality as self-differencing and real-but-ideal multiplicity that autonomously
ramifies out into qualitatively differentiated intensities and extensities in a highly mathematical
fashion. DeLanda’s reading suffers from assuming that these Deleuzes can be systematized, but
his attempt to construct a materialist Deleuze by using examples from the sciences to remove the
metaphoric or analogic content 298 points towards the correct line of argument. I argue for a
version of Deleuze that foregrounds cascades of intensity and assemblage, that starts in the
middle and stays there, and that does not require recourse to metaphysical entities. I do not
believe DeLanda gets there in the end, but without his staking out of the path, we would not be
able to get there at all.
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The Virtual Model
The Deleuze of Difference and Repetition grants virtuality, and then intensity, casual
determinacy over quality and extensity: “…we believe that individuation is essentially intensive,
and that the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field, made up of differential
relations…Individuation is the act by which intensity determines differential relations to become
actualized, along the lines of differentiation and within the qualities and extensities it creates.” 299
Tracing this line of argument through the Deleuzian texts in which it is the dominant model
would be a project unto itself, but others have produced nice encapsulations of what this section
indicates for this ontology. John Protevi, for example, articulates the causal flow in Deleuze’s
tripartite schema, at least in Difference and Repetition:
“…in all relations of being (1) intensive morphogenetic processes follow the structures
inherent in (2) differential virtual multiplicities to produce (3) localized and individuated
actual substances with extensive properties and differentiated qualities. Simply put, the
actualization of the virtual, that is the production of actual things of the world, proceeds
by way of intensive processes.” 300
Protevi starts with intensive processes, but if they must follow the structure of virtual
multiplicities that, as we saw from Badiou above, also follow the logic of the one-all then it is
difficult to see how the virtual does not have the causal efficacy as the wellspring of being or the
Being of all beings. Deleuze, at times, makes this linkage explicit: “…the Idea thus defined
possesses no actuality. It is virtual, it is pure virtuality. All the differential relations, in virtue of
the reciprocal determination, and all the distributions of singularities in virtue of the complete
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determination , coexist in the virtual multiplicity of Ideas.” 301 To harken back to Badiou: how
can an idea with a capital I that self-differentiates in series of ordinary and singular points that
establish the virtual problematics, equivalent to Ideas, that guide the morphogenetic processes in
intensity, itself beneath and transcendentally necessary to actuality, be anything other than a
Platonic model?
The argumentative warrant for these moves should be immediately familiar: “It is the
transcendental principle which maintains itself in itself, beyond the reach of the empirical
principle.” 302 The transcendental reasoning is required because the condition cannot resemble the
conditioned, just as in Bergsonism. This kind of transcendental reasoning is necessary because
virtuality, in its never ending self-differentiation, changes in kind each time it self-differentiates
such that it remains hidden behind the individuated intensive flows that in turn produce divergent
qualities through quantitative self-cancellation such that actuality and extensity obtain. 303 We are
given the exact kind of projection of an Absolute, this time a kind of pure Virtuality anterior to
all empirical differentiation, that must exist for logical reasons beyond any empirical intuition or
measurement.
The model of the virtual can then be expressed as VirtualIntensiveActual
(VIA). The structure of the pure virtual as One-All involves series of singular and ordinary
points that guide the individuation processes of the intensive register into actual things in terms
of qualities and extensity. As will become clear later, there are subcurrents in Deleuze that
complicate this image by suggesting that actuality can sublimate back into virtuality, thus
creating a tautological version of the Virtual Model that greatly resembles the tautology of
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Ideology in an ontological register. Counteractualization will facilitate the transduction of this
model into the fully process one, a process discussed later at greater length.
The Process Model
I want to start with a long quote that encapsulates the process model of Deleuze’s
ontology succinctly and provides several fundamental Deleuzian terms with great acuity. The
problem will be mapping out the different intersections between this model and the more virtualcentric one:
“…any concrete system is composed of intensive processes tending toward the (virtual)
plane of consistency and/or toward (actual) stratification. We can say that all that exists is
the intensive, tending towards the limits of virtuality and actuality; these last two
ontological registers do not “exist,” but they do “insist,” to use one of Deleuze’s terms.
Nothing ever instantiates the sheer frozen stasis of the actual nor the sheer differential
dispersion of the virtual; rather, natural or worldly processes are always and only
actualizations, that is, they are processes of actualization structured by virtual
multiplicities and heading toward an actual state they never quite attain. More precisely,
systems also contain tendencies moving in the other direction, toward virtuality; systems
are more or less stable sets of processes moving in different directions, toward actuality
and toward virtuality…neither the structures of such processes nor their completed
products merit the same ontological status as processes themselves. With this perspective,
Deleuze and Guattari offer a detailed and complex “open system” which is
extraordinarily rich and complex.” 304
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This passage describes the process ontology model in Deleuze and Guattari that I represent as
VirtualIntensiveActual (VIA) and oppose to the model found in Deleuze’s solo work
that follows from Bergsonism, represented as VIA to show the causal determinacy of the
virtual and ActualIntensiveVirtual (AIV), when we start to discuss
counteractualization. In the process ontology model (VIA), The Virtual and the Actual are
qualitative tendencies towards flux through a multiplicative structure in which there is
contradiction but not negation and towards a final actuality in which change would cease and a
kind of permanent homeostasis between all intensive flows obtain. These twin tendencies are
absolutes more so than two aspects of one Absolute that encompasses the entire model: they are
not real-ideal because they do not “exist” but instead “insist.” The open system has no
determinate border and is non-totalizable through the casting of a final metaphysical domain or
universal category. Actuality and Virtuality describe tendencies with no end and tendencies
whose usefulness to ontological endeavors may end should they stop proving useful and only as
general as reality requires.
These two models’ structures can be easily transposed into rhetorical theory’s
tautological construction of ideology in the constitutive rhetoric mode and the problematic
imperialism of rhetoricity in new materialist rhetorical theory. Before that chapter’s efforts start,
the two models and the links between them must be enumerated before moving into how
naturalism can strip both of them through the removal of metaphysical content by making their
status as measuring apparatuses who do their work with definition clear.
We start by looking at two problematic lines of argument in DeLanda’s uptake of
Deleuze: the simultaneous use-elimination of extensity in the intensive-extensive dualism and
the ontological priority given to singularities in the singular-ordinary dualism. DeLanda’s
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account of Deleuze is particularly interesting for this reason: at times, he appears to take
Difference and Repetition’s ontology at full force; at other times, he stresses the value of
indetermination and counteractualization. The path I take attempts to unwind the disparity
between these two argumentative routes and their concomitant model to suggest a naturalistmaterialist take on counter actualization that does not rely on the positing of transcendental
Absolutes.
Extensity and the Virtual Model
DeLanda’s materialist reconstruction of Deleuze’s Virtual ontology provides a shortcut to
mapping out the argumentative moves that underwrite the AB BA model and how this
model can be transduced into the Process Model. The vital dualism that requires a reworking as a
poorly posed problem is that between intensity and extensity. DeLanda explains extensity here:
A typical extensive property, such as length, area, or volume, is divisible in a simple way:
dividing the area into two equal parts results in two areas with half the extension. But if
we take a volume of water at, say, 90 degrees centigrade, and divide it into two half
volumes, we do not get as a result two parts having 45 degrees of temperature each, but
two parts with the same original temperature. 305
We have two broad ways of thinking about properties that are deeply linked to measurement and
mathematics: extensive ones that are conceptualized as perfectly divisible and resultant of
differentials in intensive gradients, and intensive ones that do not change immediately upon
being subjected to an extensive change. The challenge with this division rests with deciding what
constitutes generative and nongenerative changes. That is: why does the causal efficacy move
from virtuality to intensity to extensity without producing an Absolute?
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This question presents a fundamental division in DeLanda’s work in terms of what
warrants a truth consideration: logical or / and empirical criteria. We have already grasped that
the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition finds logical criteria structured through transcendental
reasoning adequate to explicate Being. DeLanda takes the realist-logicism route in which the
universe exhibits order and, therefore, this order can be uncovered through logical
argumentation: “The virtual…leaves behind traces of itself in the intensive processes it animates,
and the philosopher’s task may be seen as that of a detective who follows these tracks or
connects these clues…” 306 This stance relies upon a kind of empiricism that wants to find
recurring patterns in reality, treat the empirical measurements as symptoms of a logical structure,
and use the analogy between these patterns and the philosophical-logical edifice to “remove...its
metaphorical content” through empirical examples. 307 This line of argument follows Deleuze’s in
Bergonsism closely: the virtual wholes are the hidden condition that we can argue for the logical
existence of when we perform the prospective illusion by pushing out empirical aggregates
towards conceptual purity.
The important question, for now, is whether this extensive // intensive split derives from
some logical necessity to prop up a vast empirically inaccessible virtual or whether we can push
on this division itself as a poorly posed question. DeLanda puts a finer point on intensity:
“Deleuze argues, however, that an intensive property is not so much one that is indivisible but
one which cannot be divided without involving a change in kind.” 308 Deleuze takes intensity to
indicate his reading of the infinitesimal: “The expression ‘difference of intensity’ is a tautology.
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Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is
a differential, by itself a difference.” 309
Intensity as a kind of differential of difference can be difficult to grasp, but it makes a bit
more sense with an empirical example. Thermodynamics is a favorite for Deleuze: “The
important implication of this is that what allows work to be done by a system is not intensity
(temperature in this case), but rather difference in intensity…” 310 It follows logically that some
transcendental element must account for different kinds of intensities: temperature and flow are
linked empirically but only differentiable assuming a topology of intensity as pure differential.
Think of it this way: differentials in calculus are rates of change; temperature pervades everyday
physics despite not being one of the fundamental forces of the universe found in the standard
model; the way Deleuze looks at temperature as an empirical manifestation of intensity is not
interested with the metricized measurements of temperature like how many degrees one body is
that is in proximity to another body; Deleuze is after the potential for change or the difference in
differentials between two thermodynamic systems.
We can get to this level of modelling temperature as intensity by positing a depth,
gradient, or membrane that accounts for the emergence of the spatialized or metric measurements
of a temperature by transcendentally reasoning that this gradient accounts for the measurementfeatures of the phenomena. The question, then, is threefold: is transcendental reasoning
necessary, i.e., is temperature in the capacity of a differential gradient really hidden, does a
monistic membrane of the differential of all intensive differences sufficiently account for the
profusion of qualitatively differentiated empirical intensities, and is the Virtual as potential
structure required to transcendentally account for the series of purely intensive differentials?
309
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The argumentative structure that warrants the construction of a virtual as Absolute or a
more abstract reading of Thousand Plateaus’ Plane of Consistency derives from the accretion of
transcendental reasoning such that a set of all sets structure is necessary because of systematic
isomorphy. First, the messy profusion of localized virtual phase spaces, or the internal structure
of a relatively closed system, is posited but only as a metaphor: “This metaphor supplies us with
a target for a theory of the virtual: we need to conceive a continuum which yields, through
progressive differentiation, all the discontinuous entities that populate the actual world.” 311 It
appears to me that this Virtual connects to the plane of pure intensity. DeLanda chooses to
populate this “heterogenous” virtual Absolute, described “a space of spaces,” with the “notions”
contained in “mathematical models.” 312 The development and genesis of quality out of
differences in differential quantity, then, can only be explicated with resource to mathematical
models as metaphors for or, in a strong version, literally Virtual structure.
It is unclear why this construal of the Virtual does not lead to math as metaphor or a full
on realist mathematical ontology: “This is a task which will involve a specific philosophical
transformation of the mathematical concepts involved, a means of detaching these concepts from
their mathematical actualization, so to speak.” 313 Furthermore, these “mathematical concepts”
strain application because the “space of spaces” has “consistency…as the synthesis of
heterogeneities…” but has “nothing to do with logical consistency, that is, with the absence of
contradiction.” 314 A great many mathematical models are predicated upon the removal of
contradiction, but allowing them full metaphysical status without some kind of transduction or
metaphor would violate the Deleuzian stipulation that there is no contradiction through negation.
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DeLanda is aware of the difficulty here: “…the question may arise as to the legitimacy of
taking features of a model and reifying them into the defining traits of a real entity.” 315 The
removal of metaphoric content comes back in to attempt to specify how this Virtual as “set of all
sets” does not present the exact kind of metaphysical ontologies transcendental empiricists want
to deny. DeLanda argues: “Eliminating the metaphorical content will involve not only a thorough
ontological analysis of state space so that its topological invariants can be separated from its
variable mathematical content, but in addition, a detailed discussion of how these topological
invariants may be woven together to construct a continuous, yet heterogenous, space.” 316
This path to removing metaphorical content relies upon systems, complexity, and chaos
theories’ deployment of topological invariants, or mathematical singularities that are resistant to
change, to insist that these models of reality do more than model. Another path to “removing
metaphor content” derives, oddly enough, from something that may not be full on negation, but
has to be a form of disanalogy: “What guides this speculation? One way of looking at this
question is to see Deleuze as engaged in a constructive project guided by certain proscriptive
constraints, that is, constraints which tell him not what to do but what to avoid doing.” 317 In the
strong case, this dictum suggests definition through negation at the level of philosophical
argumentation. In the weak case, it suggests that disanalogy, as a kind of gradient of
contradiction without negation, guides the entailments of Deleuze’s philosophical system. The
ontological precepts are not the negation of what is wrong from past philosophical systems, but
one among many contingent options that are potential as different choices are made and
philosophical warrants leveraged.
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The greatest “proscriptive constraint” on Deleuzian thought comes from the critique of
the essentialism found in reified totalities that is closely linked to the transcendent // immanent
dualism. Essentialism reduces emergent organizations to elements of a transcendent universal
category; Immanence attempts to escape this problem by hewing closely to material processes. 318
Yet, DeLanda notices a great risk that I believe is the same risk we have already uncovered in
Bergsonism: with regards to “similarities of process” whose regularities “demand an
explanation,” “…when accounting for these common features we may be tempted to reintroduce
essences through the back door…essences of processes, yet essences nevertheless.” 319 Could
there be a more apt description of what happened with Duration as the Absolute in Bergson’s
encounter with Einstein? Except, it was not an “essence of process,” but an essence of the
multiplicity as structural one-all, an essence that I believe DeLanda shares despite his warning of
its risk of obtaining. Following the critique of essences: “It is in order to break this vicious circle
that multiplicities are introduced.” 320
Bergson also introduces Duration as temporal multiplicity to break the contradictory
infinite regress that many models of Relativity elicit. But this account of the Virtual as the “space
of all spaces” suffers from the same problems already mapped out on Bergsonism. The structure
of the Inclosure Paradox indicates a tendency towards eliminating infinite regress through a
perspectival projection such that some kind of Absolute obtains. In that move, this construal of
the Virtual reintroduces the problems of the Absolute by casting a totalizing domain over all
Beings.
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The problems of the Absolute iterate out through several adjunct constructions of
virtuality in different areas of Deleuzian thought. Deleuze’s methodological-ontological
arguments deals with clarifying the relationship between problem and solution. Philosophers act
as conduits for an incorporeal event in which they discern what is a generative virtual
problematic hidden behind its actualizations by discerning the “objective distribution of the
singular and the ordinary.” 321 Problems are matched against their conditions in terms of
“solvability” or mapping potential solutions without exhausting the generative quality of the
problem-condition relationship such that we can make a genetic account of the different
ramifications, that produce new problematics, in an infinite “progression of [sufficient
reasons].” 322 In short, regularities in how problems can be posed without regard to the truth of
their solutions tells us a lot about different mathematical groups and regularities in the material
world modelled by things like group theory that seek to map out qualities or singular points that
are invariant across a group under transformation. 323
For the extensive // intensive split, this stipulation means that DeLanda “will argue that
by extending each singularity into an infinite series, and defining these series without the use of
metric or quantitative concepts, multiplicities can becomes capable of forming a heterogenous
continuum.” 324 To define the problematic of the virtual well, then, relies on two things. DeLanda
must set up an opposition between variously phrased dualisms such as virtual//actual,
qualitative//quantitative, nonmetric//metric, and intensive//extensive. Remember, because the
condition does not resemble the conditioned and both virtual singularities and intensive gradients
hide themselves as they actualize, some mode of transcendental reasoning must engage in a
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perspective game. Behind each measurable event, some reason must exist for its occurrence. It is
necessary that there be a self-differentiating virtuality to explain the intensive manifold of
differences of differentials of intensity from the perspective of intensity. It is sufficient that this
kind of virtuality exists to account for the form of ramifications of intensity such that there is an
Absolute structure that guides the differentiation of pure intensity.
One of the primary goals in “reducing the metaphoric content” could be said to eliminate
perspectivism or relativity from the Deleuzian ontology by positing this Virtual as Absolute in
explicitly mathematical terms, but somehow sundering mathematics from contradiction.
DeLanda describes the solution: “Deleuze often speaks of the anexact yet rigorous style of
thought which may be necessary whenever we need to think about nonmetric entities.” 325 He
provides the example of work in biology in which distributions of cells are conceived of in an
ordinal, or relating to position internal to a quantitative continuum such as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, scheme of
distance instead of one that provides precise values along a cardinal logic of 1, 2, 3 and so on. 326
The ordinal // cardinal distinction comes from Russell’s early work on set theory: “…an ordinal
distance cannot be divided, and its lack of divisibility into identical units implies that two ordinal
distances can never be exactly compared” but the quality of their differences or the quality of
relationships like greater and smaller can be compared. 327 Put differently, in ordinal series
precise and external metrics like length do not work because there are variable differences
between attributes, such as distance, in the internal ordering of the set’s elements. We can think
of an ordinal set of towns along a highway: the distance between each exit on 75/85 varies such
that the internally defined unit distance between two exits varies and cannot be divided. We
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could make this ordinal continuum metric by inserting an infinity of infinitesimal points, as we
do with miles, such that the distance can be divided without regard to relative but internal
positioning.
This mathematical reasoning is legitimated by an appeal to systems isomorphy. DeLanda
provides an important stipulation in his discussion of divergent and convergent series:
“Moreover, we can also check empirically that a portion of the same symmetry-breaking cascade
is exhibited by other processes (embryological processes, for example) which depend on such
different causal mechanisms that they almost demand we postulate a mechanism-independent
entity as part of their explanation.” 328 The argument relies explicitly on how systems theorists
conceptualize information: statistical modelling establishes probabilistic correlations such that
the probability of a change in one system produces a change in the probabilities of a system in
the same environment. 329 In short, we reach immanence instead of transcendence when
apparently different phenomenon, from a naïve phenomenological stance under analysis, “reveal
a topological isomorphism between singularities in the model and singularities in the physical
system being modelled…This isomorphism” then warrants the assumption that “the model and
the physical system are co-actualizations of the same virtual multiplicity.” 330 When we subject
this logic to infinite regress, the necessity of the Virtual as an Absolute “set of all sets” logically
follows.
The requirement that this logic emerge from empirical systems to become immanent
instead of transcendent is a better step than a purely logical model, but it is the very
intensive//extensive split that prevents it from eliding the problems of the Absolute. First,
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granting ontological priority to intensity through extensity does not hold up when the definitions
of extensity provided indicate it as a pure perspectival fantasy in the first place that cannot
support removing metaphorical content because, empirically, it is metaphorical. When we
measure and cut lengths in real life, we operate along a “good enough” or tolerance standard.
You have a piece of lumber that is approximately ten feet long and you use a band saw to cut it
into two approximately five feet pieces. But how precise has this ended up being? Have we
really divided ten feet into exactly five feet? Certainly not. Divisions like these only happen in
geometrical planes. Extensity itself is an idol of distance that projects a fantasy of perfection in a
world in which empirical intervention does not comply. Defining intensity by that which is not
extensive suggests that the analogic with its patterns of analogy and disanalogy that
undercurrents of thought’s actualization into philosophy has snuck contradiction in the form of
disanalogy with a fantasy right back into a model that claims to have eliminated it. This problem
only exists in the VirtualIntensiveActual model; the VirtualIntensiveActual model does
not feature it because we start with a process ontology in which all things are intensive systems
in various states of viscosity. Intensity is partially defined by its tendencies towards actuality and
virtuality, not in terms of its disanalogy with the fantastic doxa of extensity.
Second, when Deleuze notes that intensity is not about the ways we use technological
apparatuses to measure it but about differences in differentials, he oddly leaves open a more
naturalistic and experimental reading of thermodynamics. DeLanda gets extremely close to it
with an example: “The temperature of a given volume of liquid water…can indeed be ‘divided’
by heating the container from underneath creating a temperature difference between the top and
bottom…” this empirical example can also push the body of water into a phase change into a
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gas. 331 The differences in temperature will become subdued over time, but a precise extensive
cut between different temperature flows would be extremely difficult to measure. What DeLanda
omits is that this process can also arise from adding pressure, which can be made to have a linear
relationship with temperature. When it comes to fluid and gas dynamics, pressure and
temperature are two intensive forces that have this kind of probabilistic relationship with one
another.
The point here, however, is the relationship to volume and surface area: manipulating an
experimental or environmental apparatus such that a liquid body has more surface area bounded
by the heating apparatus or separating two volumes out of the body of liquid and placing them in
two different cups will change the intensive gradient’s difference of differentials. Volume counts
as a metric or extensive property in DeLanda’s system, but changes to volume and the
topological shape of the water within surface area will produce changes to the vital points in a
specific body of water’s intensive gradient. You can do this experiment in your kitchen. A flat
pan that better fits an electric burner will boil the same volume of water in a thinner and taller
pan precisely because greater surface area of the pan touches the heating element and the water’s
volume spreads out along the basin. The relationship is not a linear one from intensity to so
called extensity, but one characterized by intensity all the way down.
Third, we have already demonstrated how a metric dimension like length operates as a
fantasy of the purely precise within a perfect mathematical reasoning, but we have not yet
explicated how changes in ordinal distance between different scales of matter change the
behavior of bodies. We might say that scale and ordinal distance are themselves intensive
gradients that may be altered by cutting or conglomerating matter. Cutting would doubtlessly be
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considered a metricizing operation in DeLanda’s framework, in part, because it violates the
range of permitted operations to a topological manifold because it brings discontinuity into what
must be continuous deformations. 332 Conglomeration of different surfaces does can fall within
the purview of topology. 333
Two potentials are worth mention here: nanotechnological scales and macro realism.
Nanoscale’s, for some materials, have emergent properties that differ unexpectedly from their
molecular-chemical and larger conglomerated mater or mixture properties. For us, this means
that performing operations like cutting change the distribution of differentials in some modes of
materiality. Of course, this suggests an infinite regress: what appears extensive from one
perspective – how many atoms are stuck together or how much we cut apart – produces intensive
changes. The line between experiment and event blurs here: natural processes of selfdifferentiation do this without laboratory intervention. 334
Macrorealism, a set of theories that challenge the assumption that quantum phenomena
exert a scale up causality, provides another interesting example. At the risk of oversimplification,
macrorealists argue that at certain scales or conglomerations of mass, top-down causal properties
emerge that challenge the quantum understanding of the universe. Of course, bodies with this
much mass produce dramatic changes in terms of density because of the pressure generated by
the mass’ interaction with gravity as intensity. We have regress once again: layers upon layers of
intensity that produce something that appears extensive because it involves mass, or at least we
can measure it through mass, that in turn may exert causal agency in how the laws of physics
themselves may vary by scale. Is mass a fantasy or does it, as an extensive property, share in the
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explication of density? DeLanda is aware of the problems of scale: “…causal problems should be
framed at the correct level given that each emergent level has its own causal capacities, these
capacities being what differentiates these individuals from each other.” 335 Why then use
extensive properties as a kind of dead actuality to prop up intensity and then the Virtual at all if,
at the limit cases of extensity intensity is all that can be found in reality?
The Virtual relies upon argumentation by analogy, particularly the kind of structural
analogy typical of dynamical systems theory as in system’s isomorphy and this reliance produces
problems of the Absolute. 336 Reaching systems isomorphy as a justification for the Virtual
requires “removing metaphoric content” such that some logically necessary structure remains to
explain the appearance of order or recurring tendency in becoming. However, this produces a
regress that produces a retrospective illusion as the Virtual: “…problems are not only
independent of their solutions, but have a genetic relationship with them: a problem engenders its
own solutions as its conditions becomes progressively better specified.” 337
The regress becomes clear: if we take a local articulation of virtual as opposed to a
transcendentalized Virtual, what counts as a problem and as a solution derives from a
perspectival projection. There must be some mechanism or a reverse in the causal flow of
VIA that accounts for ontological emergence such that the Virtual need not be a totalizable
set, but, instead something closer to the VIA model in which virtuality is an upper bound.
Some novel actualizations rise to the level of new problems; the examples about organic life and
intensive systems that accrete on top of old actualizations, like hurricanes and the climate, are
clear about the potential of an actuality becoming a new virtual problematic. 338 This regress
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between problems and solutions, virtuality, intensity, and actuality, leads into a difficult territory,
that of counteractualization. This strange and under-theorized device serves as the conceptual
link between the Virtual and Processual Models.
Towards the Virtual we have the quasi-cause: virtual multiplicities have “only a mere
capacity to be affected” because while “… (the same multiplicity may be actualized by several
causal mechanisms) they do depend on the empirical fact that some causal mechanism or another
actually exists...” to follow the immanence criterion. 339 The quasi-cause functions to allow
communication between virtual series as “a pre-actualization. It would endow multiplicities with
a minimum of actuality and, in this sense, it would represent the first broken symmetry in the
cascade that culminates in fully formed actual beings.” 340 DeLanda gestures, in a footnote, to
Deleuze’s example of lightning in Difference and Repetition: 341 “Thunderbolts explore between
different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which
determines their path in advance but in reverse, as though intagliated.” 342
Deleuze’s explanation for the importance of this empirical allusion is characteristically
obscure: “Given two heterogenous series, two series of differences, the precursor plays the part
of the differenciator of these differences…it is the in-itself of difference or the ‘differently
different’… the self-different which relates different to different by itself.” 343 This strange object
mirrors the time of the Aion: it is a kind of pure fantasy of difference that bears uncanny
resemblance to Lacan’s object petit A placed into an ontological register: “…it has no place other
than that from which it is ‘missing’, no identity other than that which it lacks: it is precisely the
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object = x…” 344 What we have here is another iteration of the “aleatory point” from Logic of
Sense: an object that logically spatializes ontological-materialist indeterminacy through paradox.
The problem comes in with DeLanda and Deleuze’s sublimation of these “quasi-casual
operators” into a plane of mathematical consistency.
Karen Barad provides a more thoroughly empiricist reading of lightning. The “Dark
Precursor” in this example has a name and is facilitated through the transmission of electrons:
“These barely luminous first gestures are called stepped leaders…the buildup of negative charges
(electrons) in the lower portion of the cloud does not resolve itself by a direct channel…the
ground responds next with an upward signal of its own.” 345 The relationship between ground and
sky does not follow a linear path nor one only determined by the “dark precursor:” “…a
lightning bolt does not simply proceed from storm cloud to the earth…flirtations alight…as
stepped leaders and positive streamers gesture toward possible forms of connection to come.” 346
This division of multiple unclear potential paths presents “a quantum form of communication —
a process of iterative intra-activity.” 347
The question of the quasi-causal operator is not necessarily one of singularities best
modelled by mathematical series, but one of the kind of ontological indeterminacy measurable
by Bohrian quantum mechanics and Quantum Field Theory, subjects we will explore more
deeply later. For now, it is sufficient to grasp that materiality and material causes are at work
here: the quasi-cause as a differentiator of differences need not logically entail the existence of a
virtuality that becomes intensity through “symmetry breaking cascades,” to use DeLanda’s
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language, because there is a measurable materiality at work. 348 The Quasi-Cause as paradox
renders indeterminacy and zones of indetermination in logical and spatialized expression, but
need not have any real-ideal status beyond its usefulness as a definitonal apparatus.
Counter-actualization presents the other side of the VIA model and is as obscure as
the quasi-causal operator: “The second task of the quasi-causal operator, to extract virtual events
from intensive processes may, in turn, be seen as a veritable counter actualization since it would
follow in a direction opposite to that which goes from the virtual to the intensive, and from there
to the extensive and qualitative.” 349 To stay with our lightning metaphor, the quasi causal
operator entails the “stepped ladder” and counter-actualization as the “positive streamers.” The
requirement that counter-actualization exist derives from the requirement of immanence: “we
cannot simply postulate the existence or an ideally continuous cosmic plane…but must account
for its production and maintenance.” 350
Yet, far from linking counter-actualization to the science of lightning, DeLanda takes a
highly peculiar path. After arguing there are not “scientific and mathematical fields” to provide
immanence to counter-actualization, he goes with the experience of “psychoactive chemicals that
can be deployed to go beyond the actual world…” as a kind of experience that “allows us to
follow it [counter-actualization] phenomenologically, by treating our minds as intensive
spaces.” 351 The clear argumentative warrant here is systematic isomorphy by way of
panpsychism: if the acid-mind achieves counter-actualization then surely things in the world do
too.
It may be argued that because group theory effectively describes quantum mechanics and their application in this
case to lightning that the virtual is necessary and directly analogous to the mathematical predictive quality of group
theory. The question of whether mathematics indicates the necessity of analogous metaphysical entities will be
evaluated at greater length below.
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To make the argument directly by tying back in the intensive // extensive split: it is the
marginalization of extensity, especially in the form of entropy, that maintains the flawed
causality of the VIA model, complicates its inverse, and we can see this limitation most
clearly in the places DeLanda attempts to give immanence criteria to the virtual as Absolute.
DeLanda reads a metaphysical Virtual into cosmology to support this Absolute: “…spontaneous
symmetry breaking [self-differenciation] …is helping unify the four basic forces of physics…as
physicists realize that, at extremely high temperatures [like those in the pre-bang
singularity]…these forces lose their individuality and blend into one…” 352
This understanding derives explicitly from the Big Bang cosmology: “The hypothesis is
that as the universe expanded and cooled, a series of phase transitions broke the original
symmetry and allowed the four forces to differentiate from one another.” 353 The singularity at
the start of the universe as we know it, assuming the Big Bang cosmology does not yield to novel
models, presents the empirical immanence requirement for a kind of virtual as Absolute, but one
that ultimately fails because of infinite regress and the counter-actualization potential presented
by entropy, qualified as extensity erroneously by DeLanda.
First, scientists are not settled on the features of the Big Bang: there could be other
universes, the Big Bang may be incorrect, and there may be cycles of Bangs and Big Crunches
that produce a higher cardinality set to deal with the regress. The answer, from the VIA
model to this regress doubtlessly positions the virtual as Absolute one step back from our
attempts to empirically measure this potentiality. Now, the virtual as the “space of all spaces”
would sit in a noumenal roost one step behind our best mapping of the potential and actual
characteristics of this newly modelled phenomenon, whichever novel model begins to accrue
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scientific consensus. In this sense, the virtual as Absolute is a problem from a naturalistic
perspective because it cannot be falsified through empirical means and its logically necessary
character must be recognized.
Second, entropy presents a materialist mode of counter-actualization because intensity
must have a sufficient reason to differentiate itself. For DeLanda, entropy lacks causal efficacy
because of its extensive status: “Extensive properties include not only such metric properties as
length, area and volume, but also quantities such as amount of energy or entropy.” 354 We
measure energy by spatializing it in some measuring apparatus and it may be said to be metric in
this way, but Entropy presents a more difficult empirical example. New research, into clocks of
all things finds the following:
Energy tends to dissipate – and entropy, a measure of its dissipation, tends to increase –
simply because there are far, far more ways for energy to be spread out than for it to be
highly concentrated. This numerical asymmetry, and the curious fact that energy started
out ultra-concentrated as the beginning of the universe, are why energy now moves
towards increasingly dispersed arrangements… In precise terms, entropy is a measure of
the number of possible arrangements that a system of particles can be in. These
possibilities grow when energy is spread more evenly among more particles, which is
why entropy rises as energy disperses. 355
Entropy, then, sounds like a re-structuralizing effect of differential individuation and
actualization itself. Entropy in an intensive register does not measure dispersed energy as the
reduction of the ability to do work, but instead measures how interaction itself changes the
“possible arrangements that a system of particles can be in.” In Deleuzian terms, entropy
354
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provides a materialist way in which the structure of the virtuality of a local system changes
through the very forces of actualization.
The question comes down to one of causal efficacy: does the energy unilaterally
determine the entropy through a relationship of anteriority or is there something buggy going on,
as in the stepped ladder lightning problem? I argue, in a highly speculative mode, that something
genuinely weird and buggy is afoot. The liar’s paradox of the “object=x” indicates a kind of
irrational non-relation in mathematical terms or an ontological indeterminacy in quantum terms
that can be construed as positioning indeterminacy as entropy in an intensive register. The more
precise a system or “clock” is, the more potential system states it has; the more system states the
more information gets lost to entropy; this loss leads to imbalances in the system; and the system
becomes qualitatively self-differentiated in response. The causality goes both ways: from
intensity to virtuality and from intensity to actuality. We end up with an infinite regress of
systems: as a system produces new actualities that are also intensive systems their own structure
changes in virtual terms ad infinitum. We can draw an analogy from entropy in clocks to
definitional systems: the more precise we attempt to make a definition the more potential states
the definition has and thus the more sub definitions are required.
Contra DeLanda’s suggestion that there is “no suggestion that these spaces actually form
a hierarchical structure,” 356 this construal of cosmic history clearly features a hierarchy that
prioritizes the virtual that tends towards conceptual purity a necessary to any and all empirical
manifestations. 357 The VIA structure maintains Platonic problems despite reversing the
order of importance from essence to event, accident, and structure. The problem with Plato from
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a naturalistic outlook revolves around falsifiability and what criteria can be marshalled for
falsification. The Virtual as the set of all sets, behind but found in a trace of everything we learn
eventually to measure through ever more complex scientific devices, cannot be falsified because
it relies upon logical evidence in the form of transcendental reasoning.
As we will see, concepts like ideology work in the exact same way. The most
ontologically rigorous path, to phrase the above in older terms, is not to follow the path from
AB and BA from Difference and Repetition and fall into problems of the Absolute, but to
follow the path of IBA found in the summary of Thousand Plateaus. If we address this split
through the very empirical-naturalistc instead of the logical-empirical approach, it appears that
what counts as extensity and what counts as intensity, outside of the Absolute intensive in
Difference and Repitition, derives from a perspectival projection or a vector within the
spatialization of a phenomenon through thought and then expression to resolve fuzzy
borderlines. Intensity is not hidden to anything other than naïve phenomenology and we do not
need to construct a set of all sets or a “space of all spaces” if we start in the middle and posit the
overall model as an open system such that it does not fall prey to the problems of the Absolute
found in Priest. Each model presents useful theoretical tools, but only one model insists that it
has metaphysical status beyond its utility in the methods most in use across the humanistic
disciplines.
Diffracting the Prospective and Retrospective Illusions and Naturalism
There are several loose ends here that need to be resolved; I have mentioned naturalism
as a better framework than transcendental empiricism, but I have not done a terribly great job in
terms of positive exposition. While it should be recognized that naturalism has several diverse
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strains, 358 the general thrust is quite simple: “Alongside the familiar pursuits of physics, botany,
biology, and astronomy, the naturalist asks how it is that human beings, as described by
physiology, psychology, linguistics, and the rest, come to reliable knowledge of the world, as
described by physics chemistry and so on.” 359 Ontological lines of inquiry, at least in the
Quinean trajectory, focus on questions of how different theoretical-modelling, empiricalexperimental, and logical-philosophical fit together by using the methodology of science to
describe science itself. 360 Put differently, for naturalists questions of methodology and ontology
are inseparable because of how measurement in experimentation works.
The difference between naturalism and the kind of immanence through empiricism that
Deleuze and DeLanda favor deals with falsifiability, the status of transcendental reasoning and
the kind of conceptual totalities it tends to produce: “…idealizations are the life-blood of science
– but we need to be aware of them just as we are elsewhere in science, so that we can assess their
aptness.” 361 Philosophical idealizations in metaphysics are useful parallel to mathematical
systems like set theory: they help us to model truths about the order we make of the universe
through scientific experimentation. The final arbiter of truth comes not from logical adequacy,
but the world itself: “Where the world fails to cooperate, our logic no longer applies. If the world
overall were less cooperative, logic would not apply at all.” 362 The idealized and conceptual
excesses of a given model, mathematical, philosophical, logical, or theoretical, system are useful
in orienting ourselves within naturalistic inquiry, but they must be falsifiable or they are the kind
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of transcendental reasoning that the very philosophy of immanence we have investigated above
claims to be incorrect because they produce metaphysical fantasies.
I believe Karen Barad’s variety of materialist naturalism, alongside Maddy’s arguments
about logical warrants, is indispensable for making the VIA model more robust. The
following arguments need to be worked through in what follows to make this transition clear:
Barad’s ontology offers us a shift in register towards diffraction and auscultation that collapses
the condition and conditioned in an infinite material regress with a fully material indeterminacy
potentially capable of grounding zones of indetermination; Logic within the LNC and LEM
modes bear a strange relationship to human history, but one that unnecessarily focuses on logics
of sight instead of touch. We need, then, argumentative warrants more amenable to spatializing
in expression the thought-system’s own diffraction and probabilistic reasoning is a preferrable
step compared to dialetheism. Finally, chiasmus will be evaluated as the best spatializing trick to
get one to think of an inside-outside and outside-inside necessary to dealing with fuzzy
borderline cases.
Barad bases her ontology in Bohr’s understanding of quantum mechanics. At a basic
level, Bohr’s interpretation opposes Heisenberg’s more prevalent and common in popular culture
version and is the commonly accepted practice in Quantum Mechanics today. 363 Heisenberg
interprets the experimental and mathematical results of Quantum Mechanics to demonstrate that
we can know either the position or momentum of something like an electron, but that this limit is
an epistemological limitation. 364 Prior to striking the electron with the measuring photon, it has a
determinate position and momentum, but we are limited by the paradox of measurement in
which the measuring apparatus itself necessarily disturbs the thing we measure. This problem
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exists at larger scales of being, but really comes into its own with Quantum Mechanics when we
translate to sight the results of shooting particles at each other with a Scanning Tunnelling
Electron Microscope. 365 In short, measurement at this, and by implication all, scale does not
simply represent the phenomena being measured but intervenes within them; the measuring
device is not separable from the phenomena. Bohr interprets this result differently than
Heisenberg: “Therefore we arrive at Bohr’s conclusion: observation is only possible on the
condition that the effect of the measurement is indeterminable.” 366 Indeterminacy, then, is not an
epistemological block but an ontological feature of the world that, outside of laboratory
processes, can be observed measuring-observing itself: resolving indeterminacy by producing
more indeterminacy. 367
The paradox of measurement does not indicate an epistemic lack but an ontological
excess that follows into analyses stranger and higher scale than the photon-electron problem:
“…hauntings are lively indeterminacies of time-being, materially constitutive of matter itselfindeed of everything and nothing…the dynamism of ontological indeterminacy of timebeing/being-time in its materiality.” 368 “Hauntings” is certainly poetic, but does the work in
Quantum Field theory not resemble the kind of virtuality described by Deleuze? Yes, and no.
Yes, it indicates a realm of being in which the vacuum is not nothing, but, instead, a strange
quantum sea with particles popping in and out of being that we describe through various
mathematical constructions. 369 But no, these strange fields are not necessarily indicators of some
transcendental virtuality because they can be measured: “However, the implication that the
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vacuum is filled with virtual particles can be detected by careful and precise measurements.” 370
Quantum virtuality is not hidden along a logic of the condition and conditioned with the
problematic visual phenomenology implied: indeterminacy is a generative materiality that can be
felt at play in both larger scale organizations, such as “photosynthesis, bird navigation, and
olfactory function,” and measured empirically by entangling various technological apparatuses
within phenomena. 371 The condition behind the conditioned can be measured. In this sense, we
have a kind of infinite regress between measurement and indeterminacy conceptually: every
measurement produces new potentiality and contingently resolves old indeterminacy only by
becoming entangled with the thing measured in the first place. 372
For Barad, the paradox of measurement with its attendant immanent indeterminacy
indicates that a phenomenon named diffraction is a better causal and boundary iterating
metaphor, and real empirical phenomena, than others. The core thing to note here, avoiding the
more complicated matters of explaining how everyday light, waves, and particles diffract, is that
knowing itself is a becoming. Karen Barad puts it this way: “…the point is not merely that
knowledge practices have material consequences but that practices of knowing are specific
material engagements that participate in (re)configuring the world.” 373 We do not produce
separation through knowing, both experimental and exercises in philosophical definition, but
instead diffract through a pattern of resonances and dissonances from within the phenomena we
describe. Measurement and metrics are intensive and immanent, their appearance as extensive
and introducing negation confuses the scientific enterprise and invites the introduction of a
metaphysic through definition against what is already a fantasy.
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The problem, then, with the VIA model arises in this gap between the condition and
the conditioned and its implicit reliance on a transcendental mode of reasoning based on
contradiction, whether such a view entails negation, that requires the positing of an Absolute to
account for variation in becoming. Diffraction offers us a way out towards the VIA model
conceptually but that presents difficulties expressively: there are no conditions that are not
themselves conditioned in an infinite regress of entangled materiality with patterns of dissonance
and resonance accounting for the visually apparent separation of phenomenon. Concepts like
virtual structure and actual viscosity are useful theoretical fictions that cease their usefulness the
instant they are taken as determinative of intensity in a hierarchical fashion tending towards and
emerging from a pure Absolute. In this sense, matter is memory and memory has an
indeterminate internality that produces contingency and thus the meaningful self-differences
between things, from one perspective a condition and from another perspective conditioned, in
terms of potentiality. The problem is spatializing this relatively abstract model into words: can
we express these things without the patterns of analogy Deleuze, DeLanda, and Barad all rankle
against? I do not think we can, and I think that analogy exceeds relationships of mere homology:
patterns of analogy and disanalogy express through speech, as opposed to language, or
interaction, as opposed to structure, by translation through semantic definition. The patterns we
experience as apparatuses in world that are already translations of qualitatively distinct forces in
a kind of material accretion.
The LNC and LEM share this modelling function as warrants that underlie higher
cardinality argumentative structures and are indispensable to philosophy and theory in the way
that mathematic inquiry is indispensable to scientific method. 374 However, their ontological
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status as metaphysically more than defining and boundary creating apparatuses is untenable.
Maddy argues, with “the law of noncontradiction” and other classical bivalent warrants, in mind:
“…it is hard to see how these laws could be revised without crippling the scientific
enterprise.” 375 Definition through argumentative warrants is a “boundary making processes” that
resonates with both the experimental apparatuses and mathematical frameworks used in the hard
sciences. 376 We can take this linkage a step further to suggest that different methodologies in the
humanities deploy argumentative warrants through higher order argumentative structures, like
the retrospective and prospective illusions, such that better models of social reality and meaning
making obtain. The key difference between a naturalist and realist take in this regard is that the
apparent order or recurring isomorphic structures identified through an empirical effort at
making philosophy immanent and not transcendent do not by necessity have an autonomous
metaphysical existence beyond their role in the modelling apparatus. Positing them as causal or
quasi-causal agents beyond any given conditioned necessarily relies upon necessity itself: they
become dialetheic absolutes based upon logical and not empirical truth criteria.
This problem scales up to mathematics regardless of which among many positions you
take on the relationship between mathematics and logic, and there are too many to cover in depth
here. 377 There are equally many takes on the central problematic of philosophy of mathematics
that Shapiro outlines quite succinctly: “The burden on any complete philosophy of mathematics
is to show how mathematics is applied to the material world, and to show how the methodology
of mathematics (whatever it may be) fits into the methodology of the sciences (whatever it may
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be).” 378 We will hardly get to a complete philosophy of how logic entails mathematical
modelling nor will we exhaustively probe the depths of mathematics’ relationship to
metaphysical inquiry; the aim here is to establish a baseline of naturalist answers to these
different problems before moving onto how the ratio based modelling system of both
argumentative warrants and mathematics inflects our ontological considerations.
I want to supplement Maddy’s naturalism with a strange evolutionary account from
Quine and draw special attention to the role of contingency in the fit between mathematical
model and empirical phenomena. Mathematics broadly conceived is indispensable to scientific
process, but the naturalist is wary of overly ambitious generalizations into metaphysics because
of the empirical requirements of naturalism. 379 Empirical verification of some of mathematic’s
predictive capacity “does not confirm its ontology… the empirical confirmation does not transfer
holistically to the mathematical existence claims.” 380 There are a multitude of mathematical
models that have applications to one or another physical theory; take, for example, Einstein’s
correspondence with Marcel Grossman, where the mathematician suggested Riemann’s nonEuclidian geometry as a model both conducive to the conceptualization of relativity and
predictions within the model. 381 So, Riemann in, Euclid out? Not necessarily: new
correspondence to physical theories does not refute the value of mathematical models’ potential
applicability: “To see how, consider the case of Euclidean geometry. General relativity did refute
it in its original role as a theory of physical space, but it still has important mathematical models,
and survives through reinterpretation as a theory of Euclidean spaces.” 382 To be precise, the
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expansion of Euclidean geometry to Euclidean spaces of infinite dimension results in the
“Hilbert Spaces” that are used to represent the “phase space” of a quantum system. 383 Maths do
not die because math can be articulated as a system of ramifying ratios, even with regards to
irrational and complex numbers that present one among many expansions of the concept of
number itself, that serve as a modelling function based loosely upon predictivity and expression
or how well it serves physics’ aims.
In this sense, math is creative and pseudo-contingent: “…we have seen already that
mathematics is not only a medium of proof; it is an engine of discovery…” 384 and “‘Predictions’
were made in a new way…mathematics was used to show what is possible, the assumption being
that what is mathematically possible is physically actual.” 385 Math is a creative enterprise even
when its applications may seem obscure or inconsistent: “Physicists insist on the form of
equations even when their content is obscure…Feynman introduced mathematical notation for
calculations in quantum electrodynamics…which…lack a consistent mathematical interpretation
even today.” 386 There are two things to note here: first, mathematical systems frequently
elaborate without regard to physical explanations by “the application of mathematics to itself.” 387
Mathematics ramifies outwards as ever increasingly complex systems of deductive entailment
within a given mathematical framework internal to a given system, builds on itself with new
categories of mathematical object and new systems, and the connections between a given math
and a given physical phenomena may remain obscure or be replaced by new maths. A layer of
contingency exists in which maths get applied where: what applications and predictive powers
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are understood, and which ones are not. In short, any fully Platonist mathematics must account
for why this math in this case but not another or fully schematize the whole of mathematics
consistently under set or, more likely, category theory. I have not yet found an undisputed effort
at doing so and must leverage Humean skepticism that any apparently successful effort may not
stay that way in the arc of disciplinary history.
Second, the case of quantum mechanics presents a far greater challenge to becoming
itself characterized by indeterminacy and contingency. Within the Standard Model of particle
physics, there are two glaring holes: mass and gravity have not yet been demonstrated to possess
the properties of the particle wave formation empirically, nor have scientists or mathematicians
sufficiently explained why certain groupings of mass volumes obtain over others. 388 The
relationship between model and the real blurs at radical scales and intensity of becoming, but this
relationship is pseudo-contingent in a diachronic and synchronic sense.
On the diachronic hand, it is highly likely that the completion of the standard model only
raises more questions, especially as our technological capacities expand to provide more
measuring apparatuses to transduce phenomena from registers perceptually distant to our
cosmological scale into experimental apparatuses through which we can manipulate these
phenomena and into data through which we can understand them. Science, mathematics, and the
models they share may themselves form an infinite progress, especially if becoming itself is an
infinite progress. In this sense, our best models are perspectival projections that attempt to
capture a potentially infinite universe in temporarily actual infinite absolutes. On the synchronic
hand, the reason why a given model fits a given phenomena well must be clarified, as must the
capacity of powerful mathematic theories like category theory to unify diverse ramifications of
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different branches of mathematics. In a purely speculative mode, I doubt we will manage to do
this thing: if the physical laws of the universe themselves may well be mutable then the math that
we describe these laws with will ramify ever outwards to keep up with the universe itself. If we
know the masses of muons, we still do not know why these masses and not others obtain. Math is
pseudo-contingent then: which maths for which problem presents contingency, but within a
given model the maths operate by conviction and the necessary entailment rational and deductive
thinking, regardless of whatever intuitive and so on components their genesis is wrought.
Yet, we can examine the relationship between mathematics, theory, and logic in a more
everyday sense. First, the phenomenological experience of doing maths is not quite the same as
the pure idealized space of the models nor the extremely abstract work we find in physics.
Eugenia Cheng draws this aspect of mathematics out clearly with the examples of “8 + 1 = 1 +
8” and “2 x 5 = 5 x 2.” 389 Children, in her experience, have greater difficulty with “1 + 8”
compared to “8 + 1” because the cognitive process of counting one above eight is easier than
counting eight above one. 390 “Commutativity,” or the ability to change the order of mathematical
operators and achieve the same solution, helps with this cognitive difficulty, but this skill that
appears given in mathematics is one that must be phenomenologically learned in the application
of model to problem. Consider the next problem with cookies and bags in which bags is the left
term and cookies the right: two bags of five cookies is not phenomenologically the same as five
bags of two cookies, even if their product is the same and the equation is commutative. 391 The
experience of doing something as simple as simple algebra and counting suggest that
mathematics is not exactly this pure ideal some like to cast it as, at least in our cognitive
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machinery, and that not all proofs are created equally insomuch as they require the conviction of
cognitive machinery. The experience of both applying and generating new models cannot be
erased underneath the apparently pure solutions of mathematics.
I have spent much time discussing the role of Soritic Paradoxes in logic, but we will not
go into the set-theoretic antimonies nor the consequences of Gödel for mathematical systems’
consistency. More productive to the larger claims of this dissertation is to examine the scientificempirical version of the Sorites Paradox, the Forced March Paradox, to suggest an immanent
probabilism superior to dialetheic projections at the level of the Absolute. Not unlike the cookie
counting and potentially cookie hoarding child, the Forced March Paradox requires dispelling the
ambiguity of borderline cases by making a choice through active determination instead of falling
into the Soritic Paradoxes by insisting upon a categorical determination or definition before
empirical investigation. Laurence Goldstein articulates this idea without cookies: “The Sorites
paradox, usually treated as a problem in logic or formal semantics, also lends itself to
experimental investigation.” 392 The forced march paradox forces a set of human subjects to make
a determination along a sliding borderline case. 393 An experimenter might have 50 cards on a
gradient between purple and blue and subjects press the button when they want to cut off the
infinite regress and empirically determine that purple has become sufficiently blue. 394 This
seemingly simple example has connections to the more abstract work above: it sheds light on the
issues examined earlier relating to the Inclosure Paradox, philosophers push their own button
when they cast a domain on infinite regress. In this sense, the Forced March Paradox is poorly
named and only a paradox from the perspective of classical bivalence. A set of active
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determinations given by a population can be mapped out statistically such that a limited, local,
and subject to change definitional boundary can be constructed without recourse to a spectral
Absolute that attempts to sort the boundaries for all time.
The problem comes in with classical bivalence and arguments from necessity given that
the probabilistic distribution of empirically selected definitions or boundaries will not be
amenable to true or false truth values, we must change our stance towards bivalence, dialetheism,
and fuzzy logics. To put it differently and in a way relevant to the Deleuze models: there can be
no strict boundary between any given condition and its conditioned or else the messy quality of
the definitional apparatus will lead to the positing of an Absolute and will violate the immanence
criteria. The VIA model attempts to deal with the problem of contradiction by reducing
various absolutes to tendencies that never obtain, thus keeping the ontology of the universe and
the metaphysics of the model comported towards potential infinity or an open system. It
internalizes contradiction reconceived as probabilistic indeterminacy and warrants truth criteria
through empirical adequacy and verification. Hierarchy and purity become relativistic
quantitative gradients of a given quality that can be determined locally, through a given
apparatus, within a certain orientation, with a given perspective, and are provisional but useful
excesses of logic. The goal is not to overturn Platonism; what we have is simply an alternative
which suggests a possible path for avoiding others that are fully absorbed by process and affect.
In this sense, the ramifying progress of academic disciplines and theories produce models of
becoming that yield a massive forced march paradox with no final term nor singular
convergence.
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Back to the big picture
It will be helpful, in my view, to tally the main claims of this extensive chapter so that the
reader can better take stock of their implications for rhetorical theory, which are taken up next:
1. The structure of the prospective illusion derives from Bergson before his encounter with
Einstein. Many different durations exist and inflect each other at once with no final term. We
can analyze them by differentiating their qualitative tendencies and pushing out their
ramifications towards a conceptual purity that never fully obtains.
2. Bergson breaks from his own Matter and Memory cascading duration system in Duration
and Simultaneity when he reacts to logically contradictory results from general and special
relativity by positing a retrospective illusion based upon the poorly posed question involved
in the time // space dualism. The results of a prospective analysis become re-integrated into
the monistic fabric of virtual being conceived of as Duration as Absolute or what I have
argued is a rather strange one-all multiplicity.
3. Deleuze takes the model in Bergsonism into a different register by displacing time//space into
virtual//intensive//actual and quantity//quality into metric//nonmetric in the VIA model.
Virtual singularities in an Absolute Virtual self-differentiate themselves into a homogenous
space of intensity theorized as a plane of the differential rates of change of all intensive
differences that change their quality when they affect one another such that the actual
phenomenal world obtains.
4. DeLanda attempts to give this “space of all spaces” or “plane of consistency” ontologically
realist status through transcendentally reasoning that different systematic isomorphies or
distributions of differences imply a single source, the Virtual as Absolute. But in doing so, he
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violates the stipulation against inference by logical necessity required by naturalist
immanence to posit a realist metaphysical entity that cannot be falsified.
5. Yet, DeLanda also provides a transduction between the Process and Virtual models in his
invocation of the quasi-cause and counter-actualization. The quasi-cause acts as an operator
of pure difference that causes virtual series to communicate by maintaining a substratum of
actuality; counter-actualization suggests that actuality itself has the capacity to sublimate
back into the Virtual.
6. However, extensity itself presents a metaphysical fantasy of pure metric precision that has no
grounding in empirical being. Any construction of intensity as pure difference and the Virtual
as the potential structure of difference that relies upon defining itself against this fantasy
appears invalid through both the immanence and negation criteria.
7. The reduction of entropy to extensity presents a difficult problem for DeLanda. As extensive,
it is causally only ever an effect. But his own empirical example of the Big Bang’s
progressive differentiation requires entropy to obtain and some level of ontological
indeterminacy in which chance itself accounts for the seemingly arbitrary, modally speaking,
values that various forms of matter tend towards.
8. Indeterminacy as a materialist ontological agent, through Karen Barad’s philosophy-physics,
provides the ontological grounding for indeterminacy as a material excess and generative
force in Bohr’s model of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory.
9. The paradoxes of measurement indicate that any apparatus designed to translate phenomena
into forms amenable to human perception becomes a co-participant in the phenomena it
seeks to determine.
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10. With Barad, we have methodology all the way down because experimental apparatuses
attempt to close off the open system of the universe to draw out particular tendencies with the
assumption that these tendencies exist outside of the laboratory setting. Acts of definition and
semantic apparatuses are not separate from this process; humanistic and social science
methodologies are apparatuses as well that participate, in their own way, in the becoming of
the universe. This stance implies a universal, to humans, naturalism in which the ultimate
criteria for truth are empirical adequacy through fit to model, probabilism, and the predictive
power of a given theory based upon experiments.
11. Logical warrants such as the LNC and LEM may not be suitable for all empirical situations
nor for history of the universe and our participation in this history. I find them inadequate
because they tend to lead to modes of necessity and transcendental reasoning to shove
paradox and indeterminacy off into an absolute that, in turn, produces more paradox and
indeterminacy as new theories about it arise.
12. However, if the model – real relationship remains in stark focus through naturalism, these
kinds of systems and logical warrants can be viewed analogously to mathematics in physics:
as useful fictions whose conclusions must be watched carefully.
13. Mathematics and logic’s relationship is far from certain, but modern science uses math as a
creative language to iterate out potential structures. These structures are used to model
different physical phenomena; different structures fit different natural systems differently.
The key is not to make a metaphysical leap of faith where none is needed.
14. Mathematical Platonic Idealism cannot obtain so long as mathematics has not been made
consistent under a specific theory through a specific method and some reason as to why this
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model with this phenomenon obtain. Given the iterative and ramifying process of both
sciences and mathematics, I take a skeptic but open stance to this potential obtaining.
15. Soritic Paradoxes only inhere at the level of the logical structure of language; we can
eliminate them through empirical inquiry or the forced march paradox and by accepting a
more probabilistic universe in which boundaries are fuzzy.
The general structure of both the VIA and AIV and VIA models is the key
predicate for my examination of rhetorical theory and critical methodology because it formalizes
the prospective, retrospective, and the diffraction of both orientations. Each orientation, the
tautological and the diffracted, have applications to humanistic inquiry as long as we
acknowledge, in line with naturalism, that they are modelling excesses that help human cognition
produce perspectival projections that usefully close off some parts of an open system such that
others can be studied more closely. The question is methodological: what humanistic methods
are well suited to the tautological and diffracted models respectively?
In rhetorical theory, we will see that an over-reliance upon close reading as methodology
and constitutive rhetoric as theory brackets the vast majority of work within tautological cycles
that project the very totalities, namely ideology or hegemony, that they strive to subvert. The
diffractive model suggests that methodological pluralism may better deal with empirical
phenomena, and suggests a mode of rhetoric as creation that can eschew modelling entirely by
intervening in the world. To naturalizing rhetorical theory and criticism we now turn.
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CHAPTER IV: ILLUSIONS AND RHETORICAL THEORY
The preceding chapters have produced three different argumentative apparatus-structures.
First, the retrospective illusion that abstracts an attribute, universalizes it into a category through
necessary chains of transcendental reasoning, and uses a quantitative form of reasoning to
account for and predict variation in empirical things. Second, the prospective illusion that
attempts to explain the genesis of a thing by ramifying its qualitative tendencies towards an
illusory conceptual limit in chains of sufficient reasoning. Despite its different vector, the
prospective illusion can still result in a retrospective one when the conceptual limit becomes
retroactively applied as the necessary condition for genesis as such. Finally, the diffractive
apparatus that suggests that the vectors AB and BA that generalize how each illusion deals
with problems of vagueness are themselves a kind of necessary perspectival projection that arises
in measurement-definition. A naturalistic footing positions the illusions as a kind of necessary
logical fiction subject to empirical verification in the world of definition parallel to mathematics
necessary function in science. Metaphysical fictions and categories appear unavoidable as part of
the human conceptual apparatus and its given-ness to regress, and we should not avoid them
because they afford us models of reality that facilitate social action. However, we must be
careful in treating them as ontologically anterior or totalizing to avoid being trapped by our own
fictions.
These broad philosophical apparatus-structures are not only relevant to philosophy.
Theory and philosophy differ only in perspective and vector combined with a tendency towards
difference in scale. Theory tends to move from some set of objects whose membership is
determined by academic discipline (A) to universal categories (B) derived from exploring the
objects through a set of partially shared disciplinary methodologies, like close reading for the
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humanities. Other scholars then take the universal categories (B) and use them to explicate the
objects of their discipline (A) to create meaning or to modify the parameters of the universal
itself. Philosophy presents greater difficulty because many tendencies coexist within each
philosopher: intuitivist, speculative, analytic, and critical name some broad orientations towards
philosophical endeavors. In general, philosophers are interested in universal questions such as
what is extensive and intensive or how do we tell apart one from many. Philosophers move from
universals (B) to experience, empirical example, intuition, critique of their forebears, or logic
games (A) to then move back into edifying their universals (B), even if their way of doing so, as
is Deleuze’s, is to argue that B is better expressed by generality than universality! Both pursuits
move in both directions; The difference subsists in perspective, initial vector, and final goal.
Theory tends towards explaining the particular at a concrete level; philosophy tends towards
explaining the universal at an abstract level. The difference between philosophy and theory is
merely historical and apparent. Historical, because philosophy has typically been granted the
privileged role in the dyad and been mythologized as occurring first; Apparent, because the
difference derives from perspective and not orientation.
This chapter switches registers from the intersection of argumentation with philosophy to
theoretical pursuits. Specifically, the pursuits of rhetorical studies, although analogy to other
fields can be drawn. The movement here parallels that from the previous chapters’ model of
Deleuze with the VIA structure in mind. I argue that IdeologyRhetoricAction
(IRA) describes the prevailing mode of ideological ontology and prescribe
IdeologyRhetoricAction (IRA) as an alternative. The same structure and remedy holds
for new materialist rhetorical theory: RhetoricityRhetoricalRhetoric (RRR) must be
made into RhetoricityRhetoricalRhetoric (RRR). The basic move of this chapter
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follows the exact critical logic it attempts to reform: the philosophical apparatus-structures will
be used to identify retrospective and prospective tendencies in each kind of rhetorical theory to
see where the pattern fits and benefit from analyzing where it does not. In short, the retrospective
illusion largely dominates both modes of rhetorical theory by producing a conceptual totality that
overdetermines human agency and analytic options for scholarship. The remedy involves
considering the benefits of a prospective illusion perspective, pushing on the duality between
perspectives with the diffractive apparatus, and exploding the methodological tools and
ontological assumptions available to rhetoricians.
Ideology and Rhetorical Theory and Criticism
Broadly conceived, ideology describes the difference between the material way we live
our lives and the stories, ideas, or representations that we have about ourselves and the way we
live our lives. How a scholar constructs ideology varies widely: it can follow a vulgar Marxist
bent in which ideology only functions as an intentional tool of the ruling class for class war;
Laclau and Mouffe describe it more as a system in which a hegemonic ideology maintains its
position through partial incorporation of minority ideologies; Althusser positions ideology as
material insomuch as it exists in social organizations that determine the flow of everyday life and
in our very construction as subjects. The above rundown hardly exhausts the nuances of
available positions, of course, but most theories of ideology offer some variation on the idea of
false consciousness. Simply, the idea that political-economic reality and how we think of it differ
and that this difference ends up oppressing some while empowering others.
Ideological critique frequently follows a logic of unmasking. If the critic can reveal
contradiction between what we are told and what we can measure, then oppressed people will
realize their state of false consciousness and resist it, whether through progressive politics or
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outright bloody revolution. This critical orientation exerts useful force for social change because,
were it completely devoid of value, repressive forces in our country would not so rankle against
academics teaching critical theory.
Some social ontologies, however, offered in the spirit of the ideological turn, present
conceptual difficulties that follow from a retrospective illusion that posits ideology as a universal
category with no outside. Critique becomes a never-ending negative critique that only reacts to
worldly events and can conceptualize no outside to ideology. Ideology all the way down, so to
speak. The dominant methodology, which centers on the close reading of texts to find meaning
through the contingent gap between what was said and what could have been said, follows from
a commitment to ontological contingency as a necessary universal feature for the emergence of
rhetoric. But, when close reading exhausts our methodological repertoire, we can end up in a
strange documentarian mode, where rhetoric becomes a slow science that claims to be about
meaning making and not prediction yet, from the vantage of disciplinary history, appears very
much about prediction. Making meaning is important, but if the goal is social change why would
we not want to use more quantitively rigorous methods to predict typical occurrences, close
reading to explain statistical outliers, and creative methodologies like activist ethnography to
attempt to produce change through positive action instead of negative critique?
This section, and chapter, cannot take us through this journey in its entirety, but will
endeavor to at least lay bare the ontological assumptions of ideological rhetorical theory, its
fundamental goals, typical methodology and its ontological commitments, and to push back on
totalizing modes of ideology with alternatives drawn from the broader process ontology
constructed in previous chapters. We move these themes in the following pattern: foundational
texts in ideological rhetorical theory set up a problematic, the relevant parts of the content
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analysis found in full in Appendix I demonstrate the problems influence, and then partial
solutions are offered to supplement existing theory and method.
The Necessity of Contingency
Contingency is a necessary ontological feature for the broadest assumptions of rhetorical
theory to have a ground. In a hard determinist universe, a discipline that stresses varying degrees
of free will that make the choice between different speech articulations in its instrumental
rhetoric guise or the gaps in the sociological formation of the subject meaningful could not exist.
We would be better served embracing rhetoric as information science and the illusion of choice
as a catalyst for advancing a predetermined Universe. Physics has not managed to eliminate
indeterminism from its frameworks nor unified them under a common mathematical expression
that could account for all beings. The movement in rhetorical theory with regards to contingency
can broadly be mapped through the following progression: individual choice in instrumental and
active speech making  context provides a way to make contingency meaningful 
contingency exists not only in induvial speech but in ideology as anterior social force. Put
differently, ideology becomes the ur-context of rhetoric. The following documents early
formulations of contingency in foundational ideological texts and them demonstrates their
persistence with reference to the content analysis. I do not proffer a solution for contingency,
only a reorientation in how we work within it from a retrospective to prospective mode.
McGee and Brummet provide tight enunciations of contingency. Brummett’s grappling
with positivism produces this formulation: “No physical stimulus is inherently meaningful, for
meaning must be given to experience, it is not a part of it automatically…The answer is that
people get meanings from other people through communication…if contexts give meaning, then
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the meaning of a person or thing or idea is constantly changing.” 395 McGee follows a similar line
of argument at the intersection of individual and society: “…there is a lack of necessity in social
control…Nothing necessarily restricts persons who wield the might of the state…nothing
necessarily determines individual behavior and belief” 396 and “No individual…is forced to
submit in the same way that a conditioned dog is obliged to salivate or socialized children are
required to speak English.” 397 While contingency may be necessary to rhetoric in general, no
local necessity does more than constrain individual choice at an empirical level. Whether
working in an individual-action-instrumental mode or one that links the social to ideology and
ideology to rhetoric, 398 the fundamental argument that one place to find contingency arises
between what is said and the context of what is said may well be ubiquitous for rhetorical theory
in general.
Charland’s “Constitutive Rhetoric” expands contingency at the level of instrumental
choice into the register of subjectifying, and therefore constitutive, narratives: “First, audience
members must be successfully interpellated; not all constitutive rhetorics succeed. Second, the
tautological logic of constitutive rhetoric must necessitate action in the material world;
constitutive rhetoric must require that its embodied subjects act freely in the social world to
affirm their subject position.” 399 We are given contingency at three levels. Constitutive rhetorics
are ontologically necessary to subjectivity as such, but, because constitution may fail, any
specific constitutive rhetoric emerges contingently in the positive sense or without necessity in
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the negative sense. The host bodies that have been ideologically interpolated must somehow act
freely, or perhaps he means under the assumption of freedom, to reproduce the constative
rhetoric through material action. Contingency emerges at the level of interpolation, the yes or no
to a subjectifying force, and at the level of future action, how a given individual choices to “act
out” the ideological fantasy. These modes of contingency exhibit a regress that factors in more
later in this chapter but provide a third form of contingency early on. How do these ideological
narratives emerge in the first place? Opportunities to identify with Québécois identity, and thus
be interpolated, draw from many sources historical and contemporary to the movement and
emerge against their configuration of Canadian identity. We are already off on a regress when we
either try to totalize Canadian identity as a local absolute the Québécois position as other or
attempt to account for the features and choices of that Canadian identity against its precursor
ideologies. At some point, the perspectival projection must be made by both the scholar
analyzing the event and the people living it. For now, let it suffice to say that an individual’s
reaction to ideology varies and the historical content of that ideology itself does not follow from
ontological necessity because it is inextricably bound with its materialization.
The “ASS: Contingency and Affordances/Constraints” category in the content analysis
demonstrates the persistence of contingency as a necessary characteristic of being for rhetorical
theory and criticism. Thirteen of the sixteen articles in the sample exhibit reliance upon
contingency at some ontological scale. Refer to the appendix for a more detailed analysis.
Three fundamental assumptions emerge from the above: hard determinism does not
adequately account for human behavior because there is something about the human that brings
contingency into at least social affairs; the meanings we make in response to this contingency are
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made from communication (and therefore rhetoric); contexts are vital to explicating these
meanings, in constant flux though they may be.
I have no great suggestion for remedying the necessity of contingency as described in
ideological rhetorical theory because, while it does not sufficiently account for the qualitative
becomings of historically discrete rhetorics or ideologies, I have spent immense time in each
preceding chapter attempting to argue that contingency and indeterminacy are features of reality.
The problem with contingency and ideology as accounted for in the rhetorical tradition emerges
at a different place when degrees of contingency become rationales for assigning agency, when
the question becomes which structure or agent exerts the majority of agency in a given causal
interaction. Perhaps, some theory of the quality of different kinds of contingency that underly
distributions of agency could emerge, but it will not do so here.
Constitutive Rhetoric: Agency, Materiality, and Regress
These three topics in constitutive rhetoric deserve, and in some cases have, entire books
written about them. A comprehensive treatment exceeds the possibillities of this project, but we
can identify the tendencies in two foundational texts and note the categories emergent from the
content analysis that support their continued influence in the field. Regress emerges at two
levels: the problem of expressing the structures and assumptions from my reading of the sources
and that these topics are themselves inextricable because of the speculative bent of this kind of
theory. Each term, and the next section on critical method, entails one another and enumerates
ever more positions through the systematic mapping of different intersections. Social ontology is
ontology and features the speculative bent inherent to this kind of effort. The key will be close
reading the texts selected for moments of under and over-determination around vital
problematics, namely materiality and agency. This reading informs us that the current social
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ontology of ideological rhetorical theory bends towards a retrospective direction and suggestions
for at least incorporating a prospective perspective will be evaluated.
Charland’s “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois” is among the
richest works in rhetorical theory and criticism ever constructed and many of the difficulties of
social ontology of ideology emerge here. Constitutive rhetoric emerges in an argument between
persuasion and identification: “…rhetorical theory’s privileging of an audience’s freedom to
judge is problematic, for it assumes that audiences, with their prejudices, interests, and motive,
are given and so extra-rhetorical.” 400 The question here ties back into the earlier commentary on
Schiappa’s big vs little rhetoric in determining what counts as rhetorical. Intentional or
instrumental modes of rhetorical theory implement a perspectival projection at the level of
audience by bracketing any prior persuasion that brought them to the speech event. One of the
fundamental moves of constitutive rhetoric involves pushing that perspectival projection into
wider valence. The speech act itself becomes symptomatic of wider socially constructed
discourses at a structural level that occur prior to persuasion.
Causal regress slips in immediately: “…attempts to elucidate ideological or identifyforming discourses as persuasive are trapped in a contradiction: persuasive discourse requires a
subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity and within an ideology.” 401
Presumably, identity and ideology likewise rely upon material-discursive acts for their
emergence and articulation. Causal efficacy becomes difficult to determine in multimodal regress
between audience, rhetor, and ideology. We have run into the Chicken and Egg problem between
the domain of an Absolute and the potential infinity of material agency once again.
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The move from persuasion to identification shifts the regress to that between discourse
and materiality. We can see this problem clearly near the start of the essay: “Political identity
must be an ideological fiction, even though, as McGee correctly notes, this fiction becomes
historically material and of consequence as people live it.” 402 What we have here resembles a
classical problem in Marxist theory: given the base // superstructure split, which side has greater
causal efficacy? For Marx, it must be the mode of production. He reverses the priority found in
Hegelian thought from the dialectic of thought tending towards Absolute Spirit into a
superstructure that serves primarily to justify, not determine, a given system of production. Does
the material exert agency over the discursive? Does the discursive evert agency over the
material? Is there, perhaps, a blurred construal that gives both concepts clear tendency while
recognizing their inextricability?
Charland appears aware this problem in at least two places that mention tautology and at
two levels of scale, one at the level of empirical phenomena and the second at the level of
theoretical generalizations about the phenomena. One of the tricks of constitutive rhetoric is “the
positing of a transhistorical subject” such that “today’s Quebec residents…have a right to their
own state because members of their community have discovered and occupied the land.” 403 At
the level of phenomena, constitutive rhetoric “…is perfectly reasonable. It is also perfectly
tautological, for it is a making sense that depends upon the a priori acceptance of that which it
attempts to prove the existence of…” 404 We must take great care here to note that this description
is of constitutive rhetoric in an empirical sense and that the process an individual engaged in
when they accept interpolation has a similar structure to the retrospective illusion. An identity
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has been projected backwards to account for itself in a chain of historically necessary causes.
Yet, we know that individuals must accept this interpolation and that they may have to read a
great many newspapers on Quebec identity, go to some meetings, or hangout at a separatist bar.
It appears to me that the retrospective bent with interpolation in which an identity-event happens,
“oh, this is me!” conflates the model with the reality and erases persuasion in favor of
conviction. I am unsure as to whether constitutive rhetoric requires this moment of conversion as
“a priori acceptance.”
The second regress is difficult because the description of the social ontology of the
empirical process named constitutive rhetoric and the ontological assumptions of the rhetorical
theory named constitutive rhetoric commit to the same kind of retrospective illusion:
“Audiences are, to use Althusser’s famous phrase, ‘always already’ subjects. This is to
say that if we disregard the point at which a child enters language, but restrict ourselves
to ‘competent’ speakers within a culture, we can observe that one cannot exist but as a
subject within a narrative. The necessity is ontological: one must already be a subject in
order to be addressed or to speak.” 405
Interpellation, as glossed in the preceding paragraph, replicates the retrospective illusion of the
empirical processes it studies: we have some evental and local absolute that attempts to forestall
regress but leaves out the usefulness of regress in determining differences in kind through
potential-infinite chains. I find the attribution of “always already” to Althusser curious. The
strange preposition, to my knowledge, originates with Heidegger, but we will not go down this
rabbit hole here. The “always already” indicates that the theory of constitutive rhetoric shares
features with the empirical phenomena it ostensibly describes: to tie subjectivity to cultural
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narratives and make it narratives all the way down. In a sense, the theory of subjectivity
advanced is itself constitutive rhetoric in this way. The history of the subject becomes as
tautological when we consider discrete subjects and specific narratives: “Constitutive rhetorics of
new subject positions can be understood…as working upon previous discourses, upon previous
constitutive rhetorics. They capture alienated subjects by re-articulating existing subject
positions…” 406 Charland’s explanation provides us with the two sides of the Inclosure Paradox:
a domain in which a conceptual interpolation bounds any specific interpolation as an absolute
alongside a potential infinity of subject positions whose existence and efficacy depends upon
previous subject positions. Subjects may be “always already” subjects but, if the narratives they
are subjectified to work through regress and are a multitude, determining which narrative and its
quality requires a move away from interpolation as conviction event towards a more processual
and persuasive register.
Charland’s approach to agency in this tautological regress varies. One perspective
follows the linguistic-structural determination of the subject and severely curtails individual
agency to the point of erasing it in its strongest articulation. Charland relatively follows Burke
and Freud in an interpretation of the individual-social relationship that skews towards top-down
causality: “…Burke moves towards collapsing the distinction between the realm of the symbolic
and that of human conceptual consciousness…their very constitution in rhetoric as a structured
articulation of signs.” 407 This statement typifies the kind of social ontology found in linguistic
turn thinking. We appear incapable of articulating ourselves without signification and every act
can be given significance in the signifying regime of a given culture; therefore, we are
signification. Charland deploys psychoanalysis to support this point: “…as G. H. Mead and
406
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Freud have made clear, subjectivity is always social, constituted in language, and exists in a
delicate balance of contradictory drives and impulses…” 408 and narratives repress the reality of
constant process and change in favor of the fantasy of pure totality. Regress creeps in here as
well the instant we question the relationship between drive and desire, but a full treatment of that
relationship would take us far off course. The focus in these quotes resonates clearly with
linguistic turn themes: we are interested in language as a top-down and determinative signifying
structure in which specific ideologies are constituted of rhetoric and dominate human agency.
We have the tautology-regress typical of the linguistic turn which is a retrospective illusion:
sometimes ideology, sometimes language, sometimes narrative, sometimes subjectivity,
sometimes society are determinative totalities at once anterior to and yet also somehow produced
by their own parts. The category bounds regress and becomes an end to itself.
Human agency becomes strained at best and impossible at worst if we accept Charland’s
“third ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric” 409 at its full force. He argues: “Freedom is
illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written…because the narrative is a structure of
understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow
through, to act so as to maintain the narratives consistency.” 410 This passage puts a finer point on
the above: the linguistic structure requires totalization such that the only agency at the level of
the human is a simple yes or no.
But would a scholar committed to a hard version of ideological constraints and
affordances in a totalizing logic accept a no as agency? A linguistic turn purist might offer
something like this pushback: “Ah, but the no is an action conditioned by a different ideology

Ibid, 139.
Ibid, 141.
410
Ibid.
408
409

226
that fits into the system of hegemonic ideology, so it too is determined in the last instance by the
regime of signification typical to a given historical subjectivity.” This line of reasoning
problematically prioritizes linguistic structure over everyday speech.
Charland’s own analysis centers on one organization’s written declaration of Québécois
identity but does not measure the everyday conversations that led to this document’s formation
from the perspective of those working within the organization nor the everyday speech of those
who a pull towards identification or not. At times, conviction explicitly overtakes persuasion:
“The process by which an audience member enters into a new subject position is therefore not
one of persuasion. It is akin more to one of conversion…” 411 The ideological move to any
everyday persuasion moves the perspectival projection of ideology back a step like a strange
spectral spirit, always lurking behind each empirical event. The linguistic-ideological-subjective
event at the level of theory has totalized the persuasive speech underneath it and an entire
network of productive disagreement. The relationship, then, between discourse and materiality
proffered here casts bodies and the material as the puppet of ideology: “The form of an
ideological rhetoric is effective because it is within the bodies of those it constitutes as
subjects… ‘An ‘ideology’ is like a god coming down to earth…like a spirit taking up its above in
a body…’” 412 Ideology from the perspective of constitutive rhetoric is a retrospective illusion: it
is a spectral totality cast back as its own cause and effect in the exact same way as the
phenomena it describes.
Raymie McKerrow’s “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis presents similar difficulty
when dealing with questions of causality but adds a finer point to the commentary on Charland
above. This difficulty and opportunity derive in part from the argumentative structure of his
411
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effort being split into the “critique of domination,” the “critique of freedom,” and his final list of
recommendations for the practice of critical rhetoric. The critical tension for agency remains:
how and where does agency exist underneath ideology’s supposedly totalizing quality?
The role of the dominant class and its relationship to ideology splits. On the one hand,
“These restrictions are more than socially derived regulators of discourse, they are
institutionalized rules accepted and used by the dominant class to control the discursive actions
of the dominated.” 413 Ideology figured as rhetorical norms at the level of institutions serve the
dominant class in class war. On the other hand, “Power…is not a possession or a content—it is
instead an integral part of social relations…Power is expressed anonymously, in nondeliberate
ways, at a ‘deep structure’ level…” 414 The clear objection to my alignment of these two quotes is
that I force a false dilemma upon McKerrow where no such false dilemma exists. Power can
exist in discursive structure and the ruling class can both intentionally deploy this power or
unconsciously act it out. I still do not find the potential dilemma here merely illusory because the
question of agency remains whether we take ideology or power as the key term.
For McKerrow, agency emerges muddled within his construal of the constraints and
affordances of a social system read. The top-down influence of discourse and unconscious “deep
structures” resonate clearly in McKerrows’ deployment of Laclau and Mouffe. In summary, no
outside to ideology exists because non-discursive practices will be represented and acted upon in
a discursive register such that “discursive totalities” have always already captured the nondiscursive in a web of discursivity. 415
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McKerrow articulates the primacy of discourse clearly: “This is not to diminish the
importance of non-discursive practices, but rather to acknowledge that the discussion of such
practices takes place in terms of discursive practices.” 416 We have here the kind of “always
already” explicated in Charland. Rhetoric figured here as discourse functions “all the way down”
such that even non-discursive practices are absorbed into discursive ones. I think that this
construal preemptively figures discourse as dominant against other strains in the Marxist
tradition, namely Marx himself who positions the relations of production as primary or that of
Fernand Braudel who focuses on material production and the emergence of capitalism. If
discursivity persists as a totalizing and spectral ghost, what if these very non-discursive options
presented by inventions that change the mode of production are part of the answer precisely
because they present an event that cannot immediately be assimilated into the discourse of
capitalism?
Several dimensionalized categories from the content analysis laid out in the appendix
demonstrate that the top-down model of ideology as discourse that determines human action
through a mixture of affordances and constraints have come to dominate the contemporary
literature on ideology. First, item 1. ASS: Constitutive Rhetoric features in nine of the sixteen
articles. The fundamental tautological bent appears clearly: textual choices are both somehow
conditioned by ideology but also produce it. Second, ASS: Top-Down Power, in twelve of
sixteen articles, in conjunction with 3. ASS: Contingency and Affordances/Constraints, in
thirteen of the sixteen articles, strongly indicate a bent that figures discourse as dominant over
materiality. The kind of ideological tautology featured in Charland, though more stridently
argued by McKerrow through Laclau and Mouffe, presents a defining characteristic of the field.
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The dominant ideology cannot be escaped because no non-ideological outside exists because of a
totalizing model of top-down causality. Any effort to resist is conditioned by the dominant mode
of ideology’s constraints and affordances and therefore cannot exit ideology; the most one can
hope for is to exert enough pressure on the dominant ideology for it to partially incorporate a
marginalized ideology into hegemony.
Appropriately, potential solutions to the top-down model emerge from internal
contradictions and discontents from within the fundamental texts themselves. The primary
discontent with the top-down model derives primarily from rhetoric’s need for contingency
against more deterministic modes of Marxist theory. McKerrow attempts to sneak in agency
against the discourse all the way down approach in terms of “influence” instead of “causality”
arguing “the structural causality inherent in… “pure Marxist reductionisms” need not result in
hard determinism. 417 His suggestion for how this works replicates the Aristotelian split through
the LEM of potentiality vs. actuality: “Presence of a symbol is not actuality, but at least is
potentiality.” 418 Discursive things exert a kind of influence through their status as potential that
may constrain action as more discourse, but does not determine it in the last instance. There may
be no ideological outside, but we can at least reshape the inside. McKerrow is right to seek a way
out of tautological causality modes, but so long as a rhetorical system is discourse all of the way
down, we will not get there by changing persuasion to identification nor linear causality to a
logic of influence.
A second line of disciplinary discontent involves frustration with the overdetermining
role of structure, at least as perceived by rhetorical theorists, in the very philosophical works by
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Althusser and Foucault they deploy to assert a perspective of rhetoric as process. 419 Brummett
takes this line of argument the furthest by positioning mechanistic causality as an Enlightenment
based fantasy, following an argumentative path remarkably close to Barad about the role of
observation as participant in the phenomena it claims to objectively measure. 420 Brummett does
well to center rhetoric around process, but then is less successful when he inadequately qualifies
how rhetoric differs from natural processes by reducing “sensation” to the “‘meaningless’
material of “experience.” 421 His impulse to find a qualitative tendency in rhetoric, for him the
intersection of communication and context thought as process, 422 beyond universalizing rhetoric
is praiseworthy. On the other hand, to find what capacities, tendencies, and qualities rhetoric has
by defining it through the negation of the brute sensate materiality of our bodies follows from
definition through negation instead of ramifying out qualitative tendencies.
A third line presages the jump from rhetoric as discourse to rhetoric as energy alongside
potentiality through a kind of dynamism and, perhaps, even, assemblage: “…considered
rhetorically, as forces, ideographs seem structured horizontally… in this sense, ideology is
dynamic and a force…” 423 McGee is characteristically prescient: viewing rhetoric as force opens
up affective registers that more language or structure centered models of rhetoric struggle to
accommodate. However, substituting discourse or ideology with equally spectral terms like force
or power displace one spectral construction with another one. What qualitative differences
discrete historical forces must be analyzed and dealt with the prospective illusion lest we reduce
all rhetorics to gradients of quantitative “force,” whatever that ends up meaning.
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A connection to assemblage theory emerges through McGee’s conscious use of the
diachronic//synchronic split: how ideographs exist in a distributed web of personal belief and the
potentiality of persuasion matter to him, and he even favors a messy regress of the synchronic to
diachronic overdetermination. 424 A problem remains: “…ideology… [is] always keeping itself in
some consonance and unity, but not always the same consonance and unity.” and “Each
ideograph is thus connected to all others as brain cells are linked by synapses…” 425 Process and
dynamism become too easily subsumed into a metaphysics of presence, but with the
relata//relation split shoving the contradiction problem into a new register that originally existed
with the actual//potential or substance//accident splits. Structure creeps back in through the
priority of relationships without irrational disconnection or indeterminism within the formations
of hegemony itself.
I have spent much time arguing that regress is inevitable, but whether we deal with by
reliance on some form of the retrospective illusion and categorical-quantitative gradients or the
prospective illusion and qualitative tendencies remains our choice. Ideology-oriented rhetorical
theory has tended to solve the regress between discourse and material by favoring the discursive
as an always anterior structure that both constrains and affords actions. Ideology always lurks
one step behind speech, but the retrospective mode only expresses one perspectival line.
Reversing our perspectival vector with the prospective illusion could find singularities in the
formation of historically discrete ideologies that help account for their emergence and quality in
a diachronic sense. We might also use retrospective and quantitative mappings of ideology’s
differential manifestations to find synchronic areas of over or under-determination to study
prospectively as statistical outliers where action can be taken. Finally, rhetorical historians and
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political economist’s rolls must merge with that of the rhetorical theorist. Have we given up the
game too soon? Political economists like Fernand Braudel believe so: perhaps the totalizing
influence of ideology deals more with our theories’ emphasis on structure and an orientation
towards the influence of the nondiscursive on the discursive could open new areas for scholars to
become activists.
The Critical Act
The top-down discursive orientation of ideological rhetorical theory has an inextricable
relationship to what it means to do criticism. After all, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and
methodology share permeable boundaries with some logical entailment between them.
Regardless of which theory of ideology a rhetorician accepts, the overwhelming tendency in the
literature performs close textual analysis of a “text” constructed from many fragments by
attending to contingent moments. These moments are symptoms of ideology, and their meaning
emerges through the gap between text and context or text and text. The critical act becomes one
to “unmask” or “demystify” ideological illusions, but by being caught up in notions of neverending critique, can end up documenting oppression more so than fighting it. Charland and
McKerrow both embrace while agitating against this mode; contemporary rhetorical critics from
the content analysis sample follow suit. Moving theory and criticism forward requires
contextualizing close reading in a larger system of potential methodologies and paying close
attention to how to find quality in singular points of quantity.
I take from Philip Wander’s “The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism” the term
“unmasking” to name criticism comported towards dispelling false consciousness: “…it
[ideological theory] could accommodate an approach to criticism bent on ‘unmasking’ rhetoric in
light of the way it functioned in an historical context and which expanded the traditional
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definition of rhetoric to include literature and philosophy.” 426 The word “unmasking” does not
recur in the article, but I believe suitably names a version of ideological criticism that adheres to
the false consciousness precept imported from critical theory. Unmasking requires careful
attention to the textual contingency afforded in the gap between text and context: “An
ideological turn in modern criticism reflects the existence of crisis, acknowledges the influence
of established interests and the reality of alternative world views, and commends rhetorical
analysis not only of the actions implied but also of the interests represented.” 427 Wander’s
rationale for doing criticism demands ethical judgement because “…criticism carries us to the
point of recognizing good reasons and engaging in right action…to situate ‘good’ and ‘right’ in
an historical context…” 428 Wander’s formulation sets the standard for ideological rhetorical
criticism: we find the meaningful gaps to unmask false consciousness by attending to text and
context and then judge the ethics of this action through some moral-ethical framework.
Charland provides a strange speculative answer to the question of the critical act: “A
transformed ideology would require a transformed subject (not a dissolving of subjectivity).
Such a transformation requires ideological and rhetorical work.” 429 Charland provides three
tentative ways to accomplish this “work.” First, to make new stories to resolve old
contradictions; second, a strange and unfinished argument about producing art to operate
aesthetically on what appears to be affects; third, to “see through the ‘givenness’ of what
appears…” or critique as the unmasking of false consciousness. 430 It seems to me that these are
great ideas strained with a strict reading of interpellation and without dissolving spectral
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totalities such as subjectivity itself. The potential for a rhetorician’s work to shift from analysis
to production, however, could foster a performative methodology that shifts the ground of our
social ontologies as we encounter problematics totalizing modes of ideology cannot account for.
Calls for performance in rhetoric come and go, but close textual analysis remains dominant,
perhaps here we should follow Charland.
McKerrow’s answer wavers between the two polls of discourse and materiality. Towards
the top-down pole, “…the impetus to so function and the possibility of change, is muted by the
fact that the subject already is interpellated with the dominant ideology. Actions oriented toward
change will tend to be conducive to power maintenance rather than to its removal.” 431 This
orientation derives clearly from Laclau and Mouffe. Social change can only happen against the
backdrop of hegemony as dominant ideology and totality so any effort of a subaltern ideology
only contributes to the maintenance of the system. Towards a more agential pole, McKerrow
finds agency in a place like Charland’s notion of the contradictions between constitutive
rhetorics as a place for potentially successful intervention: “Nevertheless, a focus on the
hierarchy of dominant/dominated may deflect attention from the existence of multiple classes,
groups, or even individuals with varying degrees of power over others.” 432 McKerrow’s fifth
principle, that no deterministic causality exists because of the existence of ontological
contingency guarantees that things could have been done differently in a logic of influence
instead of causation, leads him to argue that one role of the critical rhetorician is to productively
draw attention to social contradictions. 433 While more agentially capacitating, regress now sets in
at the level of critique against ideology. How does one know when one’s act of critique affects
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the system and when its very enunciation has been provided for by the system? Perhaps
answering the question cannot happen at the level of totality, and we must evaluate each critical
intervention in its specificity and haecceity, but we are not given guidelines for what that looks
like here.
This infinite regress of discourse or ideology or norms or whatever you would like to
name the totality produces a hellish regress of negative critique: “…the telos that marks the
project is one of never-ending skepticism, hence permanent criticism. Results are never
satisfying as the new social relations which emerge from a reaction to a critique are themselves
simply new forms of power and hence subject to renewed skepticism.” 434 Regress above, so
below. One wonders how we should know what is right and what is wrong within this regress:
are all stipulations of power wrong and the only task to counteract whatever is dominant ad
infinitum? Surely, we can have good reasons for why one set of potentialities opened by critique
are preferable without falling into the “business of moving us towards [an impossible]
perfection” in a “transcendental…Habermasian sense?” 435 Surely, we are afforded more agency
than merely opening “the possibility of revolt?” 436
McKerrow follows older modes of ideological critique whose primary goal is unmasking
seemingly natural discourses through criticism to “undermine and expose the discourse of
power…to thwart its effects,” 437 by unveiling how truth is produced in contingent practices, 438
by mapping out unconscious structures through implication by absence, 439 and “[uncovering] a
subordinate or secondary reading which contains the seeds of subversion or rejection of
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authority…” 440 Rhetorical criticism in its ideological mode, for McKerrow, deals with the
infinite regress of the discursive through a never ending negative critique that uses different
modes of contradiction to de-naturalize or read contingency through discourse such that a kind of
unmasking or unveiling occurs.
Returning to the content analysis categories of the appendix, now consider
Dimensionalized category 4 – G/C/S Unmasking and/or Resistance – which reveals the
dominance of McKerrow’s orientation towards ideological critique as it features in fifteen of the
sixteen articles sampled. The goal of ideological rhetorical criticism is to unmask the workings
of deep structure in the logic of symptom-disease and this work will never end because the
ideological superstructure’s ability to rig the game from the outset. Critical methodology then
becomes typified by dimensionalized category 5. ASS and G/C/S: Perspectival Metaphors for
Criticism arises in fourteen of the sixteen articles reviewed. Criticism becomes a perspective
game that results in the same finding, the documentation of systemic oppression without much
resistance to it. A “text” is assembled through the grouping of fragments, contingent moments
analyzed by close reading for the gap in text and context, and the domination of the oppressed is
condemned. Unmasking type criticism makes the powerful nervous, as evinced in both American
political parties’ animosity to the humanities. However, I am nervous that negative critique or
“power operating in this way is bad because it oppresses” misses the opportunities afforded by a
more performative approach that argues forcefully for the utility and value of progressive ethics.
I am not alone in this anxiety. Charland well articulates problems with the never ending
negative critique the field has largely adopted from McKerrow’s “Critical Rhetoric:” “Critical
Rhetoric demands that critique precede the invention of new rhetorics…The difficulty with all of
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this, however, is that Professor McKerrow does not guide us out of the infinite regress of
negative critique.” 441 Critical Rhetoric as negative critique resembles Nietzsche’s “slave
morality” 442 in which definition of good has no positive content but is only ever done as “not
bad.” Democrats and progressives are good because Republicans are bad; Republicans are good
because they are not Communists nor Socialists, and so on. The people are left with a paucity of
policy solutions in a never-ending game of defining identity through negation and I believe this
tact to be intentional on the part of the ruling class. Charland makes this point without recourse
the ever-problematic Nietzsche: “Foucault…does not seek to judge discourse…he provides no
ground or rationale for developing better forms of discourse or structures of power…[because]
Foucauldian discourse analysis lacks the element so central to rhetoric: a concern with
‘audience.’” 443 Charland’s audiences may be constructed through interpolation as spectral god,
but I do not disagree with his point here. Negative critique and the regress of ideology as social
totality do not provide adequate methodological resources for breaking out of definition of self as
the negation of other. Methodologies must arise that define identity and ethics in positive terms
by focusing on their empirical results and I believe we are starting to see this very thing outside
of academic circles in local strikes against Amazon and new ways of considering gender identity
at LGBTQIA+ bars all around America. Methods better suited for participating in these
movements must emerge and could challenge ideology as totality at the level of theory.
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Reconstructive close reading is not necessarily the most conducive methodology to this
goal because it is reactive in the same way insomuch as it makes speech the symptom of some
always already anterior ideological-structural cause. McGee challenges this idea in “Text,
Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture.” He condemns negative critique: “A
circle of negativism (decentering, deconstructing) should be broken, however. I think it is time to
stop whining about the so-called ‘post-modern condition’ and to develop realistic strategies to
cope with it…” 444 The “realistic strategy,” for McGee is a return to speech over structure. The
second piece makes this argument clearly with regards to Althusser: “That blind spot is a
tendency to begin one’s thinking about a subject, not in the subject itself, but in the context or
field of the subject, and then to discover little more about the subject than has already been
noticed in the descriptions of the context or field.” 445 This tendency we call the descriptive
aporia of ideological criticism in its retrospective mode. Ideology becomes, instead of a local
boundary upon an accretion of intensities made out of speech and other things, the cause we look
for in the first place by inferring that textual symptoms must refer back to ideology in general.
Put differently, what if we treat ideology as an effect instead of a cause by trying the prospective
illusion in addition to the retrospective one?
McGee suggests solutions extremely close to Deleuze: to consider ideology in terms of
“production” instead of “reproduction” 446 and for rhetoricians to “realize that the questions we
ask are more important to the development of knowledge than the provisional answers we
discover.” 447 How close this reads to Deleuze’s arguments that genuine problematics can be
found in social fields, regardless of his restriction in Difference and Repetition of social
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problems to “economic and social problems,” 448 and the overall critique of ideology as a
retrospective illusion better theorized in the discrete production of specific ideologies in
Thousand Plateaus. 449 The future question, then, becomes mapping out the problematics of
rhetoric through a naturalistic investigation of rhetorical theory with recourse to rhetorical theory
produced through textual analyses accomplished by methodologies, such as ethnography and
content analysis, that can support working within the prospective illusion.
Summary and Broad Suggestion
We can combine the retrospective and prospective orientations to come to the following
construal of ideologically inflected rhetorical theory and criticism, particularly constitutive
rhetoric:
1. Rhetoricians explicate textual meaning by reconstructing it using some theoreticalphilosophical framework in conjunction with close reading to account for the meaningful
gaps in contingency.
2. Contingency is the ontological assumption that things really could have happened otherwise
such that individuals, rhetors, and the social systems they both comprise and are influenced
by have some degree of freedom. Individual choices and historical events, while constrained
by anterior forces, really could have happened differently.
3. Contingency, and therefore meaning, arises between many different parts of the rhetorical
transaction: between what the rhetor said and what they could have said, in the different
contradictory narratives audiences identify with, in silences that mark out “deep structures,”
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in the gap between different historical positions of the dominant ideology, in the gap between
fact and myth, and between dominant and subaltern accounts.
4. Rhetorical Criticism becomes ideological when it unmasks or demystifies these
contradictions, enumerates potential alternatives, or produces new narratives that produce
new problems in an infinite regress.
5. The relationship between materiality and discourse presents great difficulties in causality,
even one broken out of mechanism by a neglect of the LNC in which one thing must be well
bounded and cause another. The predominant solution to this problem positions constitutive
rhetoric as subjectivity, discourse, ideology, norms, or narrative that fosters identification in
the sense of the always already or an anterior cause along an infinite regress of discursive
causes. Agency by individuals does not face total erasure because of contingency, but a kind
of linguistic structuralism dominates in which all non-discursive modes of action or being are
taken at their representational instead of material force.
6. The rhetorical critic does not analyze speech so much as they analyze deep sociological
symptoms of which speech is only symptom.
7. We attempt to make the causality make sense by making arguments that ideology is given
body in specific rhetorics, discourses, literal bodies, habits, practices, and so on. Ideology
haunts the material because the instant we use speech to articulate something about the nondiscursive it has become discursive, and we are trapped in an infinite regress.
8. This problem leads to relatively top-down heavy theories of rhetorical agency, and we tend to
select objects in which the system wins because we cannot conceptualize it losing without
always already being trapped by it, making us a kind of documentarian class of the systemic
oppression.
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9. Ideological critique and theory, then, operate in analogous fashion to the retrospective
illusion and a logic of necessity and this is not necessarily a bad thing: social aggregates like
ideology and their current historical manifestation, neoliberalism for most scholars, can help
us to map out a universal gradient of oppression in its quantitative guise. Difference in
quantity in the diachronic or synchronic modes could indicate singularities that help to
account for qualitative emergence or suggest places of over or under-determination ripe for
critical intervention.
10. However, it seems to me that other modes of causal thinking, a mode of ideological critique
that works beyond reified totalities in a prospective illusion mode, and methodologies
beyond reconstructive close reading could serve our social justice goals more aptly. The key
is supplement analytic negative critique with productive positive critique as the creation of
rhetorics, their synthesis.
New Materialist Rhetorical Theory
This section enumerates the critique of the big points above already in rhetorical theory
and then expands them in a positive and actionable dimension by evaluating whether New
Materialist Rhetoric contributes to solving or exacerbating the problematics and supplementing
them with ideas and methodological stipulations from philosophers relatively new to rhetorical
theory. In short, constitutive rhetoric’s emphasis on top-down causality that heavily skews
towards constraint over affordance misses two broad options for more emancipatory ideological
critique. Within a retrospective perspective, treating ideology as an immanent virtuality that
insists more than exists facilitates a cartography of differential forces, ideological and non, such
that fractures in hegemony can be attacked while fractures in counter hegemony worked on to
increase solidarity across intersectional markers. Within a prospective perspective, a perfect
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finality of ideology becomes something disparate assemblages tend towards but never reach
because of the contradictory recalcitrance of materiality itself. Parameters can be used to track
phase changes in assemblages composed of diverse elements with a process ontology in mind.
Reified Totalities: Ideology, Rhetoricity, Energy
The primary goal for this section is to map the retrospective illusion onto different
manifestations of rhetorical causality and ontological definitions of rhetoric to suggest that the
VIA model provides a better ontological grounding for rhetorical theory than the VIA
model that replicates the tautological causality of constitutive rhetoric in an ontological register.
Thinking rhetoric ontologically and ontically in terms of rhetoricity, the rhetorical, and
rhetoric. This move finds an early speculation in Charland: “…interpellation does not occur
through persuasion in the usual sense, for the very act of addressing is rhetorical. It is logically
prior to the rhetorical narratio.” 450 Diane Davis must be credited with building out this line of
reasoning in an independent genesis and most work in new materialist rhetorical theory makes
some reference 451 to her construal of “fundamental addressivity” as “rhetoricity.” 452 Rhetoricity
shifts the necessary condition of rhetoric from intentional choice to a primordial relationality:
“Rhetoric is not first of all an essence or property ‘in the speaker’ (a natural function of biology)
but an underivable obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality.” 453 In other
terms, relationality is prior to relata and a proper ontology of rhetoric must start with this prior
relationality here named rhetoricity.
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Let us start with rhetoricity, Davis elaborates through a mixture of Derrida and empirical
results from animal communication: “The question now is not whether animals have powers
humans have denied them so much as whether humans have the power to be or to do I…An
underivable rhetoricity is the immaterial ‘something’ from which a presumption of ‘selfknowledge arises…” 454 The move, despite being routed through Derrida, bears uncanny
resemblance to a Deleuzian account of the genetic emergence of subjectivity; the “I” or “the
identity of the same...names a differential effect with no ontological foundation…an originary
capacity to be repeated…” 455 The key difference involves reducing the role of the virtual as a
field of production through singularity: identity resembles pure intensity as “differential effect,”
this kind of irreducible but immaterial relationality approximates the virtual, and repetition takes
on a similar role of the return of the same.
The most significant divergence comes with the entailments of relationality: “The
rhetoricity cannot be innate because it cannot not be relational; without an other, a trace of
differentiation, there is no need or possibility for self-reference.” 456 Where Deleuze attempts to
keep his ontology in the potential and sufficient, Davis takes the route that positions rhetoricity
in the possible and necessary sense. This construal of immaterial or virtual relationality as prior
to structure erases the heterogenous multiplicities featured in all Deleuzian models and, in doing
so, positions relationality as identity only in a different register. Relationality becomes an
Absolute that only indicates differences in quantity but does not account for the genesis of
differences in quality. Indeterminacy as materialist agency becomes bracketed: one wonders why
anything emerges from this prior relationality in causal terms.
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Davis appears aware of the relative flatness of the relation//relata split projected as
anterior and an inherently textual form, although she insists on all relationality bearing a textual
nature. 457 She performs a move similar to Bergson’s insistence that we dismiss false problems:
“To respect the radical ruptures and infinite heterogeneities between…ways of thinking and
being requires…attending to a wild dissemination of differences obscured by the positing of a
single, indivisible line between thinking and being…” 458 Davis supports this line with recourse
to empirical examples like slime molds that challenge subject driven models of cognition and
Derrida’s commentary on the textuality of genetics. 459 This leads to an argument extremely close
to Barad’s diffraction in which “…each yes is already a yes-I, both an opening and a cut…” 460
except that we are mired with the relation//relata schema instead of the more immanent and
process based pattern of resonances and dissonances within the diffractive model. Non-relation
or irrationality has been brought in, but not at the level of generative indeterminacy. Regress
towards rhetoricity as an Absolute for all of Being thought as difference but grounded in
relationality obtains.
Rhetoricity avoids the poorly posed question problem but follows the pattern of the
retrospective illusion by projecting an Absolute rhetoricity. I have difficulty sorting out how to
articulate through criticism communication between non-human interlocuters when “languages
are not special in kind but take their place among animal languages, vegetal communications,
genetic codes…” 461 Reducing interaction to communication fulfills a useful first step in breaking
down anthropocentric specialness, but without a way to account for the emergence of different
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modes of communication flattens the meaningful differences we should account for. Similarly,
the move to describe communication as language instead of speech begs again the question of
the retrospective illusion: is not the illusion of a coherent structural system, as is language in
opposition to speech, as repressive as the illusion of the I as transcendent self-unity?
Rhetoricity as anterior Absolute imperialistically reads text as a fundamental relationality
anterior to all actualizations but based in the relations//relata pair. I view rhetoricity as an
insufficient version of Difference and Repetition’s virtuality that is, itself, a tautological
construal of the intensive focused model of Thousand Plateaus. The VIA model provides a
path into structure through mathematical analogy in accounting for the generation of selfdifferencing difference and provides the quasi-causal operator and counter-actualization to
ensure that the virtuality is not a dead realm of always anterior “addressivity” or “relationality.”
Put differently, while retrospective the VIA model transduced into the RRR model can
account for emergence and quality where difference prioritizing relations over relata cannot. But
why stop with the VIA model? The VIA transposed into a RRR model intimates a
rework in which intensities tend towards something like rhetoricity or relational structure as final
or formal causes that never obtain. Rhetorical critics can then start with whatever things they find
rhetorical, map out their qualities, singularities, and capacities rhetorical or otherwise, and apply
these findings to larger networks of rhetorics. Deleuzian models supplemented by diffraction
provide the kind of “limitrophy” or attention to fuzzy borderlines that Davis gestures to through
Derrida 462 but does not provide.
Moving onto rhetorical, new materialist rhetorical theory, whether the authors take
Davis’ rhetoricity at full force, expands what counts as rhetoric through ontological speculation,
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but the force with which they leverage this expansion of rhetoric into any number of things from
plants 463 to the chemical reactions of beer 464 varies. Some make the imperialistic gesture to
position rhetoric as essential to universal becoming, but a more interesting line follows a
dialetheic logic at the level of rhetorical as capacity or characteristic. At the limit of suasory,
things express rhetorical characteristics when they are agents in rhetoric as network or
assemblage. This line usefully shifts the ground of rhetorical from the register of identity to that
of expression and encourages multi-disciplinary scholarship because the elements that are less
suasory, that is more given to coercion or conviction than persuasion, are equally relevant to
understanding a given rhetoric. Rhetoricians, then, must “attune” themselves to both rhetoric and
not-rhetoric through tools both within and outside of the discipline.
One strand takes rhetoricity to indicate the inherent relationality of all being or becoming
and posits that if a relation obtains but could have obtained otherwise, contingency, then that
relationship is rhetorical because rhetoric properly deals with contingency. Barnett and Boyle
provide the strongest articulation of this stance: “…we take ontology to be fundamentally
rhetorical…to be the pervasive relationality of all things—the means by which things come into
relation and have effects on other things in ways that resonate strongly with existing and
emerging understandings of rhetoric.” 465 Things are not only rhetorical when interacting in
human inclusive assemblages, but all things that change through relations are rhetorical. The
problem here closely mirrors that with Davis’ more imperialistic take on rhetoricity: what
precisely do rhetorical concepts offer biologists that philosophy of science or just the naturalistic
scientific method not already offer? It is not as though scientists are not aware that
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experimentation isolates phenomena by measuring apparatuses that attempt to close the open
system of the universe. What do the definitional apparatuses offer an understanding of plants?
The typical justificatory move hedges back from full on disciplinary imperialism in
which all disciplines are rightfully conceived as rhetoric and take the stance that things like
animal persuasion can teach us about human rhetorics. Yet, this runs afoul of the other Davis
problem: reducing all being to a quantitative gradient of relationality does not sufficiently give us
theoretical tools that clarify how different rhetorical assemblages differ in kind, in terms of
quality. We have traded a poorly posed question for an insufficiently analyzed aggregate, to use
Bergson’s terms.
The other strand takes a more reserved stance: traditionally nonrhetorical things have the
capacity to become rhetorical when they enter in rhetorical assemblages, but any network or
assemblage of “rhetoric,” will have rhetorical and non-rhetorical elements. Within this broad
orientation, the strength of takes differ and are worth noting. Laurie Gries’ articulation has
imperialistic undertones: “By rhetorical, I refer to something’s ability to induce change in
thought, feeling, and action; organize and maintain collective formation; exert power, etc.; as it
enters into relation with other things (human or nonhuman).” 466 Ultimately, Gries position falls
pretty to the problems outlined above, a difference in kind between an event of human or animal
contingency cannot be differentiated from raw coercion. I struggle with the claim that asteroids
colliding in space offers an example comparable to the experience of living with a dog or
attempting to acquire grant money. However, Gries does suggest the potential for something
closer to persuasion. The move towards process and becoming works better than bare
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relationality that simply replicates the problems of linguistic structuralism in an ontological
register.
Other takes are more reserved. John Mucklebauer exemplifies these positions: “The point
here is that everyday physical structures may not exactly be arguments…but they [are]
undoubtedly persuasive…[I]t is important to consider these types of objects as crucial
components of rhetoric.” 467 This take follows the “Big Rhetoric” Pattern: if a thing, anything at
all, exerts persuasive agency then it must be viewed as a component of rhetoric and our purview
of what counts as rhetorical must expand. The asteroids colliding may not be persuasive to their
bodies, but their potential collision with Earth makes them rhetorical to a great many people.
Nathan Stormer articulates a position that I find most useful: “Acceptance of multiple
ontologies also requires acceptance that not all things in rhetoric are rhetorical, meaning the
active ingredients in a particular rhetoric exceed the ‘doer’ and the ‘deed’ of whatever one is
concerned with (persuasion, acquiescence, ekstasis, and so on). Rhetoric’s power is eventualized,
it is not possessed...” 468 Accounting the evental emergence of a rhetoric does not require making
the universe fundamentally rhetorical but does require the rhetorician to become more
interdisciplinary and, perhaps, even a naturalist to understand scientifically the non-rhetorical
capacities of a thing. Stormer notes that rhetoricians can be concerned with different things
“persuasion, acquiescence, ekstasis, and so on…” This argument promotes one I will make about
the differences in kind between persuasion, conviction, and coercion: all of these things can be
given a rhetorical valence and interact in rhetorical events. However, conflating the kinds of
suasion into degrees of coercion or persuasion misses the opportunity to ramify these parts of
suasion out in terms of kind both in general and for a particular rhetoric.
467
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We have three models for rhetorical capacity: one that follows from rhetoricity’s strange
imperialism in which a thing can be said to be rhetorical if it responds to the ontological capacity
that things relate; one that adds persuasion as a qualifier to this argument; one at once more
reserved and yet radically open in which a given rhetoric will be composed like one of
DeLanda’s assemblages of heterogenous parts that are assemblages in their own right with
varying capacities, affects, and tendencies, rhetorical and non. I find Stormer’s position the most
favorable and useful to constructing a naturalist rhetorical theory. Rhetoricians must attend to a
variety of capacities in agents in a communicative event, the rhetorical and non-rhetorical, and
doing so may require scientific tools outside the typical humanities repertoire. Rhetoricians must
also theorize not the thing or the object, but different capacities or potential prospective illusion
chains about tendencies in suasion broadly conceived. Persuasive systems with a high degree of
complexity or density catalyze becoming in ways that multiply indeterminacy and provide a
higher chance of a contingent result. A difference in quality, as in Bergson, emerges from a
singular threshold in a difference of quantity in which the capacity to say no to a persuasive
effort genuinely differs from the kind of brute coercion involved in asteroids crashing in space.
Turning to Rhetoric, changes in the fundamental ontology of rhetoric from persuasion to
identification to rhetoricity and an expansion in what counts as rhetorical both in terms of literal
objects and a slight bend towards process beget a change in how theorists construe rhetoric in
general. The authors who take up what rhetoric means have some features that repeat and others
that are unique. Rickert presents one of the foundational takes: “Rhetoric is an emergent result of
environmentally situated and interactive engagements, redolent of a world that affects us, that
persuades us prior to symbolicity…is thereby the emergent result of many complexly interacting
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agents dynamically attuned…to one another…” 469 Gries articulates a similar take: “Rhetoric is a
distributed act that emerges from between these affective encounters and interactions, not among
individual discrete elements…” 470 and adds a semi-Deleuzian twist, “Rhetoric is a distributed
event that unfolds with time in and across networks of complex, dynamic relations…a virtualactual process of becoming…” 471 Stormer and McGreavy alongside Brian L Ott and Greg
Dickenson more or less follow suit in terms of process ontology while adding notions of
capacity, affect, and quality. 472 The general thrust emerges clearly: rhetoric exceeds the symbolic
or representational, things in the world are rhetorical, and a focus on affect or mood or ambience
or environment or what have you should supersede or at least be added to rhetorical models
focused on things like intent and conscious persuasion. There are several words in these
definitions that require clarifying, namely “emergent,” “complexly and dynamically,” “event,”
“persuasion,” “attuned,” and “virtual-actual.”
Emergence, Complexity, and Non-Linear Causality
Emergent or emergence and its cohort terms, complexly, dynamically, and event,
frequently are deployed in new materialist rhetoric but pinning down their definitions and the
philosophical resources from which they are drawn presents difficulty. Rickert provides a good
starting place and defines “emergence” in two places. Speaking of rhetoric, “…it is emergent: an
ecology of elements and forces in dynamic, mutually conditioning interaction catalyzes in
holistic transformation when significant ‘tipping points’ are reached.” 473 These “tipping points”
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resemble the dynamic systems theory idea that we have already mapped in Deleuzian register
through DeLanda of the kind of singularities that describe, for us, and determine, for DeLanda,
the point at which a thing’s capacities or phase state change qualitatively at a certain quantitative
threshold. Emergence does not necessarily signify the emergence of the new, but the way in
which systems undergoing a “phase shift” experience a change in their organization and capacity
in the mereological relationship between parts and wholes.
Emergence has a diachronic-synchronic problem. Tending towards the synchronic pole,
the series ice—water—gas has phase states that are in a sense locally emergent but well within
the typical and documented capacities of this molecular arrangement’s phase spaces. When water
has been put into a symmetry breaking cascade through heating and sublimates into water vapor
the capacity for water to change phases of matter does not emerge, this specific water
experiences a change that has consequences for its component atoms’ behavior and other bits of
non-water stuff inevitably mixed in with it. Emergence takes on a local meaning synchronically
with a discrete empirical body of water and is best described in terms of phase states. Tending
towards the diachronic pole: the universal capacity for matter and all matter’s different phase
states must emerge from the singularity and water specifically must also emerge from the
different arrangements of subatomic gloopings that themselves emerge. Indeterminacy assures us
that, while unlikely, some specific glooping of water could interact with its environment to
actualize some new potential because, at some point, diachronically a new emergence occurred
with the capacity for matter to exist and water to manifest as an arrangement of atoms.
Rickert’s second line on emergence provides insight into how he understands causality:
“The terms partiality and emergence refer to a twofold sense of ambience, namely, what
withdraws in that which comes to presence and what must be included—even as it withdraws—
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as part of that which occasions rhetorical practices.” 474 This line of argument appears simple at
first. For a metal cup to exhibit the capacity to be heated to a high degree, its capacity to hold
water “withdraws” because, were you to poor water into it, the water would evaporate. The
capacity to hold water does not cease to exist, at least until the cup is heated enough to melt and
change states from cup to melted metal. Rickert expands this line of reasoning to a discussion of
Jane Bennett’s work on the agency of electricity in power grids, taking care to note its Deleuzian
foundation. 475 He uses her work to add detail to emergence: “Electricity…when hooked into
complex systems, such as a power grid, it evinces unanticipated properties. Electricity
exemplifies the vibrancy of materiality.” 476 Emergence here does not clear up the ontologicalepistemological nor the synchronic-diachronic questions: are the properties merely
“unanticipated” by human observers or incapable of being anticipated as articulations of the
new? This question plagues theories of emergence. For us, we must refer to Barad and insist that
which ontic values a “vibrant materiality” manifests and what emergent newness rely upon
ontological indeterminacy as their generative engine.
The difference between Heideggerian inflected new materialism and Deleuzian inflected
new materialism remains another important line because of a vital difference in position
regarding how to deal with regress in the relationship between the potential and the actual or the
present and the withdrawn. Rickert curiously glosses over this difference: “…while Bennett
never says this directly, her discussion…overlaps Heidegger’s and Harman’s point about
withdrawal.” 477 I do not believe that this conflation necessarily articulates Bennett well because,
while she rarely mentions Heidegger and does not mention Harman in Vibrant Matter, she does
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mention the object oriented ontology adjacent “thing:” “the term’s disadvantage, however, is that
it also tends to overstate the thinginess or fixed stability of materiality, whereas my goal is to
theorize a materiality that is as much force as entity, as much energy as matter, as much intensity
as extension.” 478 Elsewhere, she demonstrates charity to the concept of withdrawal in Harman,
but insists: “I concur that some dimensions of bodies are withdrawn from presence, but see this
as partly due to the role they play in this or that relatively open system.” 479 A larger debate exists
between different stripes of object oriented ontologists and new materialists that we must leave
as a rabbit tunnel unfollowed. Suffice to say, withdrawal in the sense of an essence that
withdraws and withdrawal in the sense of capacities not actualized by some members of or the
open set of a given assemblage to a given observer at a given time are not the same concept.
The small part of this debate I want to address deals with the role of causal regress and
the Inclosure Paradox: where Bennett, Deleuze, and Delanda attempt to evade the metaphysical
trap by arguing for a fully present virtuality, object oriented ontologists reaction to regress ends
up stripping materiality because of what ultimately withdraws. I believe Rickert replicates the
transcendence problem we have experienced elsewhere in which there may well be a “dark
object” or, for him, “dark attribute,” that withdraws from all potential empirical manifestation or
experimental measurement, a local and entirely metaphysical absolute. Timothy Morton
describes this object: “We could go so far as to suggest the possibility of what Bryant calls a dark
object, an object that has no relations with any other entity whatsoever…To think them is to
think the purest possibility that they might exist. It’s the ultimate congruence of withdrawal and
tricksterish illusion.” 480 When we subject an object to notions of withdrawal in an infinite regress
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within a realist-idealist stance, we get strange things like the “dark object” that are similar to
Kant’s noumena: they exist because we can cognize about them, but we cannot have knowledge
of them. Objects, relations, ambient events, what have you, then become dialetheic, just as in
Graham Priest at the level of the Absolute, they are and are not themselves. We run into strange
considerations such as “what withdraws from that which withdraws” because why could not
withdrawal itself be an object if it can be thought and we are forced to posit a transcendental but
impossible object based upon logical and not empirical criteria. Unless what withdraws can be
measured, we have simply replicated the subject//object split in an ontological instead of
epistemological level. The question is to what degree emergence can truly be said to be a
“holistic transformation?” I do not believe that Heidegger nor object oriented ontologies
adequately answer this question: we must go to Deleuze by way of DeLanda in terms of scale,
causality, and whether emergence is a totalizing event.
The problems with withdrawal are not only ontological; they carry an ethical dimension
worth noting as I have argued the inextricability of ethics and ontology. I do not think Rickert
necessarily means to mire himself in the ethical quandary between new materialism and object
oriented ontology, but the stakes are worth laying out to avoid the pitfalls moving forward. Scott
Sundvall provides two ethical problems with object oriented ontology: the seemingly withdrawn
quality of ethics within object oriented ontologies and that the consequences thereof “are not
only quite real but also quite ‘dark’ in a different sense: they can easily (and logically) be read as
veiled apologies for — or at the very least be appropriated in the service of — abstract
imperialism/colonialism, subject-objectification, and a redoubled commodity fetishism…” 481
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Sundvall’s justification for these claims can be summarized as follows. First, the
fundamental dilemma between objects having autonomous lives but human speakers being
capable of speaking for them through anthropomorphizing strategies in highly iconoclastic
rhetorical style begs the question of just how autonomous these objects are. 482 Second, and more
damningly, flat ontology in which all things are objects and their essences withdraw suggests
terrible things in light of Western imperialism and its various continuations at home and abroad
today. Sundvall puts it forcefully: “Bryant wants to flatten ontology and reduce human subjects
to the status of objects…while failing to consider that humans already have been, and still too
often are, recognized as not-human objects.” 483 This argument follows our reasoning about the
dangers of reducing genuine qualitative differences to quantitative gradients, except that a fully
flat ontology has difficulty accounting for asymmetry in agential powers. If all are simply objects
and their true substances withdraw, how does one argue that racism produces negative
consequences for bodies without attention to the “process rather than product?” 484 Third,
commodity fetishism flourishes under object-oriented ontologies because objects’ autonomy
such that any attempt to determine a mode of production results in obfuscation. 485
Object oriented thought’s insistence upon substance and withdrawal result in a strangely
dark world in which the very necessary conditions they insist account for the capacity to change
result in a world of infinite enclosure towards metaphysically withdrawn entities. Characteristics
or capacities do not merely withdraw in the sense of not being present at a discrete moment, but
hidden substance withdraws beyond all potential manifestation and interaction, as though when
you poke an object as bubble ten new bubbles form. Regress is not necessarily a problem,
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projecting an Absolute to regress in the form of pure substance is because it introduces an
ontotheological fallacy in which purity derives from withdrawal. I, alongside Sundvall, fail to see
how such an ontology can help us deal with social or climate problems other than knock human
anthropocentrism down at first, only to sneak it in the back door.
Fortunately, ontologies exist that can deal with relationality in terms of structure, as in
Deleuze, or materiality in terms of process, as in Delanda. Scale, complexity, density, and
dynamic causality are linked by DeLanda in chiasmus: “…to give a complete explanation of a
social process taking place at a given scale, we need to elucidate not only micro-macro
mechanisms, those behind the emergence of the whole, but also the macro-micro mechanisms
through which a whole provides its component parts with constraints and resources, placing
limitations on what they can do while enabling novel performances.” 486
Has DeLanda ontologized the constraint/affordance model found in ideological critique?
No, these constraints and affordances are found not through logical analysis or reconstruction but
through empirical inquiry in which experiment and measurement diagrams a specific system
conceived of as historical individual. Categorical thought gives way to a cartographic method
bound to naturalistic inquiry. The causality of the micro-macro and macro-micro presents a
useful trope for thinking the diffractive reality difficult to access from spatializing thought and
expression in an intensive and immanent register, at least when we start with intensity. Specific
and individual emergent wholes exert top-down causality through organization via the macromicro relations of interiority and yet their emergence requires their component parts in the
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micro-macro relations of exteriority. 487 Chiasmus presents a useful trope to spatialize the logic of
diffraction.
Relationships of interiority and exteriority present the chicken and egg game we have
become used to within the intensive model comfortable with infinite regress because we
embrace, instead of attempt to supersede through metaphysical fiction, perspectivism. From a
relative jump in scale and the imposition of a perspectival projection, interior relations that are
relations of exteriority appear interior by virtue of making a relation. The emergent assemblage
formed when these parts enter relatively stable relationships of exteriority viewed relative to a
higher cardinality organization of which it is contingently part will also appear to be a
component of relations of interiority from the perspective of the larger assemblage. I do not
believe we need theoretically to rid ourselves of relations of interiority; we need to be aware of
the sliding perspective game of relations of interiority and exteriority and avoid reducing one to
the other through a logic of diffraction and not linear causality. If we take dynamic systems
theory with its informational component at full force, systems are both oriented in environment
and take, in a sense, perspectives on this environment in reaction to causal stimuli. Perspective
and orientation are not only things that humans engage in insomuch as the universe itself can be
conceptualized and experimented within as an open system.
Scale, complexity, and density must not be confused nor conflated. On scale, DeLanda
writes: “The expression ‘operating at a different scale’, on the other hand, must be used
carefully. In particular, it should refer only to relative scale, that is, to scale relative to the partto-whole relation.” 488 Scale itself is produced immanently 489 and should be evaluated in terms of
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relative or ordinal distance and not absolute or cardinal length when engaging in the prospective
illusion. Assemblages tend in two directions. On the one hand, sometimes new relations of
exteriority scale up in terms of their spatial arrangements thought as distance, “a city is clearly
larger than a human being…” 490 On the other hand, and against DeLanda, sometimes new
relations of exteriority are formed inside a larger assemblage itself in new relations of interiority
from the perspective of the larger scaled assemblage that presents an increase in density or micro
complexity. With regards to the city example, “…there is no reason to believe that [the city]
possesses a higher degree of complexity than, say, the human brain.” 491 Scale and density, then,
present two tendencies in the organization of assemblages that can be measured through
complexity as an external-internal and internal-external parameter: sometimes within top down
causality relationships of interiority become more complex through density, such as the
evolutionary progress of the human brain from brain stem towards full cerebrum.
Nonlinear causality does not impute a semi-linear causality from big to small and small to
big because continuous relationships are not determined by spatial contiguity. When parts are
assemblages in their own right and can have membership in multiple “larger” assemblages,
causal influence does not always move locally. Karen Barad provides several examples of this
potential when she outlines quantum phenomena whose consequences are discernible to the
naked sight of our phenomenological apparatus through relatively simple experimental
apparatuses, such as the diffraction evident in both the two slit experiment, the light gradients
you see near your windows, and the rise of quantum explanations of biological phenomena, such
as “photosynthesis, bird navigation, and olfactory function…” 492 Scale does not derive from

DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 17.
Ibid.
492
Barad, “Transmaterialities: Trans*/Matter/Realities and Queer Political Imaginings,” 410.
490
491

259
relationships of contiguity through a necessary chain, as in our Ant Chart from chapter one, but
is produced immanently through relativistic distance conceivable as more a topological
membrane than a topographical map. Both kinds of mapping have their potentials and blindspots
when it comes to methodology, but not in helping us to articulate ontology. 493
Assemblages accrete, not unlike layers of sedimentation and compression in geology,
upon one another. With regards to “relations of exteriority” DeLanda notes, “…we need to
conceive of emergent wholes in which the parts retain their autonomy, so that they can be
detached from one whole and plugged into another one…” 494 The relative autonomy of elements
does not indicate a logic of withdrawal, as in Rickert, but does emphasize his use of the term
“partiality.” Partiality obtains because parts are themselves wholes and are underdetermined
because of their membership in multiple assemblages at varying scales. To put it differently,
things do not withdraw from relation so much as they withdraw through relation.
Within the regress of intensities, the relatively open or closed boundaries of a system
interpret external stimuli in terms of their internal consistency and, sometimes, qualitatively or
quantitatively, different external stimuli lead to a qualitatively the same or quantitatively varying
systemic responses. DeLanda names this feature redundant causality: “Catalysis deeply violates
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linearity since it implies that different causes can lead to one and the same effect...” 495 and
“…there is a large causal redundancy at the micro-level, with many collision histories being
compatible with the same macro-level effect…” 496 Mechanistic causality requires a primary
cause that explains change, as we saw in Aristotle’s notion of efficient causality that can be said
to overdetermine other causal chains. We can even return to Aristotle’s example that leads him to
speculate upon the existence of chance in the first place: why does a man choose to eat spicy
food on a given day? What is the efficient cause of this choice? His upbringing? A smell?
Proximity to the spicy food truck equivalent of his day? A sinus infection he wants to bleed out
with the powerful spices? Multiple configurations of these efficient causes can enter
conjunctions that are non-necessary or not primary, but sufficient in distribution to provide a
probabilistic outcome that the man will eat the spicy food.
The primary cause, then, becomes the most statistically likely cause that exerts the most
quantitatively measurable power on the outcome or distribution of potential outcomes. The sea of
causes specific quality does not necessarily matter from the perspective of the actualization of a
specific system that wants the spicy food: qualitatively and quantitatively different causes can act
in assembly to produce the same result because of the play of boundaries. 497 This does not by
necessity mean that their efficacy is flat because of this; we could tease out which causes have
greater efficacy by measuring statistical distributions in a population through different
methodological apparatuses in a retrospective mode. However, it does mean that rhetorical
theorists interested in nonlinear dynamics should attend to the typical through methods suited to
the typical and the exceptional as singularity.
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These problems lead DeLanda to conclude that we need a probabilistic notion of
causality, but he follows this line solidly within the VIA model and we will have to do some
work to transduce it into the VIA one. DeLanda starts with an analogy to communications:
“In communication theory, the actual occurrence of an event is said to provide information in
proportion to the probabilities of the event’s occurrence…These events…may be arranged in a
series. When two…series of events are placed in communication…a change in probabilities in
one series affects the probability distribution of the other.” 498 The difference of differentials in
the plane of intensity exhibits this tendency as well, not just the virtual. The “distributions of the
singular and ordinary” applies directly to the empirical mapping of phase states without needing
the step through transcendental necessity into virtual causality: “fluctuations…constitute the
events among which correlations may be established. At equilibrium, the fluctuations are
basically equiprobable…as a system approaches a phase transition, these fluctuations being to
display correlations…” 499 DeLanda explicitly provides different kinds of thermodynamic
systems as examples; physicists did not map out thermodynamic singularities with recourse to a
pure metaphysical differentiator of difference, they did so through measurement and
mathematical generalization.
Regardless of my naturalist misgiving for abstract and conceptually representative
entities, both the VIA and VIA models use of the quasi-causal operator and
indeterminacy respectively provide a strong case for probabilistic warrants and modelling to
replace those based upon bivalent warrants and linear causality. Emergence cannot remain
theorized at the level of unintended effects or epistemological limit for rhetoricians. Rhetorical
scholars interested in nonlinear dynamics and emergence as phase state shifts should attend to
498
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both the singular moments in which individual choice exerts force and “the collective unintended
consequence of intentional action, that is, as a kind of statistical result.” 500 The potential for a
genuinely new thing or capacity to emerge in the diachronic sense may be truly unpredictable,
but typical statistical distributions and their exemplary points are predictable. Part of promoting
greater social efficacy for rhetorical studies deals not with eschewing control and prediction as
the tools of Enlightenment’s repression of meaning but embracing them as helping us to
calculate the most apt location for intervention and singular points to deal with in terms of
quality instead of underneath a conceptual totality, like ideology as such. Let me attempt to be
more direct: emergence conceived rigorously suggests that metaphysical projections such as
ideology as totality and rhetoricity as Absolute reproduce a metaphysical logic that renders
rhetorical agency as overdetermined when it should help us account for its very emergence.
Persuasion and Attunement
New materialist rhetorical theory transduces the ideology over constraints and
affordances found in Charland’s adaptation of Althusser’s interpellation into an ontological
register. Instead of ideology that operates in a coercive-persuasive process such that we are
always already subjects, new materialists provide us with similarly tautological constructions.
Rickert provides an interesting formulation of the regress: “Rhetoric…persuades us prior to
symbolicity.” 501 and “…rhetoric rests in the fact that persuasion is prior to rhetoric. Worldly
affect, modulated in persuasion, itself hollowed out the space for rhetoric’s emergence…” 502
Once rhetoric emerges in world, one wonders if its status can serve as one among many causes
for a new emergence, and so on into regress. Rickert calls this prior persuasion in which the
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ambient environment, composed of things like place, nonhuman agents, and so on, “an ambient
occurrence: an attunement.” 503 I am unsure why Rickert moves from the notion of coercion
central to ideological rhetoric into that of persuasion for things that appear to be anything but
persuasive because environmental stimuli on a system can reduce the degrees of freedom that a
system can express and should be considered coercive instead of persuasive. When a situation of
prior attunements leads to something like a bear attacking me, I am unsure that persuasion aptly
describes the tendency in communication that has occurred. In an ideological vein, subject
formation and subjectification like racism appear to have a greater balance towards conviction
and coercion respectively. To sort this problem, we need to define terms like capacity, affect, and
tendency and evaluate persuasion with regards to its cohort tendencies in human change,
conviction and coercion, before attempting to figure out how judgement can fit into attunement
or entanglement because jettisoning judgement ethically hamstrings rhetorical criticism.
When discussing the changes to persuasion, Rickert goes with “affect” and other theorists
follow suit with terms like capacities, affects, and tendencies. 504 These terms have nuanced
histories that I cannot fully address here and do not always operate through persuasive processes.
We have to ask which systems top-down causal efficacy and complexity are sufficient for
cascades of “zones of indetermination” such that something approximating choice or the
expansion of degrees of freedom, and therefore persuasion, can obtain. Persuasion may well
prove to be the most illusory tendency in suasion broadly conceived because materialist
indeterminacy alongside underdetermination may prove an insufficient ontological grounding for
genuine choice. We know that, per the Bohr model, an electron’s characteristics do not exist
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before interaction, but the degree to which degrees of freedom present this characteristic is
admittedly suspect, as is whether a random event presents an ontological gap for free will. A full
treatment of this problem exceeds the capacities of this project but does indicate my commitment
to at least one potential metaphysical fiction in relative free will. Autonomous free will is
impossible, but we act as though we have limited free will against constraints and the entire
edifice of rhetorical scholarship must cede to information science if we find that we do not. A
potential I leave completely open and will adjust my theory accordingly if it obtains.
We will take the DeLanda route while attending to the differences between our two
Deleuzian models: “Deleuze, in fact, always gives a two-fold definition of the virtual (and the
intensive), using both singularities (unactualized tendencies) and what he calls affects
(unactualized capacities to affect and to be affected).” 505 It should be noted that these distinctions
iterate back to somewhere we have already been; DeLanda draws isomorphic equivalency
between capacities/affects and events/attributes. 506 The complete series of the above terms
requires the addition of extensive properties and qualities, but this complicates the modelling
function of these concepts because, for us, extensive properties’ phantasmatic existence makes
them not suitable for a naturalistic model.
The VIA model articulates these terms in a complex fashion. (1) Virtual capacities
are the potentials for a becoming-structure to be or not to be affected based upon unactualized
potentials, series of singularities that do not enter into communication, and topological invariants
or mathematical singularities that do not change under transformation. 507 (2) Virtual affects form
a circular pairing with virtual capacities as “virtual affects are sharply divided into a pure
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capacity to be affected and a pure capacity to affect” 508 and depend for expression upon the
quasi-causal operator as a pure differentiator of difference with regards to the event. (3) Intensive
“capacities are relational” and DeLanda likes to use examples from biology in which what
affects an organism or species can potentially express in a given duration depend upon the
environmental assemblages in which it is enmeshed. 509 (4) DeLanda appears to leave intensive
affects behind, but the biological examples imply that discrete intensities with specific
relationship with its environment in a given time scale indicates both the system state chosen in
small time and the tendencies developed over large time, in a reciprocal fashion. (5) The
definition in the preceding paragraph carefully notes that singularities as “unactualized
tendencies” reside at the level of the capacity. The relationship between the quasi-causal operator
in its guises as counter-actualization and pre-actualization provide the VIA model with the
kind of causal tautology required to produce the potential infinite or universe as open system that
DeLanda rquires. These tendencies, shaped by iteration and relational inter and intra-action over
time, sublimate back into the virtual when they reach a sufficient threshold of deterritorialization or boundary complication. The quasi-causal operator has increased potential to
function when communication channels between series of virtual singularities near maximal or
minimal states of system dis-equilibrium and enacts pre-actualization in which different
unactualized virtual capacities become actualized in the intensive register. (6) The pre-individual
processes at the level of the virtual and the intensive figured as the plane of the differentials of
differences yield “actual individuals [that] differ from each other not only in their extensity
(spatial structure and scale) but also in their qualities… such as color or texture.” 510 In
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conclusion, the causal progress from VIA, with some amount of crass reductionism, results
in CapacitiesAffectsQualities and extensive properties. Certainly, nonlinear dynamics does
not impute a kind of pure linear causality, but this model only features some level of reciprocal
influence in its spatialization between virtual and intensive registers. Individual’s actualizations
become ephemeral, even if the event as pure accident replaces transcendental essences.
It remains unclear to me how qualities that manifest in “actual individuals” do not
themselves, given the “qualitative probabilism” of Bergsonism, possess the capacity to counteractualize into the virtual as qualities themselves can be viewed as assemblages in terms of
relationships of exteriority or as intensities in their own right. Transducing the above into the
more synchronically focused VIA model presents an alternative to the nonlinear
determination outlined above because all things become intensities operating at different
temporal rhythms that accrete upon one another and pure virtuality and actuality are stripped of
their metaphysical status by becoming the conceptual poles of our modelling apparatus.
Virtuality becomes a tendency of intensity towards more rapid speeds of becoming through
deterritorialization and relations of exteriority in which intensities’ spatiotemporal structures
destabilize such that novelty can obtain. Actuality becomes a tendency of intensity towards less
rapid speeds of becoming through territorialization, irrational non-interaction, and relations of
interiority such that relative stability or maintenance of system boundaries obtains. There are no
set theoretic problems of the Absolute here. There is no virtual as the “space of all spaces” nor
the transduction of indeterminacy into the quasi-cause as a paradoxical fantasy of a pure
differentiator of difference. The environment as an open totality populated by accretions of
intensities both in the cosmological progress of diachronic emergence and the synchronic
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tendencies mappable in terms of phase shifts replaces any kind of Absolute domain with an
endless potential infinity.
Rhetoricians working in this model want to focus on speech as intensity by embracing
infinite regress and experimental-definitional apparatuses to temporarily bound this regress in
consciously illusory and provisional ways instead of casting rhetoric as always anterior capacity
or coercive restraint. However, a focus on persuasion becomes extremely complicated when we
attempt to draw resources from Deleuzian thought because the condensation through
communication of virtual singularities into differentials of differences in intensities and their
own self-cancelling process through which both intensive qualities and extensive properties
obtain does not afford much room for choice, only for chance. Should we want to use the
diachronic acuity of this model, and I am not sure we should, we must back up to better pose the
question of what different qualitative tendencies in human change present a sufficient chain of
logic by mapping the differences in coercion, persuasion, and conviction.
McGee articulates coercion with force: “Nothing in the environment bespeaks our free
agency; indeed, we most often mark out our own free will…by listing the ways in which we may
in fact constrict the free-will of others…Rhetoric, I mean to say…is a species of coercion…it
seems important in any material theory of rhetoric to describe the phenomenon as a coercive
agency.” 511 McGee suggests that the ambivalence between constraint and affordance in the
always already mode within both rhetoric as subjectivity and rhetoric as attunement presents
great difficulty for theorizing a positive mode of agential capacity. Individuals and
individuations are both coerced by the typical line of social punishment for boundary
transgression and by the expressed affects of the other intensive systems in their environment.
Michael Calvin McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric” in Rhetoric, Materiality, and Politics, 32-33.
Italics Removed.
511
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Coercion, conviction, and persuasion may never be strictly separable, but, contra McGee,
differences in the quality and quantity of coercion do matter for ethical considerations and for
how they inflect the analysis and phenomenological experience of the other terms.
Rhetorical theorists rarely mention conviction and I have only one example from
Charland: “The process by which an audience member enters into a new subject position is
therefore not one of persuasion. It is akin more to one of conversion that ultimately results in an
act of recognition of the ‘rightness’ of a discourse and of one’s identity with its reconfigured
social position.” 512 Charland uses the word conversion, but conviction works just as well.
Conviction indicates suasion through rationality or event; those moments in human change that
appear singular because they demand an all or nothing response but are normally built up
through a long series of ordinary points.
It may seem strange to put rationality and religious calling within the same tendency in
human change. Yet, their quality has much in common because they require an all or nothing
response in reaction to an unalienable, at the level of phenomenological experience, discourse.
Fisher conceives of the different elements of a narrative in terms of “narrative probability, what
constitutes a coherent story…[and] narrative fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring
true with the stories they know to be true in their lives…” 513 These conditions present the series
of ordinairy points from which Charland’s singular “conversion” emerges. This process can be
analogized to mathematics in which students learn from trial and error by doing problems and
having their work checked in terms of process and solution and through working through and
reproducing various proofs of different mathematical constructs. The similarity hinges upon the
force as the narrative of learning or narrative of identification turns the corner when the subject
512
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becomes a new subject, one with a new identification or a new understanding of the necessary
conditions of a mathematical problem. We might say that this irreversibly changes the
distribution of singular and ordinary as in a phase shift.
With narrative, each point of resonance functions like a singularity-event in a series
tending towards an emergent threshold in which some new assemblage membership exserts topdown authority overall on the whole system. One may make up a sub narrative as to how they
will act or how they fit into the larger narrative, but the links between story and identification
follow a pseudo-logical bent. The entailments either convince or they don’t relative to a chain of
necessary entailments. With mathematics, there are a variety of proofs and ways of expressing
different constructs and producing an adequate solution to different problem, but within a given
field of application the solutions follow from conviction. A teacher may persuade a student
which proof to start with or coerce them with grade-based consequences, mathematicians may
argue about which proof is preferrable or if a concept like the infinitesimal truly exists, 514 but
math systems within themselves convict practitioners of their relationships of interiority while
being open to systemic elaboration through mathematical methodologies. When entailments in
analogic processes become necessary, the subject can either turn the corner and be redefined by
them or say no.
Where do we locate persuasion? To find it, we must look at how an over-emphasis on
coercion and a complete erasure of conviction overdetermine persuasion in both the constitutive
and new materialist rhetorical theory corpuses with regards to ethical criticism. In constitutive
G. Mitchell Reyes takes the strong argument that because mathematics involves contingency in its disciplinary
history, it involves persuasion, and is therefore rhetoric in “The Rhetoric in Mathematics: Newton, Leibniz, the
Calculus, and the Rhetorical Force of the Infinitesimal” and “Algorithms and Rhetorical Inquiry: The Case of the
2008 Financial Collapse.” I do not find this take adequate to explain the development of mathematics, its predictive
adequacy in some hard sciences, nor the axiomizable quality of many branches of mathematics under set theory.
Mathematics as a discipline features rhetorical qualities because people argue; math systems in local terms follow
deductively and not rhetorically.
514
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rhetoric, ideology figured as anterior structure has a habit of overdetermining opportunities for
human agency, especially if the critic is not looking for emergent factors. With regards to new
materialist rhetoric, attunement takes on a similar role and it appears extremely unclear what we
can do about our attunements other than accept them or reject them. Rickert presents this
ambivalence and difficulty clearly: “On this view, a system of ethics is not applied to life. Our
ethics are not something exterior we bring in and deploy but rather a set of comportments that
emerge from life as it is lived…” 515 So, we are already attuned to an ethical system that derives
from both worldly ontology and the subjectivities that structure our identities. How do we
change or find which consequence of our actions to favor over another? To use Rickert’s
language, how do we re-attune?
I find Rickert’s answer unsatisfactory: “…it is important to balance an attendance to what
is present with an attendance to what withdraws and to what the future brings so that we are open
to whatever further disclosive possibilities may become manifest…attuned simultaneously to
what matters to us now while mindful that we cannot take reality for the simple presence of
beings as they seem.” 516 We are caught in an ethical infinite regress: we are always already
attuned within some system of ethics so how can we be sure that any new system of ethics we
become enmeshed with or create does not simply replicate the problems of the old system of
ethics to which we are already attuned? How are the concepts of disclosure and withdrawal here
not simply a callback at the ontological level to the same kind of unmasking criticism in a neverending negative critique in which criticism attempts to disclose that which withdraws? The
regress here does not bother me so much as the lack of criteria for ethical judgement of one
attunement against another.
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I am hardly the only one to make this point about Ambient Rhetoric. Ekaterina Haskins
argues that “…Rickert’s brief case studies in preceding and subsequent chapters only gesture in
the direction of such a list, neither offering a coherent framework for critical interpretation of
ambient rhetoric nor suggesting how one might approach ambience pedagogically.” 517 I believe
Haskins shares my own animus towards new materialist rhetoric: without a methodological shift
in our critical orientation, all of this focus on ontology and non-human actants will do nothing
but move unmasking criticism and negative critique into a new register. Doug Sweet’s review
presents a dire problem: “But the examples we see are limited, ‘new age.’ Where is work? Where
are slums, echoing gunshots, structural violence, limited horizons...Where is the political? The
ideological? They are absent.” 518 What ethical precepts do ambience and attunement really give
us? Is not the KKK member sitting in their den with their confederate flag on the wall attuned to
their system of ethics as much as we academics are attuned to our various ones?
Perhaps nowhere does this problem come out clearer than when Rickert attempts to apply
his system to the problem of Post-Truth. He finds more at fault with a naturalistic
correspondence theory of truth because it “was never as secure as it was claimed and always
relied on authority” than truth as “an emergent norm in human dwelling.” 519 This erasure of
ethical judgement follows an extremely peculiar vignette in which he almost justifies New
Gingrich’s sophistic mode because of a relativity framework for truth before backing down to
argue: “From this perspective, Gingrich might be applauded for reaching out but finely
condemned for not bringing public perception into line with the FBI’s crime statistics. Crime
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must be down, and policy must so follow.” 520 So we must pay attention to non-human actants
like technology, fine, but how can normative claims based upon naturalistic authority, on the one
hand, be a problem because they deny the emergent attunement of truth and, on the other hand,
be necessary for determining that Gingrich’s appeal was a bad one? Persuasion must be given a
footing entangled with but qualitatively different in tendency from coercion and conviction
whether we want to stay in a constitutive realm focused on social ontology or a new materialist
one with a broad definition of rhetorical.
Deleuze provides two ways out of this problem with ethical judgement and Barad
provides an important third. First, we have spent an exhaustive amount of time talking about
indeterminacy, its relationship to Bergson’s “zones of indetermination,” and the way in which
Deleuze mobilizes dialetheic paradoxes in The Logic of Sense. Attunement to worldly ethics and
subjectivity may be coercive constraints and be enmeshed with conviction for emergence, but
their actualization exceeds that capacity of reified totalities to explain when we do not start with
those totalities. Taking a prospective bent that starts in the middle and maps attentively
controversy, ambiguity, and patterns of excess and lack with regards to systems made of
rhetorical and nonrhetorical stuff’s fuzzy spatiotemporal borders presents one way out. We are
always under and overdetermined depending upon the perspectival projections we draw with our
models and the methodologies through which we make a relatively closed system within
becoming.
Second, while the details of incomposability and composability are obscure at best and
the implications of modal ontologies exceeds what I can do here, Deleuze provides a useful way
to think through Rickert’s dichotomy between disclosure and withdrawal with an eye to the
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difference between persuasion as positive creation and coercion as identification through
negation in The Fold. The resonances to Bergsonism’s anthropocentric stance are clear:
Morality consists in this for each individual: to attempt each time to extend its region of
clear expression, to try to augment its amplitude, so as to produce a free act that expresses
the most possible in one given condition or another…Extending its clear region,
prolonging God’s passage to the maximum, actualizing all the singularities that are
concentrated on, and even won over to, new singularities would amount to a soul’s
progress. In this way we might say that it imitates God. 521
Ethics becomes inextricably linked to intensive capacities and their relationship to other
intensities in a given environment, in line with new materialist rhetorical theory. But we are
provided with a way make judgements because intensities have both the capacity to affect and
the capacity to be affected. In a sense, all things are obverses of one another and should not be
placed into the passive/active dichotomy. As Stormer and McGreavy note, “…vulnerability has
to be seen not merely as frailty but as a potential strength if capacities are to be understood as
adaptive.” 522 Expanding the diversity and richness of the individuations of becoming takes on the
status of an ethical imperative: systems that diminish individuation potential through coercion
beyond the necessary maintenance of relative stability are regarded as bad and systems that
encourage the same through persuasion or the increase of capacity through vulnerability tend to
be good.
Yet, specificity and intensive diversity do not provide us with a full enough criterion for
judgement nor a mode of criticism to work within process ontology. Could not a bad faith actor
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claim that fascism is a necessary good because it contributes the most to systemic stability
precisely by destroying diverse potentiality? Absolutely, and extremely dark readings of Deleuze
can be found in the blog cracks of the Internet. 523 I do not think Barad would necessarily agree
with me, but her naturalism adds an ontologically entangled consequentialist 524 ethics:
“Particular possibilities for (intra-)acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities
entail an ethical obligation to intra-act responsibly in the world’s becoming...intra-actions do not
merely effect…an ethics of knowing…objectivity means being accountable for marks on bodies,
that is, specific materializations in their differential mattering.” 525
The way out of the infinite ethical regress at the level of epistemology involves following
a consequentialist tack in which ethics is as much a doing as a thinking and the kind of thinking
that attempts to define ethics in itself is also a doing. If all things can be said to be intensities that
function like experimental apparatuses, then there never was any distance between reflection, so
called attunement, and action; they are all different apparatuses that intra-act within becoming in
different ways and casting attunement as always already prior to reflection betrays a maintenance
of the subject object dichotomy more than its overcoming.
We can combat a thing like fascism in terms of saying that its radical withdrawal and
severing of relationality and diversity for the purpose of systemic stability is wrong; we can even
say it in terms of consequences or that the thing it says it does it does not do in the logic of a
critical unmasking gesture, but are these things enough? Would not the fascist or authoritarian or
racist simply say “no you are wrong, and these are precisely the material marks on bodies that
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should be created?” Yes. They could and they do, as anyone who has read obscure branches of
fascist rhetoric like eco-fascism has found out clearly.
But what should we expect from a social philosophy, or any social philosophy, that can
take recourse in an always anterior Absolute such that any sign or material thing simply presents
more evidence for the hidden quality of reality? In the end, it will come down to authority and,
somewhat following Rickert, sophism in the sense of disclosing the reasons why a person should
grant authority to a politics founded on falsifiability and naturalism. It is precisely because of this
need for authority that we must re-evaluate the methodologies typical to rhetorical criticism that,
for both New Materialist and constitutive rhetoric strains, overemphasize negative critique in the
close reading-retrospective mode at the expense of better analytic models and methodologies that
work to positively create. Put differently, in addition to the discursive quagmire of unmasking
the secret truths of who is right and who is wrong, we must produce realities that people will be
persuaded are right by increasing the intensive capacities and webs of belonging of as many
things, broadly conceived, as we can.
Methodologies and Mapping the Curve
In a sense, the preceding sections have merely reiterated the very illusions they mapped
out: indeterminacy itself may present a retrospective illusion should it prove insufficient to
account for choice and emergence through logical or empirical inadequacy, the domains I have
cast over other scholars’ regresses, and the degree to which the diachronic/synchronic split itself
is a poorly posed question by sacrificing metaphysical intuition to linguistic spatialization.
However, whether we embrace tautology as productive regress with logically necessary
absolutes in the VIA model and then counter-actualize it in the mode of AIV or attempt
to do cartography in the VIA model, rhetorical theorists and critics need to expand their
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methodological repertoire to accommodate the interesting potentials of ontological models. Of
course, many already do. Rhetoricians are not strangers to the calls for methodological pluralism
that arise every decade or so, neither do all contemporary rhetoricians work within a close
reading paradigm. I have attempted to pose the question without analyzing current efforts’
efficacy, in part, because I believe both my criteria for success and ontological precepts would
benefit by joining these rhetoricians before I judge their work. After all, thinking is a doing and a
doing is a thinking. The central goal here is speculative methodology: what modes of
methodology can we speculate on as likely candidates at the different ontological lines expressed
above to produce social change? The overriding goal here remains to propose alternatives to
negative critique while situating unmasking criticism as one method within a greater whole.
In truth, it is possible that I have been too hard on those who map out oppression in the
diachronic sense through the constitutive rhetoric model of IdeologyRhetoricAction; this
kind of work brings attention to the different ways in which rhetoric enacts oppression at a given
scale of speech and material substrates. However, I do believe that synchronic analyses in the
IdeologyRhetoricAction model opens a larger space for intervention because ideology can
be viewed as an effect that derives from local analyses of rhetoric as speech with an attention to
an individuated set of speech’s capacities, affects, and tendencies. Ideology becomes like
virtuality, a pure formal pole that never obtains, and action, an actuality never fully separable
from the intensive rhetorics that constrain it. Neither model is metaphysically invalid, they both
possess strengths and weaknesses that rely upon the illusory perspective games inherent in
becoming.
My overall problem with ideological work in either a synchronic or diachronic mode
derives more from the tendency towards using methods well suited to statistical outliers on
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speech sets that are typical of a given mode of oppression. Expanding the objects that count as
speech through new materialism may be capable of giving these analyses a firmer grasp of how
many things contribute to ideology as effect, but without a shift in methodology I do not think
they do anything more than replicate the problem with hidden causes at an ontological level. Put
differently, in the retrospective mode without an adequate conceptualization of the virtual as a
heterogenous anterior force and of counteractualization, we run the risk of reducing the nonlinear causal forces within a given rhetoric’s history to a quantitative gradient. Rhetoric becomes
something like norms that give body to ideology and ideology becomes a spectral causal force
conceived of in terms of quantity, more or less ideological and or oppressive, instead of a
discrete ideology ramifying out through motive, affect, material practices, and speech in a
qualitative and emergent sense. Rhetorical historians and political economists have, perhaps,
known this problem all along. Should we want to work in the VIA model we need to ask
about the transcendental empiricist conditions for the genesis of a discrete anterior structure
more so than treating it as a given and finding precisely what we expected to find from the theory
in the text.
The models suggest two continua with four qualitative tendencies in a prospective mode:
the singular/ordinary (or outlier/typical) and the diachronic/synchronic continuums. We can
conceive of the expressions of a discrete and individuated ideology or rhetoric by ramifying out
the connections between these terms and considering what kind of method fits each connection at
the level of textual analysis.
The singular-diachronic pairing requires a material culture and historiographical posture
to document the different events in a series of singularities that accounts for the genesis of an
individuated rhetoric or ideology. I think rhetorical historians and those who do Nietzschean or
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Foucauldian genealogical analysis will say they have been doing this thing for some time, but I
am not convinced on the face of the argument and, unfortunately, do not have time to survey a
wide swath of that literature here. My intuition tells me that reified concepts like power or
ideology that are not broken up into individuated and historically contingent and discrete powers
gets in the way of this mode taking on a prospective bent. Supplementing the existing framework
with notions of emergence, non-linear dynamics, evental singularities, topological invariants, and
qualitative probabilism presents a daunting task, but one that I believe would make this mode
more robust.
The singular-synchronic pairing requires more direct modes of intervention than are
typically afforded by textual analysis, but I do not think close reading, discourse analysis, or
content analysis approaches are entirely unwarranted. A singular synchronic text takes a
statistical outlier that does not fit the larger cartographies and content analyses of typical texts in
a discrete individuated set of speech and attempts to explain why it does not fit the typical
distribution and what, if anything, it tells us about the distribution itself. The justification for this
kind of analysis comes back into the significance arguments of the content analysis of rhetorical
criticism executed in the first section of this chapter: rhetorical critics want to find texts that are
significant because they work against oppression in some way but tend to just find more
oppression.
This occurs for three reasons. First, systemic oppression is real, and ideology attempts to
totalize itself across its various ramifications into different specific systems. However, when we
focus on constraints and coercion over moments of contingency that derive from ideological
underdetermination, we may miss novel developments. Second, not every text presents
something ideologically exemplary and texts that are not surprising may only yield surprising
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results when taken on at a macro level through the typical-synchronic pairing. Third, textual
close reading and text-based modes of social scientific research may simply not get there because
they are inherently reconstructive. Modes of more direct intervention in novel social movements
as they unfold could present new opportunities for research by being research in themselves. I
have specifically ethnography, natural experiments, activist-ethnography, and interview work in
mind here. It is one thing to map out contingency at the level of the produced text; it is another
thing to attempt to actualize potentialities through a kind of natural science in trial and error.
The typical-diachronic pair does not strive to account for genesis in a qualitative fashion
but expands the purview of the typical bent of ideological criticism through methods more
amenable to large data sets, such as content analysis or even natural language analysis facilitated
through big data. A focus on smaller sets of individuated texts can obscure larger patterns that
only come out when larger questions are asked and methodological apparatuses amenable to
drawing out patterns those human readers struggle to find are employed. We might even join the
social sciences in producing meta-studies of our own close reading studies. This mode concerns
itself less with the genetic account of the events sufficient to produce a discrete individuation and
more with the vast web of virtual constraints and necessary conditions of larger social
phenomena. This mode is explicitly one that falls within the retrospective illusion, but one that
will hopefully produce surprising connections between the texts it crunches.
The typical-synchronic pair primarily functions to provide the probabilistic clarity for the
singular-synchronic pairing to function by creating vast cartographies of the interconnections
between seemingly discrete sets of content through the same methodological apparatuses
employed by the typical-diachronic pairing. What elements of these cartographies indicate a
given rhetorical features’ topological invariance are useful to know so scholars can zero in on
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these invariances and connections between seemingly separate rhetorical assemblages through
more qualitatively driven methodologies.
In a sense, the entire diachronic/synchronic distinction, and the ordinary/singular one,
only function in a tentative sense because the distinction itself is a poorly posed question and a
retrospective illusion because the implementation of apparatuses produces a kind of
perspectivism. DeLanda articulates the first problem well with regards to space and time: “In
particular, for the sake of ease of presentation I have artificially separated issues related to time
and space, but in reality we are always confronted with complex spatio-temporal phenomena.” 526
The diachronic/synchronic pairing replicates this problem. If Barad is correct and space-time are
emergent features of a cosmic mattering, then the synchronic diachronic question is poorly posed
and should be diffracted through novel methodologies, likely those deriving from information
theory and dynamic systems theory.
I have not yet dived into these literatures to find how they do these things, so my solution
to this problem is only provisional. On the one hand, diachrony and synchrony should be viewed
only as temporal tendencies that speech sets can be said to enact for the purpose of stalling out
infinite regress with a definitional boundary. We know, exhaustively, that these definitional
boundaries are illusions that can only be partially clarified through probabilistic logic and
cartographic tools that work well with fuzzy boundaries. Focus groups and interviews in which
individuals engaged in the phenomena are forced to forestall regress through choice provide
some leverage, but this distinction is far from complete. On the other hand, the singular/ordinary
distinction also presents a retrospective illusion because of the inevitable role of perspective in
focalizing the phenomenon that interests us. The best way we have to get around this problem
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involves novel methodologies that are more suitable for mapping a broad swath of empirical
phenomena without attempting to push the structural homologies at the level of the differentials
of differences out towards an Absolute. We must remember that what appears singular from one
focalization of the critical apparatus will appear ordinary from another. The solution here
involves maximizing the number of focalizations and methodological apparatuses: rhetoric must
make the move science made long ago in which scholars work together to produce more
comprehensive mappings through multi-methodological pursuits. We must also exceed most
disciplines int terms of interdisciplinary conceptualization.
Analysis may always carry the specter of the retrospective illusion within it, but there is a
fifth way that does not fall on the fourfold schematic developed above: rhetoric as an apparatus
of creation. I do not here mean the kind of notion that criticism itself is a rhetorical text as much
as its object nor, exactly, James Darsey’s notion that criticism itself can be an aesthetic genesis. I
mean something closer to what Charland pondered against the infinite regress of subjectivity he
produced in the same article: “A transformed ideology would require a transformed
subject…This can proceed at two levels: (1) it can proceed at the level of the constitutive
narrative itself… (2) it can also proceed at the aesthetic level… [through] a range of aesthetic
practices…that elicit new modes of experience and being.” 527 Charland argues for something
peculiar here that I think performance studies scholars have known for a long time: the study of
rhetoric does not by necessity have to be analysis in a retrospective mode; the study of rhetoric
can be a doing through a creative apparatus such that we create new rhetorics through a variety
of mediums. I believe it is this potential direction that most interests me and I intend to start
producing work within by creating texts for consumption and then rigorously evaluating their
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success or failure through interview, ethnographic, and auto-ethnographic methodologies.
Creation by becoming part of the universe’s infinite progress has an appeal for breaking out of
the infinite regress of analysis.
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Conclusion
Ontology, epistemology, ethics, and methodology are permeable categories in which a
variety of positions have potential entailment between them whether these links are made
determinate or left to implication. This inextricable dependence requires both theorists and critics
to work in a speculative mode by mapping out the positions and potentials of their system
explicitly. However, a speculative mode can easily fall prey to the problems of vagueness and
the Absolute inherent in definition through language or, as Priest compellingly argues,
mathematical modelling. I argue that this problem in ontological inquiry necessitates attention to
the link between methodology and ontology. Constructing an ontology involves methodology
both in empirical inquiry and in definition; employing or constructing a methodology involves
ontology in an individual’s approach to world itself prior to the application or generation of a
methodology or study. Theorists, critics, and philosophers must take seriously the
methodological and ontological elements of their work to work against positing metaphysical
Absolutes that make the phenomenal world depend upon some metaphysical category whose
truth relies upon purely logical criteria beyond empirical measurement.
Graham Priest provides a perspective from formal logic that helps us to delimit problems
of vagueness and precision and the Absolute and ultimate domains through his concepts, “The
Inclosure Paradox” and “The Domain Principle.” “The Inclosure Paradox” formalizes what
happens in philosophical inquiry when border cases emerge that suffer from Soritic Paradoxes
that arise when we attempt to make the boundaries of a material thing through experimentation,
to bring in Karen Barad, or a conceptual thing through definition precise. As Barad helps us
grasp, definition and experimentation share in the difficulties of measurement. Experimentation
requires a replicable system that attempts to close off part of the open system of the universe but
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will never fully do so because of the impossibility of perfect precision, the entanglement of the
measuring apparatus with the phenomena in question, and the contingent unfolding of universal
becoming with its indeterminacy or “zones of indetermination” to use Bergson’s term. Definition
functions as semantic experimentation: a set of definitions or categories arise, borderline cases
complicate the boundaries, and the definitions or categories must be re-worked in an infinite
regress until the definer casts a domain over the regress that attempts to resolve contradiction
through an Absolute. Priest’s “Domain Principle” helps us understand that these totalities
themselves can end up as the first term in a new series of definitions because they will run into
paradoxes of the Absolute in which they must argue they both are and are not themselves. While
Priest has no problem with dialetheic Absolutes, as naturalists, we do because Absolutes must be
inferred through logic as a transcendental element beyond empirical measurement that exists
through logical truth criteria.
Jankèlèvich’s reading of Bergson links to the “Domain Principle” by providing a higher
order argumentative structures named “The Idols of Distance” and “The Retrospective Illusion.”
For my position, “The Idols of Distance” signify categorical fictions that emerge necessarily
through the process of “The Domain Principle” because of the LNC and LEM’s use in producing
logical entailment in definitional systems. In a sense, both language and math produce fantasies
that have no empirical basis, such as the temporal instant, nothingness or zero, or perfect
numerical precision. These “Idols of Distance” underly the transcendental chain of reasoning
towards an Absolute as primary cause, such as Aristotle’s Demiurge or Leibniz’s God, such that
an always anterior totality produced by reasoning about the empirical somehow retrospectively
accounts for the empirical itself. More local totalities, such as ideology, can function in this
retrospective mode as well. In short, “The Retrospective Illusion” follows the logic of a
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retrospective illusion in which some categorical human conceptualization becomes projected
backwards as the primary and anterior cause through a chain of necessary transcendental
reasoning underwritten by a progression of inferences warranted by the LNC and or the LEM. To
link to the Deleuzian terminology later in this project, “The Retrospective Illusion” moves from
AB.
Deleuze, Deleuze’s Bergson, and Bergson attempt to provide an alternative philosophical
method that traces out the sufficient ramifications of qualities in messy aggregates towards
conceptual purity in a register of temporal becoming instead of spatial being. I call the first three
steps of the four step method Deleuze produces in Bergsonism the Prospective Illusion for its
orientation towards the never complete potential of pure Being obtaining from becoming, as
opposed to many retrospective illusions that account for becoming as stemming from pure Being.
To put it in Deleuze’s terminology, the Prospective Illusion moves from BA. Deleuze distills
Bergson’s method as follows: (1) Intuitively create problems with limited reliance upon
philosophical doxa through a naïve perspective that does not take old solutions as determinative;
(2) Phrase philosophical problematics by avoiding poorly posed questions that inject “Idols of
Distance” as anterior and spectral causes, then divide messy aggregates in experience by pushing
their qualities towards pure conceptual tendencies through logical chains of sufficiency
comported towards future actuality; (3) State solutions in terms of time instead of space. This
methodology functions well with a naturalistic comportment towards ontology and methodology:
the pure tendencies’ necessity derives from their place as illusory local absolutes that help us
theorize the quality of a thing instead of causing it. The cosmos as becoming becomes an open
and non-totalizable thing and inquiry within it relies upon a combination of logical theorizing
and getting messy in the system through empirical methodologies.
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A problem arises with the fourth moment of Deleuze’s Bergson method when the pure
tendency that has been reached through the first three steps is retroactively posited as the virtual
cause of becoming. This sudden snap back into retrospectivity derives from two sources: (1) It
relies upon a tacit acceptance of a Platonic formal ontology even as it replaces essence with
temporal structure figured as duration; (2) Bergson’s encounter with Einstein’s relativity undoes
his transcendental empiricism when he projects an immanent and Absolute notion of the virtual
to deal with the logical contradictions of relativity that derive from the universal impossibility of
simultaneity. Simultaneity beyond overlapping duration becomes an Absolute sublimated into
anterior differential structure. The logical warrants underlying the projection of an immanent but
necessary virtual Absolute derive from the very LNC and LEM that earlier Bergson, especially
the Bergson of Matter and Memory, appears to sidestep and upon the insistence that the
Time//Space dualism presents a messy aggregate. The way out of the fourth step of the method
requires turning Bergson against Bergson: Time//Space is not a messy aggregate, but a poorly
posed question.
Deleuze and DeLanda’s Deleuze provide a way out of this problem, but an incomplete
one because one their solutions moves the retrospective illusion away from Time as Absolute to
the Virtual as Absolute. Parsing through this problem allows us to tranduce virtuality as other
conceptual totalities, such as rhetoricity in rhetorical theory or ideology in critical theory, to
attempt to break out of the Absolute by embracing regress. There are at least two Deleuzes that
can be mapped out through two different constructions of Deleuzian ontology. (1) The VIA
model in which the traces of intensity can be logically inferred in actual being and the traces of
virtuality as structure or the differentials of differences can be logically inferred by analyzing
intensity. This model problematically maintains hidden causes by reversing the Platonic
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hierarchy from pure essence and messy accident to pure accident and messy intensity. (2) The
VIA model in which accretions of differently viscous intensities, overlapping durations with
no final term to use Bergson’s language, can be modelled by their tendency through
detteritorialization towards virtuality and territorialization towards actuality.
Both models have their uses for rhetorical theory and theorizing ontology but mapping
out the limitations of the first makes the benefits of the second more apparent. DeLanda’s
reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology lays the problem with the VIA model out clearly in its
argumentative structure and construction of and subsequent erasure of extensity. The
argumentative structures DeLanda deploys ultimately rely upon the LNC and LEM as logical
criteria in transcendental reasoning beyond his apparently empiricist orientation. The general
argumentative structure combines systems theory with transcendental reasoning by arguing that
similar distributions of differences in different physical-scientific phenomena suggests an
underlying, if nonlinear, set of all sets virtual that serves as the common cause of intensive flows
and more viscous actualizations. Put differently, the elaboration of virtual series that structures
intensity and intensity’s own solidification into actuality depends upon the logical necessity of
the similar implying a common cause and the condition not being capable of resembling the
conditioned. It is through this logic that the LNC steps in: despite divergent virtuality violating
the LEM, it is ontologically separable from that which it conditions through the LNC. Deleuze
and DeLanda position this virtual Absolute as a self-differentiating difference in a way that
embraces a kind of Priest like dialetheia: the Virtual both is and is not itself immanently because
contradiction does not need indicate conceptual negation.
The lack of negation in this ontology does not necessarily mean that it escapes the
problems of the retrospective illusion: it displaces the poorly posed question from time//space
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into intensity//extensity. The problem arises with the marginalization of extensity such that
VIA emerges as a trinary sequence, but one that builds itself upon a fantasy that has no
empirical basis named extensity. Contradiction through the negation of an imaginary construct
comes back into the system. This problem resonates with Aristotle’s marginalization of material
causality and the implicature of chance as a hidden fifth mode of causality, or perhaps, noncausality. In short, an ontology built upon removing a fantasy from its analysis still relies upon a
fantasy and will re-introduce purely metaphysical entities at the limits of its domain. Extensity
follows the fantasy of perfect boundary precision: a table is 6 feet long or entropy accounts for X
amount of thermodynamic loss in a given system. DeLanda’s own stipulation that philosophical
precepts possess empirical adequacy suggests a naturalistic warrant that the marginalization of
extensity, especially as entropy, is not valid because metric values cannot be fully enacted
through experimental apparatuses. When we cut boards for a table, we know very well they are
not going to be precisely 6 feet long because, even were we able to cut at the subatomic level,
some material remainder would persist. Entropy’s case presents greater difficulty: as a system
loses information or the capacity to do work the system of connections and capacities in its
assemblage will change. There is no such thing as extensity and one of the very extensive
attributes DeLanda marginalizes may itself be responsible for the creativity of actualization in
which the dispersion of energy facilitates the emergence of the new. Through Barad and
Maddy’s naturalistic ontologies and methodologies we know that entropy and the indeterminacy
that comes with it suggests a material causality, familiar from Aristotle, but takes on the name
counter-actualization in the VIA model rid of metaphorical content. Counteractualization
signifies the capacity of the virtual to change based upon the contingent actualization of intensive
flows tending towards, but never reaching, complete actualization. The key in transducing the
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VIA model is to take this counteractualizing tendency with greater weight. The Virtual as a
set of all sets does not exist as a mathematical and pure entity anymore than qualities somehow
tend towards extensity as pure spatiality within actualization. Deleuzian ontologies transduce the
poorly posed question of time//space into intensity//extensity.
We must return to the Bergson of Matter and Memory but with Deleuzian and naturalist
qualifications: all things should be conceptualized as discrete individuated intensities that
function as experimental apparatuses themselves that resolve indeterminacy through the everprocessual flux of relations of interiority and exteriority and our analyses of these relationships
and processes must be falsifiable and replicable through empirical criteria. Indeterminacy and
“Zones of Indetermination” are a mode of physically verifiable material causality by way of our
best explanations of quantum phenomena. This mode of reasoning fully supports ontological
contingency, an important foundation for rhetorical theory, insomuch as it provides the
ontological potential for a highly limited mode of choice or self-determination in systems with a
sufficient quantity of nodes in the space between the influence of parts and emergent wholes.
Naturalism further aids us in positioning models and their fantasies as necessary to
human understanding but not as warranting metaphysical status and causal influence over reality.
Logical criteria have their place in theory building, but the absolutes and Absolutes they project
should not be assumed to have causal efficacy. Put differently, both retrospective and
prospective illusions are useful in making nonmetric reality metric provided we do not make a
fallacy of either by assuming that our local analytic absolutes that forestall infinite regress are
metaphysical determinants of becoming. The VIA model helps us in a synchronic sense
with this problem and clarifies the diachronic use of the VIA model by demonstrating its
tautological cycle that, instead of being pushed to an absolute, should be viewed as merely a
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model among models. The key becomes mapping out overlapping durations or assemblages’
tendencies, capacities, and boundary production through a variety of methods, particularly those
that intervene in the world in an experimental or natural experimental basis.
The conflict between these two models and their respective use cases can help rhetorical
theorists recognize the illusory domains or Absolutes of both the constitutive rhetorical model as
Ideology or Subjectivity  Discourse  Action and the new materialist rhetorical model of
Rhetoricity  the Rhetorical  Rhetoric. The retrospective tautology of these systems emerges
through analogy. Ideology somehow exerts influence on subjectivity that influences action that
somehow produces ideology. Rhetoricity resembles Virtuality in which anything contingent, and
therefore rhetorical, can be dealt with through the tools of rhetoric regardless of how great of a
theoretical or methodological fit doing so is. Transducing the ideological model to Ideology 
Discourse  Action allows theorists to deal with historically discrete individuations and their
tendencies towards both differential ideological structure and pure action without assuming a
spectral cause that lurks behind each measurement. Transducing the Rhetoricity model into
Rhetoricity  the Rhetorical  Rhetoric facilitates the expansion of objects and methodologies
for rhetoricians to use and almost demands a certain kind of interdisciplinary focus because
rhetorical things both will and will not be rhetorical. Rhetorical becomes a capacity of many
things, but not one to be analyzed through primarily textual or close reading methodologies nor
through the primary theory corpus of rhetoric. Rhetoricians are encouraged to understand the
ontological implications and positions of their work as the rhetorical moves towards rhetoricity
while analyzing how various assemblages of the rhetorical and not tend towards creating discrete
historically individuated rhetorics that are never fully solidified. Discovering genuine rhetorical
problematics, thinking in terms of parameters of intensity as intensive apparatuses move towards
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virtuality and actuality, and modifying DeLanda’s notions of capacity, affect, and tendency with
regards to specific sets of speech as discrete individuals helps alleviate this problem, even if no
model can truly escape some amount of perspectival projection or metaphysical fictions.
Using the transduced models to guide rhetorical inquiry cannot obtain without a shift in
the methodological orientation of the field. The close reading of exemplary texts by inferring
their meaning through a theoretical lens in moments of contingency need not suffer erasure, but
it must be contextualized as one methodology among many that should be employed with the
singular or exemplary. The field must no longer subsist in a cycle of never-ending negative
critique on discourses in which we know what will happen because we have already mapped
distributions of ordinary points, albeit through insufficiently wide aperture apparatuses. We must
not remain the documentarians of systemic oppression when that oppression operates well within
our understanding of oppression in the given moment. Articles detailing specific ordinairy cases
for teaching or calling out a certain historical moment should remain, but I believe the overall
thrust of the field should shift towards acts of positive creation or intervention alongside
methodologies best suited for the analysis of the matrix created by singular//ordinary and
synchronic//diachronic.
The directions for future research and the limitations of this project are inextricable and
ironic: I have deployed metaphysical analysis through a turn to naturalism to attempt to turn us
away from an overemphasis and reliance upon theoretical turns; I have deployed negative
critique to critique negative critique; I have called for positive creative endeavors despite doing
the precise kind of work through a mixture of close reading, argumentative analysis, and content
analysis that I advocate against. Perhaps most entertainingly, I have formed my own poorly
posed question by believing human thought’s tendency towards spatialization as necessitating
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and validating the use of the synchronic//diachronic and singular//ordinary splits as useful
metaphysical fictions. I hope that my next projects take my own advice from the first three
limitations as license to engage in creative projects and use mixed methodologies to map out the
contours of our discipline more fully with methodologies suited to mapping distributions of the
singular and ordinary. Put differently, it is time for me to make rhetoric and the discipline would
benefit from wider scope meta-studies. As for the poorly posed questions, I leave it someone else
to find my messy border cases, my illusory domains, and suggest new systems for these poorly
posed problems in reaction to the emergence of new messy aggregates.
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APPENDICES
The Epistemic Zombie: A Grounded Theory Content Analysis.
Grounded Theory Content Analysis presents several advantages over other methods
because its recursive coding schema facilitates both naïve questioning and intuitive re-working
of emergent categories. Lindolf and Taylor provide two primary features of grounded theory:
“Emergent theory is ‘grounded in’ the relationships between data and the categories into which
they are coded” and these categories’ relationship with the data is recursive because “new data
[alters] the scope and terms of the analytic framework.” 528 Categories can be, but are not
necessarily, imported from previous research in the “open coding” phase that strives to find
recurring things, tendencies, or structures in a data set. 529 Open coding should be done
simultaneous to “in vivo” coding during which the communicative agents behind texts or in
world’s own language are experienced to produce new and amend already emerged categories. 530
Unfortunately, this study does not have the resources or time to conduct the ethnographic work
required to do “in vivo” coding properly and will be settling on an expedient middle-method. 531
In short, rhetoricians articulate how they want their own work to be viewed by elaborating on the
goals, contributions, and significance of their arguments. This category of analysis gets close to
what an ethnography that interviews the critic behind the article would do, even if it is still
imperfect in the end. Once the data has been coded, the researcher moves to integrate the
emergent codes into “axial codes” and re-apply them to the sample before dimensionalizing the
content analysis into meaningful abstract analysis of the content that each coded section
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indicates. The following details the production of the sample, coding process and codebook
categories, and provides a dimensional analysis of the tendencies in contemporary rhetorical
criticism.
The sample is a preliminary sample pending approval of the dissertation and a
conversation about the necessity of an expanded sample. I read each full-length article, excluding
editorial notes and book reviews, of the first two numbered issues of The Quarterly Journal of
Speech 2018 and 2019. This sample was selected because QJS is the flagship journal for
Rhetoric; whatever tendencies exist in rhetorical scholarship should emerge from the ostensible
gold standard in rhetorical scholarship. However, this sample should be expanded in the full
dissertation to include work from other well-respected journals to account for error and bias
predicated upon journal leadership and aim. The QJS under Mary Stuckey is not the QJS under
Barbara Biesecker, as even the most cursory glance at the titles of articles will tell you. The QJS
under Stuckey has tended towards rigorous, theoretically inflected, but relatively traditional,
rhetorical criticism. I do not believe this negates the value of the analysis produced below but
does indicate an important limitation that requires an expansion of the sample and addition of
supplementary works selected based upon emergent categories to fill out the tendencies of
rhetorical criticism. In particular, the theoretical vanguard of rhetorical criticism that engages
ontological inquiry tends to express their projects not as close readings of an object, but follows
Greene’s argument that criticism should map rhetoric’s externalities by studying circulation.
Whether or not this tendency substantially differs from rhetorical analysis requires attention by
selectively expanding the sample to include works that articulate themselves in this way.
The preliminary open coding phase lasted for the first six articles of QJS 2019 because, at
least in the QJS, articles are remarkably consistent in what they do. I approached open coding as
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simply trying to find out what published work in rhetoric tends to do and how it articulates itself
with special attention to ontological and epistemological questions. In an attempt to stay true to
Bergsonian intuition, I started with the most seemingly obvious questions imaginable. I found
that these absurdly simple questions allowed me to bracket the enthymematic quality of
academic writing because I could not just bracket whatever highly loaded theoretical term or
citation by filling in the academic lineage myself. Put differently, I could not just write off
wonky arguments or odd segments about causality with little mental heuristics like “oh, they
must be doing something out of Althusser” and ignoring glaring contradictions. These questions
made the everyday a bit grotesque at times because I realized that this scholarship is nearly
inscrutable to anyone not in the rhetorical tradition. What do we say rhetoric is or does? How do
we describe rhetoric? What kinds of sections repeat in the work? Why should I care about any of
this work I am spending so much time reading? In short, training aside, what is going on here?
These questions produced repeating categories that striate different ways of dealing with similar
tendencies in becoming, after five recursive loops categories emerged. The following details the
criteria for each category in terms of recursive process:
1. Primary Object (PO): Rhetorical critics work with objects, or at least they tell you that
they are going to analyze some object. I am curious about what kind of objects are considered
rhetorical because that would, ostensibly, tell me something about rhetoric. For example,
Timothy Barney analyzes at least two different discrete objects: online project statements of
“citizen cartographers” and the actual maps these cartographers produce. 532 Despite the amount
of writing Barney expends to talk about these objects, they appear to be mere vehicles for what
Barney is really after and that realization across many similar contents necessitated another
Timothy Barney, “The Sight and Site of North Korea: Citizen Cartography’s Rhetoric of Resolution in the
Satellite Imagery of Labor Camps,” 11 and 12.
532

296
category. This tendency repeats across every single article in the sixteen-deep sample, even
exemplary objects are not analyzed for their own sake but for the import of abstraction.
2. Abstract Object (AO): The PO’s are vehicles to reach a second level abstraction, a sort
of hidden object that is the real point of analysis that tends to condition the PO by operating
behind it. Barney analyzes maps and project statements because he really wants to say something
about ideology, phrased as “the ideology of resolution.” 533 These sorts of abstract objects are
generally well defined relative to the paper’s analysis, but depend upon a host of other theoretical
terms that necessitate the next category.
3. Theoretical Concepts (TC): The abstract objects depend for definition upon a wide
array of theory deployed by each essay. This veritable cornucopia of academic buzzwords
created problems for the naïve and intuitive comportment of my content analysis because these
terms are frequently not defined or are given a footnote to another work that deals more with the
overall meaning of the sentence and not the term in question. Each seemingly loaded theoretical
term was marked down with a plus or a minus for whether it was defined, and footnotes were
checked for definitions that explicitly staked a position instead of referencing another work that
may or may not have staked a position. In a sense, the TC category indicates that the field of
rhetoric has a duration and memory that can be tracked through reconstructive analysis of
footnotes. I did not note every occurrence of each term, focusing instead on which terms are used
and whether they have become reified in disciplinary talk. A term has been reified if it is simply
expected to be known and not defined. Term frequencies could be constructed in retrospect with
the search function if I require frequencies to make a point. For example, Eli Mangold and
Charles Goehring never define any variant of the word hegemonic or hegemony in their
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article. 534 When I search their article with the term “hegemon” to catch various endings, we find
that they use some variant of the term ten times in their article. I tried my best to not allow my
mind to enthymematically but uncertainly fill in the blank as I read because it seems to me that
vague reconstructions of theoretical terms hamper a more philosophically inclined rhetorical
theory. Typically, when I read this kind of work, I see the word “Hegemon/y/ic” and think, “huh,
they are probably referencing critical something based in Gramsci or Laclau or something.”
Encountering these terms in a naïve sense made this reading practice and experiences seem
unproductive. What are we actually talking about most of the time? This realization necessitated
the fourth category in this lineage because an unbelievable amount of terms that have extremely
contentious lineages are used as though they have one meaning and this meaning is right.
4. Assumptions (ASS): Where do the moments of slippage or ambiguity between
theoretical terms create problems in analysis, understanding, consistency, and clarity? Where are
we being a-philosophical, taking the theory hammer to a thing, and not thinking about what
kinds of questions we are asking? In short, when I naively do not fill in, assume, or guess the
theory-philosophy lineage of a piece, what assumptions stand out in bold relief? This ASS
category has two sides that contribute to how this category has been coded. On the one side, my
own scholarship has transitioned from a need to feel like I know what is going on in seminar
classes by assuming relevance and validity to reading enough of the philosophical canon to
realize I have no idea what is going on or, rather, there are an unbelievable amount of ways to
articulate what is going on. On the other side, the way in which articles match theory to context
to text in varied configurations operates like a hammer finding object-nails all over the world.
Largely, we do not ask the kind of Bergsonian questions that should be asked, preferring instead
Eli Mangold and Charles Goehring, “The Visual Rhetoric of the Aerial View: From Surveillance to Resistance,”
25-41.
534
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to take theory to text-context or philosophy to theory, but rarely do we do our own philosophical
dirty work. This category maps out these tendencies in contemporary rhetorical scholarship into
assumptions about the way in which theoretical terms operate and split into two broad sub
categories. The first category deals with strange uses, binarization, and conflation of terms.
Concepts that are set up in a binary relationship are indicated by a // in the data set. Sometimes
specialized philosophical terms are conflated: “The potentialities of aerial photography are best
situated as part of a larger conversation about the rhetorical and imaginative possibilities of
photography in general. Perhaps the broadest of photography’s potentialities…” 535 I reference
this sentence in the data set with the marker possible/potential. These terms are not
interchangeable in the philosophical literature, as the analysis section will make clear, and the
tension between them can and should be used for more nuanced criticism. The second
subcategory deals with the theoretical tendencies that make sense of the use of theoretical terms.
This subcategory receives reconstructive analysis in the literature review, whereas this category
attempts to only note tendencies in the content analysis. For example, many articles use the term
“circulation” and do not define it explicitly, but then make statements that appear to link
circulation to some notion or notions. Mangold and Goehring write, with regards to the Earthrise
image: “Becoming visible to millions around the world through media circulation, this image’s
global spread played an instrumental role in constituting the ‘whole earth’ or ‘one-world’
globalist movement founded on ecological conservation.” 536 The footnote for this sentence
refers to Denis Cosgrove’s “Contested Global Visions: One World, Whole-Earth, and the Apollo
space photographs” 537 but provides no other elaboration. Perhaps Cosgrove goes into detail
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about how circulation works, how images move across networks, and how viewing an image
persuades, but we do not get that here. We get an uninterrogated assumption that if an image has
been viewed many times it has an effect, specifically one in which the image “constitutes” a
movement, a contentious claim. I could assume that this passage likely references Michael
Warner’s version of publics, but how can I be sure? Certainly, not every work must shake the
theoretical-philosophical foundations of the rhetorical studies world. However, being clear about
these assumptions has argumentative value and the entire structure of theory-context-text
suggests the need for the final category, primary method, that combines the two streams of
concerns that build into one another.
1. How is rhetoric described / used / defined (R/R/R): What even is rhetoric? To my great
surprise, I have relatively little clue after completing this content analysis. Rhetoric and its
accompanying terms: rhetorical, rhetoricity, rhetorically, and rhetor are rarely if ever defined. So
sparsely are they defined that I moved definitions of them into the TC category as defining even
a baseline formation of what rhetoric is functions more as a TC than a mainstay of work in
rhetorical criticism. Similalry, persuasion and its accompanying terms: coercion and conviction
are rarely referenced and placed in the TC category. I assume, in part, this tendency derives from
the sample only including numbered issues of QJS under Mary Stuckey. I had to devise a
different way to get at what rhetoricians mean by rhetoric without reconstructing it through a
mixture of meticulous citation tracking or completely analytically reconstructing it. I went with
the most naïve thing possible: just mark down every time the word is used and how it is used in
the sentence. The R/R/R category looks at how rhetoric/al/ally/icity are used at the level of
sentence grammar and the kinds of words they describe, verbs they do, and noun phrases they are
part of. This led to the following coding process. First, is rhetoric a subject of a sentence (S), an
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object of a sentence (O), or the grammatic subject of a sentence that is actually the object of the
sentence (O) and vice versa (S), a verb (V), or an adjective beyond the object the word
“rhetorical” describes (A). Here is an example of rhetoric in the objective sense: “In these works,
cartography is a rhetoric of imperial power and state control through spatial abstraction of the
ground below.” 538 The word cartography is qualified by the noun phrase “rhetoric of imperial
power and state control.” Rhetoric is an object (O) in this usage; it functions as a thing that
signifies some state of affairs that qualifies a different thing. Here is an example of rhetoric in the
subjective sense, from the same essay cited above: “This is an important reminder that rhetorics
of resolution in maps have always operated by revelation and concealment, choosing for the
viewer what should be clear and visible.” 539 Here the “rhetorics of resolution” are treated as a
subject; they are the ones operating and so rhetoric is, in this case, a subject (S). Occasionally,
relying upon grammar to clarify the agential status of rhetoric falls short and must be clarified.
Sometimes the seemingly passive object is doing all the work, for example: “they still operate
within corporate and state rhetorics. Maps are always constrained…” 540 “Corporate and state
rhetorics” are essentially an object in the sentence; these rhetorics are what “they” still operate
within. Yet, these rhetorics, alongside institutional forces, are what actively constrains the map;
the dead linguistic structure is granted an active agency here that makes it more suitable for the
(S) category than the (O) category. In the converse, rhetoric in the grammatic subject position
can be characterized as an object by passivity: “Individual rhetoric here is limited to how well a
speaker…” 541 “Individual rhetoric” appears in the guise of an active subject when it is really the
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passive object being limited by the agency of a “speaker.” R/R/R can also appear as an adverb or
verb (V) that indicates that R/R/R can be some form of doing: “…the ability of individuals to
rhetorically assert themselves…” 542 Here the R/R/R does something, instead of is something and
is marked as (V). R/R/R can also function in a more closely adjectival sense where the R/R/R
term does not describe a noun but is itself the adjective (A): “…there is something deeply
rhetorical about Whitman’s poetry.” 543 Here R/R/R functions as a descriptive term in its own
right without being tethered to an object. Second, the terms around the uses of R/R/R have been
recorded as best as possible to catalogue the powers rhetoricians attribute to this motley group of
terms.
2. Goal / Contribution / Significance (G/C/S): I needed some way to know what rhetoric
was beyond the almost endless sea of words that get attached to it, so I started cataloguing the
stated goals, contributions, and significance arguments of the articles. Perhaps, what rhetoricians
claim to do can demonstrate the tendencies in rhetorical criticism. These statements are
frequently explicit: “By recovering what I call Whitman’s ‘kosmic rhetoric,’ my goal in this
essay is to inspire rhetorical scholars to discuss, debate, and reconsider several of our most
deeply held assumptions about democratic politics, including anti-foundationalism and the
mechanics of dissent.” 544 However, there are always sub goals or more implicit contributions.
From the same article: “Generally, rhetorical scholars are uncomfortable talking about questions
of soteriology, ontology, being, and the good, and for good reason… However, we cannot
divorce Whitman’s poetry from his soteriology or his metaphysics…” 545 This argument sneaks’
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ontological inquiry into what was, ostensibly, a pragmatic argument about democracy to broaden
the theoretical contribution of the article. Sometimes the G/C/S is more grounded, again from the
same article: “In the rhetorical tradition I ascribe to and teach my students, individuality is a
living art, and it is possible to change one’s perspective…” 546 Here, the broader theoretical
concerns are brought to bear on questions of pedagogy and individual political action, a
frequently made move towards action and activism in the literature. For many, a kind of critical
unmasking is itself a sort of action, so I needed a way to see how that process works at a
structural level.
3. Contexts (C’s): This category emerged as I attempted to figure out how the G/C/S was
accomplished from only looking at the way the articles are constructed in terms of structure.
Each article has a kind of “context section” that lays out the scene for the “object,” but the more I
tried to re-code for this category the more I found it nearly impossible to determine a boundary
between text and context, context and theory, theory and text. Take Engel’s article again, as an
example. The section named “Yoga, democracy, intuition” lays out context by reviewing the
Bhagavad Ghita and American Transcendentalist thought. 547 The section “Kosmic Rhetoric”
features a mélange of Foucault and generalizations of Whitman. 548 “The good and the god terms
of democracy” reads Whitman against Weaver, Burke, Aristotle, and Charles Taylor in terms of
what language does. 549 “Talking to God” closely reads fragments of Whitman’s poetry while
referring back to Emerson. 550 I am not one to think a firm boundary between text and context has
ever really existed, but the Engels’ article has some of the more clearly delineated boundaries
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between these different components of rhetorical criticism and they are still utterly muddled at
the end of the day. Theory, context, and text are all leveraged against one another to produce
what a thing means or can mean, has the potential to mean, in retrospect. This realization shifted
the structural focus from content to attempting to form a highly dimensionalized category that
describes what rhetorical critics do, so I can see how frequently this retrospective tendency
towards meaning through contingent moments created by the juxtaposition of text-context-theory
are the driving methodology of rhetorical criticism.
5. Primary Method (PM): With one exception, Will Penman’s exercise in and
commentary on ethnography, each article has the same (PM): a reconstructive methodology
facilitated by closely reading fragmentary arrangements of theory-context-text to produce a
retrospective arrangement that analyzes the interaction of parts in a pure analytic space to predict
future action. This critical orientation becomes painfully clear in a dimensional combination of
the ASS and G/C/S categories’ findings. Certainly, the other findings and their frequencies,
particularly what the word rhetoric indicates, are interesting and worth talking about. However,
for the sake of a prospectus, the findings that explicate the PM category are the most important to
founding the importance of the project and the necessity of a philosophy of rhetoric and a reevaluation of rhetoric’s ethical commitments.
To this end, the following elaborates on some dimensional categories emergent from the
grounded theory content analysis: 1. ASS: Constitutive Rhetoric. 2. ASS: Top-Down Power. 3.
ASS: Contingency and Affordances//Constraints. 4. G/C/S and ASS: Unmasking and Resistance.
5. G/C/S and ASS: Perspectival Metaphors for Criticism. As with everything I have found, these
categories exhibit circular tendencies. Given this project’s theoretical outlook, that boundaries
become indeterminate and circular should hardly be surprising. I ask that the readers bear with
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the categories as they are written or go full J.G. Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition and read them
in whatever order you want. I do not think it will make much difference because each category
entails each other category. The analysis of these dimensional categories demonstrates that
rhetorical criticism is a slow science that makes predictions of future actions by the retrospective
alignment of theory-context-text in a highly visual language that indicates the dispassionate
god’s eye point of view of the scientific observer. This critical posture is not by necessity wrong
but limits rhetorical criticism and theory’s emancipatory potential by an overemphasis on
constraint and reliance on visual metaphors for knowing. Put differently, contemporary rhetorical
criticism has the tendencies Scott predicted: it shambles on as an epistemic zombie. The
following breakdowns refer to both appendix I: “Data Set” and appendix II: “Prospy
Breakdown.” Articles are listed in the data set by volume, number, and order in the journal, such
that the first article in QJS Volume 105, No. 1 is abbreviated as 105.1.1. I have not yet cleaned
the data set up for mass consumption; it is pretty dirty and has personal notes. I feel this keeps it
truer to both grounded theory content analysis and my own Bergsonian tendencies.
1. ASS: Constitutive Rhetoric: nine of the sixteen articles explicitly take the position that
rhetoric, whatever it is, constitutes some part of reality whether symbolic, material, or a mélange
of the two. The precise mechanisms for how this constitution operate are unclear and difficult to
determine based upon close readings of text-context. There appears to be a tacit assumption that
the text-level choices are both constituted by and constitute ideology and that we can be
confident in this kind of effect argument based upon circulation. The following two examples
detail this tendency while pointing out an internal tension to many of the texts in the sample:
non-human actants appear to push back against this constitutive tautology.
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Mangold and Goehring exemplify a heavy take on the Rhetoric’s power to constitute
reality: “Variations in scale can certainly reveal or conceal subject matter, but we argue that they
go beyond visibility politics and instead perform their rhetorical heavy lifting through altering
viewers’ sense-making processes and geographical imaginations.” 551 It is one thing to say that
Rhetoric itself is a sense-making process, a sort of prosthesis that we cannot separate ourselves
from; it is another thing to speculate on a phenomenological field, as in Merleau-Ponty, in which
both sensation and speech participate; it is another thing entirely to say that rhetoric changes
some anterior sensorial base. Mangold and Goehring elaborate on the imagination part, but the
sense-making part pushes against their own constitutive take. In short, “geographical
imagination…involves intuiting unfamiliar spatial dimensions through comparisons to familiar
dimensions.” 552 Rhetors mobilize contingency through technological enframing to modify
people’s “geographic imagination” through choosing to change the scale. 553 It appears that the
presence of a kind of analogic process is enough here to grant this process the qualifier
“rhetorical.” The everyday scales of the human experience and the brute materiality of the world
appear passive against the rhetorically active choices involved in technological presentation. The
effect argument here is stronger, less spectral, than most, even if it is incomplete. Sometimes
close reading or references to previous research guarantee rhetorical effect. 554 At other times,
editorials commenting on the images themselves. 555 In articles like this one, we know that
rhetoric can constitute reality because the articles go for plausibility: some people may have
taken a conspiracy theory route when viewing Earthrise, but, the image “[became] visible to
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millions around the world through media circulation” and environmentalism became a talking
point, so the image at least plausibly has these effects due to rhetorical choices. 556 Rhetorical
effect in the constitutive vein becomes about circulation and plausibility of the textual elements
being scrutinized by close reading having real effects in the world.
Yet, within Mangold and Goehring’s own analysis something at the borderline of human
and only questionably rhetorical pushes back against this constitutive cycle: “This rhetorical
potentiality is enabled by two unique qualities of aerial imagery: its ability to render meaning
indeterminate through its scrambling of human perception, and its ability to attract viewers to
perceptually and politically repellant subject matter.” 557 This argument appears strained; they
have already told us that it is the rhetorical choices made by the rhetor deploying scale that
change perception, not some capacity of the visual image as such, only to then tell us that there
are unique modes of visual pleasure and indeterminacy beyond rhetorical choice. There are a few
ways to resolve this apparent contradiction. We might say that rhetorics, as they cite Ranciere as
claiming, can choose to make an image unfamiliar through a device like scale to have an
indeterminate effect. 558 Yet, does rhetoric condition the human response to unfamiliar scale? Do
we really want to go there? If we do, how does that work? It seems that this rhetorical choice
does not constitute but mobilizes something between the human phenomenological field and the
visual that has relatively little to do with rhetoric. We might say that what counts as familiar and
pleasurable is conditioned by culture, which is contingent, and therefore rhetorical. Certainly, for
the pleasure argument, Mangold and Goehring are right to note a kind of visual hegemony in
Western Culture. 559 Yet, here we would be again, reducing everything to some anterior cause
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named rhetoric that lurks behind every analysis. We will backslide into saying that Being is
rhetorical; it seems more plausible that there is a mixture of rhetorical and non-rhetorical things
that make up culture as future instead of past structure. Even in the most rhetorically reductive, at
some point in the genealogy of Western visuality, we should find a moment in which rhetoric did
not constitute the human eye. We should also find a point in which the processes by which we
deal with the unfamiliar are more phenomenologically inflected than rhetorical; it seems unlikely
that rhetoric itself accounts for analogic reasoning. This epitomizes the constitutive shell game;
we have a moment in which something like visual indeterminacy indicates a dialetheic position
for Rhetoric where it both is and is not itself. We can say, no it is itself, and push the dialetheia
one step back along a retrospective path or we can say, as Stormer does, that rhetoric is full of
non-rhetorical things. 560
Let us turn to another example of a relatively heavy take on constitutive rhetoric
alongside an element frequently coupled to both Constitutive and Top-Down Power claims:
spectral effect arguments necessitated by the retrospective critical stance. Leslie J. Harris
construes space itself as rhetorical: “Spaces can be constraining and enabling, dynamic and
somewhat static, a rhetorical resource and a rhetorical invention.” 561 This argument rests upon a
tacit assumption that there is a split between the material and the symbolic that privileges the
symbolic side of the pairing: “Although material mobility remains significant, discourses of
mobility help shape understandings of the material.” 562 I am not sure why this privileging
emerges, given a strange moment in the reconstructive close reading Harris provides: “Spread of
disease was named as one of the most significant problems with vice districts. In a literal sense,
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prostitution did contribute to infection.” 563 Harris links this concern of the “Chicago Vice
Commission” to the moralizing stance taken by anti-vice advocates who extend the disease
metaphors to entail spiritual concerns. 564 The rhetorical partition of these boundaries, as evinced
by the creation of vice laws, the circulation of the anti-vice discourse, and Harris own close
reading of these discourses, are speculated to have an actual determining effect on
subjectivity. 565 The effect emerges from contingent choices in the close reading, but we are not
given terribly much evidence that either we are not stuck back in the shell game or how people
articulated their experiences of mobility in the city beyond the moralizing discourse that
sublimated a material power of disease into metaphor. If it is ideology and rhetoric all the way
down, how do we know that this rhetoric constitutes this mode of space and is not constituted by
some anterior ideological framework? How do we know that women actually experienced their
subjectivities as modified by these new constraints from dominant discourse? We do not, we are
left with the same sort of plausibility based upon close reading and circulation arguments that
something as intangible as ideology offers the critic.
Constitutive rhetoric claims that rhetorical choices in the contingent gaps constrained by
existing ideological structures change subjectivity based upon carefully reconstructed close
readings of text and context, supported by spectral effect arguments that cite large social changes
or circulation numbers. Ideology given body by constitutive rhetoric becomes a godly agent
responsible for its own cause and effect. Certainly, there is a sort of predictive power to these
reconstructive analyses. Harris is correct to note: “Although emerging from a particular time and
place, many elements of the controversy remain familiar, such as restricting women in the name
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of ‘protection,’ scapegoating immigrants, and characterizing cities as dangerous.” 566 Rhetorical
criticism becomes a slow science whose experimental arena is the reconstruction through an
alignment of theory-context-text to predict similar results based upon similar environmental
conditions through close reading.
2. ASS: Top -Down Power figures in twelve of the sixteen articles in the sample. As will
become progressively more apparent, at some level these different dimensional categories entail
one another. The specific content that fills the top-down power dynamic varies, but it tends
towards the acknowledgement that either the ideology constituted by rhetoric exerts a
deterministic effect on social agents anterior to individual rhetorical action or that language itself
exerts a prior force that is superior to the force of material things. It should be clear, at this point,
that ASS: Top-Down is closely relate to the next dimension, ASS: Contingency and
Affordances//Constraints. When power operates from the top to the bottom in an anterior mode,
all that is left for social agents to do in terms of free will are assemble the parts given to them
into something new, something new that typically just feeds the overbearing system from which
it emerges. Let us look at some examples.
Jeremy David Engels’ article in the sample is worth closely analyzing, not only because a
sort of language//materiality supports its top-down approach, but because it too has this tendency
towards ontology beyond the sort of epistemological or social ontological concerns that pervades
the sample. Engels argues that we must consider “questions of soteriology, ontology, being, and
the good” despite anxieties that these kind of arguments “have traditionally acted as cover for the
proliferation of bourgeois and neoliberal claims” because his object of analysis demands it and
he “believe[s] it is worth reconsidering the costs of divorcing democracy from such matters, as
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rhetorical scholars typically do.” 567 This claim recalls a bit of Bruno Latour’s empirical
metaphysics; we cannot ignore ontological questions in the populace because people frequently
justify their actions in terms of what they believe the world is. 568 There is a strange tension in
Engels work. On the one hand, he is correct to say that ontological considerations need to be a
part of the rhetorical critical venture. On the other hand, he buys a kind of top-down power
dynamic that privileges language as the dominant knowable term while backhandedly glorifying
affect as that which exceeds language. This seeming glorification denigrates affect. The material
side of this symbolic//material binary appears glorious because it exceeds language, and yet, is
unsuited for democratic theorizing because of its material excess beyond language. Let us look
closely at how this happens.
Engels takes the Burkean model of language//material at a perhaps mistaken, given
Burke’s reliance upon Bergson’s ontology and concomitant erasure of negation in favor of
contradiction, negative-ontological force: “Language is dualistic. It is based on distinction,
negation, and division.” 569 This ontology and starting point lead to a relatively hard take on
constitutive rhetoric: “A good is no good if it cannot be articulated…God terms act as
‘constitutive rhetoric,’ giving the good rhetorical form so that it can provide direction and
orientation.” 570 Engels takes this constitutive power at full Top-Down force: “Language is
hierarchal, and god terms function by influencing the meaning of associated and subordinated
words.” 571 This top down emphasis, ultimately, leads to a backhanded glorification of affect:
“Affect is extra-discursive: it exceeds representation. And yet people can only access the somatic
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experience of affect by labelling it.” 572 We have a strange ontology being espoused in an article
about the necessity of questioning ontological precepts for a better democracy. Language
emerges as the privileged side of the symbol//material binary that sets up a king of inclosure
paradox around affect to make it a sublime object that is always beyond but only accessible
through linguistic intervention. This extra discursive force cannot be accessed any other way
than by a change in the linguistic superstructure; it remains a question as to whether it is really
affect doing anything here or simply a change in the “god terms” that allow us to access this
transcendent reservoir, this unspeakable sublime object. This kind of formation is one way in
which the ASS: Top-Down tendency becomes apparent.
The other way involves a prioritization of ideology, that typically equates rhetoric,
norms, and ideology, to insist upon a similarly deterministic effect. Shui-yin Sharon Yam’s
article is exemplary in this capacity:
“Here, I examine citizenship as a legal status granted by the state to denote formal
recognition and validate one’s self-identity and sense of belonging to the nation-state;
citizenship is simultaneously juridical, political, and affective…As an ontological and
structural metaphor for citizenship, the family privileges subjects and values that are
familiar and beneficial to the state, while undermining the sociopolitical power of
racialized others.” 573
We have quite a bit to unpack here. Certainly, we would expect something as pervasive and
sought after as citizenship to have dimensions in multiple arenas of life, although the article does
not differentiate how these different dimensions are differentiable. Where power coalesces
around language in Engels, for Yam there is sort of a doubling of hierarchy at play. On the one
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hand, Her close reading focus emerges at the valence of linguistic structure, of the constitutive
“rhetorical framework that represents the nation as family” and the entailments that support this
metaphor. 574 On the other hand, this metaphor is at the service of deeper ideological currents,
both at the level of dominant interests in Hong Kong, 575 in the ideologies that were dominant in
Hong Kong’s colonial history, and “the broader transnational political and cultural context…” 576
Yam gives us Top-Down power at its most pervasive: behind the linguistic-rhetorical framework
that constrains individual action is a dominant ideology in Hong Kong, behind which are both a
history of colonial exploitation and transnational white-supremacy coupled with neoliberalism.
One wonders what ideological structure is behind transnational white-supremacy and
neoliberalism, is it the deeper ideological-ontological commitment to racism supported by
negative ontology argued by Calvin Warren in Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and
Emancipation or is it some older ideology that lives on by constraining a new one in a
genealogical sense? Where does ideology hit the world at a point that we can intervene in?
The Top-Down power model does not provide us an answer to this question; it positions
some structure only rendered visible in symptoms, typically found in some medium of speech
posited as language, as the more determining force in social action. Scholars working in this
mode are quick to throw words like “affect” or “material” into this model, but it remains unclear
as to what the ultimate consequences of this gesture will be. Will affect and material things
remain excesses that are positioned as backhanded agents, transcendent and, therefore, only
accessible by language or will we find a way to give them agency, beyond linguistic and
ideological superstructures? The Top-Down model is, perhaps, the most closely related to the
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other tendencies. It relies upon a tacit assumption that rhetoric can constitute, at the least, social
reality; it tends towards requiring a method that unmasks the top down power relationships;
action within the model is generally construed as weighing affordances and constraints against
the contingent openings afforded by whatever system happens to be doing the determining. I do
not disagree with the existence of oppression; I am simply unsure that the social ontology we use
to describe it is ontologically necessary and capable of changing the world.
3. ASS(es): Contingency and Affordances/Constraints feature in thirteen of the sixteen
articles in the sample; this dominant frequency is in part because of the constitutive or socialontological tendency and clearly illuminates the reconstructive theory-context-text methodology
that underwrites rhetorical criticism. If discourse constructs reality in a way that privileges the
symbolic over the material, then we can reconstruct rhetorical choices at the level of text by
weighing textual choices against contingency, in the capacity of what was possible, given the
constraints which are always also affordances allowed by a given determining structure. The job
of the rhetorical critic, then, becomes to reconstruct the meaning of these choices by closely
reading the text with recourse for dealing with ambiguity provided by either the historical
context of the text or theoretical devices. The primary difference in how this plays out in the
sample pertains to free will. At some level, there must be a tacit assumption of free will for this
model of rhetorical action to have play; if there is no ontological opening in which contingency
carries with it an element of genuine ontological indeterminacy, a moment in which reality really
can go either way, then the model utterly fails. The degree to which an article insists upon free
will varies; the following looks at one article that centers contingency upon choice and one that
follows a more deterministic, structural route.
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Craig C. Rood’s analysis of Obama’s speeches on gun violence provides a concise
statement outlining the importance of weighing text against context for rhetorical criticism:
“Republicans and Democrats in the late 1960s through the early 1990s described gun control as a
strategy for cracking down on criminals. Focusing on dead victims of gun violence is
different…The choice to focus on the dead is different, and, as I will illustrate, significant.” 577
These rhetor’s choices produce changes in rhetoric rely upon relatively tacit metaphysical
assumptions about human choice and universal necessity: “Rhetorical scholars do not need to be
persuaded that the warrant of the dead is rhetorical, rather than natural, objective, or
inevitable…the warrant of the dead is a strategic response…” 578 Rood presents us with a sort of
two world split between a necessary object realm of hard determinism and the contingent
symbolic realm that free will mobilizes to choose rhetorical responses against situational
exigences. This relatively tacit ontology guarantees the efficacy of retrospective reconstruction
as rhetorical criticism: “All five of these factors are important for understanding why Obama
turned to gun control after the shooting at Sandy Hook. Yet what is most important is the fact
that there are reasons at all…the warrant of the dead is a strategic response…” 579 Here Rood
gives us a relatively strong take on the relationship between this kind of ontology and rhetorical
criticism. The sort of “reasons” that a close textual reading of Obama’s “rhetorical choices” by
weighing text against context provides us with a close approximation of what actually happened.
Put differently, the ontological distance between critical method and the rhetor’s own method of
producing the speech collapses; the process through which rhetoric emerges and is criticized is
the same process because of a dichotomous ontology.
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This collapse is, in part, due to Rood’s own tacit assumption of human free will through
the contingency afforded by language: “Obama has acknowledged some of these structural
forces…Yet his decision to speak in the aftermath of mass shootings affirmed that our collective
fate is not solely determined by media companies or cultural scripts.” 580 This sentence brings up
an interesting dilemma when we read it against Rood on effect, citing Mary Stuckey: “…there
are other ways to evaluate the effectiveness of an argument besides looking at votes; for instance,
we might examine ‘more subtle, indirect, and long-term effects’ such as ‘framing an issue in
specific ways, or influencing the national understanding of an issue over time.’” 581 Here we have
a fundamental tension that pervades the spectral effect arguments that lurk as subcategories in
each dimensional category so far. I applaud Rood for his relative clarity in bringing the problem
of human freedom to the forefront of considerations in the ontology of rhetoric. On the one hand,
we are constrained by forces linguistic and non. On the other hand, we keep deciding to speak
anyway. We are either decidedly insane because we live in a hard-deterministic universe or
rhetorical theory, as we know it, requires a philosophical justification of genuine ontological free
will. Certainly, this free will may not be entirely conscious and wrapped up in linguistic
trappings, but it must obtain at some level in the human for choices against contingencies to have
any meaning whatsoever.
Yet, not all rhetoricians read free will into the constraints and affordances produced by
invisible and anterior structures in reconstructed moments of contingency. Some writers take a
more deterministic stance, Jeffrey A Bennett writes: “This performative presentation of self is
not one adjudicated solely through race or through gender, but via the complicated interplay of
power relations that constituted Sotomayor’s persona, which subtly includes her disability…The
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effects of discourse materialize incongruently among different bodies.” 582 Bennett articulates a
relatively fundamental take of intersectional critique; subjectivity is produced by already extant
field like interference patterns that coalescence upon a singular point that is the person’s self. We
are presented with the, becoming at this point, typical weird ontological moment later in
Bennett’s article. It appears that these anterior forces are at least modulated, in the way a passive
sieve modulates sand, by the resistant material that does its own thing in bodies. On the one
hand, I admire Bennett’s take: “Depression is not simply an effect of the body, but an array of
affective states initiated by factors as disparate as racism and socio-economic status.” 583 We
should be thinking the ultimate enmeshment of both material and discourse within a monistic
ontology, but I am curious as to why here brute material being is confined to the passenger seat
by prioritizing Sotomayor and others’ rhetorical choices and not the agential capacities of
diabetes itself. I find the section on Sotomayor’s memoir absolutely fascinating in this regard.
Bennett wants it to read it in terms of “rhetorically astute crafting” that renders clear “the
rhetorical composition of a diabetic subject[‘s construction].” 584 Yet, there is something of the
brute experience of living that takes an active role in this memoir; there is something other than
discourse shaping the young Sotomayor’s experience: diabetes and depression may be shaped by
discourse but they are certainly not able to be treated by it. Bennett’s analysis presents us with
the social constructivist play of constituting rhetorical forms, but, does the rhetorical enframing
work because it is simply clever and language at play or because there is a kernel of gritty
material Being, named diabetes, that participates in these metaphors? Could this be a moment to
go full Latour and say that diabetes participates as much in the metaphor as the metaphor

Jeffrey A. Bennett: Containing Sotomayor: Rhetorics of Personal Restraint, Judicial Prudence, and Diabetes
Management,” 273.
583
Ibid, 261.
584
Ibid, 270-271.
582

317
participates in diabetes? It seems unlikely to me that these metaphors that articulate diabetes as
an indicator of judicial restraint without the participation of a disease that shaped the young
Sotomayor’s very being.
At any rate, Bennett indicates that Sotomayor’s diabetes eventually stopped being an
issue in her confirmation hearings. 585 Where Rood would doubtlessly argue that this shift
indicates the success of the metaphor, Bennett takes a different route that emphasizes spectral
effects: “Even as diabetes was marginalized as a topic of deliberation during the hearing,
previous coverage primed audiences to read the disease as a source personal control…Diabetes is
a paradiscourse, affecting the scene even as it is seemingly absent form the space it occupies.” 586
One wonders why Bennett feels the need to grant the metaphor he has pretty well demonstrated
the efficacy of an afterlife as a ghost, haunting public opinion without any evidence that it
actually does so beyond the play of rhetorical forms that continue to constitute Sotomayor’s
subjectivity. Interestingly, I think the answer resides in a moment in which Rood and Bennett
read similarly on critical method, despite their differences on the degree of human freedom.
Pertaining to how we know criticism works: Bennett writes: “Rather than imagining static
categories that engage unending invocations of identity, intersectional critique might best be
thought of as a rhetorical style, a constitutive mode of signification that calls attention to the
effects of discourse as contingent and contextual, both fungible over time and illustrative in their
situated materialization.” 587 As with Rood, we have an argument that coalesces the methodology
used to study constitutive rhetoric and constitutive rhetoric itself. We are presented with an
ontology that argues that rhetorical forms constitute identities through their differential
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materialization on different bodies; we are also presented with an argument that the retrospective
mode of reconstructive criticism within this model accurately portrays this reality because it is
this reality and vice versa.
We may now formulate the dominant method of rhetorical criticism that builds out of the
previous three categories before looking at its ethical consequences in category four and the
methodological suggestion against perspectival modes of criticism in category five. Along with
Merlaeu-Ponty and Bergson, we should rigorously justify the dominant mode of rhetorical
criticism as a slow science that relies up the breaking up of a thing through analytic division to
view its parts from a retrospective imaginary vantage that explains a thing in terms of
unactualized possibilities based upon the present “realities.” Rhetorical criticism accomplishes
this methodology through a tacit ontology that we see the tendencies of in categories one through
three. Rhetoric constitutes parts of human reality as an anterior and spectral force that exerts topdown agency; this top-down agency is enacted in moments of contingency created by the
intersecting forces of constraint and affordance within a given spectral system, be it rhetoric,
norms, language or ideology; rhetorical criticism is the process of explaining the choices a rhetor
or rhetoric makes by reconstructing this ontology by close reading a mixture of theory, text, and
context; we know this method of reading works because of unconscious effects, circulation
numbers, the persistence of human action and assumption of free will, and the ontology supplied
by the materialization of discourse theory. In a sense, this slow scientific methodology is not by
necessity wrong, as even Newtonian mechanics is not exactly wrong when it comes to
engineering applications, but we must be clear about what we are doing. We are approximating
being through an analytic model to predict future human effort based upon congruencies in
circumstance that rely upon a certain kind of ontology. Rhetoricians are scientists whose
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experimental apparatus is close reading. This scientific orientation has both ethical and
methodological consequences for rhetorical critical practice.
4. G/C/S Unmasking and/or Resistance describes one of the goals of scholarship in a
whopping fifteen of the sixteen articles in the sample, only excepting Rood’s article that
articulates its contribution more in terms of disciplinary concerns than social justice. 588 There are
three general tendencies within this dimensional category: unmasking, focusing on constraints
over affordances, and focusing on affordances over constraints. All three positions rely upon the
social ontology explicated above; if anterior and spectral forces partially determine human free
action, then the correct move for an ethical criticism is to do some combination of unmasking
these constitutive top down power relations while mapping points of affordance or constraint for
organizing resistance. This sort of criticism is sensible to a degree and, at this point, should
already harken back to the Cloud Greene debate in the introduction. Certainly, bringing
incongruencies between perspectives to light in unmasking can be a powerful tool against those
who are acting in good faith and amenable to such critiques. I am not sure these methods work in
times such as ours when few are attending the masquerade. Yet, if human free will presents a
vital component of rhetorical criticism, then the materialization of discourse thesis is off as well.
Cloud was right to criticize it nearly ninety years ago for its near annihilation of human agency;
we will see a similar problem in some of the works that are too constraint centric in the
following. When you position structure as an anterior and determining force on human agency to
the degree the materialization of discourse camp does, we should not be surprised when we find
constraints and oppression everywhere and affordances that are easily devoured and repurposed

Of course, there is still the implication of resistance in Rood; they may frame their contributions as for theoretical
critics, but if the warrant of the dead works this way it could be instrumental for gun control advocates to read his
article to resist the NRA and so on. Craic C. Rood, “Our Tears are not Enough:’ The Warrant of the Dead in the
Rhetoric of Gun Control,” 48 and 50.
588
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by an all-powerful system. This is not to say oppression does not exist; clearly it does, this is to
say that the onto-theological tendency to position ideology/rhetoric/norms as an unholy
trinitarian god head might miss opportunities for scholarship-activism arising from different
ontologies or even approaches within constitutive rhetoric.
Let us first look at the kind of statements that are emblematic of unmasking type
criticism. Barney writes: “This is an important reminder that rhetorics of resolution in maps have
always operated by revelation and concealment, choosing for the viewer what should be clear
and visible.” 589 Where there is choice, there is the opportunity for a rhetorical critic to unmask
the machinations of power behind what gets concealed and revealed. This sort of language
sometimes happens in a less obvious and more assumed way. Allison M. Prasch sums up one of
the contributions of her article: “Second, tracing the various modalities of deixis reveals the
centrality of indexicals to narrative form.” 590 Once more, the contributed term or tool or
perspective allows the critic a wedge to “reveal” the inner workings of narrative form and,
presumptively, how power uses that form to work. We might say that the entire enterprise of
rhetorical criticism is, in some regard, unmasking how power works in language through the
vocabulary afforded by rhetorical theory.
Unmasking criticism is deeply related to the fifth dimensional category: perspectival
metaphors for criticism. Rhetorical unmasking requires the fabrication of a term, framework,
perspective, tool, or vocabulary that facilitates a virtual vantage point from which to unmask the
rhetorical functioning of a text, the determining effects of a power structure, but, most
frequently, some combination of the two. The new perspective-tool allows the sort of critical

Timothy Barney, “The Sight and Site of North Korea: Citizen Cartography’s Rhetoric of Resolution in the
Satellite Imagery of Labor Camps,” 8.
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Allison M. Prasch, “Obama in Selma: Deixis, Rhetorical Vision, and the ‘True Meaning of America’,”61.
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wedge that creates a discrepancy between reality and appearance and, thus, the aperture for the
critical unmasking operation that we first saw advocated in Dana Cloud’s work. Truly, that old
critical tendency has become part of the memory within duration of our field. I believe this tool
has two shortcomings in contemporary literature. First, a criticism of unmasking only functions
when people are doing politics in good faith and the global resurgence of fascism indicates that
we are not operating in good faith democratic times. Second, it leads to the next two tendencies
within the ethical thrust of criticism astray when combined with relatively deterministic social
ontologies that privilege various hegemony models of society.
We have a strange ethical quandary here with any given hegemony model that can be
mapped out into a few different logical potentialities. I do not want to use examples from
specific articles, here, because, where the other sections can be read dispassionately, I fear this
one is too much provocation and names will make it immediately personal. I do not want to call
out particular individuals, but, instead, map a tendency in the field. After all, many of us view the
pursuit of academia itself, both in research and teaching, as modes of praxis for however we
define social justice. Perhaps, a bit of indirection here facilitated through abstract formality is
both practical and civil.
Should any given hegemony theory be correct, we can analyze either dominant or
subaltern discourse. Scholars frequently favor subaltern discourse, likely because it is not as
psychically toxic as dominant discourse, but all we most frequently manage to find terrible
cycles of oppression that appear to have no outlet because any innovation within the system can
be appropriated by the system. We are left with horrific descriptive aporias that become less and
less surprising as you read on in the literature in which we find more and more examples of
oppression in which the system does exactly what we expect it to do: constrains and affords
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action and reacts to quell dissent based upon incorporating the afforded action. We are presented
with a never-ending carousel of defeat and our never-ending criticism appears almost complicit
with this unstoppable system that it posits. I suggest three possible solutions. First, should
hegemony theory accurately describe reality, hegemony does not come without a differential
amount of cost to those beneficiaries within its borders. I guarantee you there are tensions to be
exploited between poor-white-midwestern-evangelicals and rich-white-landholding-moneylords
but dealing with those people and their discourses can be extremely taxing and toxic. Sometimes,
finding a weakness in the system itself might be more productive than endlessly re-iterating how
it exploits weakness in marginalized groups. Certainly, brining attention to oppression is
important, but if we cannot use our expertise to help solve it, then there is a point in which
engaging in a descriptive aporia makes academia complicit with the system. Going on the attack
instead of the defensive might be a viable option for any academic committed to but frustrated
with a social ontology that positions the system as a The Blob or Akira type entity. Second, the
hegemony model of social ontology is not the only option in the world. There are good reasons
to be anxious about Bruno Latour and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, following a
revolutionary take and novel ontology of the system can be used to marginalize gains won within
the system by oppressed groups, 591 but I think we should seriously consider that hegemony
theory’s offering of never ending identities in never ending agonism may not be necessary if
social being is truly contingent and based on our choices. Third, regardless of the ontology we
use to describe social things, we might consider a pivot in methodology and the philosophy
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See Elizabeth Grosz’s conversation about the same at 161-166 of Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal
Feminism. We have a razor thin edge here. On the one hand, if the system is the problem and it differentially hurts
all people with awful gender roles, we should tear it down. On the other hand, what if tearing it down is a sneaky
way to take away the protections women have gained within the bad system by just bringing patriarchy into the back
door of the new system? These risks are real and difficult to navigate.
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undergirding our criticism. The sort of tool-perspective unmasking model affords certain
strengths but may miss the successful affordances and resistances by being too text-context
centric and reconstructing résistance from the very God’s Eye critical perspective that some
sources fault Western culture for so extoling. Maybe we need to take the decennial calls, and
probably all of feminist theory, seriously about ethnography.
5. ASS and G/C/S: Perspectival metaphors for criticism occur in fourteen of the sixteen
articles in the sample, somewhat oddly, even in the one that deals with ethnography explicitly.
Perspectival metaphors indicate a tendency in contemporary rhetorical criticism that supports
Scott’s argument that epistemological rhetoric has precipitated into the fundamental assumptions
of the field and my own argument that rhetoric is a slow science. These metaphors are
fundamental to the critical act of close-reading the meaning of contingent moments by
reconstructing an alignment of theory-context-text because this analytic gesture requires a god’s
eye perspectival view from which to accomplish its analytic breakdown. Strictly speaking, this
structure is a retrospective illusion in which some hidden condition conditions the
phenomenologically apparent text. The same kind of sight logic obtains. The perspectival and
sight-based epistemology tends to emerge when authors talk about their goals, contributions, or
significance and the dominance of perspectival language employed to make points about their
object. Barney writes of his contribution: “I define resolution as a critical lens by which to
examine the discourse of cartography and serial/satellite photography, and I invoke both its
technical and rhetorical meanings.” 592 This sort of formulation regularly repeats and can be put

Timothy Barney, “The Sight and Site of North Korea: Citizen Cartography’s Rhetoric of Resolution in the
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in an algorithmic form: “Through X [perspective 593/ vocabulary 594/ tool 595] rhetorical critics can
Y [illuminate 596 /points 597 /look 598 /map 599 predict 600 /highlight 601 ] some discursive artifact
Z.” 602 The reconstructive mode of criticism articulates the very visual hegemony that at least one
article attempts to complicate 603 by positioning rhetorical criticism as a fundamentally
perspectival act of analytic reconstruction from a god’s eye view. This sort of language emerges
even in articles that express a yearning for ontological inquiry and ethnography. Will Penman
draws an implicit delineation between community “orientation” 604 within fieldwork practices and
“[his] department’s perspective” on accountability 605 only to collapse this distinction when he
offers “a postcolonial perspective” as a solution. 606 If these sorts of tendencies, conscious or non,
have meaning in the discourses rhetoricians analyze, do they not have meaning in an analysis of
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rhetorical criticism as discourse? I believe they do. Scott ended up being correct with the result
being that rhetoric is a slow science and an epistemic zombie, albeit a zombie with some new
proclivities oddly comported towards life. I think the tendency unearthed towards ontology
should not be marginalized: we have always relied on tacit ontologies to support our work and
should make these explicit to short circuit the never-ending turn between theory and object that
eschews methodology.
To sum up the results of the diachronic and synchronic analysis: constitutive rhetoric in a
kind of perspectival analytic-reconstructive mode presents a dominant tendency within rhetorical
scholarship. The ontological features of this model follow relatively closely to the VIA
model but are better phrased IdeologyRhetoricAction with a reciprocal tautological process
in which rhetorical actions serve as new rhetoric that causes or complicates ideology. I am not
sure that this mode of analysis is necessarily a bad thing, especially if we start to think and pin
down points of inflection within this model involving the quasi-causal operator and counteractualization such that Rhetoric and Action have more clear causal lines in changing ideology
such that it becomes almost an effect more so than anterior spectral cause. Contingency serves a
great ontological purpose here, but the materialist force of indeterminacy becomes marginalized
under top-down heavy conceptualizations of ideological force.
This undue focus derives from three inter-related factors. First, the object of rhetoric has
become more language-structure than speech-action; when you look for ways and cases in which
ideology sufficiently determines, without the gaps in under or overdetermination, you end up
reifying a totality though the mapping of cases in which ideology wins. Certainly, dominant
forces win regularly but mapping out how they do so at the level of representation is not likely to
provide emancipatory options. Second, we do this projection of reified totalities, rather it be
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ideology, rhetoric as energy, rhetoricity, what have you, because we have not sufficiently done
ontology to do the analysis of speech. The work arguing against reified totalities has largely been
done in chapters 1-3, but we will note ways of working against it within the reconstructive close
reading approach primarily through discussing DeLanda’s notion of parameters and dividing the
experience of speech into coercion, persuasion, and conviction. Third, the other component of
this problem involves the methodologies through which we measure structural discourses and
speech both: we tend to go with texts or assemble a text out of fragments, following McGee, in a
reconstructive vein and at a level of discourse that is far from everyday speech and individual
decision making and motivation. Calls for methodological pluralism and interdisciplinarity come
and go, but I hope that the abstract rigor of this project pushes the meter for once such that
greater efforts at both the creation of rhetoric, content analysis, and ethnography obtain. The next
section will evaluate these potentials in detail by mapping the inklings of the problem in old
literatures, New Materialist Rhetoric’s answers to the problem, and then our answer to the
problem.
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